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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE 
More than ten years has passed since the United States and its coalition partners first 
invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban.  Few dispute the successes of the American military 
in toppling Mullah Omar’s organization and simultaneously driving Al-Qaida militants from 
Afghanistan.   
While US Special Forces and predator drones continue to hunt Al-Qaida members around 
the globe—many scattered from Afghanistan and popped up in countries including  Yemen, 
Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq and a host of other trouble spots, from North Africa to Southeast Asia 
and beyond.  And though Al-Qaida may be on the run, the Taliban remains a force within 
Afghanistan.   
Indeed, as of late 2012, it has become evident that the base case scenario for the United 
States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), though perhaps not for the current 
Afghan government, is to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and end the war through a 
cease-fire and power-sharing agreement.   
How could things have started so well for the US, only to arrive now at the point where 
negotiating with the Taliban to bring its members back to power in large swaths of Afghanistan 
is the best of what otherwise are mostly bad alternatives (another civil war, Pakistani domination 
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of the country, or a government so weak it is unable to prevent Al-Qaida from returning in large 
numbers).  This may be shocking to many, not least because of the enormous military might and 
vast resources brought to bear by US and ISAF forces.  It may be less shocking when one 
considers that “more than half of all insurgencies have been settled through negotiations.”1  
This dissertation examines four historical case studies of insurgency and analyzes which 
factors are the most important when an insurgent group decides to negotiate.  Based on a case 
study analysis of the Provisional IRA, Hizballah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the 
African National Congress, I have attempted to construct a theory of insurgent negotiation, built 
upon an analytic framework that tests multiple hypotheses on an insurgent group’s 
decisionmaking process.  My central thesis is that insurgents are more likely to negotiate an end 
to the conflict under the following conditions: 
• They are unable to sustain a series of successful attacks (operational tools) 
• They are unable to sustain their existence as a cohesive entity (organizational tools) 
Still, not all operational and organizational tools are created equal.  Which of these tools is the 
most important to determining why insurgents negotiate?  Within each of the two independent 
variables (IVs), I analyzed five sub-variables to determine the effect they have on my dependent 
variable (DV) the insurgents’ decision of whether or not to negotiate.  I find that of the five 
operational tools examined, sanctuary/safe haven and funding/financing have the greatest effect 
on whether or not insurgents negotiate, while group composition and popular support are the 
                                                 
1 Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2010, p.180.  
It should be noted that when the authors report that half of all insurgencies have been settled through negotiations, 
they are referring to the database compiled for the quantitative section of the report.  How the authors compiled the 
database is available in the section on “Case Studies Methodology” in Appendix A of the report pp.157-164.  
Overall, Connable and Libicki analyzed 89 insurgencies, 16 of which were still ongoing at the time of their study.  
This means that 73 of the insurgencies had concluded, and 40 of those 73 (55%, so more than half) had been settled 
through negotiations. When one includes earlier negotiations, amnesties, or cease fires, the number jumps to 84 
percent of all insurgencies. 
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most critical organizational tools in the insurgency’s decision-making calculus.  These 
independent variables are framed by condition variables (contextual factors) that govern the 
magnitude of the impact the IVs have on the DV and thus contribute to our understanding of the 
conditions under which negotiations take place. 
 For counterinsurgents, time and resources are limited.  Therefore, knowing which tools 
are the most important in determining whether or not insurgents are likely to negotiate can help 
the COIN force prioritize which tools to target and which tools are of lesser importance.  
Understanding which factors are important and which are not is crucial to shaping the current 
debate on strategy in Afghanistan.  “Time is short, and effective engagement with the Taliban 
could mean the difference between a protracted, unwinnable conflict and a pragmatic solution 
acceptable to both Washington and its Afghan allies.”2  In my final analysis on the Taliban, I 
argue that bringing the war in Afghanistan to an end will entail negotiating with the insurgency.  
My analysis suggests that the most important factors affecting the Taliban’s decision to negotiate 
are sanctuary/safe haven and funding/financing (operational tools), group composition, and 
popular support (organizational tools), all framed within the context of a mutually hurting 
stalemate (condition variable). 
  
                                                 
2 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, “Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.88, 
No.4, July/August 2009,” p.45. 
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1.2 METHOD 
1.2.1 Case Selection 
Cases were selected from the comprehensive dataset of 89 insurgencies generated by RAND’s 
Martin C. Libicki, who drew off of a larger list of conflicts from James D. Fearon and David D. 
Laitin’s “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” study from the American Political Science 
Review.3  Fearon and Laitin’s list of 127 insurgencies were determined according to the 
following criteria: internal wars where more than 1,000 were killed, with at least 100 on each 
side.  To the list of 127, Libicki then added 11 insurgencies that passed the 1,000 dead mark after 
their data cutoff date of 1999 and subtracted 51 insurgencies that were more in the nature of 
coups, countercoups, and spontaneous insurrections, in addition to making a few other 
adjustments.  The resulting list of 89 insurgencies has been a standard for RAND research on 
insurgencies for the past several years.4  From this list of 89 insurgencies, fifteen were excluded 
from case selection because they are considered ongoing, leaving the total cases at 74.  Next, I 
systematically analyzed each of the 74 cases to determine the insurgents’ operational and 
organizational capabilities in order to code them and place them in one of four categories.  
Following this analysis, cases were coded as follows: 
• 16 cases were coded as high operational capacity/low organizational capacity 
                                                 
3 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, 
Vol.97, No.1, February 2003, pp.75-90. 
 
4 For a full version of the list, see Appendix A, Martin C. Libicki, “Eighty Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and 
Endings,” from David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced 
Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2008,  pp.373-376. 
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• 22 cases were coded as high operational capacity/high organizational capacity  
• 20 cases were coded as low operational capacity/low organizational capacity 
• 16 cases were coded as low operational capacity/high organizational capacity  
 For my in-depth case study analyses, one case was selected from each category (see Figure 1 
below).  The selection of cases demonstrates both geographic variation (Western Europe, Africa, 
South Asia, and the Middle East) as well as variation in outcome (COIN win, COIN loss, and 
two cases of mixed outcomes, with one mixed outcome favoring the insurgents and another 
mixed outcome favoring the COIN forces).5   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 As Connable and Libicki note in How Insurgencies End, classifying outcomes of insurgencies is conceptually 
difficult.  They ask, "if the government gives insurgents amnesty and then allows the insurgents’ proxy political 
party to enter legitimate politics, who has won?  Outcomes like this are frequent in insurgency, so characterizing 
individual outcomes can be open to dispute.” Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, p.14. 
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Figure 1: Operational and Organizational Tools of Insurgents 
 
 
1.2.2 Analytic Framework  
The analytic framework used in this research owes much to the work of Kim Cragin and Sara 
Daly on assessing group motivations and capabilities in a changing world.  Their study titled The 
Dynamic Terrorist Threat contributed a great deal to my own research process.  What earlier in 
this process I had referred to as the variables of resources and leadership are now categories that 
have been renamed operational tools and organizational tools.  As the authors mention in 
putting their own work in perspective with regard to its contribution to the terrorism and 
insurgency literature, “RAND has researched the strategies, objectives, organizational structures, 
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and capabilities of terrorist groups for over 30 years.  Therefore, this framework and analysis of 
group capabilities should be viewed not as revolutionary, but rather as building on past research 
and methods for analyzing terrorism.”6  Similarly, my own research also builds on past research 
and methods for analyzing terrorism and insurgency, with a particular focus on the decision-
making process and how insurgencies end.  This framework allows me to test the hypotheses 
derived from my literature review on insurgency and counterinsurgency.    
 
1.2.3 Independent Variables and Associated Preliminary Hypotheses 
1.2.3.1 Operational Tools 
Operational tools comprise the capabilities that allow insurgents to sustain a series of 
successful attacks.7  The hypotheses that follow below are predicated upon the notion that, the 
less capable insurgents are of conducting and sustaining successful attacks, the more vulnerable 
they are to defeat, and the more likely they will be to negotiate in order to avoid losing to the 
COIN force while gaining nothing in return. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: AN INSURGENCY WITH LIMITED OR ANTIQUATED 
WEAPONRY/AMMUNITION IS LESS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS 
ON COIN FORCES 
 
This hypothesis is straightforward and simple—insurgents with greater access to weapons, 
ammunition and a more sophisticated and lethal arsenal will be able to conduct more successful 
                                                 
6 Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities 
in a Changing World, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2004, Note 1, p.xiv. 
 
7 Ibid, p.25. 
 
 8 
attacks on COIN forces.  Weapons can be obtained internally, from the population; externally, 
from state sponsors, diaspora communities or other non-state actors; or organically, constructed 
with materials found within the insurgents’ operating environment (hence the “I,” for 
improvised, in improvised explosive device, or IED).   
 During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union respectively supplied 
weapons to insurgents fighting proxy wars in places like Angola, El Salvador, and Afghanistan.  
The introduction of certain weapons into a conflict can completely alter the outcome.  It is 
widely believed that CIA-supplied Stinger missiles were the main reason why Arab and Afghan 
mujahedin were able to defeat a militarily superior Soviet Union during the 1980s.  The major 
fallback of relying on external sources of weaponry is that if these sources dry up, the insurgents 
must identify a new source of weaponry or risk having their guns fall silent.  
 Hizballah relied on a vast arsenal of weaponry to expand its attack capability, sustain its 
operations over the long-term, inflict psychological damage on its adversaries, and diversify its 
methods and tactics.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam diversified its weapons and weapon 
sources, developed links to other terrorist and insurgent groups, and assassinated Sri Lankan 
government and military officials.  Neither Hizballah nor the LTTE struggled to obtain weapons, 
and neither group negotiated an end to their respective conflicts.  On the other hand, both the 
PIRA and the ANC had trouble at various points acquiring the weapons necessary to prosecute 
the insurgency, and both groups ultimately negotiated with the government.   
 Tracing the trajectory of each conflict suggests that when insurgents’ supplies of weapons 
were depleted, its leaders sued for temporary peace.  Indeed, prior to the PIRA’s 1975 cease-fire, 
one former PIRA officer commented, “We had no weapons.  In the Second Battalion of the 
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Belfast Brigade there were three weapons.”8  With a paucity of weapons, insurgents are less able 
to conduct and sustain attacks.  When insurgents are unable to sustain a series of successful 
attacks, they become more likely to consider negotiations as a way of avoiding defeat. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: AN INSURGENCY WITH LIMITED OR NO SAFE HAVEN/SANCTUARY 
IS LESS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON COIN FORCES 
 
Sanctuaries and safe havens can be used to train insurgents, stockpile weapons, plan operations, 
secure the organization’s leadership, and even establish a provisional government.9  Without 
access to sanctuaries or safe havens, insurgents are less capable of sustaining successful attacks 
on COIN forces.  The Provisional IRA used safe havens in the Republic of Ireland for rest, 
recuperation, and planning, weapons storage, training, avoiding arrest and detection, and to 
recruit, fundraise, and lobby for political support.  The LTTE used sanctuary in Tamil Nadu for 
training and logistics, the administration of organizational functions, and to develop a more 
robust military infrastructure.  For the ANC, sanctuary was essential to the group’s survival.  
With a limited presence within South Africa proper, the insurgents relied on external sanctuaries 
in Mozambique and Angola for networking, political support, and the development of a 
rudimentary military infrastructure.   
 Sanctuary has also been a major factor in insurgencies in Malaya, Thailand, 
Mozambique, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, among others.  Sealing the borders to blunt an 
insurgency is a COIN force imperative, but the reality is that borders are difficult to seal.  Still, it 
                                                 
8 Moloney, A Secret History, p.141. 
 
9 Bard E. O’Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1980, p.15. 
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is not impossible.  COIN forces in Turkey, Israel, India, Morocco, and France each successfully 
quelled insurgencies by closing down the border and eliminating external sanctuaries.10 
HYPOTHESIS 3: AN INSURGENCY WITH DEGRADED INTELLIGENCE IS LESS 
CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON COIN FORCES 
 
Intelligence, as it is defined in this research, is the information that insurgents need to identify a 
target, develop a plan to attack that target, and understand the ramifications that the attack will 
have for a range of actors, to include the host nation government and COIN force, the insurgents’ 
supporters and wider constituency, and finally any powerful regional or international actors that 
may be involved in one way or another.11  Insurgent organizations can follow either a minimalist 
model or a maximalist model of intelligence.  The PIRA is an example of the former, with a 
nonexistent formal intelligence structure, emphasis on planning the next attack, and reliance on 
the Catholic community for snippets of important information.  When the PIRA’s intelligence 
network was infiltrated, it hampered the group’s ability to conduct attacks and brought about a 
reevaluation of strategy, with senior members arguing that politics should replace armed 
struggle. 
 On the other side, Hizballah adheres to the maximalist model of intelligence, retaining 
the full spectrum of capabilities, including a robust SIGINT and HUMINT capability.12  
Hizballah relied heavily on its intelligence capabilities to conduct psychological operations, 
surveillance and reconnaissance, operations security, and for infiltration as a form of subversion.  
                                                 
10 Paul Staniland, “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence,” Washington 
Quarterly, Vol.29, Iss.1, pp.22-23. 
 
11 Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Threat, pp.50-51. 
 
12 William Rosenau, “Understanding Insurgent Intelligence Operations,” Marine Corps University Journal, Vol.2, 
No.1, Spring 2011, pp.15-18. 
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For its part, the ANC developed its intelligence capabilities to enhance its underground network, 
for surveillance and reconnaissance, infiltration into aspects of the South African security forces, 
and the harmonization of the group’s military and political wings. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: AN INSURGENCY WITH UNABLE TO TRAIN ITS FIGHTERS OR 
TRANSFER TACIT KNOWLEDGE IS LESS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL 
ATTACKS ON COIN FORCES 
 
As it would be for any soldier or fighter, training is a highly valued component of any 
insurgent’s repertoire.  Training requires both individuals with the technical knowledge or 
knowhow to train others, as well as an area where insurgents can train far from the watchful eye 
of the government.  Deserts, jungles, and mountainous terrain all serve as ideal training areas for 
insurgents.  But even more important than carving out the space to train, to truly hone their skills 
handling weapons, constructing bombs, and conducting surveillance and reconnaissance, 
insurgents need the technical expertise of individuals with practical experience.  The internet or a 
beat up old version of The Anarchist’s Cookbook can only take one so far. 
 The Provisional Irish Republican Army relied on training and the transfer of tacit 
knowledge for specialization, lethality, professionalism and image, networking and longevity.  
Hizballah, meanwhile, valued training for other reasons, including military prowess, recruitment, 
ideological support, expanding its international reach, and institutionalization through “train-the-
trainer” programs.  Like Hizballah, the ANC used training to aid its recruitment efforts, bolster 
military prowess and overall professionalization of its forces, and solidify its ideological support.  
Similar to the PIRA, the ANC depended on training to increase its operational tempo and 
conduct more lethal attacks against the COIN forces.  The LTTE had highly trained cadres, 
particularly among the group’s elite suicide commando unit. 
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HYPOTHESIS 5: AN INSURGENCY THAT STRUGGLES FINANCIALLY IS LESS CAPABLE 
OF SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON COIN FORCES 
 
To conduct successful attacks, insurgents need money.  Money is used to pay the salaries of 
insurgents, purchase weapons and equipment, bribe corrupt officials, and provide for the families 
of killed or captured insurgents.  There are many sources of financing available to insurgent 
groups, especially those willing to commit crimes.  Sometimes an external state sponsor is 
instrumental in helping to finance an insurgency, exemplified by the case of Hizballah in Iran.  
Other times, as with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a diaspora community is responsible for 
providing significant financial assistance to an insurgent group.  Crime, whether drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, or armed robbery, is yet another avenue available to some insurgents.  During the 
insurgency in Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
generated between $80 and $150 million a year from diamond smuggling and several other illicit 
activities.13  Other groups rely on extortion, or “revolutionary taxes,” as we have seen in Peru, 
Colombia, Uruguay, Spain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Northern Ireland, to name just a few. 
 The PIRA relied on a continuous funding stream to pay the salaries of its members, 
acquire weapons and munitions, plan and prepare for operations, sustain the families of those 
fighters imprisoned or killed, and provide for the growth and maturation of its political wing, 
Sinn Fein.  For the LTTE, financing was an important source of seed money for the group’s licit 
businesses, its organized criminal activities, and as a method of funding its legal and political 
aims.  Moreover, without finances, the Tamil Tigers would never have been able to develop into 
a world class maritime operation. 
                                                 
13 Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support, p.88. 
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1.2.3.2 Organizational Tools 
Organizational tools are the activities that sustain an insurgent group’s existence as a 
cohesive entity.14  The hypotheses that follow  are predicated upon the notion that, the less 
cohesive an insurgent group is, the less effective it will be in executing its strategy, tactics, 
planning, and organization.  In turn, when insurgents are not unified, the leadership will be more 
likely to negotiate as a means of salvaging potential gains whilst avoiding outright defeat. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: AN INSURGENCY WITH DEGRADED COMMAND AND CONTROL IS 
UNABLE TO SUSTAIN ITS EXISTENCE AS A COHESIVE ENTITY 
 
Command and control is the mechanism by which insurgent groups plan, coordinate, and execute 
attacks.15  A command and control network functions according to how the group is organized, 
or its organizational structure.  To ensure that attacks are executed properly, insurgent leaders 
seek to build a degree of redundancy into the network.  However, the more people made aware 
of an operation, the greater chance there will be for the attack to be compromised as a result of a 
leak or penetration.16  How an insurgency is structured has implications for how it conducts 
operations and conversely, how it is countered.  Organizational structure and design impacts a 
group’s ability to both impart and import knowledge, the latter of which is critical to group 
survival.   
 An insurgency can be vertical or horizontal/networked.  Vertical leadership has both its 
advantages and disadvantages.  On one hand, in a vertically structured organization, once a 
                                                 
14 Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, p.25. 
 
15 Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Threat, p.40. 
 
16 G.H. McCormick and G. Gown, “Security and Coordination in Clandestine Organization,” Mathematical and 
Computer Modeling, No.31, 2000, pp.175-192; J. Bowyer Bell, “Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent 
Inefficiency of the Underground,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.2, No.4, 1990, pp.193-211. 
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decision is made it is passed down and carried out with little friction.  Subordinates understand 
their role and are keen to follow directions with a minimum amount of pushback.  A major 
disadvantage, however, is that in a vertical organization, if a leader is lost (or in the case of an 
insurgency, eliminated through kill or capture), the organization will lack direction and guidance 
for a definite period of time.  Even if a capable understudy steps in to fill the void, a period of 
transition will ensue, and some degree of resulting confusion is inevitable (this is not always the 
case, as FARC has exhibited relatively smooth succession).  
 Horizontal organizations, sometimes known as “flat,” “networked,” or “matrix” 
organizations are becoming increasingly common in the contemporary environment of 
information flows and technological innovation.  In a horizontal organization, leadership is seen 
as a total system rather than the domain of a single people or small cadre of individuals.  Like 
vertical organizations, horizontal organizations have both advantages and disadvantages.  In a 
horizontal organization, more people have access and authority to decisions, which makes the 
vetting process more thorough, but can also prolong both reaching and implementing a decision.  
In an insurgency, horizontal networks are less prone to decapitation strikes, where the 
elimination of a charismatic leader of a group can be a crushing blow.17   
 Whether an insurgent organization adheres to a vertical or horizontal command and 
control structure, if the command and control (C²) network is disrupted or dismantled, the 
insurgents will be less likely to maintain their ability to exist as a cohesive entity.  As a means of 
salvaging the group, negotiation becomes a more likely endeavor. 
                                                 
17 For more on the effectiveness of decapitation of leadership in counterinsurgency, see Jenna Jordan, “When Heads 
Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies, Volume 18, 2009, pp. 719-755; 
also, Patrick Johnston, “The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency,” http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/evnts/5724/Johnston_-_Decapitation_(CISAC).pdf, site accessed December 14, 2011; it is also 
worth mentioning Richard Friman’s work “Forging the Vacancy Chain: Law Enforcement Efforts and Mobility in 
Criminal Economies,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Volume 41, No.1, pp.53-77. 
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HYPOTHESIS 7: AN INSURGENCY WITH A HETEROGENEOUS GROUP COMPOSITION 
IS UNABLE TO SUSTAIN ITS EXISTENCE AS A COHESIVE ENTITY 
 
The theoretical framework for my section on group composition and group dynamics is drawn 
from Cynthia Irvin’s theory of militant nationalism, which categorizes members as ideologues, 
radicals, or politicos. 
 Ideologues  are the “hard” men and women of militant nationalist organizations that are 
drawn more to action than political discussion and who believe that their goals can only be 
achieved through armed struggle, viewing non-violent struggle as futile.  From a 
counterinsurgency perspective, these are the ‘hardcore’ members that must be killed or captured 
because they will not relent, and if left alone, they will continue to attack.   
 Radicals, like ideologues, prefer an active strategy to a passive one, but believe that 
armed struggle alone cannot achieve results.  That said, radicals are both willing and able to call 
upon arms when they view it as necessary.  For radicals, alliance formation is opportunistic and 
they are more likely than ideologues to see value in ideological diversity over strict dogmatic 
rigidity.18 
 Politicos see violence as both counterproductive and ostracizing to the group’s supporters 
(both domestic and international) and roundly reject the notion that armed struggle can be used 
successfully to mobilize the masses.  This group supports a strategy of base-building and 
political education, believing that influence can be measured in terms of real political power, not 
ideological purity.   
 The more homogenous a group is, the easier it will be to remain cohesive.  Conversely, 
                                                 
18 John Darby, “Northern Ireland: The Persistence and Limitations of Violence,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in 
Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville, Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1990, p.154. 
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when groups are highly polarized the result can be the emergence of “total spoilers” who seek 
absolute power and are unmoved by limited political concessions.19  Within this section of each 
case study, I explore the changing composition of groups and whether or not the COIN force 
sought to manipulate group composition to achieve its desired end.  In order to understand how 
the balance of these typologies can shift, it is instructive to think of each typology as existing 
along a multidimensional cycle (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2: Militant Nationalism Cycle 
 
 
An Additional Typology: Profiteers 
Irvin does a laudable job in presenting the three categories of individuals that comprise an 
insurgency.  However, to her typology, I would add a fourth group—profiteers.  Profiteers are 
those insurgents who have participated in illegal activities to help fund the insurgency but have 
since been seduced by the lure of easy money.  In turn, these insurgents become less concerned 
with ideology and enamored by profit.  Tom Mockaitis has written extensively about the 
degeneration of an insurgent group into a criminal organization that operates under a veneer of 
                                                 
19 Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, Vol.22, No.2, Fall 1997, 
pp.10-11. 
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militancy, with profit as the main objective.20  David Keen’s work on “useful enemies” describes 
conflict situations which are mutually beneficial to both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents.  
Illustrated through an analysis of insurgencies in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Uganda, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sri Lanka, Keen argues that for many belligerents, waging 
wars is often more profitable than winning them.21  As such, these conflicts drag on for much 
longer than they otherwise would have, as the line between adversaries is blurred in an attempt to 
squeeze every last ounce of profit from a resource-rich conflict zone. 
 
H7a: Endless Conflict and the War Economy  
 
The literature on resource generation in conflict has received much attention since the 
publication of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s widely received (and cited) study, “Greed and 
Grievance in Civil War.”22  Put simply, Collier and Hoeffler argue that states that rely heavily on 
the export of primary commodities face a higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states.  The 
“Greed and Grievance” study has led to a proliferation of follow on studies, each seeking to 
prove or disprove Collier and Hoeffler’s findings.23   
 Ballentine and Nitzschke recognize “the analytical limits that this dichotomy imposes on 
                                                 
20 Mockaitis, “Resolving Insurgencies,” p.37. 
 
21 David Keen, Useful Enemies: When Waging Wars is More Important Than Winning Them, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012. 
 
22 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. WPS 2355, May 2000. 
 
23 The most prominent of these studies are Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, “The Geography of Civil War,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Volume 39, no.4, 2002, pp.417-433; Indra de Soysa, “Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, 
Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-1999, Journal of Peace Research, Volume 39, No.4, 2002, pp.395-416; 
Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacekeeping: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” 
American Political Science Review, Volume 94, no.4, 2000, pp.779-801; James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil 
Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.41, no.3, 2004. 
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what are in reality highly complex systems of social interaction.”24  Wennmann believes that 
instead of focusing on individual methods of conflict financing, conflict economies should be 
approached as a combination of financing strategies.25  Berdal and Malone find that while 
resources were once a means of funding and waging armed conflict for states to a political end, 
contemporary armed conflict is being uses a the means to individual commercial ends.26  This 
trend toward profit and away from politics has important implications for how insurgencies are 
waged and countered.  Furthermore, as Svante Cornell highlights, the transition from a focus on 
politics to profits can change both the group’s financial condition as well as its motivational 
structure.27  “This in turn affects the evolution of the conflict, the development of the group 
itself, and the prospects of various measures of conflict resolution,” Cornell concludes.28   
 Work by Michael L. Ross looks at how natural resources influence civil war and finds 
that while the presence of ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make 
conflicts more likely to commence, they do contribute to the duration of conflicts.29  Richard 
Snyder’s research on ‘lootable’ wealth contributes a political economy of extraction framework, 
ultimately concluding that levels stability and disorder depend on four distinct institutional 
                                                 
24 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the 
Political Economy of Armed Conflict,” International Peace Academy Policy Report, October 2003, p.2. 
 
25 Achim Wennmann, “The Political Economy of Conflict Financing: A Comprehensive Approach beyond Natural 
Resources,” Global Governance Volume 13, 2007, pp.427-444. 
 
26 Mats Berdal and David M. Malone eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000. 
 
27 Svante Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Volume 30, 2007, p.212. 
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 See Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War,” Peace Research, Vol.41, 
No.3, 2004, pp.337-356 and Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From 
Thirteen Cases,” International Organization, Issue 58, Winter 2004, pp.35-67. 
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outcomes.30  One particularly instructive finding of Snyder’s research, and one with clear 
implications for contemporary insurgencies, is that as insurgents grow their wealth, exit 
strategies become more viable options.  He cites the example of Burma, where he contends that 
had narcotics not been available as an exit option for rebels, the insurgency would likely have 
continued far longer than it actually did. 
HYPOTHESIS 8: AN INSURGENCY WITH A DOGMATIC ADHERENCE TO IDEOLOGY IS 
UNABLE TO SUSTAIN ITS EXISTENCE AS A COHESIVE ENTITY 
 
Ideology has been, and will continue to be, a way for insurgencies to gain recruits and amass 
popular support.  Ideologies are crucial for insurgent groups because they explain the struggle to 
its followers and articulate a platform to resolve grievances, both perceived and real.  As FM 3-
24 notes, “the most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace,” and can 
be based on religion, nationalists, ethnic, tribal, or cultural aspirations, a desire for justice or 
vengeance, or liberation from occupation.31 Writing over fifty years ago, Eric Hobsbawm 
alluded to the absence of a “common movement” as one of the major shortcomings of rebel 
groups.32  What he meant was that these groups lacked an innovative, shared, explicit ideology to 
motivate and mobilize the group’s followers.33  Thomas Marks sees a close linkage between 
leadership and ideology, which then connect to goals, noting, “If the ideological approach of the 
                                                 
30 Richard Snyder, “Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework,” 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol.39, No.8, October 2006, pp.943-968.  Snyder’s four distinct institutional 
outcomes are private extraction, public extraction, joint extraction, and no extraction.  His comparative study 
focuses on Sierra Leone and Burma.  
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1959. 
 
33 Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein, “The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion,” World Politics, Vol.42, No.4, July 
1990, p.454. 
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leadership is able to hold sway, insurgency will result.  The movement will go on to pursue 
political goals, normally the effort to remake the system, either defensively (e.g. separatism) or 
offensively (e.g. revolutionary war, the purposive effort ‘to make a revolution’).34  Is the group 
ideologically flexible, or rigidly dogmatic?   
 
HYPOTHESIS 9: AN INSURGENCY LACKING POPULAR SUPPORT IS UNABLE TO 
SUSTAIN ITS EXISTENCE AS A COHESIVE ENTITY 
 
Popular support for an insurgency has been the focus of scholars and practitioners of both 
insurgency and counterinsurgency alike.  Indeed, Mao realized the importance of maintaining the 
good will of the population, not from an altruistic perspective but from a pragmatic standpoint.  
Sir Gerald Templer of the British military is credited with coining the term “hearts and minds,” 
during his tenure in the Malayan Emergency.  Even today, the American military in Afghanistan 
stresses the avoidance of civilian casualties for fear of alienating the population and pushing 
Afghans closer to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  
 Avoiding backlash is critical to maintaining popular support.  Scholars have noted that 
repression, especially the disproportionate use of force in response to an insurgency, can have the 
unintended effect of increasing support for an insurgency.35  Argo contends that violence has a 
polarizing effect on the population and reprisals can easily elevate a low-level conflict into a 
                                                 
34 Thomas Marks, “Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, Vol.15, No.1, Spring 2004, p.110. 
 
35  See Marks, “Ideology of Insurgency”; Nicholas I. Haussler., Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq 
Insurgency, Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis, September 2005;   Libicki et al., Byting Back.  
The phrase “disproportionate” use of force is a widely contested term and is often the cause of serious debate, 
especially in regards to Israeli responses to Palestinian or Lebanese violence. 
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more aggressive insurgency.36  A dearth of economic opportunities, a repressive political culture, 
and a non-existent civil society also qualify as elements related to fertile ground for 
insurgency.37  When the government is unwilling or unable to provide services to its population, 
insurgent groups can fill the void in this area, gaining legitimacy and popular support. 
 Popular support is also critical when considering the translation of passive support into 
more active forms, including recruitment into an organization.  No insurgent organization can 
sustain itself without replenishing the ranks of its captured or killed.  Like social movements, 
insurgent groups must attract members outside of their hardcore.38  In sum, avoiding backlash 
from the community, recruiting members from outside the initial core group, and providing 
social services can all contribute to popular support, which enables the insurgency to sustain its 
existence as a cohesive entity, making negotiations less likely.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 10: AN INSURGENCY WITH NO PUBLIC RELATIONS/PROPAGANDA 
CAPABILITIES IS UNABLE TO SUSTAIN ITS EXISTENCE AS A COHESIVE ENTITY 
 
In the battle for hearts and minds, insurgents are aware that media and public relations efforts are 
important tools in winning the battle of perception.  Publicity allows insurgents to promote their 
                                                 
36 Nicole Argo, “The Role of Social Context in Terrorist Attacks,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 13, 
2006. 
 
37 On a lack of economic opportunity, see Richard Clutterbuck, “Peru, Cocaine, Terrorism, and Corruption,” 
International Relations, Vol.12, No.5, 1995, pp.77-92 and Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The 
Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National Interest, fall 2005, pp.1-6; on a repressive political culture, 
see Austin T. Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.30, 2004, pp.271-286; on the lack 
of a civil society, see David Boyns and James David Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical 
Understanding of Terrorism,” The American Sociologist, Summer 2004, pp.5-25. 
 
38 Michael P. Boyle et al., “Expressive Responses to News Stories about Extremist Groups: A Framing Experiment,” 
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ideology, galvanize supporters, and disseminate their message to a wide audience.  In general, 
insurgents target three primary audiences through their public relations campaigns: their own 
members and constituents, supporters outside the group, and enemy forces. 
 Political support is not limited to the insurgency itself.  External sponsors can provide 
insurgents with a range of political support.  This support can be diverse and includes: access to a 
state’s diplomatic apparatus, vocal support for recognition in the international arena, persuading 
NGOs and charities to provide support to the group directly, and even denying support to the 
government opposing the insurgents.39   
1.2.4 Contextual Factors/Condition Variables 
Goals & Objectives 
The goals and objectives of an insurgency can be divided along strategic, operational, and 
tactical lines and can be physical or psychological.40  The strategic objective of an insurgency is 
its desired end state, be that the unification of two separate countries into one, the separation of 
one whole country into two (or more) distinct entities, or a host of other social, political, 
economic, or religiously inspired goals.  Operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue 
to erode the legitimacy of the ruling power while attempting to establish their desired end state.41  
Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts.42  How broadly or narrowly defined 
an insurgent group’s objectives are defined will play a role in whether or not a group is willing to 
                                                 
39 Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support, pp.88-89. 
 
40 Ibid, p.25. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Ibid. 
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negotiate.  Are goals fungible?  How much is the group willing to compromise?  In each case 
study, I seek to explore the malleability of insurgent goals and objectives, and examine how and 
why goals change over time. 
 
Seminal Events 
Though the lion’s share of the attention has been bestowed upon Malcolm Gladwell for 
popularizing the term tipping point and introducing it into everyday lexicon, Thomas Schelling 
deserves credit because he was writing about the idea nearly three decades before Gladwell’s 
book was released.  In Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Schelling frames the notion of tipping 
in a discussion of neighborhood migration.  The phenomenon was first observed as minorities 
moved into previously homogenous neighborhoods.  This caused some families and individuals 
in the neighborhood to leave, leading to more openings, which were then filled by more 
minorities.  The process continued until a tipping point was reached, thus accelerating the 
process of migration by the original group, moving out of the neighborhood in droves until 
African-Americans replaced Italian Americans, or Hispanics replaced Jews, Poles, or Irish.   
 Schelling mentions both “tipping in” and “tipping out,” which meant that not only was 
the departure of whites induced by the appearance of minorities in the neighborhood, but 
minorities would then be attracted to the neighborhood because of the presence of minorities 
already there.  These processes involve expectations, as “people do not wait until the alien 
colony exceeds their toleration before departing, nor do the minority entrants wait until comfort 
has been achieved, as long as they can foresee the numbers increasing with any confidence.”43  
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In sum, the tipping model is a special case, a broad class of special cases or critical mass 
phenomena.44   
 
Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
The final piece to the theoretical puzzle involves conflict resolution.  After all, this study is 
concerned with groups that either negotiate with the government or disavow this path in favor of 
continuing to fight.  Yet talks with insurgents are often precarious from the point of view of the 
government.  Negotiating with an insurgent group that has killed and injured hundreds of 
civilians, soldiers, and government officials can be politically expedient from the perspective of 
ending the conflict and addressing the demands of public opinion, especially in a democracy 
where continuing the conflict may amount to political suicide.  However, brokering such a deal 
is also fraught with risk.  Negotiations can, and often do, fail and backfire.  Furthermore, talks 
confer a sense of legitimacy on insurgents and may discredit other groups who have long been 
calling for peace, thus creating the impression that violence has been rewarded.45   
 The conflict resolution literature is voluminous and as such, much of it falls outside of the 
scope of this research.  However, there is a subset of the literature that deals with negotiations 
between non-state actors and host-nation governments which will be examined briefly in this 
section.46  Deciding when and how to begin negotiations is a delicate process.  Sometimes, 
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45 Daniel Byman, “Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Washington Quarterly, Volume 32, Issue 2, 
April 2009, p.125. 
 
46 Even though it deals with ethnic civil wars and not insurgency, per se, and although I disagree with many of the 
paper’s findings, for a thorough and well-researched account of the difficulty of reaching negotiated settlements in 
ethnic civil wars, see Alexander B. Downes, “The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 
Security Studies, vol.13, no.4, Summer 2004, pp.230-279. 
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insurgent groups can see negotiations as a sign of weakness, and use the down time of a cease-
fire to rearm and regroup, growing stronger and more deadly as a result.  If undertaken 
unilaterally, negotiations can cause a rift between allies who, for political reasons, may be unable 
to negotiate.47   
 Even though initiating talks with insurgents can be risky for elected leaders, history is rife 
with examples of the potential rewards of engagement.  Moreover, even if talks do not 
immediately achieve the desired outcome of ending the insurgency, they may have an effect on 
the insurgent group’s constituency.  Whether suffering from conflict fatigue or simply hoping 
that the talks might lead to peace or other benefits, negotiations can increase pressure on 
insurgents to eschew violence or risk losing many of the benefits accorded by both passive and 
active supporters.  Just the mere subject of negotiations can lead a group to splinter, sowing 
dissent within an insurgent group’s ranks as cleavages emerge between those committed to 
violence and those who see the promise of peace.48  An unwelcome byproduct of insurgent group 
splintering is that members of the rump group that emerges from the “mother” organization can 
be even more violent than the group that spawned it, as Audrey Kurth Cronin notes, “responding 
to the imperative to demonstrate their existence and signal their dissent.”49 
 Another interesting study on conflict resolution and war termination is Roy Licklider’s 
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study of civil wars between 1945 and 1993.  In it, the author tests Harrison Wagner’s hypothesis 
that negotiated settlements are likely to dissolve because segments of power-sharing government 
retain the capacity for resorting to civil war while outright military victory decimates the losers’ 
organization, making it difficult to resume a conflict.50  Caroline Hartzell makes a compelling 
argument by considering issues of context and complexity through an examination of factors 
such as superpower conflict, group identities, and third party guarantors.51  Hartzell finds that 
those negotiated settlements that provide institutional guarantees for the security threats faced by 
antagonists, are those more likely to have staying power.52  What do current models of conflict 
resolution tell us about the internal and external dynamics that lead a group to resolve a conflict?  
What are the information requirements necessary for a COIN force or government to finally 
reach the crucial decision to negotiate with perennial adversaries and potentially allow insurgents 
a legitimate change at entering the governing structure?  What factors make these agreements 
more or less durable?   
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is an element of the “shadow of the future” 
argument involved.  The shadow of the future is actually positive for cooperation because it 
allows players to escape the prisoners' dilemma by using conditional retaliation strategies.  
Where repeated interaction is expected, adversaries can sustain cooperation in certain situations, 
even if they couldn't have in a one-time interaction.  This means that previous attempts at 
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conflict resolution are important as repeated interactions, which familiarize the sides with each 
other and help facilitate future negotiations, at least in theory. 
 
Ripeness Theory and the Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
Ripeness theory and the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) are conflict resolution theories 
advanced by I. William Zartman, who sees ripe moments as providing an opening for 
negotiations.  Ripe moments arise when adversaries are locked in a conflict from which they 
cannot escalate to victory.  It is important to emphasize that the stalemate must be painful for 
both sides, that is, it must be mutual although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same 
reasons.53  Both sides need to experience the pain of a stalemate for the conflict to reach a 
turning point.  Other sources of turning points, according to Zartman, include an inconclusive 
victory, an inconclusive defeat, a bloody standoff that suddenly brings costs home, a loss of 
foreign support or an increase in foreign pressure, or a shift of fortunes that weakens the stronger 
side or strengthens the weaker.54  The notion of the mutually hurting stalemate is a condition 
variable (contextual factor) that governs the magnitude of the impact the IVs (operational tools, 
organizational tools) have on the DV (the decision insurgents make of whether or not to 
negotiate) and thus contributes to our understanding of the conditions under which negotiations 
take place.  In cases where the insurgents’ operational tools and/or organizational tools have 
limited their ability to attack or remain as a cohesive group, the presence of a MHS exacerbates 
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these factors and makes the likelihood of negotiation infinitely greater than it would have been 
otherwise. 
 
Decision-Making Structure and Process 
Different disciplines approach decision making in insurgent groups in various ways.  Brian A. 
Jackson’s work on social science for counter-terrorism conducts a wide survey of the literature in 
this area and connects the dots between several fields.  Sandler and Enders approach decision 
making within insurgent groups from an economic perspective, arguing that the choices a group 
makes can be explained by their perceived utility, based on assumed costs and benefits.55  An 
older but still relevant analysis from social psychology by Moscovici and Zavalloni can be 
applied to insurgent group decision through the lens of group polarization, which examines the 
tendency of people to make decisions that are more “extreme” when they are in a group, in 
contrast to a decision reached independently or in isolation.56  Political scientists correctly 
consider the issue of context, organizational theorists look at how differences in organizational 
design and functioning can affect decision making, and game theoretical approaches seek to 
explain decision making through the effects of competition and other dynamics on group 
choices.57   
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1.2.5 The Dependent Variable: Why Do Insurgents Negotiate? 
As stated above, my central thesis is that insurgents are more likely to negotiate an end to the 
conflict when they are unable to sustain a series of successful attacks (operational tools) and/or 
they are unable to sustain their existence as a cohesive entity (organizational tools).  Therefore, 
the dependent variable in this study is the decision that the insurgents make of whether or not to 
negotiate.  As Van Evera notes, a dependent variable (DV) is a variable framing the caused 
phenomenon of a causal theory or hypothesis.58  While there is an entire genre of the literature 
that deals specifically with the relative stability or instability of negotiated settlements to civil 
wars (itself a sub-section of the literature on war termination), this research is concerned with 
how negotiations unfold between insurgents and counterinsurgents and what lessons can be 
drawn from these negotiations.59   
 Dean Pruitt’s research looks at various strategies for dealing with terrorists, including: 
capitulating, combating, isolating, mainstreaming, and negotiating.  This final category of 
negotiating, or seeking an agreement that will end the terrorists’ campaign, examines the role of 
backchannel talks, third party mediation, and the development of flexibility by both the terrorists 
and the authorities.60  Pruitt believes that encouraging flexibility is the most significant 
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determinant of success in negotiating with terrorists and insurgents.  My own findings dovetail 
nicely with Pruitt’s analysis.  This research suggests that group composition is a critical variable 
when assessing the relative flexibility or rigidity of an insurgent organization.  The more contact 
with and dependence upon moderates within an insurgent group, the more likely this group will 
be to pull away from the “extreme strands,” or the ideologues, and move toward a position where 
concession making becomes possible.61   
 In “Setting a Place at the Table,” Heather S. Gregg asks the question, “should insurgents 
be brought into the political process and, if so, under what conditions?”  Her analysis relies on a 
comparison of the Provisional IRA and Hizballah and argues that, under certain conditions, 
allowing insurgents into the political process can be a useful tool in helping to end insurgencies.  
Gregg lists four benefits of offering insurgents a role in the government, including62: 
• Provides insurgents an alternative means for altering the status quo and offers them a 
political stake in the country 
• Holds insurgents accountable to their rhetoric and promises 
• Draws insurgents into the open and subjects them to the rules and laws of the government 
• Reduces the need for long-term third party interlocutors 
 
These four benefits of offering insurgents a role in government come with a caveat.  
Bringing insurgents into the political process as a means of enervating political violence in the 
country must occur under five conditions.  First, all sides involved in the fighting—government, 
insurgents, population—must agree that the conflict cannot be solved militarily.  If even one of 
the primary actors in the conflict believes that military means can tip the balance in its favor, it 
will be tempted to continue resorting to violence as a tool.   
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62 Heather S. Gregg, “Setting a Place at the Table: Ending Insurgencies through the Political Process,” Small Wars & 
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 Second, full disarmament by the insurgents should occur toward the end of the 
negotiation process and not be listed as a precondition for talks.  Stripping insurgents of their 
weapons immediately alters the military stalemate.  Especially in countries with a long history of 
sectarian violence, disarming one side in the conflict would leave that constituency defenseless.  
 Third, the government must recognize the popular legitimacy of the insurgents and 
address the grievances of the insurgency’s base of support.  It is impossible to kill or capture 
each and every insurgent while suppressing the group’s supporters.   
 Fourth, the political infrastructure of the government must be sound.  If government 
institutions are weak, absorbing insurgents into the political process could cause a government to 
collapse and reignite violence.   
 Finally, the government and the insurgents should agree on an amnesty program that at 
once allows some insurgent leaders to join the government while barring those individuals 
known to have committed egregious human rights abuses or other acts unacceptable to the 
population at large.63  Gregg’s analysis is useful for thinking about the COIN force perspective, 
but her findings only make sense insofar as the insurgents are willing to negotiate, too.  In my 
study of the PIRA, Hizballah, the LTTE, and the ANC, I found that a combination of operational 
tools (funding/financing, sanctuary) and organizational tools (group composition, popular 
support), when considered in concert with a mutually hurting stalemate, are the variables most 
likely to convince the insurgents to negotiate an end to the conflict. 
 Proto-insurgencies, as discussed earlier, are small cadres of belligerents who seek to 
develop their campaigns into full-blown insurgencies.64  If identified as a problem by the 
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government and dealt with using the appropriate resources, it is this nascent stage of the conflict 
where insurgencies are most vulnerable to defeat.  Research on insurgency and the opening of 
peace processes by political scientist Navin Bapat poses the question, “when do governments and 
insurgents reach the bargaining table?”65  To answer this question, Bapat uses a game theoretic 
model which integrates factors from bargaining theory, domestic institutions, and balance of 
power to construct a general explanation of the timing of negotiation.  Bapat concludes that if the 
counterinsurgents fail to crush the proto-insurgency, they will be forced to negotiate under less 
favorable circumstances at some point later in the conflict.  If these negotiations then fail, the 
window of opportunity will close and the insurgents may develop an aura of invulnerability, 
which leads the group to eschew future negotiations all together.66   
 While Bapat does not go into detail on what happens when the counterinsurgents do 
crush the insurgency, again, my findings demonstrate that in the four cases I analyzed, it was a 
combination of operational tools (funding/financing, sanctuary) and organizational tools (group 
composition, popular support) accompanied by the pain of a mutually hurting stalemate that is 
most likely to bring the insurgents to the table.  
 Any review of the literature on negotiation between states and insurgents must include 
Daniel Byman’s research on the subject.  In two separate articles, Byman details “lessons for 
policymakers” and lays out “a guide for the perplexed.”  In his 2005 Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism article, Byman focuses on helping policymakers ask the right questions about the 
windfalls and pitfalls of talking to insurgents.  He lists several interesting questions, such as “Are 
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the leaders ideologically rigid?” (which I analyze in the group composition section) and “Who 
wins a fair election?”67  Before delving into the potential rewards of engagement, Byman details 
a range of options for governments to consider when engaging in talks with insurgents, including 
the use of declarations, media interviews, trusted intermediaries, intelligence agents, and 
diplomats.68  He concludes his “guide for the perplexed” by offering a synopsis of the costs and 
benefits of negotiating with insurgents: 
Talks with insurgents are politically costly, usually fail, and can often backfire.  
Nevertheless, they are often necessary to end conflicts and transform an insurgent group into a 
legitimate political actor or wean the group away from violence.  Policymakers and analysts 
alike must recognize that the conditions for success are elusive.  This should make them cautious 
about initiating talks in general, but also eager to seize on potential opportunities should the stars 
align and the insurgent groups become ready to make a fundamental change and move away 
from violence.  Pouncing on such an opportunity requires both political dexterity to do what was 
once unthinkable and a long-term view that accepts both the possibility of real change as well as 
the risks of failure.69   
 No counterinsurgent force enters a conflict believing that it will be defeated.  On the 
contrary, whether the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Americans in Vietnam, or the French in 
Algeria, strong national militaries often believe victory is imminent and in accordance, strategy 
is designed to achieve that outcome.  But as I detail throughout this dissertation, insurgency 
outcomes only rarely favor one side completely over the other.  Even in victory, it is rare for the 
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side that prevails get everything they wanted.  Negotiated settlements are far more common and 
typically involve amnesties, concessions, and reforms.  The 2 X 2 matrix below, displayed in 
Figure 3, details the four insurgency outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 3: Conflict Outcomes 
 
Win, lose, or draw, insurgents negotiate when they are unable to sustain a series of successful 
attacks (operational tools) and/or they are unable to sustain their existence as a cohesive entity 
(organizational tools).  These conditions are magnified when the insurgents are locked in a 
mutually hurting stalemate with the COIN force. 
COIN WIN 
Negotiated 
Settlement 
Favoring COIN 
Insurgent 
WIN 
Negotiated 
Settlement 
Favoring 
Insurgents 
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1.3 SCOPE 
Four major cases will examine insurgencies in Northern Ireland (Provisional Irish Republican 
Army), Lebanon (Hizballah), Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers), and South Africa (ANC).  My final case 
study will focus on the Taliban, attempting to relate “lessons learned” from the four cases 
examined to the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan.  Each case study chapter will follow the 
same format.  I will begin by providing a brief history of the conflict before delving into issues 
relating to the insurgency itself.  After establishing a historical foundation, I will provide the 
strategic/operating logic of the group, or its’ raison d’etre.  Next, I will describe the approach 
adopted by the insurgents before moving on to a discussion of the counterinsurgent force.   
 The crux of the chapter will focus on a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the 
insurgent group’s resources, leadership, composition, and decision-making process.  Each of 
these variables will be weighed against the backdrop of the geopolitical context, exploring the 
complexities facing both the insurgents and the COIN force throughout the course of the conflict.  
Finally, I will probe the terminal stages of the insurgency and attempt to dissect the conflict 
resolution process (broadly defined) in an effort to discern a tipping point toward or away from 
negotiations.  The guiding questions of the overall study will help to generate cross case 
comparison observations. 
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2.0  THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) 
2.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) emerged from the struggles of the civil rights 
movement in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s.70  And while the group itself was original in 
many ways, it was also the continuation of a militant Irish Republican movement that traced its 
legacy back to the 1790s, when Theobald Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen formed a 
“brotherhood of affection, a communion of rites and union of power among Irishmen of every 
religious persuasion.”71  The Provisionals, or “Provos” for short, did share some similarities with 
Wolfe Tone’s United Irishmen, but for the most part the PIRA was a much different organization 
than what the United Irishmen had been 180 years earlier.   
 Throughout its thirty-year tenure, the PIRA was regarded as a sophisticated, well-
disciplined, and ruthless insurgent organization.  Its number one mission was to jettison British 
influence from Northern Ireland and establish a ‘united Ireland’ together with the 26 counties 
flanking its southern border with the Republic of Ireland (ROI). The group formed during a time 
of escalating violence in Ulster’s six northern counties.  Catholics led country-wide civil rights 
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protests in the late-1960s which were influenced in part by the African-American civil rights 
movement in the United States.72  If civil rights provided the PIRA with the framework for its 
initial organization, long-standing Catholic grievances in areas like employment, housing, and 
politics served as the catalyst for mobilization. 
 Much like the Original Irish Republican Army (OIRA), its immediate predecessor, the 
PIRA was influenced by Marxism and Socialism and much of this rhetoric is imbued in the 
group’s writings and ideology.  In theory, this should have led Catholics to co-opt the Protestant 
working class into its ranks and frame the conflict in terms of social status, not ethnicity or 
religion.  After all, from an economic perspective, working class Catholics and working class 
Protestants had more in common with each other than either did with the Unionist elite.  But 
shortly after Catholic-Protestant skirmishes throughout the North became common occurrences, 
the PIRA adopted a fervently nationalist tone to its statements.73  As sectarian violence spread, 
the PIRA became the de facto protector of the Catholic communities in the traditional 
strongholds of West Belfast, Derry, and South Armagh.74  Compared with the OIRA, the PIRA 
was prepared to use force, where necessary, to protect Catholics from Loyalist violence and 
security force intimidation. 
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2.1.1 Operating Logic 
The operating logic of the Provos is far from monolithic although common themes of defense, 
revenge, and anti-imperialism characterize its ethos.  The self-image of the group is based upon 
its role as a protector of the Catholic community and “this has remained a central part of the 
IRA’s self-image throughout the troubles, and of wider republican perception of the 
organization.”75  “The issue to start with is defense and the members’ self-image as necessary 
defenders: the immediate context for the creation of the Provisionals was one that pointed to a 
stark need for some kind of Catholic self-protection in the North,” according to Richard 
English.76  During what is known throughout Northern Ireland as “marching season,” Catholic 
and Protestant groups parade through each other’s territory to sing songs that recall the glory of 
their forefathers in battles past.  These antagonistic displays of nationalism only exacerbated 
latent feelings of ill will on both sides and though the security forces maintained a presence to 
prevent clashes, violence during these provocative marches was always inevitable.   
 By the late 1960s, the Catholic community had come to believe that it was unable to rely 
on a predominantly Protestant police force—the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)—to act in an 
impartial manner and protect it from the violence that engulfed Northern Ireland throughout this 
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period.77  Not surprisingly, the all-Protestant RUC and its counterpart, the Ulster Defense 
Regiment (UDR), engaged in connivance and collusion with the various Protestant paramilitary 
outfits in Ulster.  So this responsibility to protect and defend, especially in the early weeks and 
months of the insurgency, was probably a more common motivation for those who joined the 
PIRA than any broader republican aspirations or ideological fervor that would later characterize 
the group.78 
 In 1969, the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland under Operation ‘Banner’ to 
serve as a barrier between the two feuding communities.  Initially, the Catholic minority was 
relieved that a professional military force had been dispatched under the auspices of a 
peacekeeping force.  But these feelings of relief proved to be short-lived.  Following a series of 
aggressive searches, street clashes, and widespread arrests, the relationship between the British 
Army and the Catholic population in Northern Ireland soon soured.  “The year following mid-
1969 saw Catholic Belfast and Derry turn substantially against the soldiers, the latter’s harshness 
helping to intensify and extend that very subversion against which it was supposedly 
employed.”79  In early July 1970, in order to quell some of the street skirmishes that were 
breaking out between Catholics and Protestants, the British Army imposed a curfew on the Falls 
Road, a predominantly Catholic section of West Belfast.  In a three-day period, four civilians 
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were killed and 60 injured, 1600 canisters of CS anti-riot tear gas were fired into the 
neighborhood, and 58 allegations of looting and other misconduct against British troops were 
reported.80 
 British soldiers sent to Northern Ireland were trained for peacekeeping, not 
counterinsurgency.  Notwithstanding, only months after their arrival the soldiers found 
themselves unprepared for a mission that they had not trained for and had little desire to fight.  
Precisely because the mission was peacekeeping and not COIN, there was no effort to win the 
popular support of the Catholic population.  This lack of awareness was evident in the inability 
of the COIN force to establish even a veneer of neutrality.  Homes in Catholic neighborhoods 
were subjected to raids and ransacked while troops searched for weapons.  Occupants in 
automobiles were stopped and searched, while pedestrians on the street were harassed and 
humiliated.  Between 1971 and 1975, the British Army employed the use of ‘P-tests,’ which 
involved stopping civilians at random to ask about personal details including family profile, 
social life, employment, etc.81  Meanwhile, highly combustible events like the Protestant Orange 
parades were allowed to continue unchecked.82  Despite the likelihood that these parades would 
end in sectarian violence, the administration in Stormont threatened “ferocious reprisals against 
anyone who tried to impede them.”83 
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 The final element of the PIRA’s operating logic was an anti-imperialist message that 
became a salient part of the group’s nascent political platform.  Just as EOKA insurgents had 
done in Cyprus and Irgun terrorists had done in Palestine, the PIRA would use violence as the 
centerpiece of its strategy.84  Liberating Irish Catholics from centuries of British rule could not 
be achieved without violence, the group argued.  History served as its guide.  Indeed, the PIRA 
was greatly encouraged by the British retreat from Aden in 1970 following eight years of 
insurgency against Yemeni rebels.85  In a nod to Mao, the PIRA’s Army Council adopted a 
three-pronged strategy of defense, followed by defense and retaliation, and finally a sustained 
offensive against the British in a guerilla campaign.86   
 
2.1.2 Type of Insurgency 
The insurgency in Northern Ireland has been categorized as a “Local-international” insurgency.  
In other words, the PIRA received external support, but the outcome of the insurgency was 
basically decided parochially—according to local factors, by local insurgents, and involving the 
local population.  To be sure, various elements of the insurgency had an international 
dimension—money raised in America, arms procured from Libya, insurgents trained in Latin 
America, and operations executed in Europe.  Still, at the end of the day, the insurgency came 
down to Irish versus British, Catholics versus Protestants, Nationalists versus Unionists, and 
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Republicans versus Loyalists.  The interaction of multiple actors in the conflict was but one of 
several important factors that served to prolong its duration well beyond the ten- year average 
duration of post-WWII insurgencies.87   
2.1.3 Approach 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army exemplified the quintessential prototype of the urban 
approach to insurgency, as outlined in its training manual The Green Book.  In some of the 
border counties though, including the more rural areas like Derry, the group adopted techniques 
more in line with the rural-urban approach to insurgency that relies heavily on ambushes and 
sniper attacks.  Part of the PIRA’s sophistication derived from its ability to avoid a “one-size-
fits-all” approach.  The group was equally comfortable operating in the back alleys of Belfast 
and the bogs of South Armagh.88 
 The urban approach to insurgency espouses the use of terrorist tactics in an urban 
environment, such as targeting an adversary’s critical infrastructure, killing government and 
opposition leaders, and intimidating police and military forces in order to limit their ability to 
respond to attacks.89  This approach has two major tactical considerations.  First, while 
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engagements are still short-range and fleeting, as in classical insurgency, the added element of 
civilian bystanders is now introduced.90  This usually favors insurgents, who can blend in with 
the population and then blame the security forces for collateral damage.  Second, the presence of 
media is more prevalent in cities compared with the countryside.91  This provides the insurgents 
with the publicity to advertise their campaign.  A media presence also means that COIN actions 
are increasingly scrutinized and questioned.  More importantly, mistakes are magnified, 
increasing the opportunities for important propaganda victories on the part of insurgents.92   
 The PIRA is credited with developing the concept of “lethality self- limit,” an approach 
that favored improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to compensate for rifle-based tactics, which 
required more fighters, amassed fewer kills, and increased the chances of kill or capture by the 
security forces.93  One of the primary demands of this approach was the need for insurgent 
quartermasters, who played a critical role in the acquisition, storage, transport, and caching of 
IEDs.94  IED components were commonly held in stash houses located in rural areas of the 
Republic of Ireland, where they were less likely to be discovered by the security forces, but still 
close enough to transport to the north once an operation was set in motion. 
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2.2 OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
If leadership provides the brains of an insurgency, then its operations tools, or resources, serve as 
the lifeblood.  Put simply, operational tools are used to defend territory, plan and execute attacks, 
deter adversaries, and destroy enemies.  Without weapons, money, intelligence, training, and 
sanctuary, insurgents are only capable of waging a limited struggle.  Because insurgents are most 
often, if not always, militarily inferior to the COIN force or host-nation government (this is what 
makes the conflict asymmetric), operational tools are critical to help sustain the insurgency and 
afford the insurgents with a slightly more level playing field.  For the PIRA, this was certainly 
the case as it fought Protestant paramilitary groups, Northern Ireland security forces, and the 
British Army.   
 Operational tools are indispensable to insurgents.  At the same time, not all resources are 
created equal.  Some are critical, others are valuable but not essential, and still others are only of 
minor import.  Accordingly, this section of the chapter focuses on: 
• How operational tools factor into an insurgency  
• How the resource needs of the insurgents changed over the course of the conflict 
• To what extent the COIN force was able to deny insurgent resource needs 
 
 The PIRA’s most valuable operational tools were sanctuary, training, and funding.  To 
counter these capabilities, the COIN forces relied upon subversion, intelligence, and 
infiltration.  Figure 12 displays both the driving forces and restraining forces at work during 
the conflict.  These sub-variables are then measured in the final analysis against the backdrop 
of the group’s ultimate decision to negotiate with the British government to end the conflict. 
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2.2.1 Sanctuary/Safe Haven  
In an insurgency, establishing a sanctuary is integral to success.  For the majority of its terror 
campaign, the PIRA took advantage of safe havens around Northern Ireland, as well as 
sanctuaries in both the Republic of Ireland and the United States, although each country was 
used for different purposes at different times.  The US was mostly a place for insurgents to raise 
funds, evade capture, and coalesce political support; the Republic of Ireland served as a “rear 
base” from which insurgents could hold important meetings, plan attacks, conduct weapons 
training, and amass their arsenal.  During the 1980s, many PIRA fighters spent time in Libyan 
training camps at the invitation of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. 
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Figure 4: PIRA Force Field 
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2.2.1.1 Why was sanctuary/safe haven such a valuable resource? 
Rest, Recuperation, and Planning 
From safe houses located south of the border, PIRA insurgents could hide out after conducting 
an attack in the North.  Safe houses provided insurgents with a place to lay low and a change of 
clothes to discard any evidence from an attack, including blood and gunpowder residue.  The 
most important function of safe havens south of the border, however, was the ability of the 
PIRA’s most senior members to gather in one location without being detected or arrested by the 
authorities.  Clandestine movements need to avoid detection, and depending on group cohesion 
and organizational structure, the loss of an insurgent group’s top leadership can deliver a 
potentially fatal blow to the organization.  The General Army Convention (GAC), a meeting of 
the PIRA’s senior leadership, was held at various locations throughout the ROI.  This allowed 
the group to debate high-level decisions regarding the organization, including its military 
strategy, the role of politics, leadership composition, and the future direction of the organization. 
Weapons Storage 
The PIRA maintained numerous weapons caches in both Northern Ireland and the ROI.  As part 
of the group’s “long war doctrine,” which committed members to a lifetime of conflict, the 
insurgents stockpiled weapons, hoarded explosives, and relentlessly searched for ways to acquire 
the most modern and lethal technology.  Acquiring and amassing weapons remained a top 
priority of the PIRA until the very end.  Invariably throughout the conflict, British COIN forces 
and ROI police (Gardaí) intercepted large weapons shipments and successfully executed several 
high profile arms recovery operations, yielding substantial amounts of weaponry.  Despite 
setbacks, however, the PIRA always remained active.  The insurgents maintained at least five 
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bomb making factories in the Republic at all times.  Most of these facilities were extremely 
secure and in some cases were constructed as fortified bunkers.95  It was also not uncommon for 
the PIRA to use the home of widows and single mothers to hide their weapons.  This particular 
demographic drew less attention from the police and was able to earn some extra money by 
providing the PIRA with a critical service, while also contributing to the insurgents’ cause. 
Training 
A shared culture and history, geographical proximity, and a lingering resentment of the British 
made the ROI the most logical safe haven for PIRA members.  It was in the ROI that insurgent 
training camps were set up and new recruits were instructed in small arms handling, target 
practice, demolition techniques, and general field craft.96  The long border with the ROI was 
hard to defend and in some cases PIRA members owned property that straddled both sides of the 
border.  The ROI was so instrumental to the operational ability of the group that its Northern 
Command included not just the six counties of Northern Ireland, but also the five border counties 
of Louth, Cavan, Monaghan, Donegal, and Leitrim.97  Other than mere geography, the Republic 
was a model sanctuary because it had a relatively sympathetic population, limited internal 
security force activities, and vast rural areas where the insurgents could disguise their activities 
from the authorities—all ideal characteristics for an insurgent safe haven.98  PIRA members 
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occasionally traveled abroad for training and forged working relationships with terrorist groups 
in South America, Europe, and the Middle East. 
 
Avoid Arrest/Detection 
Both the United States and the Republic of Ireland were popular destinations for insurgents, but 
the US in particular, served as a safe haven for Republican terrorists, especially those on the run.  
According to Daniel Byman, “The diaspora [also] acted as a safe haven for IRA fugitives. The 
Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) helped IRA operatives find new identities and jobs in 
the United States, enabling them to escape justice in Northern Ireland.”99  Some PIRA insurgents 
fled to America and assumed a new life, where they blended in with the other Irish immigrants in 
Queens, Manhattan, and the Bronx, and worked as bartenders or in the construction industry.  
Insurgents would spend anywhere from days to years hiding outside of Northern Ireland, 
sneaking back into the country to execute attacks or deliver weapons before disappearing once 
again.  
Recruit, Fundraise, Lobby for Political Support 
Besides serving as a physical safe haven for fugitives, the US was also a place where PIRA 
sympathizers and affiliates were given free rein to fundraise.  “The IRA’s ability to enjoy a 
haven in the United States and to raise money was bolstered by US laws governing the rights of 
those engaged in political activity, even if such activity involved violence,” notes Byman.100  
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NORAID was founded in New York in 1970 and over the course of the conflict managed to raise 
between $3 and $5 million for “the cause,” by soliciting donations from the Irish diaspora and 
Irish-American activists in major cities throughout the country, including New York, Chicago, 
Boston, and Albany.101  The fighters were home grown but the money was foreign.  American 
political support for ending the conflict gained traction during the presidency of Bill Clinton, 
who, by many accounts, served as an honest broker during negotiations even as others accused 
him of being “pro-IRA.” 
2.2.1.2 How did it change over time? 
Although Irish militants had enjoyed sanctuary in the United States since the time of America’s 
civil war, the situation began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher pressured US President Ronald Reagan to clamp down on PIRA 
fundraising and political activity throughout the US102  Prior to Thatcher’s persistence, the PIRA 
enjoyed unfettered access to politicians, influential business leaders, and other powerbrokers 
who sympathized with its cause.  The other major change over the conflict’s duration was the 
priorities and competence of the Irish security forces.  In the early 1970s, following British 
policies such as internment, the Irish police were not likely to interfere with the insurgents.  “As 
sympathy for their cause in the Republic exploded, IRA fugitives could now find sanctuary 
across the Border, safe in the knowledge that the Gardaí would not throw them behind bars,” 
recalls Moloney.103  But over time, the PIRA’s brutality earned its members no favor among the 
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Gardaí, whose colleagues (Catholics, just like PIRA insurgents) had been injured or killed while 
attempting to apprehend insurgents operating or hiding in the ROI.  After years of dealing with 
PIRA militants using the country as a safe haven, the Gardaí eventually grew to become a quite 
effective security force.  The Irish police even collaborated with British authorities to disrupt 
ongoing PIRA plots, planned operations and future activities.   
 By the late 1980s, the once militant fervor of many Catholics—in Northern Ireland, the 
Republic, and those in the Irish diaspora—had given way to a feeling of ‘war weariness.’  Just as 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was despised by the majority of Northern Ireland’s 
Protestants, the PIRA too, had morphed into a more despicable entity to many Irish Catholics.  
John Hume and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) was the party most Catholics 
preferred.  Many in the Catholic community feared the Provos rather than respected them.  
Punishment beatings and ‘knee-cappings’ doled out by PIRA members wore thin on the 
community and had the effect of making the community feel less safe. 
2.2.2 Training/Tacit Knowledge Transfer   
Considered one of the most lethal insurgent groups of the modern era, it is essential to examine 
the training, techniques, and procedures that proved so critical to the success of the Provisional 
IRA.  What made the PIRA such an effective fighting force was its reliance on and belief in the 
value of tacit knowledge.  Tacit knowledge is unarticulated, personally-held knowledge or skills 
that are acquired through painstaking trial and error processes (learning by doing or by 
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example).104  The PIRA believed that if it ever had a chance to defeat the British militarily, and 
many members within the group’s ranks truly thought this a possibility, its fighters would have 
to hold themselves to the same rigorous training standards endured by elite COIN force units like 
the British Special Air Service, or SAS.  By placing an emphasis on training, the leadership was 
able to identify talented and highly capable recruits who took pride in honing their craft, whether 
it was bomb making, sniping, or reconnaissance.   
2.2.2.1 Why was tacit knowledge transfer such a valuable resource? 
Training and the transfer of technical know-how was important to the PIRA for five reasons in 
particular: specialization, lethality, professionalism/image, networking, and longevity.  Over 
time, however, two main factors affected the significance that tacit knowledge transfer had on 
the conflict.  First, British COIN forces developed a network of informants and sophisticated 
surveillance, which helped them neutralize the PIRA’s ability to remain ahead of the curve in 
weapons technology.  Second, and partly as a response to the success of the COIN force, the 
PIRA began to shift resources from its militant wing to its emerging political counterpart, Sinn 
Fein.105 
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Specialization 
As the organization evolved and matured, the insurgents became more specialized.  Select 
insurgents were schooled in bomb making while others were groomed as snipers, logisticians, or 
intelligence experts.106  To allow for diversification without diluting an acquired specialization, 
“units used rotation or ‘apprenticeship’ processes to spread specific types of knowledge or 
expertise.”107  Specialization afforded the insurgents a degree of tactical and operational 
flexibility.  Attacks were tailored to the abilities of different units in different areas of operation.  
Units operating in more rural areas like South Armagh typically experienced a slower learning 
curve and were given the opportunity to immerse themselves into a specialization slowly and 
with the deliberate oversight of battle- tested mentors.  In contrast, units that operated in Belfast 
and other urban areas know for a high operations tempo (optempo) were thrown “in at the deep 
end quickly,” which led to more mistakes and a greater chance that something could go awry 
with an operation.108   
 While the PIRA retained more than 30 varieties of weapons in its vast arsenal, the use of 
explosives, grenade launchers, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) required the most 
sophisticated degree of training and tacit knowledge transfer in order to be effective.  As such, it 
makes sense that these were also the weapons that experienced the most innovation over the 
course of the insurgency, as the group continuously sought to improve its ability to deploy them 
against the COIN forces.  “For these innovation efforts, [the] PIRA drew on expertise within the 
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commercial sector and on experts from abroad and within the military” to increase members’ 
proficiency in deploying these weapons, which led directly to the ability to kill larger numbers of 
the security forces and Protestant paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.109   
Lethality 
Killing British soldiers stationed in Northern Ireland was an overtly stated objective of the 
insurgents.  The group believed that if it could kill enough soldiers, mounting body bags would 
compel the British population to pressure its government to withdraw from Northern Ireland 
quickly or negotiate an end to the conflict on terms favorable to the PIRA.110  Consequently, the 
number of COIN force soldiers killed became a measure of success for the insurgents.  Unlike 
ordinary terrorists, who target non-combatants and other non-military elements of the civilian 
population, insurgents desire to take the fight directly to the government or it’s military. 
 Tellingly, definitions of what constituted “non-military elements of the civilian 
population” were an issue of much debate.  To clarify the matter, in 1985 the PIRA Army 
Council released an official statement that decreed ‘legitimate targets’ included “anyone who 
provided services or materials to the security forces, from the supplier of fresh vegetables to the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary Headquarters in Belfast to the rural garage owner who sold petrol to 
off-duty policemen.”111  In effect, a wide net was cast. 
 The emphasis on lethality made training and technical expertise paramount to the PIRA’s 
strategy.  Within the group, innovation was prized.  Insurgents designed new explosive devices 
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using a clever array of, at first, remote manual detonators and later, automatic detonators to make 
their bombs more precise and targeted.112  The group also developed its own take on already- 
existing weapons, including the improvised projected grenade (IPG) and the projected recoilless 
improvised grenade (PRIG).113  By developing precision- guided weapons, the PIRA sought to 
maximize COIN force casualties while reducing harm to civilians, thus helping the group to 
enjoy what it deemed as acceptable levels of popular support in Northern Ireland. 
Professionalism & Image 
In spite of the death toll, the minimization of civilian casualties remained a deliberate objective 
of the PIRA.  Often times, before it detonated a bomb in a major urban area, the group would call 
ahead to alert authorities so that civilians could be evacuated.  This way, the bomb still had the 
desired effect of causing economic damage, but by warning officials of the impending strike, the 
PIRA attempted to frame the conflict as a reaction to the British occupation, and not a war 
directed against the British people themselves.  This all tied in to the group’s aim of projecting 
an air of professionalism and an image of a potent military force.114   
 Certain cells within the explosive unit were tasked with institutionalizing the production 
of the bombs’ electronic components.115  This effort was a defensive countermeasure, aimed at 
ensuring that PIRA bombs would not be prematurely detonated by the security forces or explode 
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inadvertently, killing PIRA members or innocent bystanders.  As covered in the next section, the 
deeper the COIN forces were able to penetrate the PIRA the more adept they became at 
thwarting insurgent bomb attacks.  This had a negative impact on the group’s morale and 
signaled to others that perhaps the Provos were becoming sloppy, or simply no longer had the 
same desire to fight as they once did.  To avoid complacency, the PIRA trained not only its own 
members, but also traveled abroad to develop a network with other terrorist and insurgent groups 
that would allow it to hone its skills and learn new techniques and guerilla tactics. 
Networking 
The PIRA schooled its own recruits in various terrorist tactics but also shared its expertise 
abroad with other insurgent groups.  While both the ROI and the US contributed to the conflict’s 
transnational dimension (links with these two countries dated back centuries), the PIRA 
developed connections in other countries as well, establishing a robust presence in the Middle 
East and North Africa, with operatives stationed in Algeria, Libya, and Lebanon.  The Provos 
exchanged training tips and tactics with myriad terrorist groups including FARC, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and 
Fatah.116  In July 1973, PIRA insurgents attended a meeting in Libya with members from the 
German Baader-Mainhof gang, the Japanese United Revolutionary Army, the Liberation Front of 
Iran, the Turkish People’s Liberation Army, and the Uruguayan Tupamaros.117 
  In one of the most significant cases of tacit knowledge transfer between insurgent 
groups, three PIRA members were detained in Colombia in August 2001 and charged with 
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aiding FARC.  The PIRA, a widely recognized and highly regarded technological innovator, 
trained FARC rebels in the areas of homemade explosives, mortars, and other lethal urban 
terrorist tactics.118  In return, PIRA insurgents used FARC’s autonomy in certain areas of 
Colombia’s jungles to test fire new weapons and explosives.  Founding members of the 
Provisional IRA had learned from the Greek Cypriot terror group EOKA and the early years of 
the organization saw a fairly regular exchange of ideas, technology, and training with the 
Spanish group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).119  Now the PIRA serves as master to 
other apprentices.  Networking was a deliberate strategy that facilitated the collection and 
codification of knowledge and added to the complexity of countering an increasingly agile 
network. 
Longevity 
Specialization, increased proficiency and lethality, a professional fighting force, and the ability 
to network all contributed to the IRA’s longevity and formed the foundation of its long war 
doctrine.   From the start, the PIRA acknowledged the value of training recruits and taught its 
members new skills to support and improve the group’s operational capability.120  A PIRA ‘boot 
camp’ offered not only the benefits of military training, but also philosophical or ideological 
guidance as well.  To some PIRA experts, the ideological indoctrination superseded the tactical 
training.  “An underground army inevitably has a training program, at least in theory… [but] 
they are far more concerned with maintaining the creed than in instilling the techniques of war,” 
                                                 
118 Kim Cragin et al., Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies, Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2007, pp.83-87.  The PIRA also enjoyed the safe haven of Colombia’s jungles in the 
south and east of the country in order to test fire new weapons. 
 
119 Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction Vol.2, 120. 
 
120 Jackson, “Training for Urban Resistance,” p.120. 
 
 57 
observes J. Bowyer Bell, a prominent PIRA historian.121  To be sure, Bell’s quote indicates a 
substantial socialization aspect to PIRA training, but for pragmatic reasons, military training 
increased in emphasis over political training during the 1970s, the most violent period of the 
insurgency.122  
2.2.2.2 How did it change over time? 
Two factors had a major impact on the PIRA’s ability to effectively transfer tacit knowledge 
within the organization and between its members.  The first was infiltration of the group by 
British intelligence agents who relied on subversion to hamper PIRA operations.  Second, and 
partly in response to the success of COIN force intelligence efforts, the PIRA began to shift its 
resources from the militant wing to the group’s political dopplegänger, Sinn Fein.  
 By the mid-1970s, PIRA explosive experts had become notorious for their skill and 
ability to kill and injure British soldiers.  In response, the British turned to Brigadier General 
Frank Kitson, infamous in his own right for effectively quelling the Mau Mau insurgency in 
Kenya over a decade earlier.  To neutralize the PIRA’s bomb makers, Kitson implemented a 
strategy that relied on subversion, sabotage, and subterfuge.  This strategy would combine 
human intelligence (HUMINT) with electronic intelligence (ELINT), signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), and communications intelligence (COMINT).   
 Among the techniques employed by the COIN forces were: airborne sensors with live-
feed television, sophisticated photograph devices, infrared detection systems, listening devices, 
phone taps, hidden cameras, motion detectors, and technologies that intercepted communications 
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traffic.123  And while the tools used to collect intelligence were sophisticated, the focus remained 
on “low-grade” or “low-level” intelligence, which allowed intelligence analysts to track the types 
of attacks, types of weapons, timing, and frequency of operations.124    
 On the HUMINT side, COIN force agencies including the Force Research Unit (FRU), 
MI5, British army intelligence, and a paramilitary police unit known as Special Branch, all 
recruited PIRA members as agents, or “touts.”125  On many occasions, insurgents-turned-
informers would purposefully sabotage an attack by interfering with one of the bomb 
components.  Another technique, known as “jarking,” involved placing tracking devices in 
weapons and explosives discovered in PIRA arms caches, which made it possible to follow the 
trail of the arms through the group’s logistical system, sometimes with an audio capability 
included.126  Before long, the COIN forces were intimately aware of the technological 
innovations being made in PIRA weaponry and even went so far as to control insurgent 
techniques through collaboration.127 
 The other major change in the importance of tacit knowledge transfer was a slower 
evolution over the course of the insurgency.  The more successful the British were at neutralizing 
the insurgents’ ability to wage war, the more the group began to shift resources from acquiring 
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weapons to canvassing for votes.  The inverse relationship between success on the battlefield and 
in the voting booth played right into the hands of the British, although a side effect of Sinn 
Fein’s electoral success was the marginalization of Ulster’s Protestants constituency, particularly 
the Loyalists.  This paradigm shift is emblematic of the group’s transition from war to peace and 
demonstrates why any comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy must include a political 
element.  
2.2.3 Funding/Financing  
The Provisional Irish Republican Army, like other insurgent groups, relied on a combination of 
internal and external funding mechanisms to meet the financial requirements needed to wage a 
protracted insurgency against the British and various Protestant paramilitary groups.  As John 
Horgan and Max Taylor observe, while finance doesn’t necessarily inhibit an insurgent group 
from waging war against the state, it does limit “the extent and sophistication of a terrorist 
organization’s activities.”128  For a group like the PIRA, with a constantly evolving political 
wing in Sinn Fein, financing was even more important than for pure militant groups.  “Finance is 
one of the most important long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a 
terrorist group and its political wing,” notes Horgan.129 
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2.2.3.1 Why was financing such a valuable resource? 
For the PIRA, funding was such a critical resource because of the group’s wide range of 
activities and responsibilities.  Furthermore, declaring war against such a formidable enemy as 
the British military would require significant resources if the PIRA was to have even a remote 
chance of success.  This, in turn, necessitated a vast array of weaponry and the maintenance of 
complex organizational infrastructure, both of which are expensive.  In general, PIRA operating 
costs can be divided into five main areas: paying the salaries of its members; acquiring weapons 
and munitions; planning and preparation for operations; sustaining the families of PIRA 
prisoners and members killed in action; supporting the growth and maturation of its political 
wing, Sinn Fein.  
Pay salaries of volunteers 
Upon being sworn into the group, or becoming an ‘official Provo,’ newly- minted PIRA 
members pledged an oath to uphold the values of the Oglaigh na hEireann and were anointed as 
‘Volunteers of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.’130  And just as in a volunteer army, 
compared with a conscripted military, volunteers chose to enter service, but did not work for free 
and were given regular pay.  Sometimes referred to as the human resources dimension of 
insurgency, fighters still need to be remunerated for their services.  This compensation took the 
form of cash payments, so insurgents could take care of the needs of their families and maintain 
a reserve of money for ordinary activities like food and shelter, when it was not provided directly 
by the group.  Some members held down regular jobs in addition to their PIRA activity while 
others were considered too valuable and central to the organization to focus their energy 
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anywhere other than on the organization itself.  These individuals were considered ‘full-time 
staff,’ and were likely known to the security services.  More often than not, this meant they 
needed to take care to conceal their activities and movements and lead an extremely clandestine 
existence.131   
 Although the figures are still a matter of debate, reports indicate that up until 1994, 
Active Service Unit (ASU) members received £30-£40 per week, depending on their actual role 
in the organization as well as the geographical location from which they operated (think of it in 
terms of destination-based per diem).  Taking into account the PIRA’s 400-500 estimated 
members, weekly payouts totaled £12,000 or more.132  Conventional wisdom holds that when 
individuals receive a regular salary, they are less likely to supplement their incomes by engaging 
in illegal criminal activities, which bring unwanted attention on the group and expose members 
to arrest, prosecution, and the possibility of being “flipped,” or turned into an informer, or “tout,” 
against the group.133   
Acquiring Weapons and Munitions 
Obtaining the material resources for guerilla war is expensive, especially when, like the PIRA, 
the group has a desire to acquire high-tech weaponry including SAMs and SAM launchers, 
Russian-made rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, machine guns, assault and sniper 
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rifles, and heavy weaponry like the Barrett Light-50 heavy machine gun.134  Due to the largesse 
of weaponry bestowed upon the group by Qaddafi, which is covered in detail later in this 
chapter, in the 1980s the PIRA had less of a need to devote a substantial portion of its operating 
budget to acquiring weaponry.  Furthermore, the explosives used by the group were almost 
exclusively being made by the PIRA themselves.135  PIRA bomb makers, or engineers as they 
were called within the group, were universally acknowledged to be among the most skilled in the 
world at their craft.  That most of the ingredients needed to construct home-made mortar 
equipment and home-made bombs could be obtained at a relatively low cost merely allowed the 
group to spend more of its budget on cutting- edge electronics, like radio-controlled detonation 
devices, to pair with its bombs.136  Insurgents too, like to accessorize! 
Planning and Preparation for Operations 
Long an under- researched aspect of insurgent organizations, the amount of money needed to 
successfully execute lethal operations against COIN forces “extends far beyond the purchase of a 
gun and bullets which culminate in an attack.”137  The planning and preparation for operations 
included, but were not limited to: transport costs, the maintenance of weapons storage sites, the 
support of safe houses, vehicles used to transport arms, and the purchase of radio equipment. 
Transport costs included the price of petrol used in transporting the operatives to and from the 
scene of the attack or the purchase of train, bus, or airplane tickets for international operations. 
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 Payments were made to those individuals who allowed their homes or property to be used 
as weapons storage sites as well as to those whose homes were used to hide prisoners, many 
times for extended periods, in order to avoid detection by security forces following a PIRA 
operation.  While these may seem like banal details, they are essential to executing a successful 
attack.  Besides a reputation for brutality, PIRA insurgents were meticulous planners. Finally, the 
PIRA purchased between six and eight cars to transport arms from storage sites to border areas, 
as well as radio equipment for monitoring the movement of security forces prior to and following 
an attack.138  
Sustaining the Families of PIRA Prisoners and ‘Martyrs’ 
Another budgeting concern for the PIRA leadership was the sustenance of the families of 
insurgents who were killed or in prison, men (and their families) who were ‘on the run,’ and 
PIRA members who had served extended jail terms and as a result, were highly unlikely to 
secure employment in the licit sectors of the economy.139  While the families of prisoners 
received financial support on a weekly or monthly basis, for various reasons it is unknown 
exactly how much money was reserved for these expenses.  According to some estimates, over 
the course of its existence, NORAID raised between $3 and $5 million for the PIRA.  While the 
official line in pubs and fundraising dinners was that the money would go toward sustaining the 
families of PIRA prisoners, many of those donating were well aware that a portion of the money, 
if not most of it, would be diverted to purchasing arms and explosives to continue the “armed 
struggle.”  Nevertheless, longtime IRA supporter George Harrison and NORAID founder Martin 
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Flannery, himself an IRA veteran who fought the ‘Black and Tans’ in the 1920s, always denied 
that the money went for guns.  They admit that money was collected for guns, but this was kept 
separate from the money used to support the families of those most directly affected by ‘the 
Troubles.’140  Official public statements and facts on the ground rarely converged. 
Provide for the Growth and Maturation of Provisional Sinn Fein 
As Sinn Fein became more prominent—both within Ulster politics and in relation to the PIRA 
overall—the financial resources needed to cover the group’s ever evolving infrastructure 
inevitably grew too.  In addition to the organization’s headquarters in West Belfast, Sinn Fein 
established offices throughout the Republic of Ireland, held many public meetings and gatherings 
in hotels and pubs, and incurred substantial costs to remain competitive in local elections.141  To 
subsidize its activities, the PIRA expanded its fundraising portfolio to include armed robbery, 
kidnapping, and other forms of organized crime.  James Adams concludes that “the organization 
has branched out from simple terrorism into organized crime to provide the estimated $7 million 
per year they need to pay the gunmen and support a growing political base in Northern 
Ireland.”142  This should come as no surprise.  After all, insurgency is armed politics. 
2.2.3.2 How did it change over time? 
Beginning in the 1970s, when the group was still relatively obscure, external assistance was 
minimal, with the exception of a modest amount of money trickling in from sympathizers in the 
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United States.  But, in a pattern that was to repeat itself throughout the duration of the conflict, 
watershed events would lead both individuals and organizations to donate substantial amounts of 
money that would swell PIRA coffers and provide the group with the means necessary to survive 
over three decades of war against the British security forces. 
 The first such incident took place in January 1972 when British paratroopers killed 13 
protesters and injured an additional 17 following a civil rights march in Derry.143  Since the 
primary responsibility of NORAID was to raise funds for the Provisionals, it became the main 
vehicle through which American donations flowed.144  NORAID raised the lion’s share of funds 
following acts of high profile British violence like Bloody Sunday, an incident that Committee’ 
head man Michael Flannery dubbed the group’s “first big publicity break.”145  Besides being a 
major recruiting boon for the PIRA, the donations offered to NORAID following Bloody Sunday 
foreshadowed the strength of the financial link with the Irish-American diaspora.   
 The next major windfall for the PIRA’s finances came later that year in August 1972 
when contact was formalized between the Provos and the Libyan regime of Qaddafi, who was an 
ardent opponent of the British.146  Accordingly, the PIRA secured approximately $3.5 million 
from Qaddafi which could be used to keep the organization afloat in its nascent stages.  This 
relationship was temporarily severed in the mid- 1970s due to disagreements between senior 
PIRA leaders and high-ranking members of Libyan intelligence, but was later reestablished 
following the death of ten Republican prisoners on hunger strike in 1981. 
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 Between contributions from abroad and the PIRA’s internal activities, revenue for the 
group in the mid- 1980s is thought to have totaled somewhere around £7 million per year.147  
Indeed, much has been made about the external aspect of the PIRA’s finances, but there also 
exists a significant, sophisticated internal operation used to generate funds through both licit and 
illicit activities. 
 The scale and scope of the PIRA’s internal funding capabilities is complex.  To generate 
the income necessary to operate the organization on a day-to-day basis, the group engaged in a 
wide array of illegal activities, including kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, extortion, petrol 
smuggling, and “riding shotgun.”148  In what has been dubbed by Gerry Adams as his “Capone 
discovery,” the PIRA leader learned that the organization could raise significant amounts of 
money from coercing shopkeepers and business owners into paying protection money.  Less 
lucrative, but still valuable activities included income tax fraud, livestock smuggling (pigs, cattle, 
and bovine antibiotics), film piracy (including pornography), and automobile theft.  The group 
also relied on legitimately owned businesses and has counted pubs, private security firms, taxi 
cab services, construction firms, and restaurants among its licit activities through which to both 
earn and launder money. 
 In sum, it takes a complex financial infrastructure to sustain a sophisticated insurgent 
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group.  Northern Ireland is an anomaly in that it is the only insurgency of the 89 post-WWII 
insurgencies to occur in a country with a high socio-economic status.149  Commenting on the 
fundraising operations of the PIRA, Anderson emphasizes, “the Provisionals no longer have to 
live the hand-to-mouth existence of most guerilla groups; through prudent financial planning and 
entrepreneurial acumen, they have achieved long-term fiscal security, a solid base of investments 
to draw on.”150  Certainly, this is one of the reasons for the insurgency’s longevity.  But what 
role, if any, did financing play in the group’s decision to negotiate?  This is explored at great 
length in the discussion of the shift from an emphasis on the PIRA and a move toward Sinn Fein. 
2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS 
The leadership of the Provisional IRA was responsible for taking the group’s vast resources, as 
described above, and translating them into effective action.  This had to be accomplished while 
maintaining group cohesion, a difficult task considering COIN force infiltration of the PIRA.  
The organization sought to achieve this through five main components—command and control 
(to include organizational structure), group composition, ideology, popular support, and public 
relations/propaganda.  Each of these elements played a crucial role in determining the 
insurgency’s trajectory, as each individual component affected the organization’s strategic 
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decision-making.  Moreover, during the course of the thirty- year conflict, each element changed 
considerably, altering the PIRA’s path along the way from violence to power sharing. 
2.3.1 Command and Control 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army was a complex organization, as reflected by the structure 
of the group and its decision-making apparatus, which was divided by both function and area of 
responsibility.151  As dictated by the ‘Constitution of Oglaigh na hEireann,’ the General Army 
Convention (GAC) is the ‘Supreme Army Authority’ of the PIRA.  The GAC is a fluid body or 
meeting of delegates from various arms of the organization and numbers between 100 and 200 
members.152  Comprised of a mix of active insurgents, prisoner representatives, Brigade staffs, 
General Headquarters members and the Army Council, the GAC was responsible for electing an 
‘Army Executive’ of twelve members by ballot, who in turn elected the Army Council.  GAC 
meetings were extremely rare and intelligence reports indicate that only three such meetings took 
place over the course of the group’s existence.153   
 The 12 member Army Executive met twice per year and its main responsibility was 
electing the Army Council.  As such, the Army Executive was not a distinct ruling body in and 
of itself, but functioned in the capacity of a check-and-balance type role vis-à-vis the Army 
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Council.  The Army Council was a seven member body that met frequently and, according to 
Taylor and Horgan, was “the overall PIRA leadership responsible for the execution of all 
military policies in line with overall strategies.”154  The Chief of Staff of the Army Council was 
the main authority and overall decision-maker of ‘strategy and tactics’ of the group’s “long war” 
strategy. 
 The General Headquarters (GHQ) Staff was subordinate to the Army Council and 
implemented the Army Council’s decisions.  That structure was put in place during the group’s 
reorganization in the late 1970s.155  While the Army Council formulated the decisions and was in 
charge of authorizing specific operations, the GHQ staff was responsible for “running the PIRA 
campaign of violence.”156  Based in Dublin, the GHQ staff consisted of 50-60 members and was 
tasked with the overall maintenance and conduct of PIRA activities.  The GHQ was divided up 
into 10 departments, each headed by a ‘Director’ or ‘Officer’ and staffed with 4-5 members.  The 
departments were responsible for executing the operational decisions of the Army Council and 
providing various forms of support as military activities demanded.  The 10 GHQ departments 
were: Quartermaster, Security, Operations, Foreign Operations, Finance, Training, Engineering, 
Intelligence, Education, and Publicity.157 
 In addition to a clearly defined command structure, the PIRA also divided its operational 
structure according to geography, North and South.  Northern Command included the six 
counties of Northern Ireland as well as the five border counties, as outlined in the section on 
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sanctuary.  In decreasing authority, Northern Command was composed of Brigadiers (also 
known as Brigade Adjutants or Brigade Commanders), OCs, and ASUs, or active service 
units.158  A typical ASU was trained for a specific task (e.g. bombing, intelligence, robberies, 
etc.) and consisted of 4 Volunteers and had one OC, with 3-4 ASUs in each Brigade.159  
Southern Command included all the countries of the ROI, minus the 5 border counties, which 
fell under the jurisdiction of Northern Command.  Since the group’s inception, Southern 
Command played more of a supporting role to Northern Command.  Still, the importance of 
Southern Command as a base of logistic support should not be discounted, as the ROI always 
remained a safe haven for PIRA insurgents on the run as well as the group’s primary base for the 
storage of weapons.   
 The structure described above was adopted in the late 1970s as part of planning to engage 
the British in a war of attrition.  To the PIRA, replacing the brigade/battalion/company structure 
with a more cellular structure was a measure taken out of necessity, as the group sought to avoid 
infiltration by British security forces.  This rearrangement had its roots in the jails and was 
credited for operational success, particularly in the area of the detonation of remote-controlled 
bombs.160  The leadership of the group was unaffected by the reorganization.  The chain of 
command was left intact.  Regional commands dispersed weapons and explosives to the cells, as 
needed.  More than ever before, secrecy was essential since cells now operated beyond their 
home base.  Rural cells, particularly those operating in South Armagh and Derry, chafed at the 
restructuring of the organization and argued that the emphasis on maintaining secrecy, even 
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among other Republicans and family members, “undermined Volunteers’ social standing and 
morale.161 
2.3.2 Group Composition 
For the most part, the composition of an insurgent movement defines the group’s strategy, both 
political and military.  Within every organization are hawks, doves, and pragmatists.  The 
Provisional IRA split from the Original IRA in December 1969, according to Richard English, 
along “three interweaving strands: legitimacy, ideology, and militarism.”162  It was this final 
strand—militarism—that would come to define the Provisionals.  At the time of the split, the 
Provos regarded their erstwhile comrades as weak and ineffectual.  Even more egregious, the 
Official IRA had abandoned the military duty “traditionally cherished by the IRA.”163  The PIRA 
would restore this vengeance and raise the armed element of the struggle to a level previously 
unseen. 
2.3.2.1 Gerry Adams 
Gerry Adams was born into a staunchly Irish republican household with roots stretching back to 
the earliest days of the movement, with grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles, and cousins each 
occupying significant positions in the IRA or one of its many predecessors, including the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood, the Fenians, and the Cumann na mBan, the women’s branch of the 
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IRA.164  Adams joined the IRA in 1965 at the age of 16 and in 1966 and was sworn into D 
Company (D Coy) of the Belfast Brigade, one of the most aggressive units in the organization, 
which earned it the nickname “the Dogs,” shorthand for “the dogs of war.”165  Much can be said 
about Adams and indeed many books have been written about “the Big Lad,” as he came to be 
known, and his role in some of the PIRA’s most violent incidents throughout the early 1970s. 
 More significantly, the focus of this section is to trace the evolution of the PIRA’s most 
influential members over the course of the insurgency, and no member had a more profound 
impact on the direction of the organization than Gerry Adams himself.  He rose quickly through 
the ranks of the PIRA, becoming the organizational commander (OC) of the 2nd Battalion in 
Belfast sometime between February 1971 and March 1972.  The following year he was 
appointed Adjutant for the entire Belfast Brigade, and by July 1973, at the time of his arrest, his 
status as OC of the Belfast Brigade identified him as a rising star within Irish republican 
circles.166  During his time in these roles, the evidence suggests that Adams was firmly 
committed to the idea of using violence to further the PIRA’s objectives.  Adams’ reign as OC of 
the Belfast Brigade was one of the most violent periods in the long history of the conflict.  
Between May 1971 and July 1973, the PIRA had killed 211 people.167   
 Still, because of the lingering influence of Marxists like Cathal Goulding and his 
involvement with organizations like the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) and 
the National Liberation Front, it would be a mistake to characterize Adams, even in his early 
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years, as a true ideologue.  He clearly accepted that conflict was an inevitable reality of the 
PIRA’s struggle, and used his organizational abilities and tactical skills toward violent ends.  But 
the cerebral Adams had always been open to the idea of debate or discussion, including on hot 
button issues like abstentionism and electoral politics.168   
 Writing under the pseudonym “Brownie,” from Cage 11 in Long Kesh prison in the late 
1970s, Adams, with assistance from Bobby Sands and Brendan Hughes, outlined what would 
become the organization’s doctrine for the “long war.”  In a series of articles published in An 
Phoblacht, Adams put forth the argument that what was needed was an “active abstentionism,” 
focused on building alternative structures of governance to provide critical services to the 
minority Catholic population in the north.  The provision of services would be the responsibility 
of Sinn Fein. This is often the period in the PIRA’s history that has been identified as the turning 
point of where the political wing would receive equal consideration with the military activities of 
the group.  But the move was subtle and more importantly, it displayed Adams’ skill for 
appeasing the two most important elements of the group—ideologues and radicals.  “The really 
significant feature of the move was the way Adams sold it to his colleagues, largely on the basis 
that increasing political support would enable the IRA to intensify and sustain its war effort.”169  
Primarily due to the influence of Adams, the “Armalite and the ballot box” strategy would now 
govern the PIRA’s actions moving forward.170 
 Referencing a more intimate involvement in politics under the guise of a military 
offensive was a strategy Adams would successfully employ once again in 1986.  Couched in the 
                                                 
168 Moloney, A Secret History, p.69. 
 
169 Ibid, p.151.  
 
170 English, Armed Struggle, pp.224-225. 
 
 74 
language of escalating the war against the British through an increase in operational capabilities, 
including an influx of weaponry from Libya (130 tons to be precise), Adams persuaded a 
General Army Convention that it was in the best interest of the PIRA/Sinn Fein to reevaluate its 
rigid orthodoxy concerning politics and vote in favor of the group’s entry into Leinster House, 
the Irish parliament in Dublin.   
 Adams’s performance at the 1986 convention was a huge coup for those in favor or 
trading bombs for ballots, but at the same time his constant reassurances to PIRA hardliners 
ensured that a major split between ideologues, radicals, and politicos was avoided.  Furthermore, 
even though Adams engineered the Provos’ move away from abstention, at this point in the 
struggle he still believed that violence was a necessary component of the conflict.  In 1986, the 
same year as the convention, Adams was still of the mind that violence was “a necessary form of 
struggle” and that jettisoning the armed struggle from the PIRA’s repertoire would be foolish, 
because “without it the issue of Ireland would not even be an issue.”171   
 So what caused Adams to finally accept that violence no longer had a place in Northern 
Ireland and when did this change occur exactly?  What spurred his conversion from radical to 
politico?  Several reasons stand out.  First, Adams was among the first members of the PIRA’s 
leadership to recognize that the PIRA and British COIN forces had been stuck in a military 
stalemate for quite some time.  He admitted as much in his book, The Politics of Irish Freedom, 
published in 1986.  In the book, Adams lamented that “the IRA were able to block the imposition 
of a British solution but were unable to force the British to withdraw.”172  Although this 
explanation lacks nuance, Adams simply realized that the PIRA’s campaign of violence was 
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beginning to do more harm than good, especially as it related to the group’s bargaining position 
in any future negotiations, which had to be part of the equation if the PIRA was unable to defeat 
the British militarily.   
 Second, Adams felt that his organization was now in a much more powerful bargaining 
position than ever before.  The entire incentive structure had changed by the 1990s and the ever-
opportunistic Adams believed that Sinn Fein/PIRA could gain considerable ground on issues 
high on the group’s wish list, including: police reform, prisoner release, and most importantly, 
placing Irish republicans in the upper reaches of government.173  Commenting on the position of 
the British in any future negotiations, he declared, “they can be moved as far as the political 
influence or power that can be harnessed for a democratic solution; they will move as far as that 
can push them.”174   
 Third, and finally, the relationship between nationalists and their loyalist counterparts had 
undergone major changes.  The PIRA spent so much of its energy focusing on the British that at 
times, the loyalists seemed to be nothing more than a nuisance that could be dealt with at a later 
point.  Throughout the negotiations, Loyalists clamored to display their virility by adopting 
slogans like, “No Surrender,” “What we have we hold,” and “Not an inch.”175  While the 
hardliners often spoke of evicting all loyalists from the six counties of the north, toward the end 
of the conflict Adams would concede that the loyalists were a political reality in Northern Ireland 
and as such, must be part of any lasting settlement. 
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2.3.2.2 Martin McGuinness 
Unlike Gerry Adams, Martin McGuiness was not from a family of Irish republicans.  
McGuinness grew up in the bogside area of Derry and spent the majority of his youth focused on 
soccer, not violence.  By his own admission, he was somewhat of a pacifist and to the extent that 
he thought about politics, he was far more interested in reform than revolution.176  Working as an 
apprentice butcher around the time that “the Troubles” spilled onto the streets of Northern 
Ireland, McGuinness’ attitude hardened following the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ in August 1969.  
He soon joined scores of Catholic youth in throwing stones and petrol bombs at the police before 
graduating to full-fledged membership in the Derry faction of the PIRA by the age of 19 years 
old.177   
 During his tenure with PIRA/Sinn Fein, McGuinness would go on to hold nearly every 
important position in the organization, including Derry IRA commander, Northern commander, 
chief of staff, chairman of the Army Council, Sinn Fein vice-president, Mid-Ulster MP, and Sinn 
Fein minister of education.  Since the Derry faction of the PIRA was known as one of the 
fiercest, most capable units in the entire Army, McGuinness’ bona fides was rarely questioned.  
In part because of his reputation as a stoic military commander, McGuinness was often chosen 
by Adams to accompany him during important speeches to the group’s leadership.  One such 
event was during the 1986 General Army Convention speech regarding the organizations about- 
face on the issue of abstention.  McGuinness was selected to reassure the rank-and-file that the 
Provos had no intention of ending the armed struggle against the British, proclaiming, “[t]he war 
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against British rule must continue until freedom is achieved.”178   
 At some point though, McGuinness, like Adams, made the gradual transformation from 
radical to politico.  The steely eyed former Derry commander was beloved by PIRA hardliners 
for delivering strongly worded sound bites, including his comments that “without the IRA we are 
on our knees.  Without the IRA we are slaves.  For fifteen years this generation of republicans 
has been off their knees.  We will never be slaves again.”179  McGuinness commanded respect in 
a way that Gerry Adams never could.  He had a reputation for personal bravery and could point 
to a distinguished military record on an operational level.180 
 So how could McGuinness go from hard-line militant to holding hands with the most 
notorious Unionist, the Reverend Ian Paisely, on the steps of the Stormont government in 
Belfast?  One could reasonably trace the changes in McGuinness back to the early 1990s, when 
some of his public statements seemed to be critical of what he viewed as unnecessary PIRA 
violence.  A PIRA bomb that exploded in the town of Enniskillen in November 1987 killed 
eleven civilians and drew the ire not only of the Protestant community in the North, but of many 
Catholics both north and south of the border.  To McGuinness, the Provos were becoming 
careless and sloppy in their planning and execution of attacks.  Publicly, and with genuine 
dismay, he began to criticize the conduct of the PIRA’s campaign and hinted at a need to be 
more parsimonious in its selection of targets.181   
 Over time, McGuinness further distanced himself from the PIRA and became known for 
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his work through Sinn Fein, the group’s political wing.  By 1998, Martin McGuinness had made 
a thorough metamorphosis from radical to politico and was able to take many of the PIRA’s 
members with him.  McGuinness’ credibility within the organization was a major advantage 
when it came time for the group to lay down its weapons.  Reflecting on McGuinness, Moloney 
recalls, “Since he was the man in charge of the day-to-day war against the British, his 
commitment to armed struggle seemed beyond doubt.  So when [McGuinness] backed the peace 
process, many of the rank-and-file were prepared to follow.”182   His long journey from battle-
hardened PIRA veteran to Sinn Fein politician to the deputy first minister of the power-sharing 
government in Northern Ireland had a major effect on the evolution of the peace process. 
2.3.2.3 Ivor Bell 
Ivor Bell’s transformation from radical to ideologue was the primary reason for the falling out 
between himself and his erstwhile ally, Gerry Adams.  Bell had been a veteran West Belfast 
activist and an IRA soldier during the 1950s and 1960s.  He quit when the group agreed to a 
cease fire toward the end of its 6 year border campaign from 1956-1962.  Bell then rejoined the 
more radical incarnation of the IRA, the Provisionals, and was appointed commander of B Coy 
in the Kashmir Road area, also serving as Adams’ adjutant in the Second Battalion.183  In his 
many positions within the PIRA, Bell served as deputy to Martin McGuiness when he was the 
chief of staff and had been elevated to Brigade staff operations officer following the internment 
sweeps in the early 1970s. 
 A close confidant of Adams during the start of the PIRA’s campaign, Bell’s politics have 
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been described by some as anarchist in nature, although as a radical Marxist and former PIRA 
ambassador to Libya, he also drew heavily on the ideas of Qaddafi and at various times 
advocated a Revolutionary Council to replace the Army Council structure.184  Although initially 
open to electoral politics (he had participated in secret talks with British ministers in 1972), over 
the years Bell became increasingly radicalized and convinced that diverting resources to Sinn 
Fein was a waste because it took away from the armed struggle.185  Between 1983 and 1984, 
along with like-minded ideologues in the Belfast Brigade, Bell plotted a mini coup against 
Adams and predicated his strategy for revolt against growing opposition to the dual strategy of 
the bomb and the ballot.186  As a result, Bell was expelled from the PIRA and faded into relative 
anonymity, thus enervating the position of the remaining ideologues within the group. 
2.3.2.4 Joe Cahill 
More so than any other individual, Joe Cahill embodied the image of what a true IRA man was 
supposed to be.  Born in 1920, he joined the IRA in the 1930s and was imprisoned at different 
points through the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.  Part of the “old school,” or “forties men” as the small 
group of IRA members active during the 1940s were known, Cahill had been the lynchpin to the 
George Harrison gun-running network in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States but left the 
IRA in the 1960s to protest what he saw as its “political and leftward” emphasis.187    
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 Cahill was a member of the first PIRA Army Council, a founding member of NORAID, 
and also featured prominently at the center of the ongoing weapons deals with the Libyans in the 
1980s.  However, his most instrumental role in the organization was providing the credibility to 
validate Gerry Adams’ many ideological shifts in over the years, mostly relating to the PIRA’s 
decision to become further involved in politics.  Often opposed to any attempts to broker a cease 
fire, Cahill changed suit in 1994, siding with Adams and catching many of the Army Council’s 
ideologues by surprise.188   
Toward the end of his career, Cahill was less influential within the Army Council but still 
maintained a wide range of contacts and was viewed favorably by politically influential Irish-
American groups in the United States.  When the PIRA ultimately voted to commit to a cease-
fire in 1994, it was Cahill who was dispatched to the US to assuage the fears of many that the 
group was not throwing in the towel, but merely playing politics.189  
2.3.3 Ideology 
The PIRA was born of an ideological split in 1969, with staunch Marxists led by Cathal 
Goulding forming the Official IRA (also known as “the Stickies”) and Sean MacStiofain leading 
what would become the Provisional IRA.  At the core of the dispute was the Provisionals’ 
commitment to violence as both a means of protection and of achieving political goals.  In their 
thinking, the ‘Gouldingites,’ as they came to be called, were far too enmeshed in radical leftist 
politics, dreams of a global national liberation front, and Marxism—all issues which distracted 
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them from the goal of a united Ireland.  This is not to suggest that the PIRA did not have some 
devout Marxists, particularly among its highly influential members in prisons.  But the most 
significant difference between the OIRA and the PIRA was the latter’s Maoist-like obsession 
with the ascendancy of armed struggle over politics. 
 For the new guard, older members’ ideological fervor obfuscated the IRA’s traditional 
focus on militarism.190  While many of the decisions he would make later in life usually existed 
in the “grey area” between politics and violence, a young Gerry Adams had no illusions about 
the utility of militarism.  “There are those who tell us that the British Government will not be 
moved by armed struggle… [Yet] the history of Ireland and of colonial involvement throughout 
the world tells us that they will not be moved by anything else.”191   
 The PIRA is typically referred to as an ethno-nationalist group.  However, this 
description hardly does justice to explaining the intricacies of the group’s ideology.  The PIRA 
as an organization experienced considerable change throughout the years.  However, one 
constant had always been an unwavering commitment to the Republican cause and the desire for 
a united Ireland free from British rule.  Certainly, one can find strands of Socialist thought in 
many of the group’s writings, both official and non-official doctrine.  The PIRA even went so far 
as to condemn the Republic of Ireland’s entry into the European Economic Community (ECC) 
while simultaneously voicing its disapproval with the Treaty of Rome as a tool of capitalism.192    
 Combined with a strict adherence to armed resistance against what it viewed as 
oppressive British imperialist policies, the PIRA’s political thought could most aptly be 
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described as an amalgamation of “socialist politics and violent aggression.”193  Over the course 
of its lifespan, the organization espoused affinity for groups in Cuba, South Africa, Palestine, 
Vietnam, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.  Many Irish Republicans were convinced that the British 
presence in Northern Ireland was motivated by economic gain, not cultural affinity, and certainly 
not for providing governance beyond Loyalist communities (even though Catholics were eligible 
for, and many did receive, welfare benefits from the British state).   
 What the conflict was not about was religion.  Given the animosity between Protestants 
and Catholics in Northern Ireland, one could not be blamed, at least initially, for mistaking the 
conflict as a religious struggle.  But the two communities were not murdering each other over the 
issue of transubstantiation or burning each other’s home downs because of the Council of Trent.  
“There is not one IRA statement that would cite the Bible or Catholic doctrine in support of, or 
as justification for, any of its actions.”194  On many issues, the leadership of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Ireland and the PIRA’s leadership were at odds.   
 The conflict in Northern Ireland involved an ethnic dimension, but at its core, the 
insurgency was, like all insurgencies, about politics.  Though the differences were more 
substantive, on the face of things Catholic simply meant Nationalist, or Republican; Protestant 
was interchangeable with Unionist, or Loyalist.  Throughout its lifespan, the Provisional IRA, or 
at least the most influential among its leadership, came to recognize that violence was no longer 
an effective means of realizing its political aspirations.  Violence did advance short-term 
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objectives, especially when paired with “armed propaganda.”195  But longer-term goals, 
including the PIRA’s stated aim to remove any semblance of a British presence from the North, 
came to be seen as political problems with political solutions. 
2.3.4 Popular Support 
Like many successful insurgent groups, the PIRA received both state sponsorship and domestic 
community support for its actions.  The PIRA gained legitimacy among the Catholic population 
in Northern Ireland because it served as a bulwark against Unionist aggression at a time when the 
police force of Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), proved unable and 
unwilling to fulfill this task.  According to Richard English, “Not only were the police offering 
inadequate protection, they were, on occasion, the attackers from whom protection was so 
urgently required.”196  He adds, “The unacceptability in republican (Catholic) areas of the RUC 
meant that the PIRA could present themselves as the effective police force in local areas; the 
historical sense of suffering and of losing out legitimated resistance to an order so unfair as to 
produce such experience.”197   
Since the PIRA was essentially the only group capable of maintaining law and order in 
Catholic areas, it took stringent measures in policing its own community.  There was a deliberate 
attempt to appear as defenders of the areas and not strictly as enforcers of community norms.  In 
certain respects, the PIRA was careful not to ostracize the local community, and was quite 
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successful in winning local support.198  On occasion, particularly in the latter stages of the 
conflict, community policing techniques like knee-cappings and punishment beatings backfired, 
and supplied the COIN forces with Catholics willing to spy on the PIRA. 
 In effect, the PIRA was able to secure legitimacy among the Catholic population largely 
as a result of overwhelming mistrust of the RUC.  A February 1985 poll conducted by the Belfast 
Telegraph on law and order issues in Northern Ireland showed that 96% of Protestants thought 
the police did their job fairly while only 47% of Catholics felt the police did their job fairly.  An 
astounding 57% of Catholics in Northern Ireland believed that the RUC did not do its job fairly. 
On the question of the legal system in Northern Ireland, 57% of Catholics felt that it dispensed 
justice unfairly but 89% of Protestant thought it fair.199 
 The PIRA was keenly aware of the importance of community support in executing a 
successful guerilla strategy.  In the Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army, or the 
Green Book as it sometimes referred to, the PIRA listed five elements for collaboration with the 
local population.  They were as follows200:   
• Recruiting volunteers for columns from the population of territory in which the 
column is operating;  
 
• Use civil political committees among the people whose function it would be to 
agitate against the oppressor, get new members for guerillas, organize supplies for 
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columns, provide transportation for guerillas, lead the people in a campaign of 
active and passive resistance to enemy occupation;  
 
• Have guerilla agents working among civilian population collecting information;  
 
• Use part-time guerillas who would continue in civilian occupations yet be 
available for active service when called on.  Thus local companies would be built 
up and used as reserves when the occasion warranted; 
 
• Build up liaison between guerillas and people until such time as it was perfect.  
When the people suffer under enemy oppression for aiding the guerillas the latter 
would help and protect the people. 
 
 And while the support that the PIRA received from the Republic of Ireland and the 
United States could most aptly be described as passive, it nonetheless contributed directly to the 
group’s ability to achieve prominence and longevity.201  But it was the support of the Catholic 
population in Northern Ireland proper that was so crucial to the longevity of the PIRA.  And, 
according to Cronin, “terrorist groups generally cannot survive without either active or passive 
support from surrounding populations.202  The PIRA collected “donations,” from the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland who viewed its existence as crucial to their own survival and would therefore 
do anything necessary to ensure its continuation.203 
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2.3.5 Public Relations/Propaganda 
The use of public relations and propaganda in modern day insurgency is considered ‘a given.’  
With the ubiquity of social media and the low cost of communication technology, news that the 
Taliban use the social media site Twitter to report attacks (many of them fictitious or prone to 
hyperbole) is met with a yawn.  When the PIRA was beginning its campaign of terror against the 
British state in the early 1970s, media was considered a fairly unique innovation.  The PIRA 
developed its own newspaper, Dublin-based An Phoblacht, the first edition of which appeared in 
early 1970.204  In June 1970 the Provos resurrected The Republican News, which would become 
the most widely read newspaper in the North.  The PIRA used its newspapers for three main 
reasons. 
 First, the PIRA used its newspapers to justify its actions on both moral and political 
grounds. When PIRA operations went awry and innocent bystanders were killed or injured, the 
Provos tried to explain the problem away through propaganda, always directing blame toward 
the British.  Second, An Phoblacht and Republican News were used to provide an outlet for Sinn 
Fein, once the organization began to contest elections. The media element of the conflict became 
a more important feature of Republican strategy as Sinn Fein took on greater importance and 
elevated itself beyond its former status as “the IRA’s poor second cousin.”205  A key figure in the 
PIRA’s media activities was Danny Morrison, a former editor of a magazine for the Belfast 
College of Business Studies, who took over as the editor of Republican News in 1975.  With 
Morrison at its head, Republican News became “more impressively edited and more 
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professional.”206   Third, both PIRA periodicals were used to explain the group’s strategy, 
especially as it changed, to numerous audiences including: the PIRA’s own members, its wider 
community of supporters, the Irish-American diaspora, British government officials, and anyone 
else willing to listen.   
2.4 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
Figure 5: Timeline of PIRA Seminal Events, Attempts at Conflict Resolution, and MHS 
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2.4.1 Goals/Objectives  
The goals and objectives of the PIRA were clearly outlined in the group’s Constitution207 and 
can be summarized in three main points: to guard and honor and uphold the sovereignty and 
unity of the Republic of Ireland; to support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic based 
on the 1916 Proclamation; to support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful government in 
sole and absolute control of the Republic.  Yet, as with most groups that achieve the longevity of 
the PIRA, goals and objectives are often modified and change over time.   
 The political maturation of the PIRA was a process that unfolded over three decades.  For 
the PIRA, the road from ‘the bullet to the ballot’ was a circuitous one, fraught with setbacks—
both major and minor—along the way.  The organization’s first experience with electoral success 
came in 1981 when Bobby Sands ran for Parliament while on hunger strike in a Belfast prison. 
The next major step was the reevaluation of the group’s long established principle of political 
abstentionism which came in 1986 when Sinn Fein allowed successful candidates to take their 
seats in the Irish parliament (the Dail).208 
 A critical sea change in Republican thinking occurred in 1994 with the declaration of the 
PIRA’s first unilateral ceasefire.  According to Neumann, “In evolutionary terms, the 1994 
ceasefire was significant in that ‘armed struggle’ was not considered to be the sine qua non of 
Republican strategic thinking anymore, and that participation and ‘access’ could make up for 
armed force.”209  But to what end could the sudden about face in the PIRA’s strategic thinking be 
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attributed?  Alas, the goals of the group remained the same—the expulsion of British forces from 
Northern Ireland and a United Ireland, one nation North and South.  However, two major factors 
altered the PIRA’s political outlook.  First, Sinn Fein’s participation in the democratic process 
led it gradually to engage other political actors—first constitutional Nationalists like the Social 
Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP)—then representatives of the British government and 
elements of the Unionist majority.210   
 The second major factor contributing to the shift in Republican thinking was the 
recognition that demographics mattered.  The ‘demographic time bomb,’ as it came to be known, 
foreshadowed future realities on the ground.  A steadily growing Catholic population would 
eventually usurp the Protestants as a majority in the North, and within the existing political 
framework, this would allow the Irish Nationalists (at least in theory) to represent a majority in 
Northern Ireland and cede the group a democratic vote, thus nullifying the armed struggle.211 
2.4.2 Seminal Events  
Policies like internment without trial (1971) and incidents like Bloody Sunday (1972) and the 
hunger strikes of 1981 were seminal events in shaping the context of the insurgency in its 
formative stages.  Because these events were interpreted by the Catholic population as extremely 
draconian and one-sided, credence was lent to the argument being made by ideologues of the 
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PIRA that armed resistance, and armed resistance alone, could repulse the British from Northern 
Ireland. 
2.4.2.1 Internment without Trial 
British intelligence and counterintelligence played a major role in combating PIRA terrorism, not 
only in Ireland, but overseas as well. Through subversion, infiltration, and espionage, British 
intelligence was able to severely limit PIRA operations and attacks.  However, intelligence was 
not always so reliable.  In the first phase of the insurgency, COIN force HUMINT was especially 
poor.212  In an effort to obtain information on the Provos, a violent and well-organized new 
version of a century old organization, the COIN forces implemented several policies, internment 
foremost among them, which would have a counterproductive effect on security force efforts 
throughout Northern Ireland.   
 The policy of internment without trial was implemented in August 1971 and consisted of 
sweeping up large numbers of Catholics to be detained without access to lawyers or trials.213  
The policy of internment without trial was a direct result of the intersection between intelligence 
and policy.  On the one hand, there was immense political pressure being applied on London 
from the Northern Irish government to introduce this draconian measure.214  But, because the 
Army did not have quality intelligence on suspected PIRA members, the arrests were 
counterproductive.  Indeed, during the opening stages of what was referred to as Operation 
Demetrius, 342 individuals were arrested by the British Army and police—fewer than one 
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hundred of them, less than one-third—had any connection whatsoever to the PIRA.215   
 Other extreme tactics employed by the COIN forces were the use of Diplock Courts and 
“supergrass” witnesses.  Diplock Courts depended on the confessions of the accused while in the 
custody of the RUC, often after interrogations that employed the use of torture.  Another “extra-
judicial” practice sanctioned by the Special Powers Act was the use of “supergrass” witnesses, 
who were essentially convicted terrorists who agreed to testify against their former comrades in 
exchange for legal immunity.216 
 The effects of this policy proved devastating, providing a boon to PIRA recruitment and 
contributing significantly to resentment against the British Army, which in turn made 
intelligence gathering even more difficult.  Commenting on the effects of internment, Ed 
Moloney observes, “Internment enlarged the IRA into a six-county wide army and transformed it 
into a force that could now seriously challenge British rule in Northern Ireland.”217  English 
concurs, “It remains clear that internment helped to invigorate that which it had been intended by 
the authorities to uproot.”218   The events that followed compounded problems even further. 
2.4.2.2 “Bloody Sunday” (1972) 
The clumsiness of the British Army was due as much to deliberate British policy as it was a 
consequence of “out-of-date” intelligence.219  This antiquated intelligence led to a disastrous 
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operation on January 30, 1972 when British paratroopers opened fire on unarmed Civil Rights 
marchers who had organized to protest the policy of internment .220  The events of “Bloody 
Sunday” left 13 unarmed civilians dead.  Referring to the Parachute Regiment deployed to 
respond to the protesters, Richard English notes, “Likely to use extreme force rather than 
delicacy, the ‘Paras’ were hardly the most appropriate body for carrying out an arrest operation 
in such a volatile setting as Derry in January 1972.”221  The British Army was no longer seen as 
a viable peacekeeping force.  Following Bloody Sunday, the Army lost its status as neutral and 
indeed came to be seen as “the pig in the middle.”222  The loss of credibility with the Catholic 
population made intelligence gathering far more cumbersome.  British COIN doctrine 
emphasizes that “intelligence takes time, and much depends on building up mutual confidence 
between the security forces and the local populations.”223  The British Army was particularly ill-
suited for such a mission, especially a regiment with a reputation for brutality like the Parachute 
Regiment.224 
 Bloody Sunday can be seen as a pivotal event, indeed a tipping point, in the history of the 
insurgency for several reasons.  First, as mentioned above, this event caused the COIN force to 
suffer a loss of credibility with the population whose acquiescence and cooperation they 
depended on for intelligence gathering.  British intelligence would need at least another decade 
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before it could claim consistent intelligence victories against the insurgents.  Second, this event 
strengthened the hand of the ideologues among the insurgent leadership.  Violence must be met 
with violence, they argued.  Unarmed protest was equated with surrender.  The organization was 
deluged with young, hot-headed recruits committed to achieving revenge.  By some estimates, 
Bloody Sunday led more Irish Catholics to join the insurgency than any other single action by 
the British.225  Third, the incident caused outrage in the United States and brought the nearly two 
year old conflict to the attention of Irish-Americans, some of whom were eager to support the 
Provisional IRA with guns, money, and political support.  
2.4.2.3 Hunger Strikes (1981) 
The hunger strikes of 1981 were another major event that shaped the context of the conflict and, 
similar to Bloody Sunday nearly ten years earlier, had the effect of boosting PIRA recruitment 
and contributing to the lore of the organization.  The death of ten hunger strikers before the eyes 
of the world broadened sympathy for the Republican cause, and with sympathy came a much 
needed influx of money and guns.  But more importantly, for sure, was that 1981 saw the PIRA’s 
first taste of political success, as hunger striker Bobby Sands ran for and was elected to the 
British parliament as representative for Fermanagh-South Tyrone.226  Internment and Bloody 
Sunday resulted in a certain degree of bloodlust, boosting the profile of those capable of and 
willing to use violence to exact revenge.  But the death of the hunger strikers and the legend of 
Sands led to a different outcome.  A PIRA man popular enough to run for and win a seat in 
Westminster caused many within the organization to rethink the issue of abstention and for the 
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first time, begin thinking about devising a transition from “the bullet to the ballot.” 
 The hunger strikes empowered the politicos of the group, who argued that politics did 
indeed have a place in the struggle.  Because the incident involved such a wide range of actors, 
from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to the Catholic Church, it had a profound effect 
on all parties to the conflict, but none more than the PIRA.  The empowerment of those 
advocating  a change in strategy at this time would not have been possible without Sands’ 
election according to Danny Morrison, because prior to this event, “the movement was totally 
suspicious of politics, because politics equals compromise.”227 
 The impact of the hunger strikes cannot be overstated.  Sands’ election as MP for 
Fermanagh-South Tyrone “made it possible, much sooner that anyone had imagined, for Sinn 
Fein to fully embrace electoral politics.”228  “It was a realization that would propel the 
organization into serious electoral politics and herald a phase in the Provisionals’ department that 
would usher in the peace process,” recalls Moloney.  But in an insurgency, politics are but one 
way to vie for power.  As the next section will point out, each side in the conflict struggled for 
military supremacy in an attempt to deal a knockout blow to the enemy – but failed to achieve 
this. 
2.4.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
From the very early stages of the conflict, secret, backchannel talks took place between members 
of the insurgency and leadership within the British government.  The Good Friday Agreement is 
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merely a broad framework that maps out how the government in Stormont should administer the 
state.  This agreement was decades in the work.  Father Alec Reid was a key facilitator in the 
early stages of the talks representing the PIRA.  As early as 1974, the Dublin government was 
engaged in backchannel talks with the UVF.  So the sides were talking about peace for a long 
time, but the conflict trudged along for years.   
 The backchannel talks were crucial because as a result of continuous back channel 
contacts (track two diplomacy) both sides knew who their partners were and knew who they 
were not.229  Encouraging backchannel talks and attempts at informal diplomacy have clear 
policy implications here.  Previous negotiations and agreements between Nationalists, Unionists, 
and the British government would affect how future negotiations unfolded and from that 
perspective are important to analyze. 
2.4.3.1 Sunningdale Agreement (1973) 
The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 saw the only tangible attempt at political reconciliation 
throughout the entire decade.  The impetus may have been the fact that the PIRA killed more 
people (235) the previous year, or recognition within the highest ranks of the British government 
that incidents like Bloody Sunday and internment without trial had merely served to fuel PIRA 
recruitment and fundraising.230  Nevertheless, Sunningdale turned out to be a monumental failure 
and succeeded only in alienating both Unionists and Nationalists alike.   
 The terms of the agreement included: a devolved legislative assembly, all-Ireland 
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institutional cooperation and consultation, and a human rights provision.231  Amazingly, both 
unionists and nationalists thought their side comprised too much in this deal.  The result was a 
coordinated strike by the unionist Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) and increased friction 
between Sinn Fein and the SDLP on the nationalists’ side.   
 In the lead up to the agreement, British COIN forces arrested and detained elements of 
the Belfast Brigade’s leadership thought to be completely opposed to any form of negotiation, 
including Gerry Adams and Brendan Hughes.  By targeting the hardliners in the group, the 
British were hoping to shape the leadership in a way that would make the PIRA more amenable 
to doing a deal.  In spite of a clever strategy and an aggressive attempt to gather political 
intelligence on the PIRA, the power sharing agreement collapsed which, Moloney remembers, 
“seemed to symbolize to the outside world the addiction of the parties in Northern Ireland to 
their ancient quarrel and spoke to an almost inherited inability on the part of the belligerents to 
entertain reasonable solutions.”232  
 Sunningdale foreshadowed just how difficult it would be to reach an agreement that 
could ameliorate the grievances of the diversity of constituencies now involved in the conflict.  
This was not simply an attempt to rectify Protestant versus Catholic.  The insurgency 
metastasized into a multi-dimensional affair with competing interests on all sides—PIRA, SDLP, 
UUP, DUP, and both the Irish and British governments.  Violence resumed and both sides dug 
in.  The next major landmark in the political process would not come for another dozen years. 
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2.4.3.2 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 
Toward this end, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement made remarkable strides and was viewed as 
“an accord that was profoundly to alter the framework within which the IRA were to operate in 
subsequent years.”233  Essentially, the agreement gave the ROI a continuing and consultative role 
in the affairs of Northern Ireland, with increased responsibility for border security.  The 
insurgent leadership correctly realized that it was being marginalized through these negotiations.  
Sinn Fein/PIRA leader Gerry Adams commented on the Anglo-Irish Agreement shortly after it 
was signed, lamenting that it had been, “designed to isolate and defeat republicans.”234   
 In order to avoid being shut out of the political framework London and Dublin appeared 
to be building without the PIRA, Adams recognized that a move toward political inclusion was a 
necessary next step.  After a review of the effects that a mutually hurting stalemate had on all 
sides in the conflict, the discussion turns to the changes taking place within the PIRA.   
Throughout the 1980s, as the organization’s membership, most poignantly its leadership, began 
to change shape, ideologues gave way to radicals and radicals in turn to politicos.  This shift was 
most evident in the post-Cold War era, evidenced by such significant political milestones as the 
Downing St. Declaration (1993) and thereafter the Belfast Agreement (1998).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2.4.3.3 Downing St. Declaration (1993) 
As time passes  and history is recounted by those who lived it, we are able to learn more about 
the peace process in Northern Ireland and the seminal events leading up to the historic agreement 
to put an end to all forms of political violence in the country.  One of the more interesting threads 
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that have been unraveled since the end of the conflict has been the frequency of secret back 
channel talks between all elements of the conflict in Northern Ireland.  To the public, the 
Downing Street Declaration of 1993 was a joint British-Irish statement crafted by the British 
Prime Minister, John Major, and his Irish counterpart, Albert Reynolds.  However, as we now 
know, “what made the Downing Street document exceptional was that it was modeled on ideas 
and concepts evolved, initiated, and developed in a secret dialogue whose instigator [Gerry 
Adams] was the head of the political organization pledged to overthrow the principle [of 
consent] by gun and bomb.”235  The main tenets of the Downing Street Declaration (DSD) that 
caused the biggest stir were the principle of self-determination and the principle of consent.  
Both of these ideas were conceptualized in paragraph 4 of the document, which stated: 
The British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland 
alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of 
self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North 
and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.  They reaffirm, as 
a binding obligation that they will for their part introduce the necessary legislation 
to give effect to this, or equally to any measure of agreement on future 
relationships in Ireland which the people of Ireland may themselves freely so 
determine without external impediment.236 
 
In laymen’s terms, it would be the right of the people of Ireland as a whole, both North and 
South, to determine the fate of its people, to include the Unionist majority in the North.  John 
Hume, leader of the SDLP, thought that the Declaration was an explicit refutation of the PIRA’s 
call to violence.  The British openly declared no self- interest—economic, political, or military—
in the affairs of Ireland.  But what angered Irish republicans, especially the politically active and 
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influential members in the prisons, were that the document failed to include an overt 
commitment by the British to withdraw its forces from Northern Ireland.237 
2.4.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
In June 1972, just six months after the events of Bloody Sunday in which British security forces 
shot13 unarmed demonstrators, British ministers, including then Northern Ireland Secretary 
William Whitelaw, met with Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness to discuss a possible 
resolution to the conflict.238  The talks ultimately went nowhere, and the PIRA called off a short-
lived cease-fire amidst accusations that the British were not serious about the negotiations to 
begin with.  Three years later, in 1975, British officials met with the PIRA’s highest ranking 
decision making body, the Army Council, only to have these talks break down over PIRA 
accusations that the British were merely using the talks as a stalling tactic while attempting to 
figure out a way to defeat the PIRA once and for all.  I argue that by the late 1980s, both sides 
recognized that a military stalemate had been reached, with neither side able to muster the 
military might necessary to escalate the conflict into a situation where a clear advantage could be 
pressed.   
 While the recognition of a mutually hurting stalemate is not uncommon, the fact that by 
the late 1980s both sides seem to have reached this same conclusion was poignant.  In remarks 
delivered to a press agency in November 1989, Northern Ireland Secretary of State Peter Brooke 
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admitted that the PIRA and the British were deadlocked in a military stalemate.239  For their part, 
the Provos had reached this point too.  An unnamed PIRA member described the situation as 
such: “Our aim is to create such psychological damage to the Brits that they’ll withdraw, sick of 
the expense, the hassle, the coffins coming back to England.  But we know we can’t defeat them 
in a military sense, no more than they can beat us.  So there’s kind of a stalemate.”240  Part of the 
negotiating process had been brinksmanship, with both sides aware of their own weaknesses, but 
never ready to admit this to the adversary for fear of appearing weak.241 
2.4.4.1 Ceasefire (1974-1975) 
In a mutually hurting stalemate, both parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which 
neither can escalate to victory and the deadlock is edging toward unbearable costs for each side.  
In a conflict that lasted as long as the insurgency in Northern Ireland, there are likely to be 
several openings, or “ripe moments,” for the realization of a MHS by one or more sides.  The 
1974-1975 ceasefire was agreed upon as both sides recognized the futility of tit-for-tat violence 
which was leading to a sharp increase in deaths on both sides.  Army Council members Daithi 
O’Conaill and Ruairi O’ Bradaigh had high hopes for what could be considered the first serious 
opening for a potential breakthrough in talks since the conflict began six years earlier.   
  From his prison cage in Long Kesh, Gerry Adams and his supporters argued vehemently 
against a cease-fire.   Indeed, for the remainder of his career, Adams seized upon the 1974-1975 
ceasefire as an example of what could go wrong when his point of view was disregarded.  In 
Adams’ assessment, the cease-fire led to several negative outcomes for the PIRA, two of which 
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contributed to the mutually hurting stalemate and thus prolonged the insurgency.   
 First, the cessation in fighting allowed the COIN force the time needed to resupply and 
reorganize its intelligence apparatus.  No substantial political issues were resolved and during 
this lull in fighting the British devised and implemented a policy of “‘Ulsterization,’ 
normalization, and criminalization.”242  Britain had convinced the PIRA to accept a cease-fire 
under the premise that discussions would focus on “structures of disengagement,” leading to a 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. 243  The fruitless negotiations had a profound impact 
on Gerry Adams, who became convinced that the British had negotiated in bad faith.  
Convincing the future leader of the PIRA that political progress was a worthwhile avenue to 
pursue would be an arduous process, evolving slowly over the course of the next two decades. 
 Second, the cease-fire contributed to a Loyalist offensive directed at Catholic civilians, 
particularly in Belfast.244  Since the Provos’ claimed to be the protectors of the Catholic minority 
in the North, Loyalist paramilitaries like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)  believed that by 
murdering ordinary Catholics they could disprove the PIRA’s claim and thus the group’s raison 
d’etre.  Once the Catholic population realized that the PIRA could no longer protect it, pressure 
would mount on the group to disband.245  This twisted logic of the Loyalists led to the rise of 
demented gangs like the Shankhill Butchers, known for torturing their victims before killing 
them.  In turn, the PIRA responded with an intensified campaign of its own, also directed at 
civilians.  Neither group could lay a valid claim to being the more violent outfit nor could any 
                                                 
242 Moloney, A Secret History, p.145. 
 
243 Ibid, p.143. 
 
244 Ibid, p.145. 
 
245 Ibid. 
 
 102 
group break the stalemate.  A morass settled in as both the urban and rural settings of Northern 
Ireland devolved into an orgy of sectarian violence.246   
2.4.4.2 Impact of the Eksund (1987) 
Weapons procurement for the Provisional Irish Republican Army was not a major source of 
concern for the group when the insurgency began in the late 1960s.  Accordingly, the PIRA’s 
predecessor, the Original IRA, had a network in place since at least the 1950s and found it “a 
simple task” to reactivate this network once it became necessary.247  The main cog in the PIRA’s 
gun-running network was a County Mayo insurgent and veteran member of the PIRA, George 
Harrison, whose contacts reached back to New York and a mafia-associated arms dealer of 
Corsican background, George DeMeo.248  The small group also included Joe Cahill and Liam 
Cotter and provided hundreds of light, powerful, collapsible rifles known as Armalites, which 
would become the PIRA’s signature weapon.  When the Harrison network was disrupted, arms 
supplies to the PIRA from the US were ‘infrequent and erratic.’   
 While the PIRA would eventually reconstitute its arms network through a Libyan 
connection, an even more robust supply than it had ever had, the group’s arsenal was not always 
sufficient.  In the United States, at least, arms procurement for the PIRA was seen as “no longer 
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a patriotic lark but rather a risky endeavor,” according to J. Bowyer Bell.249  Over time, 
acquiring weapons became more difficult, which in turn constrained what the PIRA could do 
from an operational standpoint. 
 A combination of British pressure, backlash from brutal attacks, and increased scrutiny in 
the US forced the PIRA to look to Qaddafi as an alternative supplier of arms and explosives.250   
The Libyan connection proved vital not just to the continuation of the insurgency, but also to its 
intensity.  Qaddafi was able to supply the Provos with a diverse array of weaponry, including 
Semtex (a Czechoslovakian made odorless plastic explosive), Russian RPG-7 rockets and 
Kalashnikov rifles, Chinese Simarol rifles, Armalites, and M60 machine guns.251  Libyan- 
supplied weaponry allowed the PIRA to plan more ambitious operations, both in Northern 
Ireland and abroad.  Throughout 1987, the organization received four major shipments of 
weapons totaling 150 tons.   
 Always close observers of other “wars of liberation,” the Provos were well aware of the 
Vietnamese defeat of the United States during the 1960s and 1970s.  Drawing parallels between 
the two conflicts, the PIRA was planning to launch its own Tet Offensive against the British in 
an effort to drive the Army once and for all from Irish soil.252  The Irish Tet Offensive would 
come in the form of The Eksund, a Panamanian-registered vessel loaded with: 1,000 Romanian-
made AK-47 automatic rifles, one million rounds of ammunition, 430 grenades, 12 rocket 
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propelled grenade launchers with ample supplies of grenades and rockets, 12 heavy Russian 
DHSK machine guns, more than 50 SAM-7-ground-to-air missiles, 2,000 electric detonators, 
4,700 fuses, 106 mm cannons, general purpose machine guns, anti-tank missile launchers, flame 
throwers, and two tons of Semtex plastic explosives.253 
 The Eksund never made the trip from Tripoli back to Ireland.  An informer betrayed the 
operation and French authorities boarded the ship before it could reach its destination.  The 
capture of The Eksund in 1987 was a devastating blow to the PIRA and its hopes of escalating 
the insurgency against the British.  Still, the group had managed to import more than enough 
weaponry to continue its struggle for the foreseeable future, much of which was hidden in 
bunkers in the Republic of Ireland under the careful watch of the Quartermaster General.254 
 The capture of the Eksund had a major impact on the PIRA’s resources.  Thinking about 
the loss of weaponry in terms of a mutually hurting stalemate, the loss of these weapons did not 
mean that the Provos couldn’t continue their long war against the British government.  In fact, as 
Richard English comments, “by the time the Eksund was captured, the Libyan connection had 
already provided the IRA with the means of continuing its war.”255  But the point here is that, 
without that shipment of weapons, the PIRA was unable to conduct its ‘Tet Offensive’ and 
escalate the war in the way the group knew that it needed to in order to “get over the hump.” 
 With the capture of the Eksund, the group began to discuss chances for success on the 
military front against England.  Simultaneously, an ongoing effort by British intelligence to 
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infiltrate the PIRA leadership was beginning to yield devastating results.  An expose in The 
Atlantic detailed exactly how a secret British intelligence outfit, the Force Research Unit (FRU), 
surreptitiously served as a double agent in the PIRA, sowing doubt and discord among the 
highest ranks of the insurgency.  According to Matthew Teague, “British spies subverted the IRA 
from within, leaving it in military ruin, and Irish Republicans…have largely shifted their weight 
to Sinn Fein and its peaceable, political efforts.”256 
2.4.4.3 Cease Fire (1994) 
The leadership of the PIRA looked back upon the cease-fire of 1974-1975 and vowed that never 
again would the group commit to a cease-fire until “the Brits declared for withdrawal.”257  In 
practice, even the utterance of the phrase “cease-fire” had become so discredited that it was 
rarely used.  Yet by 1994 the war had been going on for 25 years and in spite of the political 
“stepping stones” of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Downing Street Declaration, there was 
still no end in sight.  A concerted political-military strategy was needed to break the impasse.  
 While Adams and a small group of advisers were negotiating the political terms for a 
cease-fire, the Army Council worked out the details on the military side.  For the PIRA, the 
terms of a cease fire included a complete halt to recruiting, military training, targeting activity, 
and intelligence gathering for operational activity.258  These prohibitions applied to PIRA units 
in Northern Ireland as well as the Republic.  British COIN forces, in response, would temporarily 
halt police actions to include surveillance, imprisonment, and harassment of the insurgents.  
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When the vote for whether or not to support the cease-fire was put before the Army Council, five 
were in favor (Adams, McGuinness, Doherty, Cahill, and the South Armagh adjutant of Northern 
Command), one abstained (Slab Murphy), and one voted against it (Kevin McKenna).259   
 The 1994 cease-fire was a definite recognition of a stalemate between the insurgents and 
the COIN force.  But more than that, the cease-fire was a recognition of “conflict fatigue” on all 
sides.  Unlike the cease-fire twenty years earlier, this pause in hostilities would not be used as an 
opportunity to rest and rearm, but on the contrary, the small respite in fighting would be seized 
upon to move forward with a genuine push for peace.  The 1994 cease-fire was a tipping point in 
the conflict in Northern Ireland.  Figure 16 below details the total number of people killed in 
different time periods, as well as the number killed by the PIRA.  Although the Belfast 
Agreement was not signed until 1998, and indeed even after the signing of the agreement splinter 
groups like the RIRA continued to fight, there was a significant drop off in the number of deaths, 
both overall as well as those killed by the PIRA.  But what explains this tipping point?   
 In The Tipping Point, Gladwell describes the precipitous drop in crime in New York City 
in the 1990s, where within a five year period between 1992 and 1997, murders dropped 64.3 
percent and crime decreased by nearly 50 percent.260  While Gladwell recognizes ancillary 
factors at play, including changes in the New York Police Department’s strategy, a decline in the 
crack trade, gentrification of previously dangerous neighborhoods, and an improved economy, 
his main conclusion is that “the small number of people in the small number of situations in 
which the police or the new social forces had some impact started behaving very differently, and 
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that behavior somehow spread to other would-be criminals in similar situations.”261  Similarly, in 
Northern Ireland, ancillary factors had an effect on the ebb of violence—war weariness among 
both the Catholic and Protestant populations, the incarceration and death of dangerous terrorists 
and paramilitaries, and decades of secret back channel negotiations between the parties to the 
conflict.  Still, these factors alone cannot account for the dramatic decrease in deaths. 
 
Figure 6: Conflict-related Deaths in Northern Ireland, 1969-1998262 
 
Although the 1994 cease-fire did not end the conflict, it did tip the insurgency toward 
negotiation.  In an example of what Gladwell calls the “Law of the Few,” PIRA leader Gerry 
Adams was able to sell the idea of curbing Republican violence to even the most ardent and 
committed ideologues within his inner circle.  The idea that Sinn Fein represented the future of 
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Irish Republicanism took root and spread like a contagion, as the ideas, attitudes, behaviors, and 
actions of those involved in the conflict were transformed, seemingly overnight. 
2.4.5 Decision-Making Structure and Process 
2.4.5.1 Army Council/General Army Convention  
The Army Council consisted of seven members and served as the IRA’s supreme decision 
making body.  More than just a military commission, the Army Council was considered to be the 
rightful government of the country of Ireland and by extension, it has attained a spiritual, almost 
sacred status among the PIRA’s members.263  The Army Council was responsible for 
determining PIRA policy and its roles and powers were clearly outlined by the group’s 
constitution.  While its prime function was to “conclude peace or declare war,” the Army 
Council had a number of secondary responsibilities of great importance, such as determining the 
group’s rules of engagement (ROE), stipulating its membership regulations, choosing a chief of 
staff, and enforcing a disciplinary code, including procedures and penalties for court martial and 
even execution.264   
 Within the Army Council there was a clear division between the radicals and the 
ideologues.  On one side were the radicals like Adams and Pat Doherty, who were well on the 
way to becoming politicos.  On the other, however, were dyed-in-the-wool ideologues like 
“Slab” Murphy and Kevin McKenna, true PIRA soldiers who only tolerated the political speak 
of the organization because they were repeatedly reassured that it was all part of an elaborate 
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hoax developed to secure a pan-nationalist alliance with the SDLP and the Irish government.265  
Once this alliance was firm, it would be used in tandem with the PIRA’s military campaign to 
pressure the British government to withdraw from Ireland.  
2.4.5.2 Abstentionism 
The PIRA’s long-standing position on abstention, or refusing to sit for political office in any 
parliament (this included in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, or England), is best 
summarized by J. Bowyer Bell, who believed that in the eyes of most PIRA members, sitting in 
parliament or participating in electoral politics “was not only an invitation to corruption, a 
tainted tactic already proven sterile, but also, and most important, outrageous immorality.”266  To 
be sure, the birth of the Provisional IRA emerged due in large part to a disagreement over this 
very issue.267  Those who even suggested abandoning armed struggle in favor of party politics 
were regarded as naïve, possessing little historical knowledge of British-Irish relations, and 
traitorous to the legacy of the 1916 Easter proclamation of independence and the Irish parliament 
of 1921, or Second Dail.   
 In 1986, at a General Army Convention held in County Donegal, Gerry Adams lobbied 
those in attendance that northern elements of the Irish republican movement should make a foray 
into politics south of the border by taking a seat in the Dail Eireann, or Irish parliament.268  
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abstention was the primary cause leading Sean MacStiofain and his allies to split from the Cathal Goulding-led IRA.  
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Unlike Goulding, who advocated in 1969 that the IRA drop its policy of abstentionism in order 
to contest seats in all three parliaments (Leinster House, Stormont, and the House of Commons 
in Westminster), Adams eschewed the more ambitious move in favor of a pragmatic effort to 
elevate the importance of the PIRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein.  Not all PIRA delegates in 
attendance agreed with the decision.  Ruairi O’ Bradaigh and other veteran IRA hardliners 
walked out of the meeting and went on to found Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), along with a 
splinter military wing which came to be known as the Continuity Irish Republican Army 
(CIRA).269  The CIRA would claim responsibility in 1996 for the deadly bombing of a hotel in 
Enniskillen, County Fermanagh, which was a direct effort to sabotage ongoing peace talks at the 
time.   
 Moving the PIRA closer toward the ideas and principles embodied by constitutional 
nationalism was, undoubtedly, a major problem for the group’s hard liners and many of their 
friends in the United States with deep pockets.  Sinn Fein first contested elections in 1982, so the 
move toward a less militant approach to the conflict had been evolving ever since.  Deception 
was a necessary evil practiced by the organization’s leaders.  In order to mollify the concerns of 
the PIRA’s soldiers that the group was still committed to armed struggle above all else, the 
leadership simply misled them.270  “Not meaning what one said increasingly became a defining 
and acceptable feature of republican political culture,” notes Moloney.271  This strategy was used 
to assuage the fears of the PIRA’s ideologues and hawks that PIRA guns would not fall silent 
until the British were expelled from Northern Ireland by force and the 32 counties were united as 
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one sovereign nation. 
 The emergence of the insurgency in Northern Ireland occurred in1969 with the civil 
rights movement.  The timing is important because the Catholic-Protestant divide in Northern 
Ireland is set against the backdrop of worldwide revolutions and ethnic discord resulting from 
decolonization.  Catholics in Northern Ireland were hopeful as they observed the mighty British 
Empire retreating from its vast overseas holdings, ceding territory and granting autonomous self-
rule in various parts of Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, South and East Asia.  But what 
would be the PIRA’s disposition toward negotiation?  Undoubtedly, in the earliest stages of the 
insurgency, ideologues held the most clout—only armed struggle would force the British from 
Northern Ireland.  However, there were various stages throughout the conflict where the 
decision-making apparatus of the group decided political negotiations could be advantageous.  In 
the end, this is the vision that would prevail. 
2.4.5.3 Decommissioning 
Of all the myriad concerns addressed by the PIRA throughout its 30 year war against the British, 
none was more difficult to reach consensus on than the thorny issue of decommissioning, which 
had been central to the acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.272  There were a host 
of historical, ideological, tactical, and strategic reasons that made decommissioning such a 
difficult concept for the PIRA to reach an agreement on.273  The agreement, which 
unambiguously called for “the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations,” led to the 
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establishment of an independent arms body as a verification mechanism.274  Due to PIRA 
intransigence and repeated setbacks along the way, including several government shutdowns, it 
would take years for this body to begin its work. 
 To the hardliners in the group, decommissioning was an admission of surrender.  
Moreover, the PIRA’s cache of armaments, equipment, and “other resources” were technically 
under the control of the group’s Quartermaster General, Micky McKevitt, a notorious Irish 
Republican ideologue.  Around the time the Good Friday Agreement was being negotiated, the 
PIRA still retained a vast arsenal of weaponry, including large quantities of the powerful 
explosive semtex.  If the PIRA destroyed these weapons, it would be impossible to resume the 
war if the peace process fell apart and violence returned en masse to Northern Ireland.   
 Two international events eventually led the PIRA to agree that its arms would be put 
“beyond use.”  The first incident occurred in August 2001 and involved three PIRA members—
James Monaghan, Martin McAuley, and Niall Connollly—arrested in Bogota, Colombia for 
connections to FARC.  The “Bogota Three,” as they became known in the press, were allegedly 
sent to Colombia to “trade IRA military know-how for Colombian cash.”275  One month later, 
Al-Qaida attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, eliminating any grey area that may 
have blurred the line between terrorist and freedom fighter.  Terrorism was now a binary label:  
the PIRA was either a terrorist group or it wasn’t.  According to English, “there was, after those 
attacks on America, a measure of pressure from American sources for the PIRA to 
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decommission; and in the period after 11 September and the Colombian episode, the US State 
Department called for the IRA ‘to just totally dissociate itself from any terrorist activity.’”276 
2.4.6 Why did the PIRA Negotiate? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1998, the insurgency in Northern Ireland officially came to an end with the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement.  This historical agreement was the culmination of thirty years of 
conflict in Northern Ireland.  Thirteen years after the signing of this historic peace deal, all 
parties to the conflict have remained focused on politics as a lasting peace has settled in 
throughout the country, pockmarked with only episodic acts of violence practiced by fringe 
groups and criminals.277  The Provisional Irish Republican Army laid down its arms and stepped 
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aside for Sinn Fein, completing a process that had begun years earlier.  So why did the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army negotiate?  To answer this question, one must begin by 
examining changes in the group’s operational tools, organizational tools, and an assessment of its 
intentions.   
 By the late 1980s/early 1990s, the operational tools most important to PIRA success on 
the battlefield had all been blunted to one degree or another.  Both the American and Irish 
governments cracked down on allowing PIRA insurgents to use their countries as a safe haven.  
Insurgent freedom of movement in the US and the Republic of Ireland were severely 
constrained.  With a restricted sanctuary, the group could no longer train its members the way it 
had before, which contributed to shoddy operational execution.  Finally, by the latter stages of 
the conflict, Irish America had been persuaded to cease funding the hardline elements of the 
group bent on continued violence.  Manpower and resources were now almost completely shifted 
to Sinn Fein, and those who wanted to be seen as supporting the ‘good fight’ would follow suit.   
 In addition to diminished operational ability, the PIRA’s organizational structure was 
rotting from the inside out.  Its ranks had been infiltrated by MI5, the Special Branch, and the 
Force Research Unit (FRU) of the British Army.  Operations were aborted on a regular basis.  
Informers existed at the highest levels of the group.  Essentially, the PIRA’s command and 
control network was compromised.  The composition of the PIRA had changed dramatically as 
well.  Politically-minded leaders like Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness now had tight 
control over the Army Council.  As discussed above, the decision in 1986 to reverse the 
organization’s long-standing policy of abstentionism caused a split that led Ruairi O’ Bradaigh 
and other ideologues to leave the group and form RSF and CIRA.  Throughout the rest of the 
1980s and beginning with the 1994 cease-fire, other militant leaders within the PIRA—
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Quartermaster General Micky McKevitt, Seamus McGrane, and Liam Campbell foremost among 
them— became increasingly concerned that the Adams-McGuinness partnership would abandon 
violence and accept a political solution. 
 Between 1987 and 1988, the PIRA lost 26 Volunteers violently and killed 27 civilians 
they didn’t mean to kill.  According to English, this two year span in the late 1980s “reinforced 
the growing sense of the futility of the campaign in terms of what they [the PIRA] had honestly 
believed it would achieve.”278  There was also a general feeling of war weariness among 
Northern Ireland’s population.  The PIRA had never been supported by a majority of Northern 
Ireland’s Catholics.  That honor was bestowed upon John Hume’s SDLP.  And there was also a 
feeling that Irish America was out of touch with the realities on the ground.  It was all fine and 
good to write checks when you were living the high life in Boston, New York, and Washington 
D.C.  But the daily reality for Catholics in Belfast and Derry was death, misery, economic 
hardship, and military occupation.  The tides of public opinion had shifted. 
 Tracing the PIRA’s intentions over the course of the insurgency also provides clues to 
why the group negotiated.  By the late 1980s, the conflict had reached a mutually hurting 
stalemate.  The PIRA, Loyalist paramilitary groups, and the British military—the three primary 
belligerents in the conflict—each came to recognize that no side held a discernible advantage.  
On the political front, the British were able to endure 100 deaths a year in perpetuity.  Successive 
British governments felt comfortable with this number.  Following Operation Motorman in 1972, 
when the death toll was above 500, violence never again reached a level that created enough 
pressure on the British government, at least in strategic terms, to radically reconsider its 
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stance.279  The conflict was locked in a military stalemate from the mid-1970s until its end in 
1998.  Following 1972, the violence never again reached civil-war like proportions.     
 The “dirty war” is recalled for the brutality and cunning involved on both sides and has 
come to be epitomized by the Stakeknife affair.280  The Eksund had been captured in 1987 and 
PIRA morale was at its lowest level since its apex following the Hunger Strikes in 1981.  The 
PIRA’s emphasis on professionalization and training and indeed its high learning curve in the 
area of bomb-making were important factors that allowed it to remain competitive with British 
forces on the battlefield.  Provo insurgents always prided themselves on the ability to maintain a 
high ops-tempo.281  With this no longer the case, many fighters were left dejected and wondering 
if the group would ever return to its previous glory.   
 The recognition of a MHS by all sides, but most importantly by the PIRA, is directly 
related to the another reason why the group transitioned to the political realm.  Just around the 
time the PIRA recognized that it could not achieve its goal through military force alone, the 
group also matured politically.  As PIRA violence ebbed, Sinn Fein’s electoral success flowed.  
An inverse relationship existed between PIRA violence, especially as the civilian death toll rose, 
and Sinn Fein’s ability to win votes.  The Republicans’ constituency was tired of the violence 
and demonstrated this at the polls.  By the 1990s, the political element of the PIRA’s 
organization had become more than just an “add-on” to armed struggle.282   
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 A dynamic developed that favored less involvement in violence and brought greater 
results at the polls.  Even within hard-line PIRA factions, it was hard to deny the positive things 
that political involvement was reaping.  A kind of momentum developed, which brought about a 
resource shift from the PIRA to Sinn Fein.  After all, to organize, stand for, and win elections, 
Sinn Fein needed to build a robust infrastructure.  Siphoning money and energy toward the 
armed struggle, with its negligible return on investment, began to make less and less sense.   
With electoral success came increased legitimacy.  Each bombing was now met with a loss in 
popular support.  Adams had initially sold the ideologues in the organization on the notion that 
politics were a mere smokescreen and negotiations were nothing more than a ruse to expose the 
Brits’ lack of commitment to the process.  But by the mid-1990s the political dynamics on all 
sides had changed.  With the support of the United States, and a President in Bill Clinton who 
“leaned toward green rather than the orange,” Adams had developed undeniable clout for the 
PIRA on the international stage and had achieved unparalleled traction within the group’s upper 
echelons.  With each Canary Wharf bombing, and each Adams’ refusal to condemn those types 
of attack, Adams’ credibility as a viable negotiating partner was attenuated.283   
 To recap, the Provisional IRA abandoned its historical legacy of armed struggle for three 
main reasons.  First, the group was locked in a military stalemate with the two other belligerents 
in the conflict, the British Army and Protestant paramilitaries.  PIRA operational capabilities 
were enervated through a deliberate campaign of sabotage and subversion by the COIN force.  
The insurgents had transformed from the hunters to the hunted.  By the 1990s, PIRA attacks 
were less deliberate and rarely well-orchestrated.  The group had come to resemble a wounded 
animal that lashed out violently in all directions, causing collateral damage and a loss of popular 
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support.  From an organizational perspective, its once vaunted command and control network 
was crippled, and those in the group who advocated a purely military struggle had been 
successfully marginalized.   
 Second, and this is a point often overlooked by scholars, the Provos negotiated because 
they won much prized concessions as part of the deal.  The British government granted amnesty 
to PIRA leaders and political prisoners.  Martin McGuinness, the PIRA’s second in command, 
assumed a leading ministerial position in a devolved government.  Moreover, decommissioning 
was postponed, allowing the PIRA to save face.  At this point it is worth reiterating the 
Clausewitzian maxim that war is politics by other means.  Insurgency is nothing more than 
armed politics.  As such, the goal of any insurgent organization is garner recognition and 
legitimacy in the political sphere, and with the concessions granted as part of the Good Friday 
Agreement, the PIRA had certainly achieved this. 
 Third, Adams and his inner circle of leadership negotiated an end to the insurgency 
because they recognized, correctly, that the momentum of politics had carried to organization to 
a new phase of the conflict.  Years of secret backchannel negotiations with the British 
government had fundamentally transformed the nature of the conflict and the nature of the PIRA 
itself.  It was no longer PIRA-Sinn Fein, but Sinn Fein-PIRA; and finally, just Sinn Fein.284  
Success at the polls minimized any chance of a spoiler problem, and the two main splinter 
groups that emerged from the conflict, the Continuity IRA and REAL IRA, could be managed. 
 By opening the political system to the insurgents, the British government was able to end 
the conflict.  With a changed political status quo, the PIRA now had a stake in the political future 
of its own country.  Furthermore, the group would be held accountable, not only to the 
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government it was now a part of, but also to its constituency.  Failing to deliver would have 
serious consequences.  Allowing the PIRA to transition into politics also drew a clandestine 
group out into the open and forced it to remain transparent and abide by the same rules and laws 
that governed the other parties.  Finally, by including the insurgents in the government, the 
British were able to abdicate from the role of third-party guarantor.  The future of Northern 
Ireland, for better or worse, would not be solved by the citizens of Northern Ireland and their 
respective political representatives and institutions. 
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Table 1: Provisional IRA Analytic Framework Summary Analysis 
Operational Tools 
Training The PIRA’s emphasis on training included a focus on ideology/political indoctrination.  To the extent that 
this affected negotiations, the splintering of the organization into the CIRA in 1986 and the RIRA in 199 
threatened the success of negotiations at various points.  Overall, though, training was not a major factor. 
Sanctuary In the mid-1980s, both the ROI and the US began clamping down on PIRA insurgents’ freedom of 
movement within their respective territories.  This sudden change limited the ability of the insurgents to 
operate.  The result was a realization that the fight would be won or lost in Northern Ireland.  
Funding As Sinn Fein continued to contest and win elections, funding for the PIRA and kinetic operations was 
gradually shifted to help support the organization’s political wing.  Once this trend gained critical mass, 
Sinn Fein grew into ‘the senior partner,’ solidifying the decision to embrace politics. 
Organizational Tools 
Command & 
Control 
While C² played a relatively minor role in the actual decision to negotiate, the group’s structure did ensure 
that once the decision was accepted, it was highly likely to be implemented and followed by a majority of 
the members.  C² facilitated consensus and a system of checks and balances. 
Group 
Composition 
The composition of the PIRA constituted one of the most significant impediments to negotiating an end to 
the insurgency.  Rather than accept the decision to negotiate, ideologues within the group splintered at two 
separate points, leading to the creation of the CIRA and RIRA. 
Ideology As an ethno-nationalist group, the PIRA’s ideology was an obstacle to the decision to negotiate.  From its 
inception, the PIRA stated its intention to stop at nothing short of a united Ireland, which could only be 
completed by the reunification of the ROI and the 6 counties of the North.  
Popular Support Over time, a sense of war weariness set in among the population on both sides of the sectarian divide.  The 
popular support for continuing the conflict transformed into pressure to negotiate an end to the war from 
some of the same constituencies that were ardent supporters throughout. 
Propaganda The PIRA’s propaganda machine, once so effective at galvanizing support for continuing the conflict, 
proved equally adept at smoothing the transition to politics.  PIRA publications explained the nuances of 
policy changes and strategic shifts in an effort to gain support for the peace process. 
Strategic Decision Making 
Goals The PIRA’s goals proved to be an obstacle to the decision to negotiate.  Since negotiations would not 
allow the PIRA to achieve its objectives, Adams and his inner circle convinced the skeptics that PIRA 
goals were still achievable, but would have to be won through politics, not violence. 
Seminal Events The seminal events in the conflict—internment, ‘Bloody Sunday,’ and the hunger strikes—had the effect 
of prolonging the conflict and dissuading those who favored negotiation in the earliest stages of the 
insurgency.  Each incident fueled PIRA recruitment and funding and elevated the importance and position 
of the group’s hard-line ideologues. 
Previous attempts 
at conflict 
resolution 
With decades of mistrust and mutual recriminations to overcome, previous attempts at conflict resolution 
served as the ‘baby steps’ toward establishing good faith negotiations and honest intentions.  Although not 
necessarily perceived in this light at the time, these failed negotiations familiarized all sides with the other 
and laid the groundwork for the 1994 cease-fire and 1998 GFA. 
Mutually hurting 
stalemate 
The realization of a MHS was a major factor in convincing all parties (the PIRA, the COIN force, and the 
Protestant paramilitaries) that no side would be able to marshal the resources necessary to escalate to a 
clear-cut military victory.  This placed the impetus on the importance of negotiations. 
Decision-making 
structure & 
process 
The PIRA’s decision-making structure and process demonstrated that it was capable of making significant 
changes in strategy.  This reassured the politicians who became intimately involved in the process, 
including US President Bill Clinton who took a personal interest in resolving the conflict. 
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3.0  HIZBALLAH: THE PARTY OF GOD 
3.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND 
Literally translated as “the Party of God,” Hizballah285 was formed in the midst of an internecine 
civil war that would wreak havoc in Lebanon for fifteen years, ending only in 1990.286  The 
group emerged from the extremely complex patchwork of ethnic and religious groups in 
Lebanon and draws its support almost exclusively from the Shia communities in the country’s 
capital city, Beirut, and its surrounding environs, southern Lebanon, the Bekka Valley and the 
Hirmil Region.287  Similar to other insurgent movements throughout the Middle East, Hizballah 
receives support and is influenced by powerful actors in the region, including Syria and Iran, the 
latter of which was the “principal moving force” behind the group’s creation.288 
 Much of Hizballah’s early success in building its organization can be traced back to the 
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Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya, also known as the AMAL (an acronym for the Lebanese 
Resistance Detachments) movement, a Shia militia attached to the populist political movement 
Harakat al-Mahrumin, or, “the Movement of the Deprived.”  Trained by the Palestinian group 
Fatah, AMAL later came into conflict with Palestinian guerillas fighting in southern Lebanon 
and decided to participate in the National Salvation Committee.289  This decision was just one of 
a series of several political miscalculations, which along with accusations of cronyism and 
corruption, led a significant portion of AMAL’s followers to switch sides and support Hizballah.   
3.1.1 Operating Logic 
The average insurgency lasts approximately ten years.  Over the course of an insurgency, both 
the insurgents and the counterinsurgents can (and often do) evolve, sometimes radically.  
Insurgents will occasionally alter their objectives, typically in response to a change in the 
conditions on the ground or following the transformation of the geopolitical landscape, 
particularly as it relates to the regional balance of power.  Hizballah has waged an on-again, off-
again insurgency in southern Lebanon for the past thirty years.  In the process, it has established 
itself as perhaps the world’s most capable terrorist group, to include Al Qaida.  But to truly 
understand Hizballah’s raison d’etre, it is necessary to understand the context of the insurgency 
and how it has changed over three decades. 
 The main impetus for the formation of Hizballah was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1982.  Two former Israeli Prime Ministers—Ehud Barak and Yitzhak Rabin—both back this 
version of events, that it was Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon that precipitated the 
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emergence of Hizballah, which when initially founded in 1983, “was less an organization than a 
cabal” until the mid-1980s.290  In 1983, approximately 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards were 
dispatched to the Bekaa valley to organize the nascent group and provide it with training.291  
 Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, ostensibly to root out Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) fighters and install a government in Beirut pliable to Jerusalem, morphed into an 
occupation of southern Lebanon and is commonly cited in Israel as the textbook case of mission 
creep.292  During the first decade of its existence, Hizballah was almost exclusively committed to 
expelling the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from Lebanese soil and cast itself as a force 
determined to end what it believed was the foreign domination of its country by the “neo-
imperialist” powers, most notably the Israelis, the French, and the Americans.   
 When the Israelis unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, there was a major 
discussion within the highest ranks of Hizballah about which way to steer the organization.  
Would the group turn inward to focus on the Lebanese state and attempt to tackle issues of 
corruption and domestic politics?  Or, would Hizballah maintain its “resistance posture” in 
Lebanon and the Middle East while presenting itself as the most viable option to defend the 
Lebanese people?  While the group did assume a more direct role in the Lebanese political 
system, the lion’s share of its efforts was devoted to continuing to wage a campaign of guerilla 
warfare against the Israelis, even though the IDF had ended its eighteen year occupation.293  
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 Another important change in Hizballah’s operating logic following Israel’s withdrawal 
was the group’s decision to become more closely involved in supporting various Palestinian 
groups fighting the Israelis, insisting that as Muslims it is a “holy duty to support the Palestinian 
people.”294  The decision to devote both more attention and resources to Palestinian armed 
groups was reached following a consultation between Hizballah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah and 
Iran’s rakbar, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khameini.295  Promoting the Palestinian cause and representing the 
ideals of the Iranian revolution have always been a part of Hizballah’s agenda to some extent, 
although these themes have been emphasized to varying degrees at times.  Following Hizballah’s 
July 2006 war against Israel, the group has sought to present itself as a defender of all Muslims 
worldwide and has broadened its appeal among both Sunni and Shia Muslims.   
3.1.2 Type of Insurgency 
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida were vaulted to the top of the list of the world’s most dangerous 
terrorist organizations following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.  
But speaking just days after the deadliest terror attacks ever executed on US soil, former Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage declared that “Hizballah may be the A team of terrorists” 
whereas “Al Qaida is actually the B team.”296  Hizballah can be most aptly characterized as an 
example of a “Global-Local” insurgency, which is a local insurgency (based out of Lebanon) that 
receives outside support (Syria, Iran) and has the potential to become part of a wider regional or 
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global struggle.297   
 What makes “Global-Local” insurgencies unique (only 5 percent of insurgencies since 
World War II can be classified as such) is that they are distinct but connected to a common 
agenda.298  Hizballah maintains its power base in Beirut and southern Lebanon, but is also 
closely connected to Tehran and to a lesser extent Damascus.  Time will tell exactly how close 
Hizballah’s reach will extend into Iraq.  Some scholars have identified the establishment of a 
“cyclical sharing network” which operates between Iraqi Shia groups, Hizballah, and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds force.299  While it is no fait accompli that the Shia-dominated 
government in Baghdad will reconcile with Iraq’s erstwhile enemy Iran, rich cultural and 
theological ties exist between Shia intellectuals in the Iraqi cities of Karbala and Najaf and the 
Iranian religious scholars in Qom and Tehran.   
 With a long and complex history, it is not out of the question to imagine the emergence of 
an increasingly militant “Shia Crescent” to counter Sunni influence throughout the Middle 
East.300  Hizballah is the rare insurgent organization with domestic clout, regional popularity, 
and the wherewithal to conduct attacks on an international scale.  The group has displayed a 
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penchant for mobilizing Shia across the region, including in Sunni-dominated states like Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain where there is little tolerance for and outright discrimination against Shia 
Muslims. The Arab Spring has only deepened these divisions.  When it comes to Lebanese 
political maneuvering, Hizballah has been extremely savvy and pragmatic, but lest we forget that 
elements of the group still remain wedded to the idea of a larger movement yearning to supplant 
secular rule with Islamist rule in Lebanon and the greater Middle East.301  
3.1.3 Approach 
As with the group’s operating logic, Hizballah’s approach to insurgency has changed over the 
past thirty years as it has mastered different tactics and adapted its fighting style to reflect what is 
known as the composite approach to insurgency.  The composite approach is actually several 
different approaches combined (urban, conspiratorial, military-focused) which the insurgents use 
at different times depending on the enemy, the terrain, resources available, etc.302  In its early 
years, Hizballah favored suicide bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings.303  Over the course of 
Israel’s eighteen year occupation, Hizballah honed the skills and techniques of guerilla warfare, 
including sniping, ambushes, and psychological operations (PSYOP) to name a few. 
 The 1994 and 1996 Hizballah attacks against Jewish targets in Argentina may not have 
been monumental in terms of the death toll, but these incidents really put Hizballah “on the map” 
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with regard to terrorist groups that have demonstrated a proven ability to conduct successful 
attacks overseas.304 As the organization matured, it adopted a politico-military approach that 
signals its readiness for an enduring insurgency.  With a sophisticated media wing and a robust 
social services division, Hizballah has transformed into a professional organization.  That it is 
well-equipped and trained by not one but two state sponsors which are relatively influential 
states in a highly chaotic region only adds another layer of complexity to an already complex 
group. 
3.2 OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
Throughout much of its existence, Hizballah has enjoyed state support not only from one 
regional power, but from two.  In the history of insurgencies, this arrangement is rare, and it is 
one of the main reasons why the group has established itself as a major force in Lebanon.  Syria 
and Iran have provided Hizballah with a wide range of resources, including sanctuary, 
intelligence, training, organizational aid, financing, and weapons.  The Lebanese diaspora 
communities in Latin America, West Africa, and Southeast Asia have also given Hizballah 
financial support and a transnational intelligence gathering capability.305  These communities 
abroad have been linked to organized crime, with funds sent from Ciudad del Este, Abidjan, and 
Bangkok back to Beirut. 
 Hizballah is unique because it is such a richly resourced organization.  This 
embarrassment of riches has allowed Hizballah to create an extensive social services network 
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debate over the extent to which the group was or was not involved. 
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throughout Lebanon, build a sophisticated political party complete with its own media wing, and 
maintain an arsenal of high-tech weaponry that affords it the ability to conduct terrorist attacks 
abroad or stand its own against Israel, the most feared military force in the region.  Of all the 
resources at Hizballah’s disposal, three in particular have had the greatest impact on the group 
and its longevity: training, intelligence, and financing.  This section details the importance of 
each resource, why it was so valuable, and how it changed over time. 
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3.2.1 Training 
In its current form, Hizballah is considered a self-sufficient terrorist-insurgent organization that 
is made even more efficient through Iranian and Syrian support.306  Were this support to 
disappear overnight, there is little doubt that Hizballah would continue to exist as both a political 
and military force in Lebanon, although the group would absolutely suffer from the loss of state 
sponsorship.  Iran continues to provide a significant amount of aid to Hizballah.  Syrian 
sponsorship is declining as the regime of Bashar al-Asad struggles to maintain power in the face 
of continuing challenges to the minority rule of the Alawite sect in Damascus.  At the time of 
this writing, the Assad regime is facing the most serious challenge to its rule since Bashar took 
control of the country following the death of his father, Hafez. 
3.2.1.1 Why was training such a valuable resource? 
When it emerged in the early 1980s, Hizballah was nothing more than an inchoate collection of 
Shia militants that had broken off from similar organization like AMAL and the al-Da’wa 
party.307   But before this loose group of rebels could develop into something more formidable, it 
was in dire need of training, direction, and organizational aid.  This guidance was provided by 
the al-Quds (Jerusalem) Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).308  A group of 
1500 Guards were dispatched to Lebanon from the Iran-Iraq battlefield following Israel’s 1982 
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invasion to provide materiel support and train Shia militias in areas of recruitment, ideological 
inculcation, and military training.309   These lessons also included how to conduct effective 
reconnaissance, gather intelligence, and suicide bombing tactics.310  The training provided to 
Hizballah by the IRGC drastically improved Hizballah’s operational capacity, but it also allowed 
Hizballah to reach a level of expertise where its members could then train other terrorist groups, 
to include Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). 
 
Military Prowess  
The IRGC contingent sent to train Hizballah’s aspiring insurgents trained the militants in a range 
of guerilla tactics but also taught some members how to properly utilize sophisticated weapons 
systems, including the BGM-71 TOW missile.311  In the Bekaa region, twenty Iranian training 
officers of the IRGC, each a specialist in a different aspect of guerilla warfare, bestowed upon 
the Hizballah members their knowledge of infiltration techniques, explosives, hit-and-run 
ambush style tactics, and range of counter-intelligence methods.312  These skills allowed the 
insurgents to wage an effective guerilla campaign against the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) units 
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throughout southern Lebanon as well as Israel’s proxy force, the South Lebanese Army (SLA).   
 Hizballah members possess an array of military capabilities and the group’s tactics have 
evolved considerably over time.  RAND researcher Kim Cragin divides Hizballah’s operational 
and tactical evolution into three periods, or phases.  Phase one was characterized by suicide 
bombings, kidnapping, and other hostage-taking tactics and lasted from 1983 until 1988.  Phase 
two, from 1989 to 1995, primarily consisted of guerilla warfare; although overseas attacks in 
Argentina were also a major component of the group’s terrorist campaign during these years.  
Finally, phase three (1996-1999) involved the use of ketusha rockets and kidnapping Israeli 
soldiers.313  The main point about the training provided by the IRGC is that “Hizballah members 
did not need to develop their own learning process; lessons were simply handed to them.”314  
This meant that Hizballah’s learning curve would not be as steep as it was for other insurgent 
groups and in effect, the insurgents would not be forced to struggle through difficult setbacks 
before reaching a high level of efficiency.315   
 Part of the reason why the IRGC’s training worked so effectively was because the Iranian 
trainers and the Hizballah fighters would assess each mission after it was conducted.  Studying 
                                                 
313 Cragin, Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2, pp.40-47.  Ketusha, or “Katyusha” rockets are 122 caliber (mm) 
surface-to-surface rockets with a maximum range of 20 kilometers, although a newer version of the standard 
ketusha, the “extended range” ketusha has a maximum range of 35 kilometers.  See Figure 1. “Weaponry Used by 
Hizballah during the July War,” in Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63, December 2006, p.6.  For further reading on the threat posed to 
Israel by Hizballah’s rocket capability, see Dennis M. Gormley and Colin P. Clarke, “The Destabilizing Role of 
Missiles” in Bernd Kubbig and Sven-Erik Fikenscher, eds., Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East: 
Overcoming the Security Dilemma, London: Routledge Press, January 2012.  
 
314 Ibid, p.47. 
 
315 In Chapter Two of their study The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and 
Capabilities in a Changing World, Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly construct an assessment framework for evaluating 
both the intentions and the capabilities of various terrorist and insurgent groups, including Hizballah.  According to 
the capabilities portion of the framework, Hizballah did not follow a linear development and indeed was able to 
“skip a number of steps” that other insurgents groups suffer through.  They credit the training provided by the IRGC 
as being one of the key factors enabling this rapid development. 
 
 132 
after action reports is critical in warfare because when possible, it allows combat units to figure 
out what went wrong and what went right and then take the steps necessary to fix their mistakes.  
“Some of the more battle-hardened and seasoned fighters assessed each mission with their 
Iranian advisers to bolster the degree of surprise and effectiveness in preparation” for the next 
attack, according to Magnus Ranstorp.316  The Iranian-led training camps throughout Lebanon 
became a “matrix of crucial guidance” and centers of learning that taught tactical agility and 
innovation.317 
 
Recruitment 
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps dispatched to Lebanon was tasked with the difficult 
mission of creating something from nothing.  The leadership in Tehran sought to cultivate a 
terrorist proxy that would remain faithful to the tenets of the Islamic Revolution while also 
serving as a strike force capable of carrying out Iran’s dirty work yet affording the mullahs, who 
were often several steps removed, the luxury of plausible deniability.  Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 may have provided the impetus for Shia fighters to band together, but benefits 
helped too.  IRGC members organized a comprehensive recruiting drive, which included a 
monthly stipend and other financial incentives such as subsidized education and no cost medical 
treatment for fighters and their families.318  
 Imad Mughniyeh, perhaps Hizballah’s most notorious member, is an example of what 
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Malcolm Gladwell would call a ‘Connector,’ who also so happened to possess the versatility of a 
‘utility player’ in baseball parlance.  A ‘Connector’ knows many people, runs in different circles, 
and operates without friction across different worlds, subcultures, and niches.319  This is part of 
what made Mugniyeh such a valued asset to Hizballah.  He functioned as the go-between among 
various factions of the organization and its associates.  One of his main areas of effort was 
recruiting Lebanese expatriates abroad and preparing them for terrorist operations inside of 
Israel.320  Highly prized recruits included anyone with foreign language skills, a “Western 
looking appearance,” or a European passport, which would make international travel much less 
onerous.  Much like Al-Qaida does today, Mugniyeh attempted to recruit foreign nationals who 
had converted Islam and could be thoroughly vetted and indoctrinated by the group.  These 
individuals would be used for myriad purposes, from suicide attacks to auxiliary reconnaissance.  
According to Ranstorp, Germany was one of Mugniyeh’s favorite recruiting spots.  For missions 
that involved infiltrating Israel, he sought to build a network of Israeli Arabs.321   
 
Ideological Support 
From the beginning, Hizballah militants and their Iranian handlers adhered to an ideological 
worldview stemming from the shared experience of clerical training and religious study in the 
Shia seminaries of Najaf, Iraq.  This ideological fervor encompassed three uncompromising 
elements, including a belief in Shia Islam, the supreme rule of the wilayat al-faqih, and a duty to 
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practice jihad, or struggle in the name of Allah.322  The main point here is that from day one, 
Hizballah militants were dogmatic in their devotion to the austere version of Shia Islam being 
exported by Ayatollah Khomeini and his inner circle.  Nevertheless, IRGC units provided the 
nascent movement with ideological guidance to reinforce these beliefs and urged Hizballah’s 
core membership to adhere to strict Islamic behavior while adopting an “anti-Zionist” platform 
that still defines the group to this day.323  This “ideological indoctrination” was a deliberate 
campaign aimed at recruiting and training radical Shia throughout the Bekaa valley.324 
 
“Training the Trainers” 
An indirect benefit of the training provided to Hizballah by the IRGC has been Hizballah’s 
ability and willingness to train Palestinian militant groups that also fall within Iran’s sphere of 
influence.  It is truly a “win all” situation because Iran furthers its interests by strengthening 
another enemy of Israel; the Palestinian groups become more adept at numerous terrorist 
techniques; and Hizballah militants are able to practice their trade and hone their own skills 
without actually having to engage in conflict.  Palestinian militants have trained at Hizballah run 
military training camps, which operate along 3 month cycles and include instructions on small 
arms, explosives, intelligence, and counter-surveillance.325  Hizballah’s support to Palestinian 
terrorist organizations including Hamas, PIJ, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade runs the gamut 
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from the provision of logistical assistance to training in suicide tactics.326  Lebanese guerillas 
training Palestinian militants is an example of terrorist training coming full circle, as it was 
Palestinian militants under the auspices of Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) that provided Lebanese guerillas with training in the late 1970s.327 
 In December 1992, Israel expelled 415 Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas members to 
southern Lebanon, which merely had the effect of forging even closer ties between each of the 
groups.328  The Al-Aqsa Intifada, or the Second Intifada, commenced in September 2000 
seemingly in response to then- Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount.  
During the next five years, training and technology exchange between Hizballah and Palestinian 
groups would follow three general patterns, including direct person-to-person instruction (tacit 
knowledge transfer), physical technology exchanges, and even attempts by Hizballah members 
to assume a modicum of operational control over the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, although this 
final point remains a matter of dispute in the literature.329  While reports on whether or not 
Hizballah attempted to seize operational control of specific Palestinian militant groups are 
contradictory, what is not up for debate is the value added to both Hizballah and Palestinian 
militants as a result of Hizballah fighters training the Palestinians in a host of guerilla warfare 
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practices.    
 
International Reach 
Conventional wisdom among regular observers of terrorism points to Al-Qaida as the first 
terrorist organization with a true transnational capability.  In reality, Hizballah is the most 
globally capable organization in terms of both fundraising and operational capacity, having 
successfully executed attacks in Argentina, France, and Saudi Arabia.330  A worldwide Lebanese 
diaspora has allowed Hizballah to extend its network to nearly every continent, with the most 
prominent diaspora communities located in West Africa and Latin America.  After September 
11th, the tri-border region where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina meet was identified as an 
“ungoverned space” where terrorists lived, trained, plotted, and raised money.  The tri-border 
region, or ‘Triple Frontier,’ is frequently cited as one of the most lawless places on the planet.331  
Lesser known areas where Hizballah has established a presence include Uganda, South Africa, 
and several Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.332  
Investigations of the group’s high profile attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Argentina 
in 1994 and 1996 revealed “official Iranian involvement,” to include training and logistical 
support.333  In the case of the attacks in Argentina, Imad Mughniyeh and Iranian Intelligence 
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Minister Ali Fallahian were implicated for their role in helping to coordinate and execute the 
bombings.334 
3.2.1.2 How did it change over time? 
As it continues its transformation from a terrorist group to a politico-military force in Lebanon, 
Hizballah has relied less and less on training provided by the IRGC.  In fact, as will be discussed 
below, Hizballah not only receives training from Iran but in a case of “training the trainers” it 
teaches various Palestinian militant groups how to utilize the same techniques for which it once 
sought guidance.  Accordingly, Hizballah members now have the ability to identify new 
weapons, teach themselves how to use these weapons to best effect through practice in the field, 
and finally deploy these weapons in battle.335  In effect, Iranian training made Hizballah more 
formidable and self-sufficient, as evidenced by the group’s performance against Israel in the July 
2006 war.336   
 If “practice makes perfect,” than the history of Hizballah as a fighting force offers 
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important clues to why these insurgents fight with such a high level of skill.337  Just as the British 
Army had done for the PIRA in Northern Ireland, the IDF gave Hizballah guerillas the 
opportunity to hone their skills against one of the best militaries in the world, and certainly the 
best trained and equipped force in the region.  As Kenney observes, tacit knowledge is passed 
along when “veterans and novices communicate, swap stories, and improvise, generating 
‘knowledge-in-practice’ through everyday interaction.”338  Hizballah’s training took place on the 
battlefield.  The effect of this tacit knowledge transfer was evident in the rising number of Israeli 
and SLA casualties as the conflict progressed. 
 Israeli counterinsurgent forces and the SLA patrolled southern Lebanon for eighteen 
years between 1982 and 2000 and Hizballah often clashed with other militant groups within 
Lebanon, including AMAL and occasionally Palestinian militants operating from refugee camps 
within Lebanon’s borders.  Indeed, as the subtitle of Hala Jaber’s book notes, Hizballah was 
“born with a vengeance.”  Still, Israeli COIN forces are among the best in the world and also 
benefit from years of continued deployments.  Israel has catalogued an extensive list of best 
practices and lessons learned from its battles against its Arab neighbors as well as both Hizballah 
and Palestinian insurgents in the West Bank and Gaza. 
3.2.2 Intelligence 
In an insurgency, intelligence is an essential capability because it allows each side to obtain an 
understanding of the forces shaping the conflict as well as the nature, objectives, and capabilities 
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of the adversary.  Insurgents rely on intelligence to gather information about the size and 
composition of the COIN force, the various strengths and weaknesses inherent in its leadership, 
and a rudimentary understanding about the level of domestic support (on both sides) at any given 
time for continuing combat operations.339  Insurgents also rely on intelligence to plan and 
execute attacks.  Intelligence can inform an insurgent group’s potential target, the most effective 
method(s) by which to conduct the attack, and the possible response that the attack will elicit 
from the COIN forces.340 
3.2.2.1 Why was intelligence such a valuable resource? 
In Hizballah’s ongoing insurgency against Israel, its intelligence network proved to be one of its 
most valuable assets, especially as the organization evolved over time.  In southern Lebanon, the 
Party of God’s popularity with the local population led it to develop an informal intelligence 
gathering network that complemented its official intelligence apparatus, modeled after the 
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).  Hizballah’s intelligence network was 
critical to its success against Israel in four main ways: operations security (OPSEC), infiltration 
and subversion, surveillance and reconnaissance, and psychological operations (PSYOP). 
 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Well aware of the far superior military capabilities of the IDF, Hizballah emphasized 
psychological operations in strict adherence to Sun Tzu’s admonition: “One need not destroy 
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one’s enemy.  One need only destroy his willingness to engage.”341  Through meticulous 
intelligence gathering and a sophisticated PSYOP campaign, Hizballah waged a war of attrition 
using “persuasion, communication, and the shaping of perception,” in addition to a range of 
guerilla tactics aimed at wearing down the Israelis.342  Starting in 1991, Hizballah’s television 
station al-Manar began targeting Israeli public opinion by broadcasting actual battlefield footage 
that showed Israeli soldiers being killed and maimed.  Within five years Al-Manar created a 
‘Hebrew Observation Department’ to monitor Israeli radio and television broadcasts around the 
clock.343  
 In a direct attempt to attenuate IDF morale and influence both Israeli government 
policymakers and the Israeli public, al-Manar ran a series titled ‘Who is Next?’ in reference to 
the daily segments showing soldiers being killed, while some footage revealed IDF troops 
retreating from Hizballah attacks.344  Hizballah was completely cognizant of the chord this struck 
in Israeli society, which prides itself on an image of survival and a strong military tradition.  
Much of Hizballah’s intelligence about its enemy was gleaned through Israel’s proxy army, the 
SLA.  About ten year’s into the conflict, conscripted SLA fighters, nearly three-quarters of the 
non-leadership of which was Shia, suffered from extremely low morale as they fought their 
fellow countrymen on behalf of a culturally-alien occupying force.345  Hizballah recognized this 
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and took advantage of it, encouraging SLA fighters to abandon their units and using them as “a 
source of invaluable military, political, and psychological information” in its effort to persuade 
Israel to withdraw.346  By the late 1990s, SLA field intelligence operatives were selling maps to 
Hizballah insurgents that detailed IDF positions and routes to navigate minefields, in addition to 
information about ISF/SLA operations.347 
 
Infiltration as a form of Subversion   
Imad Mughniyeh, who served as a bodyguard to Fadlallah and spent his early years with a 
specialized unit known as Fatah Force 17 directed the bulk of Hizballah’s intelligence 
responsibilities.  Mugniyeh was a major player in Hizballah’s Special Security Apparatus (SSA).  
The SSA was comprised of the central security apparatus, the preventative security apparatus, 
and an overseas security apparatus.  During his time handling intelligence operatives, Mughniyeh 
became obsessed with bringing the war to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.  This meant finding ways to 
infiltrate Israel in order to conduct terrorist attacks, to include suicide bombings, on Israeli soil. 
 A less onerous but still effective tactic was infiltrating the SLA, an extension of Israel’s 
security apparatus.  According to William Rosenau, infiltrating an organ of the state is a form of 
intelligence collection and derives at least five significant benefits: the opportunity to “plant” 
misleading or downright false information; the ability to commandeer government funds, 
weapons, or other military resources; “talent spotting,” which involves singling out the best and 
the brightest of that particular organ of the state in an effort to sway that individual toward the 
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other side; a general ability to delegitimize the state by the mere claim of infiltration (as the 
Taliban has done to great effect in Afghanistan) and finally, giving insurgents the ability to 
assess their adversaries’ strengths, weaknesses, and objectives.348  In a manner that would make 
Lenin proud, Mughniyeh relied on subversion to attack the Israelis from within, sowing seeds of 
doubt throughout the ranks of the SLA, crippling its ability to operate effectively within 
Lebanon. 
 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
As an insurgent force, Hizballah dedicated its intelligence manpower to surveillance and 
reconnaissance, constantly watching IDF troops and movements, while simultaneously trying to 
avoid the ubiquitous eye of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other high-tech 
equipment like ground surveillance radar, infrared sensors, and motion detectors.  Hizballah also 
sent militants to conduct auxiliary reconnaissance missions inside Israel in preparation for 
potential attacks.349   
 As they have for three decades, Hizballah and the Israeli military trade tit-for-tat attempts 
to gain the upper hand on the other.  The adaptation and counter-adaptation never ends.  Mossad 
and Shin Bet work tirelessly to devise new strategies to protect Israeli citizens, defend the 
country’s borders and airports, and prevent minor skirmishes from escalating into major battles, 
as in July 2006.  And for its part, Hizballah (and Palestinian militants as well) will monitor, 
study, and adapt.  Hizballah is widely known to have developed a robust knowledge of critical 
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infrastructure targets inside Israel, including a network of gas and electricity installations 
throughout the country.350  As discussed below, Hizballah’s intelligence capabilities have put the 
group on par with some of the most elite intelligence outfits in the region, and have contributed 
significantly to the stalemated nature of a constantly simmering insurgency. 
 
Operations Security (OPSEC) 
Operations security (OPSEC) is an internal security mechanism that requires a high level of 
intelligence capabilities to function effectively.  The goal is to obfuscate the identities of the 
individuals and plans for a single or a series of attacks.  Iran’s MOIS worked with Hizballah’s 
SSA on the most important aspects of operational security.  Among these were assisting 
insurgents with concealing their identity while traveling abroad, procuring a host of critical 
resources (weapons, fake identity papers, money), and connecting insurgents with various 
“fixers” who acted as local liaisons.351   
 As the chapter on the PIRA detailed, if COIN force intelligence can infiltrate or ‘flip’ 
members of the insurgents’ inner circle, it can strike a mighty blow at the resolve of the 
insurgents.  To prevent this, Hizballah has worked to form an “iron-clad security matrix,” whose 
foundation is an encyclopedic collection of materials on all past, present, and new members of 
the group’s internal security branch.352  Rules are enforced by the ruthless Engagement and 
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Coordination Unit, led at one time by Wafic Safa, a participant in the negotiations surrounding 
several prisoner exchanges with Israel.353 
3.2.2.2 How did it change over time?  
Hizballah’s intelligence capabilities matured as the insurgency progressed, despite Israel’s 
earnest attempts to defeat the insurgents through military force.  Hizballah’s ability to innovate 
on the battlefield is a direct byproduct of its vast and sophisticated intelligence-gathering 
network.354  With Syrian and Iranian assistance, Hizballah has transformed itself from a poorly-
organized militia into a functioning army with the ability to attack with an array of weapons, 
from plastic explosives to anti-tank missiles.  Counterintelligence became one of the 
organization’s strongpoints, as members of its internal security forces grew into experts at 
identifying and removing infiltrators and ensuring secrecy within the group.  In a nod to Israel’s 
SIGINT capabilities, the insurgents eschewed even encrypted phone calls.355  Focusing on 
subversion and infiltration, the group has at times even utilized Israeli uniforms and 
ammunition.356  Hizballah’s superior training, tactics, and weapons were on display during the 
summer 2006 battle with Israel.  As an Israeli soldier commented during the fighting, “Hizballah 
is a militia trained like an army and equipped like a state.”357   
 It should be noted that resources play an important role for the counterinsurgents as well. 
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One reason why Hizballah has been so effective at countering Israeli attempts to dismantle the 
organization has less to do with Hizballah and more to do with Israel.  Indeed, because Israel has 
repeatedly responded with force to multiple Palestinian intifadas, it is essentially fighting an 
ongoing two-front war.  Even before the threat of Hamas, the IDF was fighting from a defensive 
position in southern Lebanon, a position which was fortified following Hizballah’s successful 
escalation-counter escalation in the late 1990s.358  As the United States has learned in 
Afghanistan once resources were diverted to Iraq beginning in 2003, fighting insurgencies on 
two fronts devours a significant amount of military manpower making victory in either theater 
difficult to achieve.   
3.2.3 Weapons/Ammunition 
Each insurgent group has different requirements for what will sustain the group.  Much of this 
depends on the nature of the adversary, which on the counterinsurgent side of the equation is 
most often a nation-state.  Nation-states have armies and armies have weapons.  In many cases, 
the COIN force has a bigger, better-trained army and deadlier weapons than the insurgents.  
When one thinks of irregular warfare, the thought that comes to mind is the AK-47 versus the 
tank column.  The flood of the international black market with small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) following the collapse of the Soviet Union exacerbated civil wars and ethnic conflicts 
throughout Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucasus region.  In Lebanon, Hizballah relied on 
resourcefulness and Iranian sponsorship to keep its arsenal current.  Besides making Hizballah 
more lethal, weapons and materiel were a resource that helped sustain the group since the early 
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1980s, contributed to their victory over intra-Lebanese rivals, made the group a more versatile 
threat, and had a major psychological impact on Israel, and to a lesser extent, the United States. 
3.2.3.1 Why were weapons/ammunition such a valuable resource? 
Attack Capability  
Since its inception, Hizballah has relied on a diverse set of tactics in its terrorist repertoire.  
Kidnappings, skyjackings, and suicide bombings dominated its early years. Until the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any 
other terrorist organization.359  It is unnecessary to detail every major terrorist attack ever 
conducted by Hizballah in order to demonstrate how valuable weapons and materiel have been to 
its efforts.  Hizballah’s reputation speaks for itself.  Following its performance in the July 2006 
war with Israel, this reputation has been cemented.  In his assessment of Hizballah’s performance 
in this battle, Andrew Exum writes, “Hizballah trained on, maintained, and used all of its 
weapons systems in a skilled and disciplined manner.”360  Hizballah’s stockpile of Russian 
made, wire-guided and laser-guided antitank missiles even managed to destroy Israel’s most 
modern tank, the Merkava.361   
 
Sustainment/Longevity 
Hizballah will celebrate its unofficial thirtieth anniversary in 2012.  Planning has much to do 
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with the group’s sustainment and longevity.  Beginning in 1996, while the IDF still occupied the 
security zone, Hizballah guerillas constructed fortifications and bunkers throughout southern 
Lebanon and placed mines on routes commonly used by Israeli military vehicles.362  More than 
500 Hizballah arms caches are thought to exist in southern Lebanon alone.363  Without the 
largesse of weapons and materiel shipped into Beirut from Damascus and Tehran, Hizballah 
might not have “prevailed” in its quest to achieve ascendancy within Lebanon itself.  The Shia 
militia was merely one of several armed groups fighting in Lebanon’s civil war, which lasted 
from 1975 to 1990, and saw numerous actors enter and exit the conflict over its duration.364  In 
the first two years of the civil war, Shia fighters suffered heavy casualties at the hands of 
Maronite forces.365  Hizballah’s core group of militants remembered being outmatched in the late 
1970s and vowed to acquire an arsenal of weapons. 
 
Versatility 
The group boasts a diverse armory that allows it to function as a guerilla group or a small-scale 
conventional army.  Besides small arms proficiency, Hizballah is comfortable with explosives—
both smaller, improvised explosive devices and large truck bombs.  In southern Lebanon, 
insurgents would detonate homemade claymore mines containing nails and antipersonnel ball 
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bearings to great effect, a tactic that was adopted by Shia insurgents in Iraq.366  But what makes 
Hizballah so unique is its remarkable versatility.  In addition to what looks like a typical weapon 
inventory for insurgents, Hizballah has obtained plenty of ‘toys,’ such as global-positioning 
systems, advanced aircraft analysis and design software, stun guns, nitrogen cutters, naval 
equipment, ultrasonic dog repelling equipment, and laser range finders.367 
 
Psychological Impact 
There can be little doubt that Hizballah’s 1983 suicide bombing had a profound psychological 
impact on both the United States and France.  Following the bombing, the U.S. withdrew its 
forces from the country.  The truck bombing was one of the deadliest terror attacks ever on 
American forces abroad.  While Westerners coming of age in a post-9/11 world have become 
accustomed to news of suicide attacks in the daily press, in 1983 the use of this tactic was rare.368  
Hizballah’s campaign of suicide bombing was linked to its strategy of expelling the Multi-
National Force (MNF) from the country.369  In southern Lebanon, Israel was forced to confront 
an enemy that hid in plain sight and employed asymmetric tactics including hit and run attacks 
and ambush style raids.  The Israelis were fighting in unfamiliar terrain against insurgents who 
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disguised bombs as rocks, an irregular warfare trend on display today in the slums of Sadr City 
and the wadis of Helmand province.370  These types of attacks sapped the IDF’s morale over the 
years and weakened the leadership’s political appeal with Israel’s domestic population.  In the 
2006 battle with Israel, ketusha rockets rained down on northern Israeli towns and villages as 
Hizballah once again sought to erode the Israeli public’s support for continuing the fight.      
3.2.3.2 How did it change over time? 
Hizballah is arguably the most well-equipped insurgent organization in history.  This is part of 
the reason the Shia militia has been able to go toe-to-toe with the IDF, the most potent military in 
the region and arguably among the fiercest fighting forces in the world.  Over time, Hizballah 
has acquired weapons from Iran, via Syria, that have transformed it more along the lines of an 
army than a terrorist group or militia.    
 While most insurgent groups learn how to use guerilla techniques, not many evolve into 
forces fully capable of fighting as a conventional military able to master so many different kinds 
of weapons.  In its July 2006 battle with Israel, Hezbollah skillfully employed a bevy of weapons 
systems, including: small arms (AK-47s, M-16s, and M-4 carbine rifles), short range (0-25 km) 
surface-to-surface rockets (122 millimeter katyusha), mid- range (>25 km) surface-to-surface 
rockets (“extended-range katyushas, Fajr-3, Uragan, Fajr-5, Khaibar-1, and Zelzal-2), shore-to-
ship missiles (C-701, C-802 Noor), unmanned aerial vehicles (Mirsad-1), and antitank missiles 
(RPG-29, AT-13 Metsis-M, AT-4 Spigot, AT-3 Sagger, TOW, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-14 Kornet-
E).371  Most of these weapons were made in Russia, Syria, and China.  Mimicking Israel’s worst 
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kept secret regarding its nuclear weapons, Hizballah currently maintains a policy of “strategic 
ambiguity” about its anti-aircraft capabilities, declining to confirm or deny the possession of 
advanced Scud missiles in its replenished arsenal.372 
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS 
During its entire existence, Hizballah has only been led by two individuals—Abbas al Musawi 
(assassinated by Israel in February 1992) and Hassan Nasrallah.  To be fair, Iran retains a 
generous amount of influence with the Hizballah leadership and the Islamic Republic’s Supreme 
Leader ‘Ali Khamenei is still revered as Hizballah’s “official” marji al-taqlid, or source of 
emulation.  Other highly respected and learned Shia religious scholars including Iraq’s Ayatollah 
Ali al-Sistani and Lebanon’s Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah also hold sway within the 
inner circles of Hizballah.  Yet, even as current Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah 
settles into his role as an “international celebrity,” and thus muscles his way into gaining more 
autonomy from Tehran, the Iranian leadership continues to be a major part of the story of 
Hizballah.373   
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3.3.1 Command and Control  
Hizballah is rare among insurgent groups.  It has existed for nearly three decades and can claim 
between 20,000 to 25,000 supporters, although this number has almost certainly increased since 
Hizballah’s 2006 war against Israel which the Shia group capitalized on to garner legions of 
support in the Islamic world, including among ‘the Arab Street.’  Over the course of much of 
Hizballah’s tenure, the group boasted anywhere from 500 to 4,000 members comprising its core 
fighting force.374  Its military wing is known as al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic 
Resistance.  It has evolved from “a loose network of militias” to encompass a political wing, a 
social services wing, a media wing, a military wing, and a religious wing.375  A truly complex 
organization—“half political party and half armed militia, part local organization and part 
international movement”—it has grown in sophistication, professionalism, and lethality.376  In 
Norton’s words, “Hizballah has evolved into a Janus-faced phenomenon.”377  To prevent against 
Israeli targeted assassinations of its top members, Hizballah restructured the group’s 
organizational structure in early 1992.  The group layered its leadership, a measure that was 
deemed necessary following the assassination of Abbas al-Musawi and his family in the southern 
Lebanese village of Jibshit in February 1992.378  
 Politically, the group is designed more like a vertical organization.  The highest level is 
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the majlis al-shura, or Consultative Council, which is comprised of seventeen clerics who 
maintain close ties with Iran.379  In turn, the majlis al-shura select Hizballah’s operational 
leadership, which consists of the secretary-general, his deputy, and five of the nine members of 
the Shura al-Tanfiz (Executive Committee), which is different from the fifteen member 
Politburo.380  The Politburo is the main supervisory body of the organization, responsible for 
coordinating party committees devoted to security, social services, and religious activities.381  
Under these bodies are the three regional commands, as well as Military Affairs, Social Affairs, 
and the Trade Union.  The Hizballah hierarchy is discussed at greater length in the section on 
decision-making. 
 In stark contrast to its political wing, Hizballah’s military wing functions horizontally, 
with squads of seven to ten men.  Squads use an elaborate system of communication and operate 
with a high degree of tactical autonomy.382  The command and control structure includes 
“fighting clerics” who derive authority from the Shura Council, linking back to Iran.383  While 
the clerics may derive their authority from the Shura Council, they are not a part of it (nor are 
they part of the Politburo) and thus do not hold political positions within the group.  Yet these 
“fighting clerics” are highly trained in insurgent warfare tactics and communicate within the 
organization.384  Referring to the July 2006 battle with Israel, Exum observes, “Hizballah’s 
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tactical leaders not only were given the freedom to make quick decisions on the battlefield but 
did so with a degree of competence that rivaled their opposite numbers in the IDF.”385 
 Hizballah maintains an active media arm, Al-Manar television station, which is available 
to televisions throughout the world on satellite.386  Al-Manar was instrumental in providing a 
Shia-Lebanese perspective of the 2006 war with Israel, as the “Qana massacre” received 
considerably more attention on Al-Manar than on most mainstream media outlets.  In March 
2006, The US Treasury Department designated the al-Manar television operation, al Nour Radio, 
and the Lebanese Media Group (the parent company to both al-Manar and al Nour Radio), as 
specially designated global terrorist entities.  Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the US Treasury 
for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, proclaimed that, "Any entity maintained by a terrorist 
group – whether masquerading as a charity, a business, or a media outlet – is as culpable as the 
terrorist group itself."387  In addition to supporting Hizballah, Al-Manar has also aided the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.  The State Department placed al Manar 
on the Terrorist Exclusion List back in December 2004, in effect barring individuals who engage 
in a range of actions involving Al-Manar from entering the United States.  
 Clandestine groups are by their very nature secretive.  However, much is known about 
how Hizballah has structured its organization and how, with Iranian assistance, this organization 
has evolved over the years.  Perhaps no institution is more familiar with the group’s ability to 
adapt than the IDF which has seen just how effective Hizballah’s organizational structure has 
been on the battlefield.  Referring to the group’s organizational structure, Cragin proclaims, “the 
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parallel (but separate) religious, political, and military structures in Hizballah—from the very top 
to the very bottom of the organization—have made it easier for the group to translate strategic 
decisions into tactical practice.”388 
3.3.2 Group Composition 
Unraveling the web of influence in Lebanese Hizballah is not a straightforward process.  Due to 
the extent of Iranian influence, it is difficult to identify whether it is Iranian mullahs who wield 
the most power, organic Lebanese Hizballah party members, or revered Shia clerics from Iraq 
whose directives guide the course of the organization.  Moreover, the legitimacy of different 
individuals has ebbed and flowed over the group’s thirty year existence.  The grassroots appeal 
of Hizballah in Lebanese society has paved the way for “disproportionate weight in the party’s 
decision-making process to members of the leadership who hold harder-line views on both social 
and political matters.”389  While certain leaders hold more austere views than others, Muhammad 
Ra’id, the head of Hizballah’s Political Council and a member of the group’s Decision-Making 
Council, believes that Hizballah members are best classified “along a non-ideological continuum 
ranging from ‘flexibility and realism’ to ‘less flexibility and less realism.”390  This section 
provides a thorough background on Hizballah’s most important decision-makers, highlighting 
the various roles played by each, and documents the specific roles these individuals have played 
in making Hizballah the group it is today. 
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3.3.2.1 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah was born in the city of Najaf in 1935 where he studied and 
trained under Ayaytollah Abu Al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Kho’i, an Iraqi cleric well-known for his 
apolitical devotion to Islamic scholarship and jurisprudence.391  Under the guidance of al-Kho’i, 
Fadlallah co-founded the Iraqi Da’wa party in the 1960s.392  Fadlallah moved to Beirut in 1966 
where he preached the doctrine of an Islamic state in Lebanon nearly thirteen years before Iran’s 
revolution in 1979.393  In 1982, he would become known as the cleric and poet credited with 
helping form Hizballah.394  However, his precise role has been widely debated by scholars and 
“Lebanon watchers” over the years.   
 The lack of clarity on Fadlallah’s role has led to an air of mystery and mischief and to 
this day he is the most controversial figure associated with the group.  His association with 
Hizballah is often debated and sometimes denied, but many scholars agree that he is the spiritual 
leader of Hizballah.395  In fact, after the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, Fadlallah became the 
most influential cleric in all of Lebanon.396  As Jaber notes, [Fadlallah] “has on many occasions 
openly identified with Hizballah, but he has also opposed their position.”  Nevertheless, Jaber 
adds, he has served as “a strong source of inspiration,” even if he holds no official title or 
                                                 
391 Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, 
Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, p.139. 
 
392 International Crisis Group, “Rebel without a Cause,” p.12. 
 
393 Jaber, Born with a Vengeance, p.67. 
 
394 Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Reporter at Large: In the Party of God,” Part I, The New Yorker, October 14, 2002. 
 
395 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, New York: Norton & Co., 2006, 
p.114.  Nasr is one of several scholars who refer to Fadlallah as Hizballah’s spiritual guide although Norton believes 
that this characterization is incorrect.  For further elaboration, see Norton, pp.118-119. 
 
396 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, London: Pluto Press, 2002, p.13. 
 
 156 
considers himself as independent from the organization.397  Wehrey et al. settles the debate 
between Ranstorp and Saad Ghorayeb distinctly, declaring “Regardless of whether or not 
Fadlallah has a direct relationship with Hizballah, most experts agree that his beliefs have made 
an impact on the organization.”398  This much is beyond dispute. 
 His inspiration is reflected in the diverse views he holds on a range of subjects, including 
the use of violence, the Palestinian cause, Iranian influence, and participation in electoral 
politics.  Over the years, these views have caused Fadlallah’s relationship with Hizballah to grow 
both “strained” and “tense,” although it still remains civil.399  What is undeniable is that because 
of his position as one of the most respected clerics in all of Shia Islam, Fadlallah has exerted a 
significant amount of influence on Hizballah’s politics over the years. 
 Fadlallah’s views on violence have matured considerably since Hizballah’s founding in 
1982.  Initially, the cleric urged Lebanese and Muslims worldwide to resist the yoke of 
imperialism “by all available means,” to include violence.400  Israeli aggression must be met with 
aggression, argued Fadlallah, who called for war against the Israeli occupation and was 
responsible for organizing a nationwide strike on May 17, 1983, the day that a treaty was signed 
between Israel and Lebanon.401  Although Fadlallah reportedly endorsed and provided 
justification for the suicide attacks in 1983, he then subsequently retracted this support.402 
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 Fadlallah’s role in inciting Hizballah to violence was deemed as so integral that he 
became the target of an assassination attempt carried out by CIA-trained Lebanese agents.403  
The attempt was a joint US-Saudi operation that ultimately failed, although the car bomb used in 
the attempt did succeed in killing eighty-five people and maiming an additional 200.  To pre-
empt a retaliatory attack, the Saudis reportedly paid Fadlallah two million dollars to be used for 
humanitarian aid among the Shia slums of southern Beirut.404  But over the years, and especially 
following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 1982, Fadlallah has preached the ballot 
over the bomb and has at times publicly castigated Hizballah for its resort to the use of arms. 
 One of the most common descriptions of Fadlallah portray him as pragmatic and open 
minded, a rarity among Islamic clerics or religious leaders writ large, who often espouse views 
deemed dogmatic and rigid.  Going against the grain, Fadlallah had argued for political 
participation since the mid-1980s, a position that was widely unpopular at the time, especially 
among Hizballah’s more militant hard-liners.  Believing that Lebanon’s diverse demographics 
made Islamic rule in a purely Islamic state impossible, Fadlallah urged Hizballah’s leadership to 
concentrate on what was achievable, namely, progress through politics.  His position did not 
advocate an immediate about-face, but on the contrary, he insisted on a process of gradual 
reform.405  For Fadlallah, an Islamic state is a long-term goal that cannot be achieved “solely 
through intimidation and violence,” but rather through “a campaign of persuasion.”406  It is this 
view, among several others, that has placed him at odds with the leadership in Tehran, which 
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advocates a more aggressive and direct route to achieving an Islamic state in Lebanon based on 
the path of Iran’s Islamic revolution. 
 Like his relationship with Hizballah, and largely because of it, Fadlallah’s relationship 
with Iran is complicated.  On the whole, Fadlallah almost certainly has more in common with 
Iran’s Supreme leader than he has differences.  Both Fadllalah and Khameini support the 
Palestinians, rail against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and both have advocated  the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.   However, Fadlallah and the Iranian leadership 
should not be viewed as one in the same.  Unlike Hizballah, Fadlallah does not recognize Iran’s 
Supreme leader as his Wali al-Faqih, or religious exemplar.407  Instead, Fadlallah took Sayyed 
Al-Khouii, an Iraqi theologian, as his faqih while looking to Tehran on certain political 
matters.408  In an interview with the International Crisis Group, Fadlallah stated that in regards to 
religious authority, “Iran has no privileged position.”409  When push comes to shove, Fadlallah’s 
agenda remains a Lebanese one first and foremost while Khameini clearly follows an Iranian 
design. 
3.3.2.2 Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah 
Sayyeed Hassan Nasrallah was born on August 31, 1960, the first of nine children born to a poor 
produce salesman named Abdel-Karim Nasrallah.410  Hassan grew up and attended school in the 
Lebanese village of Bazuriya before finishing his formal education in Tyre.  After joining 
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AMAL as a fifteen year old, largely due to the influence of his brother Hussein, Hassan traveled 
to Najaf in Iraq to study under Baqr al-Sadr at one of the most famous Shia seminaries in the 
world.   While in Najaf, Nasrallah would meet his protégé and mentor, Abbas Musawi, who went 
on to establish a religious seminary in Baalbak where he instilled in Nasrallah a “revolutionary 
fervor” and “commitment to change” society which he still symbolizes to this day.411  When 
AMAL split in 1982, Nasrallah joined Musawi and other members who sought to Islamicize the 
movement and eventually became a founding member of Hizballah, taking his place on the 
Shura Council.412  From 1987 to 1990, Nasrallah fought as a mobilization officer in the Biqaa 
Valley, where Hizballah battled AMAL and successfully achieved dominance as the most 
capable defender of Shia interests in Lebanon.413   
 By 1992 Nasrallah was elected secretary-general of Hizballah and has since become not 
only the most recognizable face of the group, but among the most influential and prominent 
Islamic leaders in the entire Middle East.  What he lacks in religious credentials he has made up 
for as a fighter and a gifted orator.  As secretary-general of Hizballah, Nasrallah  has been 
described as “an extraordinarily shrewd leader” who has sacrificed greatly for Hizballah, to 
include losing his oldest son in a battle with the IDF.414  Other caricatures of Nasrallah depict 
him as an “ingenious marketer” who “makes smart decisions” and holds an “almost erotic 
appeal” for his many followers throughout the region.415  Over time, Nasrallah has become more 
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pragmatic while demonstrating an uncanny ability to balance a dual strategy of compromise and 
defiance.  To be sure, it is these two qualities, embodied as politics and resistance that make 
Hizballah unique among insurgent groups as both “a political and military powerhouse.”416  
Nasrallah is credited with guiding Hizballah’s ideological shift over the years, which has been 
marked by “flexibility and adaptability,” effectively allowing the group to “expand its base of 
support and sink deeper roots into Lebanese society.”417 
 Hassan Nasrallah ascended to the leadership of Hizballah just around the same time the 
group was about to take its most serious step into the political arena.  “Under Nasrallah’s 
leadership, Hizballah continues to pursue a strategy of pragmatism, accommodation, and 
engagement in the Lebanese political system,” remarks Hajjar.418  Richard Norton dubs this 
balancing act, “walking between raindrops.”419  Hizballah expert Magnus Ranstorp has closely 
followed Nasrallah’s ideological evolution during his tenure as secretary general and believes 
that Hizballah’s “Lebanonization process” has been a major factor in the pragmatism 
characterizing this transformation.420  Among the major changes that Hizballah has undergone 
while under Nasrallah’s tutelage are a tighter relationship with the Asad regime in Syria and 
occasional cooperation with erstwhile rival AMAL.  But even though Nasrallah has softened 
many of his “hard-line views,” his reign has also overseen an increase in ‘resistance’ activities 
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directed against Israel.421 
 From his earliest days, Nasrallah has been a consistent advocate of attacking Israel.  This 
resistance has included capturing Israeli soldiers, launching so-called “martyrdom operations,” 
continuing to pursue conflict in the Shebaa Farms area of the Golan Heights, and most recently, 
the July 2006 war against Israel that brought death and destruction to both sides.  His undying 
enmity toward Israel has not softened since one of his earliest public interviews in which he 
declared that “Our strategy is to build a future for ourselves through confrontation with the 
Zionist enemy.”422  Despite Nasrallah’s hard-line vis-à-vis Israel, this has not precluded him 
from adopting a softer stance in regard to Hizballah’s participation in the Lebanese political 
system.   Frederic Wehrey observes, “[a]lthough previously supportive of a more militant, non-
participatory role for Hizballah in the late 1980s, Nasrallah came to accept the realities of the 
Lebanese political system.”423  It seems that once he was confronted with the nuances of 
surviving in Lebanon’s complex confessional political system, Nasrallah made the transition 
from ideologue to radical, much the same way Gerry Adams did as leader of Sinn Fein/PIRA. 
 Hizballah’s secretary-general has repeatedly stressed that while the group would respond 
to Lebanon’s domestic concerns with pragmatism and flexibility, its resistance activities “would 
constitute Hizballah’s non-negotiable priority, potentially in perpetuity.”424  And while 
Nasrallah’s open defiance has indeed earned him the status of an “international celebrity,” it has 
also invited a steady stream of criticism from prominent Lebanese voices.  Following the July 
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2006 war against Israel, Gibran Tueni, the publisher of Lebanon’s leading newspaper asked: 
“Who authorized Nasrallah to represent all the Lebanese, to make decisions for them and to 
embroil them in something they don’t want to be embroiled in?  Did Nasrallah appoint himself 
secretary general of the whole Arab world?”425  But although opinion throughout Lebanon and 
the Arab world may remain divided on the appeal of Hizballah’s secretary general, he 
undeniably remains a symbol of strength, defiance, and resistance to the West, as evidenced by 
the posters seen throughout the region that bear his image along with other populist leaders like 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadenijad.426 
3.3.2.3 Ayatollah Ruholla al-Musavi Khomeini 
The legacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini still looms large in Hizballah lore.  Many 
of Hizballah’s leaders were trained in Najaf, Karbala, and Qum, where they had studied under 
Khomeini, as well as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Muhsin al-Hakim.427  Until his death in 
1989, Khomeini was Hizballah’s velayat-e faqih, or model of emulation.  From its inception, 
Hizballah has subscribed to Khomeini’s brand of pan-Islamism which stipulates that Iran and 
Lebanon are “two indissoluble parts of the same nation.”428  The teachings of Khomeini have 
instilled in Hizballah a staunch anti-Americanism and an aversion to Israel that permeates most 
of the group’s writings and statements to this very day.   
 The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 gave Khomeini the confidence to preach the 
                                                 
425 Norton, Hezbollah, pp.117-118. 
 
426 Jerrold Green, Understanding Iran, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2008, p.120. 
 
427 Norton, Hezbollah, p.45. 
 
428 Pollack, Persian Puzzle, p.200. 
 
 163 
benefits of theocratic rule.  According to the late Supreme Leader, Iran is an example of how a 
country can succeed by following Islam and installing a truly Islamic government.  For 
Khomeini, Allah had sent Islam for it to be implemented, and he would see to it that Iran would 
build the model Islamic state but the Revolution would spread throughout the region, including 
Lebanon.429  As Barry Rubin notes, Khomeini “had rejected the idea that ‘Islam in the present 
day is incapable of administering a country.’”430  Hizballah’s founding charter offers an 
indication of the impact Khomeini has had on the organization.  When it was first announced in 
1985, the charter maintained that all members “abide by the orders of the single wise and just 
command currently embodied in the supreme example of Ayatollah Khomeini.”431  Still, 
Khomeini was not above criticism.  Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, graffiti 
sprouted up in Lebanon questioning Iran’s leader.  A popular phrase spray-painted on walls 
throughout Beirut was “Why 598 and not 425?”  This was a dig at the United Security Council 
Resolution 598, which ended the eight year war between Iran and Iraq, and UNSCR 425, which 
called for the restoration of security in south Lebanon, but was still unfulfilled.432 
3.3.3 Ideology 
Hizballah’s ideology has been described as “a fiery mix of revolutionary Khomeinism, Shia 
nationalism, celebration of martyrdom, and militant anti-Zionism, occasionally accompanied by 
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crude, neo-fascist anti-Semitism.”433  Its ideological approach is epitomized by its secretary-
general Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, who through his sermons and official statements, offers 
“ideological ambiguity” and skillfully presents Hizballah’s platform in different ways to 
different audiences.  With the skill of a public relations guru, Nasrallah uses several different 
contexts, or frames, in delivering Hizballah’s message.  His ability to preach in various terms—
religious, nationalist, Arab, anti-Israeli— is an effective means to rally supporters to Hizballah’s 
cause.434  As Norton observes, “ideological currents have shifted dramatically in the last two 
decades in favor of Hizballah, which offers an ideological vision that many Shia now find 
persuasive.”435  
 Not only does the group look to the teachings of the late Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini for 
inspiration, but many scholars believe that Hizballah is actually more faithful to the legacy of the 
Islamic Revolution than are most ordinary Iranians themselves.  But not all experts agree on 
Iran’s role in shaping Hizballah’s ideology.  For example, As’ad Abu Khalil argues that it is 
“inaccurate” to describe Hizballah as an Iranian creation and that the group’s ideological 
platform is the product of the “Islamization” of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and theory.436  Still, 
even a cursory glance at Hizballah’s founding charter as captured in its 1985 open letter 
addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” reveals language heavily colored 
by the Iranian revolution.437  Indeed, Hizballah’s ideological links to Iran have helped shape the 
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group’s stance on the nature of conflict, the ideal character of the nation-state, how to relate to 
other Muslims, and finally, its overall approach to dealing with the West.438 
 Hizballah’s outlook can be considered binary.  This ideological partition divides the 
world between the exploited and the exploiters, or the oppressed (mustad’afin) and the 
oppressors (mustakbirin).439   This dichotomy attempts to convey the dualism and millenarianism 
of the Shia community which views itself as a perpetual underdog in its struggle to achieve 
equality and justice.440  In Hizballah’s worldview, oppression takes many forms, including 
economic, cultural, political and social and transcends both nationality and religion.441  Central 
tenets of Hizballah’s charter include the obligations to struggle against secularism, injustice, and 
the oppression of the ummah by foreign imperialists, especially America and Israel.442  In the 
words of Nasrallah’s deputy Sheikh Na’im Qaseem, “even if hundreds of years should pass by, 
Israel’s existence will continue to be an illegal existence.”443  According to Hizballah’s ideology, 
the mere existence of Israel is anathema.444     
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3.3.4 Popular Support 
 Hizballah is a prominent example of an insurgent group that enjoys a significant amount of 
popular support, both domestically and within the wider Arab and Islamic world.  Hizballah’s 
main base of support is located in three general areas: Beirut and its surrounding environs; 
southern Lebanon; and the Bekaa Valley/Hirmil Region.445  While some of the group’s prestige 
is a result of success fighting against Israel’s superior military, Hizballah’s social services 
provision earns the group active internal support, which according to the US Army and Marine 
Corps Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24) is “usually the most important form of support to an 
insurgency.”446  Still, how can we truly know if Hizballah commands as much popular support as 
it claims?  In Christopher Paul’s review of the social science literature on terrorism and 
insurgency, he concludes “popular support is too often assumed and the processes by which it is 
generated and maintained not often problematized.”447  Support for Hizballah in Lebanon is 
apparent by its role as a major political player in Lebanon, as the group continues to consolidate 
power.448  Anecdotal evidence from newspapers and journal articles suggests that Hizballah is 
perhaps more popular than ever before.   
 In an effort to quantify this support, Simon Haddad of Notre Dame University in Jounieh, 
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Lebanon has conducted comprehensive survey research to unearth the reasons for the group’s 
‘rock ‘n roll’ like status.  Haddad’s study concludes that the Party of God is so beloved in the 
Shia community for its adherence to religious piety and the social aspects of Islam.  Furthermore, 
the majority of respondents polled held positive views toward the growth of the organization and 
its use of force, while backing Hizballah’s refusal to disarm in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1559.449   
 Hizballah is the best-organized group operating in Lebanon and retains the broadest base 
of support of all Shia political parties in the country.450  This support is cross-cutting and extends 
across other ethnic groups.  According to a World Public Opinion.org poll conducted in August 
2006, support for Hizballah was measured as the following: 96 percent of Shias, 87 percent of 
Sunnis, 80 percent of Christians, and 80 percent of Druze.451  These figures would be impossible 
to imagine during any point of Lebanon’s fifteen year civil war.  While some of the group’s 
popularity was no doubt a result of its perceived success fighting the Israelis a month prior to the 
poll, these numbers still indicate that Hizballah’s appeal extends beyond Lebanon’s Shia 
community.  Hizballah’s popularity should come as little surprise.  In contrast to other political 
parties and even the Lebanese state, Hizballah provides a wide range of social services at little or 
no cost to the community.  Hizballah offers a “vast network of womb-to-tomb services” 
including hospitals, schools, orphanages, and credit programs.452  Capacity gaps breed functional 
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holes which have hampered the efforts of Lebanon’s government to address the needs of its 
population.453  In the absence of the state’s ability to provide for all of its citizens, Hizballah has 
filled the void and come to the rescue of the oft-neglected Shia community of southern 
Lebanon.454  The Lebanese government has welcomed these efforts in recognition that they are 
required for domestic stability.  Several scholars have found that when an insurgent group is the 
only provider of goods and services in an area, support for these organizations is higher than in 
areas where multiple entities supply services.455  
 These programs can be divided between large service providers and smaller, more 
specifically targeted outreach efforts.456  Some of the larger services include Jihad al-Binaa 
(JAB), or Construction Jihad, and the Islamic Health Committee (IHC), both opened in 1984.  
Three years later, in 1987, the Relief Committee of Imam Khomenei (RCIK) was opened in the 
Hrat Hreik section of the southern suburbs around Beirut.457  The Relief Committee was 
responsible for the creation of an employment office as well as the formation of several technical 
trade institutes, including those open to women.   
 These services, in addition to many others throughout Lebanon, receive funding from 
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Iran.  In the early years, Hizballah reportedly received between five and ten million dollars a 
month, although Jaber suggests that it is possible that the figures are higher.458  The funding has 
decreased over time, but financing from Iran is still considered a major resource for Hizballah, 
which uses the money to maintain its ubiquitous social welfare infrastructure.  Surely, many 
Iranians must wonder why their government subsidizes an insurgent group in Lebanon even as 
Iran’s own economy continues to suffer, exacerbated by more restrictive sanctions imposed by 
the West in response to Tehran’s ongoing nuclear ambitions. 
3.3.5 Public Relations/Propaganda 
Hizballah transmitted the first broadcast of its television station Al-Manar (“The Beacon”) in 
1991 and began regularly scheduled broadcasts a mere three years later.  Al-Manar is also known 
as Qanat Al-Moqawama, or the Station of Resistance and serves a critical function as the main 
dissemination point for Hizballah news and propaganda.  In addition to Al-Manar, Hizballah 
maintains an extensive media operation that includes Al-Nur Radio, Al-Intiqad Weekly Journal, 
Baqiatollah Islamic Magazine, as well as a network of over fifty websites that operate in several 
languages, including English, French, German, and Arabic.459  Al-Manar is not just a Lebanese 
phenomenon.  Rather, its popularity has facilitated its growth into one of the leading news 
organizations of the Arab world.  The station broadcasts worldwide via satellite and runs on an 
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annual budget of roughly $15 million.460   
 Insurgency is armed politics, and a large part of politics is disseminating a favorable 
message to a target audience.  Hizballah’s propaganda operations are sophisticated enough to 
allow for a two-pronged approach.  The group targets both the “enemy audience” (Israel) and a 
“neutral audience.”  The main themes directed toward Israel are Hizballah’s unremitting resolve 
and determination to continue the fight; the notion that this conflict will be a long struggle; the 
futility of Israeli aggression; the quagmire of the conflict; the well-defined political aim of 
Hizballah’s cause; and finally, guilt-induced messages geared toward exploiting sympathetic 
Israelis, both citizens and soldiers alike.461  To the neutrals, Hizballah’s propaganda reinforces 
the portrait of the Israelis as foreign occupiers intent on sullying Islam and occupying Muslim 
lands.  Furthermore, Hizballah attempts to convince neutral audiences that Hizballah alone is the 
most legitimate entity in Lebanon and the only force capable of regaining Lebanon’s sovereignty 
following decades of war and occupation.  
 Just as impressive as Hizballah’s television and video production is the group’s extensive 
use of new media and information technologies, including its widespread presence on the 
internet.462  Nasrallah has his own personal website, complete with archives of his speeches and 
a photo gallery divided into various sections, including: military operations, Lebanese brigade, 
Islamic resistance, Al-Aqsa intifada, attacks, Qana massacre, Mansoura massacre, and “other 
massacres.”  On Hizballah-run websites, the term Israel is always placed in quotation marks and 
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Israelis are frequently referred to as Nazis.   
 The content available on Hizballah’s websites is a reflection of the group’s diverse 
agenda and includes: news and information, welfare and social services, religious indoctrination, 
personal information of Hizballah leaders, anti-Israeli content, bulletin boards, and youth-
oriented features.463  Targeting youth is a bald attempt at recruitment.  In 2010, to further its 
effort toward engaging the younger generation, Hizballah developed an online video game 
application where players wage a war against Hizballah’s enemies, mainly the Israelis.  Before 
the game begins, a player takes rounds of target practice against a lineup of well-known Israeli 
politicians.464  The two primary Hizballah-run websites are www.hizbollah.org and 
www.ghaliboun.net.  When Israeli hackers interrupted service on these websites during the July 
2006 war, Hizballah’s own hackers hijacked communication portals of companies, cable 
providers, and web-hosting servers in south Texas, suburban Virginia, as well as Delhi, 
Montreal, Brooklyn, and New Jersey.465 
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3.4 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
Figure 9: Timeline of Hizballah Seminal Events, Attempts at Conflict Resolution, MHS 
3.4.1 Goals/Objectives 
The Party of God is a subnational group striving to control territory within Lebanon while 
retaining an austere Shia Islamist influence to its politics.466  Hizballah has several primary 
objectives, although the group is well aware that some are more quixotic than others.  In an ideal 
world, Hizballah seeks to create a wider Islamic community and to export the Islamic Revolution 
abroad.  Over the years, it has announced its intention to jettison the Israelis from Jerusalem and 
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holds the restoration of the rights of Muslims everywhere as a sacred duty.467  But Hizballah’s 
decision to participate in Lebanese parliamentary elections for the first time in 1992 is a clear 
indication that the group is finally “coming to terms with its socio-political setting.”468 
 With Israel’s 2000 unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hizballah reached a 
crossroads.  Resisting occupation was at the core of Hizballah’s doctrine, as spelled out in its 
1985 open letter.  Two years prior to Israel’s withdrawal, and perhaps in anticipation of it, 
Nasrallah and Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Na’im Qaseem hinted that the 1985 open 
letter is now obsolete and that it should no longer be considered as “an authoritative guide to the 
party’s positions.”469  While the letter did serve its purpose, it was now relegated to the Hizballah 
archives as a document which “belonged to a certain historical moment that had passed.”470  
Even though the seminal document outlining Hizballah’s core beliefs has been downplayed by 
some of the group’s top leaders, the long-term objectives of Hizballah remain the same.  It still 
seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon based on the ideals of the Iranian 
revolution and the elimination of the State of Israel.471   
 If the group’s 2006 war with Israel is representative of its continued desire to wage a 
protracted struggle against Israel, what about the issue of establishing an Islamic state in 
Lebanon, a country with a mosaic of religions, ideologies, and ethnicities that include Muslims 
(Shia, Sunni, Druze, Alawite), Christians (Maronites), fundamentalists, moderates, secularists, 
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communists, Arabs, Armenians, and Palestinians?  When asked about his views on an Islamic 
state in Lebanon, Nasrallah replied: “We believe the requirement for an Islamic state is to have 
an overwhelming popular desire, and we’re not talking about fifty percent plus one, but a large 
majority.  And this is not available in Lebanon and probably never will be.”472  That Nasrallah 
and the Hizballah leadership grasp this reality is reflected in the group’s political strategy which 
works within the framework of a multi-sectarian Lebanon.473  Nevertheless, Hizballah believes 
that it is a religious duty to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon because this is the only form of 
government suited to achieving justice, equality, and freedom until the return of the divinely 
anointed Hidden Imam (Mahdi).474  
3.4.2 Seminal Events 
3.4.2.1 Death of Khomeini (1989) 
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini precipitated what many have called Hizballah’s 
‘Lebanonization’ process.  The ‘Lebanonization’ process, described at length by numerous 
scholars but most comprehensively articulated by Magnus Ranstorp, refers to the deliberate 
decision by powerful players in Iran’s theocracy and Hizballah’s leadership to transform the 
group from a terrorist organization into a military, political, and social force within Lebanon.475  
As Wehrey observes, Hizballah’s changing views on participation in the political process began 
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to take shape and “were in large measure linked to broader changes in the clerical leadership of 
its primary patron and financier, Iran, following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.”476  
Influential members of Hizballah had grown weary of being seen as a stalking horse for Iran and 
sought to assert a greater degree of autonomy from Tehran, in effect nationalizing the resistance 
to reflect a Lebanese, not an Iranian agenda.   
 To replace Khomeini, Ayatollah Ali Khameini ascended to the status of Supreme Leader 
of Iran and in the process, inherited a wealth of challenges, including an economy in tatters from 
eight years of continuous war.  Commenting on the death of Khomeini, Norton notes, “the 
charismatic symbol of the revolution was replaced by men of more modest proportions who 
would now have to address the daunting, if mundane, challenges of post-revolutionary Iran.”477  
One of these challenges was Iran’s relationship with Hizballah, and its spiritual guide Sayyid 
Muhammad Hussein Fadllalah who openly questioned Khamenei’s religious credentials.  As 
discussed earlier, Fadlallah looked toward Iraq, not Iran, for inspiration.  Tensions between Iraq 
and Iran were at an all-time high immediately following the death of Khomeini, who had vowed 
to pursue the war with Iraq until Saddam Hussein was defeated.  Khameini was elevated to 
succeed Khomeini mainly due to his popularity with conservative clerics in Iran, but outside  
Tehran, Khameini was still an unknown quantity.  As such, Fadlallah found more in common 
with the moderate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and together, the two “proved instrumental in 
bringing to power a new cadre of clerics who transformed Hizballah’s political strategy,” and 
ushered in the era of one of Hizballah’s rising stars, Hassan Nasrallah.478 
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 The death of Khomeini and his replacement by Khameini as Hizballah’s ultimate source 
of authority touched off a power struggle within Iran over the future direction of the group.  
Right around the same time as the death of Khomeini and the elevation of Khameini to Supreme 
Leader, the emergence of President Rafsanjani signaled the marginalization of the Iranian 
revolutionist faction and a move toward moderation in both Iran and Lebanon.479  Rafsanjani 
was concerned with rebuilding the Iranian economy and normalizing relations with the Arab 
world following the eight year war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988.480  In a move that 
was symbolic of the schism between moderates and conservatives in Iran following the loss of 
the Islamic Revolution’s leader, Rafsanjani deemphasized militant Shia ideology as he recast 
Iranian foreign policy in more pragmatic terms.481   
 Hizballah, for its part, was determined to gain greater independence from Iran in order to 
depict the group as Lebanese, first and foremost.  In certain areas, Hizballah gained the 
independence it sought but with more autonomy came less funding from its principal sponsor 
and new pressures to raise money through alternative sources and methods.482  Furthermore, 
even as Rafsanjani loosened the reins in some areas, he tightened them in others by replacing 
Pasdaran units in Lebanon with those more pliable to ‘official Iran’ and placing his brother, 
Mahmud Bahramani, in charge of Syrian and Lebanese affairs at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs.483   
 The death of Khomeini, the symbol of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, had a major effect on 
the future direction of Hizballah.  Many see this moment as pivotal in changing Hizballah’s 
trajectory by influencing the decision to expand and evolve its portfolio beyond a terrorist group 
and into a formidable ‘hybrid’ organization capable of waging war and contesting elections.  In 
the section on decision-making, I detail the machinery and inner-dynamics at work behind 
Hizballah’s official entry into politics during the 1992 parliamentary elections in Lebanon.  
3.4.2.2 War with Israel (2006)  
Conceptualizing Hizballah as an insurgent group takes some imagination and definitional 
flexibility.  As defined by RAND researcher Martin Libicki’s list, the insurgency in Lebanon 
lasted from 1975 to 1990.  Hizballah was merely one faction among many that participated in 
this insurgency, described by others as closer to a civil war.  But one also needs to consider the 
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon which lasted from 1982 to 2000, a period that saw 
Hizballah emerge as Israel’s primary enemy.  Attacks and small skirmishes between the IDF and 
Hizballah guerillas continued in the years following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.  Hizballah 
remains armed and a look at the group’s rhetoric reveals that its animosity toward its ‘Zionist 
enemy’ has not tempered in the least.  For practical purposes, until Hizballah disarms and 
renounces violence, it can be considered to be in a perpetual state of insurgency.   
 The desire and capability to continue jousting with Israel reached a tipping point in July 
2006 when Hizballah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers just over the border.   In what has become 
one of the most studied and analyzed conflicts of the past decade, Hizballah fighters battled the 
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IDF for thirty three days.484  By most accounts, Hizballah more than held its own against Israel 
and perceptions that Hizballah actually “won” the battle have emboldened the group’s leadership 
and magnified its popularity throughout large portions of the Arab and Islamic world.  This 
perception of victory, real or imagined, has serious implications for the future of Hizballah.  If 
Hizballah had been thoroughly routed by the IDF, as many observers predicted, the group may 
have been more likely to acquiesce to demands of disarmament and an overwhelming Israeli 
military victory could have signaled a death knell for one of the world’s most notorious 
terrorist/insurgent groups.485   
 In his analysis of the conflict, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” Exum notes 
that some of the IDF officers he interviewed for his study are convinced that Hizballah is 
“completely trained by Iran in both its weapons skills and its tactics.”486  This view may be 
outdated and reflects an ongoing debate over exactly how much control Iran still maintains over 
Hizballah, at least from a purely military perspective.  What is clear, however, is that Hizballah 
has far more metis than its Iranian counterparts.  Metis is the hands on experience gained through 
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conducting guerilla activities repeatedly in local settings.487  Indeed, as Exum relates, “the 
fighters of Hizballah have infinitely more combat experience and acquired tactical nous than 
their Iranian sponsors,” leading some to the conclusion that Hizballah trains Iran, not the other 
way around.488   
 In counterinsurgency, having superior military forces does not automatically guarantee 
victory.  The war of perceptions is sometimes just as integral to determining success as tactical 
and operational ability on the battlefield.  While there is certainly an element of ‘David versus 
Goliath’ when comparing Hizballah’s forces with the Israel’s, it was the IDF’s indiscriminate 
bombing of Lebanon that drew the most ire from the Lebanese population and the broader 
international community.489  In “Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War,” 
William M. Arkin assessed that as the conflict continued over the course of thirty-three days, 
Israel’s use of air power was of diminishing value because of the lack of discrimination among 
its targets.490  Although he remains a staunch supporter of the use of airpower in COIN, Arkin 
concludes that “Hizballah may not have defeated Israel on the battlefield, but the organization 
won the hearts and minds of many.”491   
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 The “hearts and minds” component of the conflict is anything but trivial.  Various 
commentators, including Amnesty International, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and 
former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, all condemned Israel’s conduct of 
the war and depicted Israel as the aggressor, even though Hizballah’s actions initiated the 
skirmish.492  The damage Israel inflicted on Hizballah will yield short-term gains at the expense 
of long-term, strategic objectives.   
 
3.4.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
Hizballah’s ideology and public statements make clear that “negotiating with Israel is only a 
form of compromise that validates Israel’s occupation of Palestine,” and as such, Hizballah will 
never sign any agreement with Israel, make peace with the Jewish state, or otherwise legitimate 
the existence of Israel.493  Yet, Hizballah has negotiated with Israel on more than one occasion, 
even if only through intermediaries.  Negotiations have been held regarding the “rules of the 
game,” in southern Lebanon (with the help of German mediation in 1996) and also negotiated 
exchanges for the bodies of dead fighters.494  This section examines the Taif Accords of 1989 
and the ongoing negotiations between Syria and Israel to determine what lessons can be learned 
from history and whether or not Hizballah might ever decide to officially recognize Israel and 
declare an end to its three decade old insurgency against Tel Aviv. 
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3.4.3.1 Taif Accords (1989) 
 
The first major breakthrough in the thirty year insurgency raging in Lebanon was the signing of 
the Taif Accords in 1989, a peace agreement which officially ended the Lebanese civil war.  A 
tri-partite commission of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria helped broker the agreement, with 
the Saudis playing the biggest role.  As a result of the Taif Accords, the President was still 
reserved for a Christian, the Prime Minister would still be a position held for a Sunni Muslim, 
but now the Prime Minister would be responsible not to the President, but instead to the 
legislature, as in a traditional parliamentary system.   
 Hizballah did not play the role of spoiler in the process, but on the whole, the group was 
unhappy with the outcome.  Essentially, the Taif Accords cemented the notion of a “shared 
existence” between the various sectarian groups in Lebanon and altered the balance of power by 
taking some authority away from the Maronites.495  Other changes initiated by the agreement 
were an increase from 108 to 208 members of Parliament, divided equally among Muslims and 
Christians.  But the Shiites in Lebanon felt that not enough was done to change the system.  In 
their eyes, the changes left the Maronites to play the “hegemonic role” in the political system 
while Muslims would now be “politically accountable, yet without any real power.”496 
 But how radically did the Taif Accords change the reality on the ground in Lebanon?  
While the accords did modify certain principles, they did not alter the basic character of 
Lebanon’s system and as such, the country remains “more-or-less a consociational 
                                                 
495 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, New York: Holmes and Meier 2002, p.157. 
 
496 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah, p.27. 
 
 182 
democracy.”497  The intent of the accords were to bring about an end to the violence while also 
finding a way to reconfigure the political system in such a way that it mollified or at least 
seriously addressed the grievances of all of Lebanon’s ethnic communities and thus suffocated 
the embers of civil war in such a way as to not have them flare up again.  However, as Hudson 
concludes, “Taif in practice deviated significantly from Taif in theory.”498  
 As part of the Taif Accords, which became official when the parties in agreement signed 
the ‘Document of National Understanding’ on September 21, 1990, all militias throughout the 
country except Hizballah were to disarm.499  Because it held a unique role as a “resistance force” 
fighting the Israelis in southern Lebanon, Hizballah was allowed to retain its weapons and 
remain armed.  This final part is quite interesting from a historical perspective because it begs 
the question: if the Israelis did not occupy the security zone at the time of the Taif Accords, 
would Hizballah have been forced to disarm as part of the agreement, thus ushering the group 
into mainstream politics while simultaneously “declawing the ‘Party of God?’”  To be fair, 
another part of the Taif Accords called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops, which had 
maintained a presence in Lebanon even longer than the Israelis did, dating back to 1976.500  
Syrian withdrawal did not occur until 2005, and even though the Syrian presence drew far less 
ire from everyday Lebanese than did the Israeli occupation, the fact that both the Syrian and 
Israeli militaries refused to flinch until the other did first only further complicated efforts to 
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broker a peace deal between the two countries.  As a result, Lebanon was stuck in the middle.   
 Analysis of Hizballah’s behavior in the lead up to and the immediate aftermath of Taif 
revealed an interesting transition that would forecast the group’s future moves.  By acceding to 
the stipulations laid out in Taif, Hizballah went from a “revolutionary ‘total refusal’ anti-system 
party” to an “anti-system ‘protest’ party.”501   This shift attenuated the power of the ideologues 
and strengthened the hand of those in favor or participating, at least theoretically, in the 
Lebanese political system.  Still, this seemingly slight shift produced major implications. 
 Even though Hizballah was not particularly pleased with the main pillars of the Taif 
Accords, the group made no attempts to sabotage the peace process.  One of Hizballah’s central 
tenets is the avoidance of public disorder, and the group’s one time Secretary General Husayn al-
Mussawi continually reinforced the message that even ‘an oppressive government is preferable 
to chaos.’502  In retrospect, the Taif Accords marked the beginning of Hizballah’s long-term 
strategy of infiltrating the political system with the aim of changing the system gradually, simply 
through participation. 
3.4.3.2 The Golan Heights 
At this stage in the game, Hizballah is in a position to call its own shots and negotiate (or more 
importantly, not negotiate), when and how it wants.  But for much of its existence, the main 
obstacle to disarming Hizballah was the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and 
Syria.503  In 1983, Israel reached a peace agreement with Lebanon to end its occupation only to 
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have Syria step in and force the Lebanese government to abrogate the treaty in March 1984.504   
 The dispute between Israel and Syria dates back to the 1967 Six-Day War when Israel 
captured the Golan Heights, which it officially annexed in 1981.505  A function of geography, the 
Golan Heights represent a significant military advantage, as the side that controls this territory 
maintains both an offensive and defensive edge due to the plateau’s elevation.  Furthermore, the 
Golan (and the still disputed Shebaa Farms regions) is valuable for the water resources contained 
within this area in what is otherwise desolate terrain.   
 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has made clear that a complete Israeli withdrawal from 
the Golan is a prerequisite to any potential peace deal.506  Still, one has to wonder if the Syrians 
would be willing to make peace with Israel and demand the disarmament of Hizballah even if the 
Israelis were to relinquish their claim to the Golan, a long- shot proposition in its own right.  
Syrian intransigence was one of the main reasons that Israel withdrew from Lebanon unilaterally, 
and not as part of a broader peace deal.  US brokered peace agreements between Israel and Syria 
stalled in both 1999 (in Shepherdstown, West Virginia) and 2000 (in Geneva, Switzerland).507   
 Norton has referred to Lebanon as a “pawn in the regional game” between Israel, Syria, 
and Iran, with other actors, including the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey 
involved peripatetically at various points.508  In 2012, the positions of the players and the 
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dimensions of the regional game look drastically different than they did a decade ago.  Both 
Israel and Syria have withdrawn their military forces from Lebanon.  The survival of the Syrian 
regime is in question and Iran’s regional position is arguably much stronger following the 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power and other regional developments across the Middle 
East.  Most importantly, Hizballah appears to be firmly entrenched in the Lebanese government 
while still retaining the capability to incite a regional conflagration by provoking Israel, as it did 
in July 2006.   
 Following the cease-fire between Hizballah and Israel in July 2006, several Israeli 
cabinet ministers, including Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Internal Security Minister Avi 
Dichter, proposed the idea of restarting negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights.509  
Members of the Likud party criticized the government for appearing to negotiate from a position 
of weakness, although back channel negotiations still took place.  However, with lingering 
instability in Damascus and the war of words escalating between Washington and Tehran, even 
resolving what was once thought to be an intractable problem will not guarantee success on the 
issue of disarming Hizballah. 
3.4.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
A mutually hurting stalemate can provide the opportunity for what Zartman has dubbed “a ripe 
moment.”  These moments can present themselves following long periods of tit-for tat-violence, 
or major flare-ups of fighting punctuated by aggressive military incursions and operations.  
While there was several “ripe moments” throughout Israel’s eighteen-year occupation of 
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southern Lebanon, none were able to produce a serious breakthrough in the stalemate.  And 
although Israel’s military is far superior to Hizballah’s guerilla insurgency, by the mid- 1990s the 
ratio of Hizballah to IDF/SLA casualties was less than 2:1, down from a ratio of 5:1 in the 
1980s.510 
3.4.4.1 Israeli Withdrawal (2000) 
The decision to withdraw Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000 capped the end to an 
eighteen year occupation that began in 1982 with Operation Peace for Galilee, an operation 
ostensibly intended to remove the threat of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerillas 
launching attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory.511  Galilee was an effort to finish the 
job left undone four years earlier by Operation Litani, the first major Israeli incursion into 
Lebanon aimed at countering the threat of Palestinian terrorists recently relocated from Jordan to 
Beirut.   After three years of operating in southern Lebanon (in direct violation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 425 which called for Israel to withdraw to the recognized 
international border), the Israeli government voted on and approved a measure to establish a 
“security zone” in southern Lebanon on January 14, 1985.512  The security zone was 
demonstrable evidence of Israel’s commitment to occupying Lebanon on a long-term basis, 
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building a defense infrastructure that consisted of forty-five SLA and IDF outposts, between 
1,000 and 1,500 Israeli soldiers, and 2,500 Southern Lebanon Army fighters, in addition to 
another several hundred Israeli intelligence officials spread over a 328 square mile area.513  It 
also demonstrated Israel’s disregard for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 
which Israel clearly saw as an inferior instrument of ensuring security in the area.  The stated 
reason for establishing the security zone was to counter attacks from Palestinian guerillas as well 
as to prevent Hizballah from launching Katyusha rockets into northern Israel.   
 In 1993 and 1996, respectively, Israel responded to Hizballah incursions over the 
Lebanese-Israeli border with Operation Accountability and Operation Grapes of Wrath.  The 
former operation was ordered in response to escalatory attacks traded back and forth between 
Hizballah and Israel in the early 1990s.  These included the Israeli assassination of then-
Hizballah Secretary General Abbas Musawi in 1992 and counterattacks by Hizballah that 
included the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, as well as an intensified 
campaign of mortar and rocket attacks in northern Galilee.  Throughout Operation 
Accountability, Israeli warplanes bombed the Shia villages of southern Lebanon, causing 
thousands of Shia to flee north to Beirut.514   
 The goal of the IDF was to pressure the Lebanese government into restraining Hizballah.  
But the very idea that the Lebanese government had the ability to achieve this objective, even in 
the face of mounting Israeli pressure, was vigorously debated within Israel at the time.  Many 
believed that Beirut lacked this capability, especially as the government was only three years 
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removed from a civil war and by 1993 Hizballah was already a well-trained and equipped force 
within Lebanon.  In reality, only Syria was capable of reining in Hizballah and although the end 
of Accountability appeared to some members of Israel’s Knesset as an opportune moment to 
initiate peace talks with the Syrians, correctly identifying this break in the fighting as a “ripe 
moment, Israeli military officials saw the security zone as essential to protecting Galilee and 
other parts of northern Israel.515  In what would lead to another seven years of perpetual 
stalemate, the most concrete result of this operation was the establishment of “the rules of the 
game.”  
 “The rules of the game,” is a phrase that was an axiom developed over time and tacitly 
recognized by all sides following Accountability in 1993.  According to “the rules,”—brokered 
in part by France, Iran, Israel, Syria, and the United States—Hizballah would not target Israel 
proper if Israel refrained from targeting Lebanese civilians or civilian targets.516  Although both 
sides often violated “the rules,” they became codified in a sense and legitimately placed a limit 
of sorts on conflict between Israel and Hizballah.  In fact, according to Norton, when Hizballah 
insurgents killed Israeli soldiers within the confines of the security zone, IDF spokespersons 
referred to these killings as having been “within the rules.”517 
 “The rules of the game” were blatantly violated during Israel’s Operation Grapes of 
Wrath in 1996, which is best remembered for the Israeli shelling of more than 100 Muslim and 
Christian civilians who had taken shelter at a United Nations base in Qana, Lebanon.518  The site 
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of a cemetery for the victims has become a shrine and place where Lebanese of all backgrounds 
make regular pilgrimages.  The Qana massacre is commonly cited as one of the major reasons 
for the “underlying hatred” of Israel that continues to “fester” more than fifteen years after the 
killings.519  All told, Israel conducted over 2,000 air raids and dispensed over 25,000 artillery 
shells but still failed to achieve its strategy of ‘circular pressure,’ which Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin explained was an attempt to use “coercion as a tool of diplomacy” to pressure non-Shia 
Lebanese citizens to disarm Hizballah.520   
 The period between 1994 and Israel’s withdrawal six years later was characterized by 
Hizballah ambushes against the IDF throughout the security zone, a severe curtailment of COIN 
force freedom of movement, and the gradual erosion of morale among the Israeli military forces 
stationed in Lebanon.521  Between May 1993 and May 1997, Israel suffered an eight percent 
casualty rate among its soldiers serving in southern Lebanon, a relatively high rate of attrition 
considering the modest number of combatants deployed to the area.522  But the event that marked 
a renewed push among Israeli citizens for the military to withdraw from Lebanon was a 1997 
helicopter crash, Israel’s version of ‘Black Hawk Down,’ that killed seventy three soldiers and 
became the symbol of a countrywide protest movement throughout Israel led by the Four 
Mothers movement.523   
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 While some military officials within Israel welcomed the stalemate with Hizballah in lieu 
of a violent escalation, by 2000 a consensus had been reached that the “indefinite nature of the 
operation” in southern Lebanon actually made Israel less safe and more vulnerable to attack.524  
Toward the end of the occupation, the conflict in Lebanon had been framed as “Israel’s 
Vietnam,” a morass that had come to be viewed as a “tragedy,” in stark juxtaposition to the 
narrative of “Lebanon as heroic work,” that was the norm among the majority of Israeli citizens 
and officials in the early and intermediate stages of the conflict.525   
 Following the election of Ehud Barack as prime minister in 1999, an Israeli withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon became a fait accompli and was officially set in motion in the summer of 
2000.  According to Dalia Dassa Kaye, whose research focuses on the role of political leadership 
in reframing ‘the Lebanon issue,’ the Israeli withdrawal “marked a dramatic turning point in 
Israeli security policy.”526  But for anyone hoping that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 
would provide the much needed opening to initiate a dialogue between Israel and Syria and 
ultimately lead to the disarming of Hizballah, their hopes were soon dashed.  Shortly following 
the Israeli withdrawal, Hassan Nasrallah publicly stated that “As long as Israel threatens 
Lebanon every day with air strikes, attacks, and punishment, Lebanon has the right to maintain 
all elements of strength that can confront these Israeli threats.”527 
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3.4.4.2 Consociationalism & Civil War in Lebanon  
Military stalemate in an insurgency rarely tells the whole story.  In Lebanon, the country’s 
unique ethnic/religious makeup and confessional political system contributed to an ongoing 
political deadlock that prevented the government from making a modicum of progress on some 
of the most pressing political issues.  Hudson’s analysis of Lebanon’s consociationalist political 
system described the system as government rule by a cartel of ethno-sectarian elites responsible 
for managing “their respective ‘flocks’” and maintaining a civilized working relationship.528  
This system of government was a byproduct of Lebanon’s legacy of colonialism and a pragmatic 
attempt to balance the levers of power between a population that was one-third Shia Muslim, 
one-third Sunni Muslim, one-third Christian Maronite, with a smattering of ‘other,’ to include 
Armenian Christians, Greek Orthodox, Druze, Phalangists, and Palestinian refugees. 
 The Lebanese Civil War lasted from 1975 to 1990 and led quickly to the breakdown of 
government structures as Lebanon was engulfed by anarchy, earning the nickname the “militia 
republic.”529  The multi-dimensional nature of the conflict saw “several phases, each marked by 
complex shifting alliances and dozens of failed cease-fire agreements.”530  In fifteen years of 
fighting, the war included both large-scale massacres of civilians (the most notable of which was 
the infamous slaughter of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982) and vast 
numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee flows.    
 Besides the myriad Lebanese actors involved in the civil war, regional rivalries between 
                                                 
528 Hudson, “Trying Again,” p.105.  For a thorough treatment of Lebanon’s political system, see Michael Hudson, 
The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon, New York: Random House, 1985. 
 
529 Hudson, “Trying Again,” p.112. 
 
530 Ibid, p.109.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail each side involved in the fighting at various points of 
Lebanon’s civil war.  In my opinion, the most vivid recount of the war is offered by Thomas Friedman in From 
Beirut to Jerusalem. 
 
 192 
Syria and the PLO, the PLO and Israel, Israel and Syria, and Iran and Iraq, each contributed to 
the chaos in Lebanon.531  As I detail in the forthcoming section on conflict resolution, messy 
insurgencies lead to messy outcomes.  Indeed, as Connable and Libicki note, “insurgencies with 
more than two clear parties involved have longer, more violent, and more complex endings.”532  
By this criterion, Lebanon was no exception.  At one point in the conflict, more than ten separate 
autonomous political-military organizations were involved in the fighting and any recognizable 
pillar of government had dissolved altogether.533 
3.4.5 Decision-Making Structure and Process 
Hizballah’s decision-making process will never seem entirely transparent to outside observers.  
After all, the organization is a globally-designated terrorist group and must maintain a level of 
secrecy, operational security, and overall opaqueness.  According to a report by the International 
Crisis Group, while Hizballah’s constituency is influential and typically factored into the group’s 
decision-making process, more weight is given to “members of the leadership who hold harder 
line views on both social and political matters.”534  In accordance with Irvin’s typology, these are 
the ideologues and radicals.  Holding considerable although not infallible authority over the 
Majlis Shura al-Qarar, or Decision-making Consultative Council, is Nasrallah.535  Decisions are 
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normally reached through consensus and occasionally by a formal vote.  Other influential groups 
within Hizballah’s decision-making structure are high-ranking resistance fighters and key 
personnel from the security and intelligence agencies.536   
3.4.5.1 ‘Lebanonization’ and the Electoral Process (1992) 
As detailed above, the death of Khomeini in 1989 prompted a critical reappraisal of Hizballah’s 
strategy following the end of Lebanon’s civil war.  The most controversial topic in the early days 
of a Post-Taif Lebanon was whether Hizballah would contest the parliamentary elections in 
1992.  Up until this point, Hizballah maintained a policy of abstaining from political 
participation, even though Fadlallah had argued against this policy for years.537   
 The ‘Lebanonization’ process that began after Khomeini died gained steam in the first 
two years of the 1990s and signaled not only Hizballah’s acceptance of a multi-religious 
Lebanon but also the tacit recognition of the legitimacy of the state’s political institutions.538  As 
with most significant decisions, the actual decision to enter formally into politics “was heavily 
debated within Hizballah,” according to K. E. Wiegand.539  Much like the PIRA, an important 
sticking point for those who decided to support the move into politics was that the “bullet and the 
ballot” were not mutually exclusive.  Therefore, sitting for elections did not preclude maintaining 
a militia with an arsenal and continuing to exist as a resistance movement.   
 By the early 1990s, Hizballah’s leadership came to believe that the longer the group 
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stayed out of politics, the more influence it was leaving on the table.  Shortly before Hizballah 
participated in the 1992 elections, in which it would claim eight of 108 seats, Nasrallah 
announced, “It is important for the party to be represented in the Lebanese parliament in order to 
contribute to the elimination of political confessionalism, which is one of the party’s main 
goals.”540  Cliff State, who looks at Hizballah through the lens of political opportunity structures, 
has surmised that Hizballah’s reputation as a “clean” party stood in contrast to other Lebanese 
political parties which were notoriously mired in corruption.541   
 Hizballah’s decision to make a foray into political life reflects a tectonic shift within the 
movement itself as power diffused from ideologues to radicals.  This shift came at the expense of 
hard-liners in Iran who saw Hizballah as a direct extension of the legacy of the Islamic 
Revolution.  Again, it is necessary to reemphasize here that Sheikh Fadlallah was a major figure 
in pushing for the moderation of the group’s stance in favor of eschewing elections.  Fadlallah 
insisted that because an Islamic state would not be feasible to achieve given Lebanon’s diverse 
society, gradual reformation of the party’s views were essential if Hizballah was to make 
progress and secure the ability to affect Lebanon’s political, social, and economic realities.  As 
Norton observes, “by being inside the political system, Hizballah might also be able to shape 
political dialogue to its benefit, as well as head off problematic initiatives,” including the 
Lebanese national budget.542 
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3.4.5.2 Relationship with Iran and Syria 
There is no doubt that Iran has played a major role in Hizballah’s rise from a disorganized militia 
to a powerful politico-military force in Lebanon.  It is widely known that both Syria and Iran 
exert some level of influence over Hizballah’s decision-making, although Syria’s role has been 
minimized and Iran’s influence has waxed considerably since the death of Khomeini.  Khamenei 
lacks the same currency with Hizballah’s leadership and “although in theory Khameini has the 
final say, his role appears to be more subtle,” never overruling a single decision made by the 
Consultative Council.543  His influence via Hizballah is de jure rather than de facto and as his 
approval has been reduced to little more than a rubber stamp.   
 The relationship between Iran and Hizballah is based on a shared ideology and a financial 
backing that provides Hizballah with both money and weapons to ensure that Israel must account 
for the threat on its border.  But despite Iran’s role as a “sugar daddy” of sorts, Hizballah does 
not take orders from Tehran nor does it operate at the behest of the Iranian government, the 
Pasdaran, or the Supreme Leader.544  Most experts agree that Iran had no operational 
involvement with the planning and execution of Hizballah’s 2006 conflict with Israel.545  Still, 
after observing the popularity that the battle generated for Hizballah throughout the region, the 
Iranians were quick to take credit.  More recently, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
has accused Iran of using Hizballah to strike at Israeli targets abroad, including the July 2012 
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suicide bombing of a Bulgarian bus that killed five Israeli tourists.546  Other attacks have been 
thwarted in locales as diverse as Cyprus, Kenya, India, Thailand, and Georgia. 
 This “policy of rapprochement” has cemented Hizballah’s position within Lebanon’s 
confessional political system, but Nasrallah’s public statements are often explicitly clear in 
conveying Hizballah’s unwillingness to even consider making peace with Israel.547  Still, just as 
was the case with the PIRA, when it comes to “never saying never,” actions speak louder than 
words.  Like Gerry Adams did with the British in Northern Ireland, Nasrallah takes a hard line 
against Israel in his public statements.   To those like Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson who 
believe Hizballah is ready to “shift more decisively into the political realm,” incendiary speeches 
are interpreted as both posturing for Tehran while simultaneously mollifying the hard-liners 
within the group— until the conditions become ripe for a deal to be struck.548   
 Of the two countries, Syria has played the role of junior partner to Iran in its dealings 
with Hizballah.  This is not to downplay Syria’s role in Lebanese affairs, however.  Syria has 
served as the main conduit for Iranian arms passing into Hizballah-controlled Lebanese territory.  
Moreover, Syria has worked tirelessly behind the scenes to manipulate Lebanese internal 
political dynamics from 1992 until 2005, when Syria was forced minimize its presence in 
Lebanon following the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 
2005.549  Up until the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, Syria relied on Hizballah and to a 
                                                 
546 Joby Warrick, “Attack on Israeli Tourists Prompts Fears of Escalating ‘Shadow War,’” Washington Post, July 19, 
2012. 
 
547 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah, p.156. 
 
548 Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Disarming Hizballah: Advancing Regional Stability,” Foreign Affairs, 
January 2010; also see, Steven N. Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Declawing the ‘Party of God,’” World Policy 
Journal, Summer 2001. 
 
549 Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” p.482. 
 197 
lesser extent the Lebanese government to further its regional policy objectives, especially as 
these related to countering Israeli hegemony in the Middle East.550  
3.4.6 Why did Hizballah Negotiate?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hizballah is a unique insurgent group to analyze because of its’ truly hybrid nature.  It is, without 
a doubt, part political party and part ‘army without a state.’  Why did Hizballah choose the path 
toward ‘Lebanonization’ in the first place and make a foray into politics if it never intended to 
make the full transition to political party?  The short answer is, because it could.  As detailed 
above in the section on the 1992 elections, Hizballah’s decision to enter the Lebanese political 
system was not a default decision, but one that was debated at length within the group.551  The 
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rationale behind the decision was the following: by entering the political process, Hizballah 
would become a legitimate actor in Lebanese politics.  If the group was legitimate, then so was 
its continued resistance.552   
 At the time that Hizballah made the decision, the group’s political leverage over the 
Lebanese government, due in large part to Syrian backing, allowed it to stand for elections 
without having to jettison its weapons.  Just two years removed from a decade and a half long 
civil war, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were in the process of being reconstructed.  
Hizballah’s operational tools, including its training, intelligence, and weapons, meant that it was 
the only Lebanese entity capable of defending the south of the country, which in 1992 was still 
occupied by the IDF (and would continue to be for another eight years).  Moreover, unlike the 
nascent LAF, as a military force, Hizballah was willing to take casualties defending Lebanon.   
 Still, joining the political process was not without its cost to the Party of God.  In 
exchange for entrance into Lebanese politics, Hizballah agreed to alter its objectives to achieve 
its domestic political goals.  This included pursuing a more moderate political agenda, honoring 
the post-Taif confessional system, softening its rhetoric, and working with the majority 
government parties on a range of issues.553  The most obvious concession Hizballah made was to 
abandon its aspirations of remaking Lebanon into an Islamic republic ruled by sharia law.  A 
further price to pay for achieving status as an opposition party within the government was the 
agreement not to use violence for domestic political purposes.  Hizballah’s continued resistance 
against Israel in the zone of occupation was officially recognized as legitimate by the Lebanese 
government, a point insisted upon by Hizballah’s Syrian overlords.  
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3.4.6.1 Why hasn’t Hizballah Negotiated Completely? 
If it is clear why Hizballah negotiated its way into the Lebanese political system, it is less 
apparent why the group has refused to negotiate completely.  Much of the literature on why 
insurgents abandon violence or what factors shape organizational behavior once the group has 
fully transitioned into politics assumes a linear progression from terrorist to statesman.554  I 
argue that there are three main reasons why Hizballah has not made the complete transition to 
political party and has instead decided its best interests are served by functioning as a hybrid 
politico-military organization.   
 First, none of the sides in the Lebanese insurgency have recognized the existence of a 
military stalemate.  Hizballah’s 2006 conflict with Israel reinforced this reality.  By fighting the 
Jewish state to a standstill, Hizballah was lionized throughout the Arab and Muslim world as a 
vanguard of Islamic resistance.  For its part too, Israel declared victory, despite the fact that 
Hizballah refused to surrender the two Israeli soldiers it kidnapped to begin the conflagration.  
The safe return of these soldiers, whom Israel now believes are dead, was a stated objective of 
the IDF in launching its attacks on Hizballah.  Despite the establishment of a political wing, 
Hizballah still relies on its military wing to achieve certain objectives.  Unlike the relationship 
between Sinn Fein and the PIRA, the relationship between Hizballah’s political and military 
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wings has never reached the level of mutual opposition or competition.  On the contrary, these 
two entities enjoy a symbiotic relationship characterized by strategic cooperation.555 
 Second, in the case of Hizballah, politics has not been tied to a clear-cut conflict 
resolution strategy.  Hizballah’s insurgency is primarily against Israel, even though the IDF no 
longer occupies Lebanon proper.  Nevertheless, following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, 
Hizballah maintained that Israel still occupied the Shebaa Farms, and thus its insurgency would 
continue.  According to Wiegand, “[F]rom 2000 to early 2005, Hizballah’s status became more 
legitimate, despite its continued control of an armed militia.”556  Violence is still seen by 
Hizballah as a primary tool to affect change.  And why shouldn’t it be viewed this way, since the 
group’s use of violence almost always produces the desired results.  In May 2008, Hizballah 
insurgents stormed downtown Beirut and sparked fighting that resulted in the deaths of 65 
people.  The political violence was employed ostensibly to protest the removal of a pro-
Hizballah manager at the Beirut airport and investigations into Hizballah’s private 
communications network.  In the end, in exchange for a promise not to use violence domestically 
to settle political disputes (which should have been implicit in the group’s agreement to join the 
political process back in 1992), Hizballah was granted veto power within the Lebanese 
parliament.557 
 Third, despite examples of success in cases where the two were not linked, the 
international community has insisted that disarmament take place as a first step in the 
international recognition of Hizballah’s legitimacy.  As a matter of fact, Hizballah is a political 
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powerhouse in Lebanon with a strong base of popular support, as evident through its success in 
elections both parliamentary (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005) and municipal elections (1998, 2004).  
The stark reality is that the Party of God is not going away.  Yet, both Israel and significant 
members of the international community refuse to recognize Hizballah, even tacitly, as a 
legitimate political party.558  One of the primary motivations for the Israelis in the July 2006 war 
was to disarm Hizballah through military action.  Both UNSCR 1559 and UNSCR 1701 call for 
Hizballah to disband its arsenal.  But the group has no incentives to do so and insisting on 
Hizballah’s disarmament as a precursor to international recognition is only prolonging the 
group’s transformation from a hybrid to a full-blown political party.    
 While it is not a direct reason for its refusal to negotiate, Hizballah’s war chest has 
allowed the group to continue its hybrid operations.  Hizballah’s funding stream derives from a 
combination of state sponsorship, an array of organized criminal activities, donations made from 
the Lebanese diaspora and other sympathizers abroad, as well as legitimate businesses.  From 
Iran alone, Hizballah is estimated to receive $200 million annually.559  This money is transferred 
to the terrorist group in deliveries of cash, in the form of weapons, and through private charities 
linked to Iran’s leadership.560   
 Even as its own economy suffers under increasing sanctions, Iran continues to fund 
Hizballah because the simple fact is that Iran needs Hizballah.  The showdown over Iran’s 
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nuclear program has led to an escalating ‘shadow war’ between Iran on one side and Israel and 
the United States on the other.561  This war has the plotlines and characters of a great spy novel.  
Iran accuses the Tel Aviv-Washington alliance (with the tacit blessing of Riyadh) of 
assassinating its nuclear scientists, launching sophisticated cyber attacks aimed at crippling its 
ability to enrich uranium, and funding anti-Iranian terrorist groups like Jundallah.562  Besides 
targeting Israeli diplomats and embassies abroad, Iranian nationals and Hizballah members were 
implicated in a foiled assassination plot that involved hiring Mexican gang members to kill the 
Saudi ambassador to Washington.563  From a conventional military standpoint, Iran is limited in 
what it can do to strike back at its adversaries, so many observers believe this will lead Tehran to 
continue fund Hizballah to provide it with the operational ability to strike on Iran’s behalf.564 
 Unlike other groups that need to spend precious time and energy figuring out how to 
finance their day-to-day operations, Hizballah enjoys the benefits of foreign patronage, which 
allow its members to focus on fundraising in other arenas, including expatriate remittances, front 
companies located both within Lebanon and abroad (primarily in Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia) and various forms of crime ranging from cigarette smuggling to film piracy to credit card 
fraud.  Indeed, sustaining the organization’s ever-growing legitimate portfolio makes its criminal 
activities that much more critical.   
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 The group has also been accused of dealing in more pernicious forms of crime, like the 
trade in conflict diamonds and narcotics smuggling.  In 2011, an investigation into the Lebanese 
Canadian Bank revealed that Hizballah maintained extensive ties to the South American cocaine 
trade.  The Lebanese Canadian Bank helped the Shiite terrorist group launder its profits from 
cocaine trafficking by mixing drug proceeds from money earned through the sale of used cars, 
purchased in the United States and resold in Africa.565 
 In the case of Hizballah, the group still has not reached a tipping point toward 
negotiations.  This can best be summarized by examining the parallel growth of Hizballah’s two 
wings, the political and the military.  In contrast to the PIRA, whose two wings were 
characterized by an inverse relationship (as Sinn Fein grew in prominence, the Army Council 
faded), “Hizballah’s restricted but constant war against Israel indicated that its political military 
and political wings had developed in parallel, attempting to promote a public image of two 
separate identities while both remained under the control of the same leaders.”566 
 Hizballah’s insurgency is so complex because it is actually two separate insurgencies.  
The domestic insurgency within Lebanon continues, while the insurgency against the Israeli 
state, which Hizballah justifies by citing Israel’s occupation of the Shebaa Farms, is mostly 
dormant, but punctuated by spates of violence.  The group maintains an aggressive posture 
toward Israel because it is popular within Lebanon.  The continuing insurgency against Tel Aviv 
is critical to Hizballah’s legitimacy within Lebanon and its status as a resistance force (this is 
also one of the primary reason why Hizballah can avoid disarmament).  It is the combination of 
Hizballah’s claim as a resistance force coupled with the legitimacy it derives from social welfare 
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that “provide it with enough justification among the populace, that the populace (in the South) is 
willing to tolerate (or even see as a reasonable situation) Lebanese Hizballah as a quasi-
governmental organization, grafted onto the Government of Lebanon, that retains its arms.”567 
 Hizballah is hybrid organization involved in both politics and terrorism and as Matthew 
Levitt has pointed out, so long as the international community fails to raise the cost to Hizballah 
for continuing to exist as such, “why would they ever give up violence so long as it helps them 
politically (aside from any ideological commitment to violence, which there is as well)?”568  
With a group like Hizballah, there are no easy answers, just difficult questions.  Because it is 
able to maintain its arsenal while also functioning as a “deeply embedded political party” and an 
“integral part of the political system,” the group “confounds simple stereotypes and 
classifications.”569  “The Party of God” boasts an arsenal of 40,000 missiles and enjoys veto 
power as a full partner in Lebanon’s coalition government.570  The paradox of Hizballah is that it 
thrives as both a political party and an insurgent group, not a political party or an insurgent 
group, yet many observers still fail to conceptualize it as the former.  This problem of 
categorization makes crafting concrete policy recommendations more complex.   
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Table 2: Hizballah Analytic Framework Summary Analysis 
Operational Tools 
Training Hizballah has received elite-level training from the IRGC since the early 1980s, which has transformed the 
group from a militia into an army.  Hizballah’s military wing poses issues for disarmament and future 
integration into the LAF, making negotiations difficult. 
Intelligence After spending two decades battling the IDF and SLA in southern Lebanon, Hizballah’s intelligence apparatus 
experienced firsthand a sapping IDF morale.  Negotiating an end to the ongoing conflict with Israel seems 
unlikely since Hizballah already perceives its adversary as lacking commitment. 
Weapons At the present time, Hizballah’s weaponry remains one of the group’s greatest strengths.  Still, since the 
majority of its arsenal is paid for and supplied by Iran, this remains a source of potential future vulnerability for 
Hizballah. 
Organizational Tools 
Command & Control With a support base of between 20,000-25,000 individuals, Hizballah’s infrastructure provides it with a robust 
constituency.  Its social services wing, combined with a legion of loyal supporters, ensures the group’s 
legitimacy, which in turn provides it with leverage. 
Group Composition The leadership is influenced by a conservative, hardline element within Iran’s ruling circle.  While Nasrallah 
has displayed a pragmatic streak and would likely negotiate within Lebanon, any chance of a Lebanese-Israeli 
détente is slim with Hizballah’s leadership involved in the decisionmaking. 
Ideology Hizballah’s ideological flexibility bodes well for the prospects of further political compromise on the part of the 
organization. 
Popular Support At the time of this writing, Hizballah’s popular support in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world is higher 
than ever.  Following the 2006 battle with Israel, Hizballah’s social service wing helped rebuild the Shia slums 
of South Beirut and southern Lebanon. 
Propaganda Al-Manar, Hizballah’s sophisticated media arm, uses propaganda to denounce Israel.  This has the effect of 
prolonging the conflict by hardening attitudes on both sides are reinforcing the idea that negotiations with the 
‘Zionist-Crusader’ alliance is apostasy.   
Strategic Decision Making 
Goals Hizballah’s goals have undergone a substantial evolution from the time of the group’s ‘Open Letter’ in 1985.  
The group’s leadership has come to terms with the reality that due to Lebanon’s ethnic and religious diversity, 
achieving an Islamic state is unrealistic.  It now seeks to consolidate political power. 
Seminal Events The death of Khomeini in 1989 was initially greeted with optimism by those advocating for Hizballah to 
disarm and become a non-violent party in the Lebanese landscape, although these observers were soon 
disappointed.  The 2006 conflagration with Israel makes the chances of negotiations extremely unlikely. 
Previous attempts at 
conflict resolution 
The Taif Accords ended the civil war and put Hizballah on an equal footing with Lebanon’s other politico-
military organizations.  Negotiations over the Golan Heights have served as a stumbling block to progress 
between Hizballah and Syria and will likely continue to be so even if the Assad regime falls. 
Mutually hurting 
stalemate 
The Lebanese consociational political system and Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 are emblematic of 
Hizballah’s overlapping insurgencies. 
Decision-making 
structure & process 
Hizballah’s decision-making structure and process represents the clearest indication that an end to the domestic 
insurgency is likely.  If Hizballah does become more closely integrated with the Lebanese state, this is also a 
positive sign for an eventual negotiation with Israel, including possible recognition of Tel Aviv. 
 
 206 
4.0  LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) 
 
 
4.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND 
British Ceylon gained independence in 1948 and has been known as Sri Lanka since 1972.  Sri 
Lanka has a population of 18 million people, the majority of whom are ethnic Sinhalese (74 
percent).  Another 18 percent of the population is Sri Lankan Tamil (6 percent of whom are 
Upcountry or “Estate Tamils”) who are primarily Hindu, while another 7 percent are Tamil 
Muslims.  The remaining population, less than 1 percent, is comprised of small numbers of 
Sinhala Christians, Anglo-Sri Lankans, and descendants of European settlers.571   
The conflict between Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus initially stemmed from 
differences in tradition, heritage, language, religion, and color and the fact that Sri Lankan 
Tamils were highly educated and thus represented disproportionately in commerce, professional 
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opportunities and government service.  Due largely to their superior numbers, the Sinhalese were 
politically more powerful than the Tamils and beginning in the 1950s, began to discriminate 
against Tamils in areas including education, religion, and language.  K.M de Silva, a Sri Lankan 
historian, observes, “the Sinhala have sometimes thought of themselves as a chosen people with 
a providential mission, who are for that reason entitled to cultural, linguistic, and political 
supremacy in Sri Lanka.”572  This discrimination was accompanied by a rise in Sinhala 
nationalism, which grew stronger even as Tamil leverage was further reduced.  Four main factors 
can be traced to the rise of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka following independence in 
1948:  a backlash against British Colonialism, the material conditions associated with 
nationalism (these included communication, transportation, industrial production, mass markets 
and mass politics, general systems of public educations, and a Weberian bureaucratic component 
with administrative structures designed to support standardized mass society),573 perceptions of 
an antiquated and inequitable distribution of resources and positions (especially in the 
government), and a desire to exercise majoritarian rule with all the benefits this type of 
government afforded.574   
The Tamil insurgency began in earnest when violence erupted in northern Sri Lanka in 
the early 1970s.  Several Jaffna politicians were targeted for assassination and in 1974 a common 
criminal by the name of Chetti Tanabalasingham founded the Tamil New Tigers (TNT).575  To 
counter intimidation of the Tamil minority in a highly polarized society, the Tamil United 
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Liberation Front (TULF) emerged in 1976 amidst calls for a separate Tamil state.  Two years 
later, a small group of hardcore Tamils broke off from TULF to form a separate Tamil 
organization— the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were born.576   
4.1.1 Operating Logic 
The Tamil Tigers can accurately be described as an ethno-nationalist insurgent group that fought 
for secession from the state of Sri Lanka.  The LTTE sought to establish an independent Tamil 
state in northeastern Sri Lanka, where the majority of Sri Lanka’s Tamils live.  Sri Lanka’s long 
legacy of colonialism invited both Portuguese and Dutch influence and following 150 years of 
British rule, the government was unable to peacefully manage the ethnic differences that were 
exposed following independence in 1948.  Gradually, over the next several decades, the Sri 
Lankan government rolled back Tamil rights and reasserted the power of the Sinhalese majority.  
It was the combination of majoritarian rule and exclusivist ethnic policies of the Sri Lankan state 
through the 1960s and 1970s that gave rise to the Tamil separatist ideology.577   
 Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, a coherent, militarized Tamil insurgency had 
formed and consisted of several groups.  In addition to the LTTE, these groups included: the 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the People’s Liberation Organization for Tamil 
Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Liberation Front (precursor of the Tamil Liberation Organization, or 
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TLO578) and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).579  Through a 
combination of violence and coercion, the LTTE consolidated control over these other 
organizations and “established itself as the principal and most lethal voice of militant Tamil 
aspirations.”580   
In the earliest stages of the conflict, the COIN forces of the government in Colombo were 
completely unprepared to deal with an insurgency.  The Sri Lankan armed forces were more of a 
“parade force” than a military.  The Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) had no combat experience 
and barely any concept of how to wage a successful counterinsurgency campaign against a well-
disciplined and motivated insurgent group.  Since the Tamils effectively controlled the Jaffna 
peninsula in the northeast of the country, the LTTE had a home base from which it could train, 
plan, and execute attacks against the military.  Furthermore, across the Palk Straits in Tamil 
Nadu, India, the LTTE was able to rely on the support—both active and passive—of thousands 
of ethnic Tamils who sympathized with the group.   
In July 1983, the LTTE slaughtered thirteen government soldiers, prompting sectarian 
rioting and ethnic conflict throughout the country.  Over 300 Tamils were killed/died violently 
during the riots.581  This marked the beginning of civil war in Sri Lanka.  Following the riots, 
125,000 Tamils who had been living in southern Sri Lanka relocated to the predominantly Tamil 
north of the country, while 5,000 Sinhalese Sri Lankans departed the Jaffna peninsula and 
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resettled in the south.582  Tens of thousands of Tamils fled the country altogether and moved to 
Tamil Nadu. 
4.1.2 Type of Insurgency 
The insurgency in Sri Lanka is an example of a “Local-International” insurgency.  Geopolitics 
shaped the relationship between India, a capricious supporter of the LTTE, and Sri Lanka, a 
country that maintained good relations with Pakistan and China and was perceived by the Indians 
as abandoning New Delhi’s non-aligned movement through Colombo’s ties to the West.  The 
Tamil diaspora played a major role in financing the LTTE, running its global arms procurement 
network, and establishing a sophisticated propaganda wing that framed the struggle in terms 
favorable to the Tigers’ goal of an independent Tamil Eelam.  The LTTE maintained extensive 
contacts with other insurgent groups throughout the globe.  Yet even though the international 
dimension of the conflict played a significant role in the Tamil insurgency, the outcome was 
ultimately decided by local factors and local forces.  Tamil nationalism remained germane to the 
Tamil ethnic group and never became part of global struggle.  On a regional scale, Tamil 
ambitions were relegated to Tamil Nadu in southern India. 
4.1.3 Approach 
The Tamil Tigers were an adaptive and innovative insurgent organization that evolved over time 
and learned to fight as both a guerilla group and a conventional military.  Proficient in a range of 
tactics and comfortable fighting in jungles, urban centers, or on sea, the LTTE pioneered the use 
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of suicide terrorism and assassinated heads of state with relative impunity.  Velupillai 
Prabhakaran consolidated control over the LTTE and molded it into the pre-eminent Tamil 
insurgent group.  Along the way, he spearheaded a campaign to marginalize or outright eliminate 
any rivals to the group.  The group’s domestic and international capabilities mutually reinforced 
each other and grew to include a global arms procurement network and a sophisticated 
fundraising arm that blended licit and illicit businesses along with money laundering operations 
that facilitated the group’s activities. 
 The Tigers have routinely been anointed by many COIN experts and scholars as the most 
comprehensive, lethal insurgent force in history.  The group skillfully combined low intensity 
guerilla warfare with conventional capabilities, including the asymmetric use of suicide bombing 
and highly effective maritime operations, all bolstered by a robust diaspora network ready and 
willing to supply funds and arms at a moment’s notice.  The LTTE fought in the jungles and in 
the cities while it pursued a Maoist strategy in the quest for an independent Tamil homeland.583  
The first phase of the insurgency established base areas where hard-core members of the 
movement mobilized supporters.  Following a second phase of terrorism and assassinations, the 
LTTE incorporated more conventional operations designed to inflict severe pain on the Sri 
Lankan government forces and convince Colombo’s politicians that not only was the war not 
winnable, but it was no longer worth fighting.  Cease-fires by the insurgents were only accepted 
when the Tigers needed an opportunity to rest, recuperate, and prepare to reengage.  
The fundraising effort organized by Sivaganam Gopalarathinam, afforded  the LTTE the 
ability to develop its military wing into the most comprehensive guerilla force in history, 
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complete with an air force (the Air Tigers), a navy (the Sea Tigers), a suicide commando unit 
(Black Tigers), an intelligence group, and an elite fighting wing known as the Charles Anthony 
Regiment.  
4.2 OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
LTTE operational tools included weapons, sanctuary, and funding, pitted squarely against a Sri 
Lankan COIN force that waged a take-no-prisoner war to exterminate Prabhakaran and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weapons 
Funding 
Sanctuary 
Diplomatic Pressure 
Counter-Intelligence 
Tactical Innovation 
COIN FORCES INSURGENTS 
Continue 
Fighting  
 
Versus 
 
Negotiate 
Figure 11: LTTE Force Field 
 213 
4.2.1 Weapons/Ammunition 
The LTTE’s weapons procurement network has been called the “most secretive” of the group’s 
international operations.584  The earliest identified network was run by Sothilingam 
Shanthakumar, a smuggler from the Velvettiturai (VVT), a fishing port that serves as the base for 
a distinct caste of Tamil fishermen.585  Until 1987, the LTTE relied almost exclusively on the 
Indian intelligence services, especially the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to provide arms 
and explosives.586  From 1987 onward, following the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord, the LTTE 
sought to diversify its source of weapons and made the establishment of a global procurement 
network one of its top priorities.  The Tamil Tigers also used explosives to establish themselves 
as one of the most feared insurgent groups in the world, known for their extensive use of suicide 
bombing.  Finally, the group developed legitimate air and sea capabilities to complements its 
ground forces, thus rounding the organization into a comprehensive military threat.   
4.2.1.1 Why were weapons/ammunition such a valuable resource? 
 
Diversification of Weapons and Weapons Sources 
In any insurgency, diversifying the source of a group’s weapons is critical, as the LTTE learned 
in 1987 when the Indians withdrew their sponsorship.  Per the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan 
Peace Accord, the Indian government agreed to cease its support for the Tigers by cutting off the 
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arms pipeline.  The importance of diversification was even more apparent following the downfall 
of one of the LTTE’s main rivals, the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOTE).  PLOTE was crippled when a shipment of weapons destined for the group was 
intercepted in Madras and the group’s leaders forfeited a $300,000 down payment already paid 
to the Palestinian group al-Fatah.587  Keen not to suffer a similar fate, the LTTE developed 
contacts abroad, and soon engaged in procurement activities in Northeastern and Southeastern 
Asia (especially China, North Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Burma), 
Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), former Soviet Republics (primarily Ukraine), 
Southeast Europe and the Balkans (Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus), the Middle East (Turkey, 
Lebanon), and Africa (Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and South Africa).588   
The South African connection proved particularly fruitful for the Tigers.  Situated 
between the active arms markets of Mozambique and Angola, weapons dealers in South Africa 
provided the LTTE with consistent access to a steady supply of small arms.589  Furthermore, 
South Africa maintained a fairly robust communications and transportation infrastructure, which 
made it an attractive location for illicit activity.590  For most of the 1990s, the Tigers used Burma 
as a logistical hub but later moved the bulk of their operations to Bangkok.  Thailand’s 
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geography, established international business presence, and easily corrupted security officials 
made it an ideal choice for the LTTE’s logistical hub.591 
From the post-Cold War arms bazaars in Beirut and Peshawar, and especially those in 
Cambodia, Burma, and Afghanistan, the insurgents acquired rapid-fire pistols, assault rifles, 
rocket-propelled grenades, and surface-to-air missiles.  Ammunition needs were met through 
intermediaries in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and North Korea, which supplied mortar, 
artillery, and 12.7 mm machine gun rounds.592  Occasionally, as it did in Mullaithiu in 1996, the 
LTTE would raid Sri Lankan military bases and steal whatever weapons were available.  The 
Mullaithiu  raid proved extremely bountiful, as the insurgents acquired multi-barrel rocket 
launchers (MBRLs), T69-1 RPG launchers, artillery batteries (122mm, 130 mm, 152mm), 
various mortars (120 mm, 106mm, 81mm, and 60mm) and an array of anti-armor and anti-
aircraft systems, to include W-85 anti-aircraft guns.593  Finally, the group rounded out its arsenal 
through the procurement of explosives from suppliers in the Ukraine and Croatia.594   
The LTTE’s procurement network was led by Tharmalingham Shunmugham, alias 
Kumaran Pathmanathan and known in shorthand simply as “KP.”  He was so closely associated 
with the Tigers’ arms network that their global weapons operations were referred to as the “KP 
Department.”595  The “KP Department” prioritized the acquisition of explosives, but unlike the 
PIRA, the LTTE was not adept at producing these indigenously.  In August 1994, the “KP 
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Department” arranged for the shipment of between 50-60 tons of RDX and TNT explosive 
acquired through the Rubezone Chemicals plant and sent from the Port of Kikoleyev in Ukraine 
to Sri Lanka.  The deal was brokered through an LTTE front company known as Carlton 
Trading, which was based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and facilitated through the use of false end-
user certificates.596  Other front companies were set up in Chittagong, Rangoon, and Kuala 
Lumpur.597   
The LTTE’s weapons inventory, in addition to the arms and equipment listed above, also 
included a T-55 tank, Russian-made Strela-3 manportable air defense systems (MANPADS), six 
Czech built Zlin Z-143 single-engine aircraft, 50 to 100 frogman kits and five to 10 underwater 
scooters, a fleet of 500 to 1,000 fiberglass boats, between six and 10 Mirage-class boats, and four 
partially completed submersibles.598  The insurgents used GPS systems to more accurately 
deploy their missile projectiles well before the COIN force acquired this same capability.599  
Such an extensive arsenal gave the LTTE the flexibility to fight as guerillas, or if it chose, 
to battle SLAF COIN forces in more conventional warfare.  Most insurgent groups engage in 
asymmetric conflict because it is their only option.  But the LTTE was one of the most dynamic 
groups in history, partly due to its ability to fight in a number of ways.  An evaluation of the 
LTTE’s military capabilities by Jane’s supports this assessment: 
“At its peak, prior to the 2008-2009 SLA offensive, the LTTE had successfully 
developed and implemented an impressive range of conventional and non-
conventional tactics, and was able to routinely strike at a wide range of different 
targets.  The group earned a reputation for its mastery of conventional, land-based 
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warfighting, regularly deploying its battle-hardened cadres against heavily 
fortified military targets.  Such operations frequently showcased the LTTE’s 
ability to coordinate direct and indirect fire, and on occasion LTTE ground forces 
even mounted combined arms operations together with the group’s naval and air 
wings.  Unusually for a sub-state group, the LTTE was able to supplement its 
mastery of manoeuvre warfare with an effective use of positional warfare.”600 
 
 
Links to Other Insurgent and Terrorist Groups  
The LTTE’s efforts to procure weapons and establish a global arms network brought it in contact 
with several other insurgent and terrorist groups.  In addition to Khalistan-oriented Sikh 
insurgents, Kashmiri mujahedin, and Middle Eastern militants, the Tigers forged links with over 
20 separate Tamil Nadu separatist groups.601  While many of these relationships were temporary 
and tactical, more an example of strategic cooperation than a long-standing relationship, others 
proved durable and resulted in considerable tacit knowledge transfer.  Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
insurgents were trained by LTTE Sea Tiger officers in seaborne suicide tactics in Indonesia.602  
Technological exchange occurred with Indian insurgent groups such as the United Liberation 
Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War, also 
known as the Andhara Peoples War Group, or PWG.603  When PWG member Marepalli 
                                                 
600 Ibid. 
 
601 These groups include The Tamil National Retrieval Force, People’s War Group, Liberation Cuckoos, Peasants 
and People Party, MGF Anna Dravida Munethra Kalaham of Thirunavakarasu, Tamil National Movement of 
Nedumaran, Indian People’s Party, Center for the Campaign of Tamil Education, Thaliai Nagar Tamil Society, 
Movement of the Educated Front, Tamil Nadu People’s Movement, Thileepan Society, People’s Education Center, 
Tamil Nadu Socialist Party, Republic Party of India, People’s Democratic Youth Front, Liberation Organization of 
the Oppressed People, World People’s Progressive Front, Human Rights Organization, Organization for Social 
History, and the Marxist Periyar Socialist Party.  Van de Voorde, “Sri Lankan Terrorism,” p.192. 
 
602 IHS Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency, “Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam.” 
 
603 Gunaratna, International and Regional Implications.” 
 
 218 
Basavaraju was apprehended by the Indian government he admitted that his group had received 
explosives training from an LTTE expert in land mine technology.604   
The Sea Pigeons have allegedly served as an intermediary between insurgent groups and 
have transported arms to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on behalf of Harakat-al Muhahideen, a 
Pakistani militant group linked to Al-Qaida.605  Though the group became wary of associating 
with Al-Qaida or Al-Qaida affiliated groups following the attacks of September 11th, the LTTE 
continued to train divisional commanders of the Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M).606  
Other insurgent groups known to commiserate with the LTTE at various times during its 
existence include the Revolutionary Armed Forces Colombia (FARC), the African National 
Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 
Namibia, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 
the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in 
Afghanistan, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP).607 
Linkages with a smorgasbord of insurgent groups allowed the LTTE to circumvent 
existing international arms control conventions and add to an already potent arsenal.  The 
LTTE’s relationship with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was integral to its ability to obtain 
weapons.  These deals took place across the Cambodian border in Trang, Thailand, where the 
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weapons would be purchased and then moved along the Andaman sea coast, where they were 
shipped across the Bay of Bengal to LTTE insurgents in Sri Lanka.608 
Not only does the Sri Lankan diaspora play a vital role in this operation, but so does the 
group’s extensive human trafficking network.  Other dimensions of the LTTE’s criminal 
enterprise, which is detailed at length in the section on group composition, also enable weapons 
procurement by putting the group’s members in touch with a wide range of nefarious individuals, 
including arms dealers, weapons brokers, and intermediaries.   According to Peter Chalk, the 
Tigers acquired US Stinger-class missiles from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in 1996 and 
used these weapons to shoot down a Sri Lankan civilian Lionair jet in 1998.609  Several years 
earlier, in April 1995, the LTTE shot down two Avro transport aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air 
Force, killing everyone on board.  This was the first known use of missiles by the insurgents and 
observers argue that the introduction of missiles changed the dynamics of the conflict from that 
point forward.610 
 
Assassinations 
The LTTE developed the capability to assassinate Sri Lankan government officials, foreign 
officials, and high-ranking members of the COIN force military services.  When the LTTE 
wanted to reneg on a peace agreement, the group commonly used assassination of a top Sri 
Lankan official to convey this message clearly. 
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Table 3: Major LTTE Assassinations 
Name Title Date 
General Ranjan Wileratne Minister of Defense March 1991 
Denzil Kobbekaduwa Army general August 1992 
Wijaya Wimlaratna Army general August 1992 
Lakshman Wijeratna Army general  August 1992 
Clancy Fernando Navy commander November 1992 
Lalith Athulathmudali Former national security minister April 1993 
 
4.2.1.2 How did it change over time? 
Before 1987, the Tigers mainly obtained weaponry from four distinct sources: Afghanistan, 
external sources in India, indigenous production, and munitions captured from the Sri Lankan 
military.611  While weapons had always been important to the LTTE, the onus to develop a truly 
comprehensive military capability became more pronounced when the Sri Lankan government 
began upgrading its armed forces in the mid-1990s in an effort to gain a qualitative advantage 
over the insurgents.  Between 1995 and 1996, Sri Lankan defense spending increased by nearly 
one third.612  F-7M Airguards were purchased from China, Kfir fighters from Israel, and Mi-24 
Hind-D helicopter gunships from Ukraine.  By 1998, the defense budget had ballooned to a 
whopping $880 million, elevating the direct cost of the war to an estimated $5.2 billion.613  
Although the insurgents had utilized guerilla tactics to devastating effect against the COIN force, 
the LTTE realized that to stave off defeat, it had to counter Colombo’s moves by enhancing its 
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capabilities and upgrading its infrastructure.  As part of its efforts to innovate in the area of 
weapons technology intended to blunt COIN force countermeasures, the LTTE diverted 
resources to its two operational wings that functioned as suicide strike teams, the Black Tigers 
(BTs) and the Sea Tigers (STs). 
 
Table 4: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Technological Innovations614 
Innovation Purpose Intended Mitigation of Government 
Countermeasures 
Wax-coated wiring in explosive 
devices 
Prevent emission of explosive 
vapors 
Defeat detection by sniffer dogs 
Airtight casing for explosive 
devices 
Prevent emission of explosive 
vapors 
Defeat detection by sniffer dogs 
LED indicator lamps in bomb 
circuits 
Verify “live” circuitry  
Secondary, tertiary detonation 
triggers in explosive devices 
Provision of internal fail-safe 
mechanism 
 
“Explosive bra cup” design for 
suicide vest 
Conceal explosive slabs Defeat physical hand searches 
Elongated fuel tank in vehicle 
bombs 
Conceal explosive devices Defeat detection by “dipper” probes 
Chassis molded, mint-laced 
explosive devices 
Conceal explosive charge and 
prevent emission of explosive 
vapors 
Defeat causal visual inspections and 
detection by sniffer dogs 
Hollowed out, shallow 
superstructure for suicide boats 
Increase speed and reduce surface 
detection 
Minimize radar cross-section 
Penetration rods affixed to suicide 
boat prows 
Amplify explosive force Defeat hardened SLN superstructures 
Mini submarines for diver 
operatives 
Covert de-bussing inside harbors Defeat port harbor patrols 
Prepaid SIM cards, single satellite 
signals for communication devices 
Avail secure communication Defeat government communication 
intercepts 
Discursive writing, Slidex chart for 
coding communications 
Avail secure communication Defeat government 
counterintelligence 
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4.2.2 Sanctuary 
Sanctuary proved indispensable to the Tigers for four principal reasons.  First, the Tamil diaspora 
provided the LTTE with virtually a global sanctuary.  Second, the physical sanctuary maintained 
in Sri Lanka’s Northeast, particularly Jaffna, allowed the insurgents to train without fear of 
COIN force infiltration.  For years, a sympathetic Tamil population and government in Tamil 
Nadu, India (located a mere twenty-eight kilometers across the Palk Strait and home to 60 
million ethnic Tamils) acquiesced to the LTTE’s need for a physical foreign safe haven.  The 
Tamil Nadu sanctuary was facilitated by the relationship between Prabhakaran and P. 
Nedumaran, a senior politician in India.  Tamil Nadu demonstrates that for sanctuary to be 
valuable, it need not be geographically contiguous.  Third, sanctuary became a de facto 
headquarters for the LTTE and a place where the group established a system of governance to 
rival that of the Sri Lankan state.  It also prolonged the duration of the conflict because it allowed 
insurgents to evade arrest and offered the Tigers a secure area to rest, recuperate, replenish, and 
rearm.  Some scholars argue that Prabakharan was too much of an ideologue to ever seriously 
consider a negotiated settlement with the Sri Lankan government.  Instead, he and his group 
reaped the benefits of several cease-fires to reorganize for the next offensive. 
4.2.2.1 Why was sanctuary such a valuable resource? 
Training & Logistics 
By mid-1987, approximately 20,000 Tamil militants had been trained in India, which included 
camps in Tamil Nadu, as well as specialized training which occurred in New Delhi, Bombay, and 
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Vishakhapatnam.615  In addition to these locations the Tigers received training in Uttar Pradesh 
and Karnataka and established camps in Salem and Madurai.616  For the majority of the conflict, 
the most promising insurgents were sent for training outside of Sri Lanka’s borders, while the 
rest were trained in camps located in the forested areas of the north.617   
The average training cycle for an LTTE recruit lasted approximately four months.  Those 
insurgents who displayed skill or advanced military acumen were handpicked to attend 
specialized training courses to prepare for task-specific roles in the group’s intelligence, 
communication, explosives, or naval components.618  In 1994, the LTTE implemented a training 
school designed specifically for ‘officers,’ which included a rigorous curriculum that 
incorporated lessons learned from previous battles against the COIN forces.  In the realm of 
intelligence, the LTTE trained specialized members for each phase of the intelligence cycle, 
including a cadre of insurgents whose only job was the collection and analysis of long-term 
intelligence on both potential and real targets.619 
Tamil Nadu was critical to the LTTE’s longevity and the group even managed to train 
and operate there while fighting the IPKF in the late 1980s, primarily due to a combination of 
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popular support among the locals, government apathy, and “cynical bureaucratic ploys of the 
intelligence agencies.”620  The LTTE’s tentacles extended deep into Tamil Nadu.  They 
constructed a dense network in the Thanjavor district between Nagapattinam and Adirapattinam, 
Vedaranyam, and Point Calimere.  The local administration was co-opted or subverted, among 
them police and politicians.  Fishermen, farmers, and smugglers served as the manpower for an 
ever-growing sanctuary.   
A highly sympathetic population was a contributing factor to the LTTE’s ability to 
achieve so much success in using Tamil Nadu and other Indian areas as sanctuary, although the 
Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka proper was unmatched in value.  The Tigers so thoroughly 
controlled the Northeast of the country at various points throughout the conflict that they were 
able to build mock ups of the actual venues they planned to attack.  The map and models 
department within the group constructed these real-life models.621  Some of the more devastating 
attacks ever conducted by the group—international airport, World Trade Center, Central Bank—
resulted from this type of training.622 
 
Administration of a “State Within a State” 
For those insurgents who needed a hiatus from fighting in Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu was an ideal 
destination, especially for those fighters whose absence from the conflict would only be 
temporary.  As early as the 1970s, Tamil militants, including Prabakharan, evaded arrest for 
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crimes by fleeing to Tamil Nadu.623  The LTTE purchased safe houses and communication 
centers in Tamil Nadu where militants on the lam and attempting to evade capture could hide, 
without removing themselves too acutely from the battlefield.  Besides safe houses, the 
insurgents used factories to manufacture uniforms and weapons.624  There were even hospitals 
run by the insurgents that were used to treat wounded fighters.   
As they solidified control over the northern and eastern Tamil-dominated provinces of Sri 
Lanka, the LTTE used these areas to build an extensive network of bases and defensive 
fortifications.625  The group’s unofficial headquarters was located in the town of Killinochchi in 
Northern Province, located approximately 100km southeast of Jaffna.  By establishing a de facto 
shadow government in the north and east of the country, the LTTE gained legitimacy at the 
expense of the Sri Lankan state.     
Since the ultimate prize for insurgents is control of the state, constructing a shadow 
government is a necessary pre-requisite.  The LTTE’s sanctuary afforded the Tigers with the 
opportunity to build a parallel system of government in the areas under their control.  In many 
parts of the north and east, this included courts of law, municipal administration, a police force, a 
customs service, a tax and legislation code, a banking system, and a television and radio network 
(this will be discussed in greater detail in the section on media and public relations).626  During 
long stretches of the conflict, traveling from government-controlled areas to Tiger redoubts 
required passing through well-guarded border control posts that include identification checks, 
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goods inspection, and the collection of customs fees.627 
 
Military Infrastructure 
Following the ethnic riots of 1983, thousands of Tamil refugees fled overseas to India, Australia, 
Canada, and the UK.628  This sowed the seeds for the Tamil diaspora and the transnational nature 
of the LTTE’s insurgency.  The global diaspora was a major part of the organization’s 
fundraising and propaganda network.  But the Tamil Nadu sanctuary was the heartbeat of the 
LTTE’s military infrastructure.  Insurgents connected with insurgents, but also formed bonds 
with elements of the Tamil Nadu political class, including with political groups such as the 
Dravida Kazhagam, the Kamraj Congress, and the Pure Tamil Movement.629  These political ties 
would prove extremely valuable over the course of the insurgency. 
LTTE political liaisons met with Tamil Nadu politicians in Madras, the capital, but 
eleven other districts served as part of an extensive military infrastructure, each connected by a 
high-tech wireless network.  The districts were the center of the LTTE’s war supplies and are 
listed in no specific order with the military specialty in parentheses: Dharmapuri (procurement of 
explosives), Coimbatore (arms and ammunition manufacturing), Salem (explosives 
manufacturing), Periya (military clothing manufacturing), Vedaraniym (coastal area from where 
supplies were dispatched), Madurai (transit area), Thanjavur (communications center), 
Nagapattnam (landing area for supplies from ships), Rameswaram (refugee reception and 
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recruitment), Tiruchi (treatment of wounded insurgents), and Tutocorin (trade in gold, silver, 
narcotics, and other goods).630 
4.2.2.2 How did it change over time? 
In the early years of the Tamil insurgency, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi lacked the 
political clout to convince Tamil Nadu’s chief minister, M.G. Ramachandran, to close down the 
LTTE training camps that operated unmolested and free from scrutiny.  Ramachandran  
possessed no  great affinity for the insurgents, but he needed to be seen as sympathetic toward a 
group that could claim  widespread popular support in the community and had already been 
embraced by Ramachandran’s political rival, Muthuvel Karaunanidhi.631  Blowback from Indira 
Ghandi’s tacit support of the movement would come full circle over a decade later, when a Black 
Tiger attack killed her brother Rajiv, then prime minister. 
Even though the Tigers were able to maintain connections to Tamil Nadu during their 
conflict with the IPKF, the relationship had changed considerably by the early 1990s.  Fighting 
an occupation force on home territory was one matter, but to assassinate an Indian head of state 
on Indian soil (the only LTTE suicide bombing on foreign soil), was another story.  There was a 
definite backlash within certain segments of the Tamil Nadu population.  Furthermore, Indian 
security services vowed to be far more aggressive in their pursuit of any LTTE insurgents 
operating in Tamil Nadu.  In 1995, feeling pressure, the LTTE established a permanent base in 
Twante, an island located off of the coast of Burma.632  The Sri Lankan government pressured 
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Burma’s military junta to dismantle the Tigers’ base, so in January 1996 the LTTE vacated 
Twante and developed a base on an island located off of Phuket, Thailand. 
4.2.3 Finance/Fundraising 
Finance sustains an insurgent group and offers a sense of hope, even when insurgents may not be 
winning on the battlefield.  The LTTE had a limited capacity to raise funds internally in Sri 
Lanka, so the diaspora movement took on added significance.  Different people surely donated 
for different reasons—shared ethnicity, religious fervor, genuine sympathy, coercion.  Some 
donated very small amounts, while others donated hundreds of thousands of dollars.   The LTTE 
collected donations from co-ethnics in Canada, France, Australia, Norway, the UK, and 
Switzerland, reflecting both the high concentration of Tamils in those countries as well as the 
lack of specific legislation outlawing the group from fundraising.  In all, Peter Chalk estimates 
that an astonishing eighty to ninety percent of the LTTE’s “war chest” originated abroad.633  
4.2.3.1 Why was finance/fundraising such a valuable resource? 
Seed money for licit businesses 
While the LTTE did raise money through a range of organized criminal activities, much of the 
money donated by the Tamil diaspora was used for the creation of legitimate Tamil businesses.  
Beginning in 1983, the LTTE opened up restaurants in Tamil Nadu and Paris, France and 
                                                 
633 Personal interview with Chalk, November 2011.  Gunaratna estimates that by late 1995, 40% of the LTTE’s war 
budget was generated abroad until the loss of the Jaffna peninsula in 1996, when this number rose to 60%. 
 
 229 
eventually branched out to London, Toronto, and Cambodia.634  The Tigers’ brain trust also 
thought it wise to invest in stock and money markets.  The group also maintained an impressive 
real estate portfolio.  This entrepreneurial spirit extends to the sale of newspapers, videos, Asian 
spices.  Members and activists invested in travel agencies, grocery stores, printing presses, 
money exchange and transfer agencies and import-export firms.635 The group diversified its asset 
base from agriculture to finance, invested in a number of farms, started finance companies, and 
constantly sought out other high profit venues.636 
 When donations were supplied to the LTTE the group used them as seed money to start 
and grow businesses, from telephone services to community radio stations.  Tamils have 
historically been linked to commodity buying and selling, especially gold, so the LTTE 
aggressively entered this market too.  Funds generated from legal businesses would be diverted 
to the group’s war aims and ill-gotten gains from an array of smuggling activities were laundered 
through Tamil owned legal businesses and money exchange and transfer agencies (similar to 
hawalas) to evade detection by authorities.  The LTTE became involved in the film industry, 
first through trading and investing, but later by founding video and CD shops, which generated 
sizeable revenue.637 
 
Legal and Political Aims 
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Money donated from abroad or earned through legally-owned Tamil businesses was used for 
more than just purchasing arms.  Through its vast financial architecture, the LTTE was able to 
pay for the exorbitant legal fees of the group and its members.  One example is especially 
revealing.  According to Chalk, following the 1995 arrest of the LTTE’s representative to 
Canada, Manikavasagam Suresh, the group organized demonstrations and a mass mail-out 
campaign that portrayed Suresh as a victim and accused the authorities of persecuting the 
Canadian Tamil population.  Moreover, the group hired two highly paid lawyers to defend 
Suresh, including New York-based Viswanathan Ruthirakumaran (who happened to be the head 
of LTTE operations in the United States).638  When the group was designated as a terrorist 
organization by the United States in the late 1990s, Ruthirakumaran hired a leading US law firm 
headed by Ramsey Clark, the former Attorney General during the Johnson administration. 
 
Organized Criminal Activities 
LTTE members engaged in almost every form of organized crime possible, from drug trafficking 
to extortion and from arms smuggling to money laundering.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, Tamil 
groups embarked on a bank-robbing spree in Jaffna.  Out of ignorance, the LTTE argued that it 
was stealing from the “public” and not the Tamil people.639  Involvement in the drug trade first 
became apparent as early as 1984 when Swiss police reported that Tamils were responsible for 
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trafficking approximately 20 percent of the heroin coming into the country.640  Italian police also 
broke up several Tamil heroin rings throughout the 1980s.  Sri Lanka’s geographic proximity to 
the Golden Triangle of Laos, Burma, and Thailand, combined with the LTTE’s advanced 
maritime capabilities made heroin trafficking an obvious racket for the group to pursue.641    The 
Tigers’ reach also extended into Pakistan, where they linked up with notorious Indian crime boss 
Dawood Ibrahim and his “D-Company” gang.  They used the port city of Karachi to solidify a 
foothold in South Asia and diversify smuggling activities to include humans, in addition to 
heroin.642 
The Sri Lankan government reported that the LTTE’s human trafficking business netted 
the group approximately $340 million by smuggling 17,000 people to 11 different countries.643  
Although drug trafficking and human smuggling are two of the more well-known organized 
criminal activities perpetrated by the LTTE, the group also relied on various types of fraud 
(credit card, social security, bank, casino, etc.) and extortion to bankroll its operations.644  
Extortion often involved coercion, with direct threats of implied violence to those who failed to 
‘donate’ to the Tigers’ war chest.645  Other times, extortion was accompanied by intimidation, 
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blackmail, beatings, and threats against family members, both in Sri Lanka and abroad.  Finally, 
the insurgents levied ‘taxes’ on a network of Hindu temples in the United Kingdom and 
Canada.646  
 
Developing a World Class Maritime Operation 
Each year the LTTE generated between $24 and $36 million in revenue.  According to Chalk’s 
estimates, the group reaped $800,000 a month from Canada, $500,000 a month from 
Scandinavia, just shy of $400,000 a month from the UK, $250,000 from Australia, and another 
$200,000 from the United States.647  Flush with cash, Prabhakaran understood that if his group 
were to have a legitimate chance to defeat the Sri Lankan military, the Tigers had to develop an 
effective maritime capability.  The COIN forces used Israeli built ships, like Dvora class patrol 
crafts, to interdict LTTE supplies and sink and capture insurgent vessels.   
In 1984, Prabhakaran created the Sea Tigers, which at its inception was equipped with 
several small vessels but grew to include a formidable maritime force comprised of four 
indigenously constructed vessels.648  The Sea Tigers were led by Colonel Soosai 
(Thillaiammbalam Sivanesan) from 1991 on, who commanded a division of two groups.  The 
first group concentrated on tactical actions while the second group was responsible for the 
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LTTE’s expanding fleet of merchant ships, known as the Sea Pigeons, which ferried both licit 
and illicit goods.  Within this division were thirteen sections, including the Sea Battle 
‘Regiments,’ Underwater Demolition Teams, Sea Tiger Strike Groups, and a Radar and 
Telecommunications Unit.  A Marine Engineering and Boat Building Section, a Maritime School 
and Academy, a Recruiting Section, and sections to support ordnance, personnel, and logistics 
were all part of the Sea Tigers’ shore infrastructure.649   
4.2.3.2 How did it change over time? 
Throughout the course of the insurgency, the LTTE consistently expanded and diversified its 
sources of income.  In the early to mid-1980s, drug trafficking was a consistent revenue stream, 
but this changed over time.  As the conflict wore on it became more and more difficult for the 
LTTE to sustain its fundraising network.  Donations that were once offered freely later had to be 
coerced.  Once Western nations like the United States and the United Kingdom began to crack 
down on LTTE activities within their respective countries, the group increasingly devoted more 
time and energy to organized crime as a method of financing its activities, including human 
smuggling.  After the LTTE was proscribed as a terrorist organization in countries where it once 
raised funds freely, this shift opened the LTTE up to arrest and prosecution.  In 2005, Canada 
outlawed LTTE fundraising networks.  This proved a devastating blow to the insurgents, who 
lost an estimated $12 million from the Canadian connection.650  The loss of revenue from 
Canada was a major factor in the LTTE’s final defeat, especially because it occurred at the same 
time as the Sri Lankan COIN force was receiving $1 billion annually in military and financial aid 
                                                 
649 Ibid, p.18 
 
650 Stewart Bell, “Canada a Key Source of Tamil Tiger Funding,” National Post, July 20, 2009. 
 
 234 
from Beijing, as the Chinese sought to expand development rights for port facilities in South 
Asia.651 
4.3 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS 
4.3.1 Command and Control 
The LTTE’s command and control was vertically structured, with the Central Governing 
Committee at the top of the organization.  As “God become man,” Prabhakaran lorded over both 
the political and military branches of the movement and ran the day-to-day operations in a 
command-driven style, although he did regularly consult with a small circle of trusted comrades 
on different aspects of policy.652  The hierarchical structure of the group included a bell-shaped 
middle stratum of leaders built into the organization to provide the LTTE with a measure of 
redundancy and defend against the SLAF strategy of targeting Prabhakaran with a decapitation 
strike.653 
The LTTE’s entire movement counted approximately 15,000 cadres, to which an 
additional 3,000 to 4,000 personnel served with the Sea Tigers.654  The organizational structure 
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was “two-tiered,’ geographically structured, and composed of seven regular commands each led 
by a district commander.  Prabhakaran oversaw the seven district commanders and chaired the 
Central Governing Committee, charged with oversight for the military and political tiers of the 
organization.  To join the Tigers, a recruit had to swear fealty not only to the organization as a 
whole and with it the goal of an independent Tamil Eelam, but also to Prabhakaran himself.  He 
was viewed by many as omnipotent and omniscient in his decision-making.  In short, though he 
was an eminently parochial figure at times, Prabhakaran was responsible for the global 
operations that this transnational organization had developed through its thirty-year history.   
Prabhakaran’s ironclad grip over the organization started to fray beginning in the early 
1990s, when he ordered the execution of long-time confidant and high ranking LTTE member 
Mahattaya.  Prabhakaran accused his erstwhile colleague of plotting with the Indian army’s 
RAW to kill the top leadership of the group, including Prabhakaran himself.655  A second and 
even more devastating schism occurred with the defection of one of the LTTE’s top 
commanders, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (“Karuna”) in early 2004.  The falling out between 
Prabhakaran and Karuna effectively split the LTTE in two; the former retained control of the 
northern faction while the latter came to exert control of the Tigers’ eastern faction.  When the 
split led to open conflict between the two groups, the Sri Lankan government’s special task force 
supplied Karuna’s fighters with arms and sanctuary in return for intelligence about the LTTE’s 
northern units.656  Karuna subsequently handed over the LTTE playbook, which the COIN forces 
used to plan their final offensive. 
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The most important of the seven commands is the military wing, which was structured 
very close to the organization of a conventional professional army.  Within the military wing 
were the Sea Tigers (navy), Black Tigers (suicide commando unit), and an elite intelligence 
outfit.657  A rudimentary air capability existed for a short time as well.  Beneath the military 
wing was the political wing, led by Thamil Chelvam and Anton Balasingham.  Throughout the 
course of the insurgency, the political branch remained subordinate to the military wing, 
although the former was elevated during instances of negotiations and cease-fires.658  But unlike 
the Army Council-Sinn Fein dynamic within the PIRA, the LTTE’s political wing was never 
strong enough to usurp the military wing of the group.  As much as outsiders might have wished, 
Prabhakaran was no Gerry Adams. 
Insurgents within the seven commands were members of either a political wing or a 
combat group and further divided into specialized subdivisions.659  The LTTE operated as a 
meritocracy—it promoted insurgents and afforded them more responsibility with performance, 
rather than seniority. Upon promotion, the fighter received increased command 
responsibilities.660 
As discussed above, the Sea Tigers were divided into two separate wings, one for 
amphibious operations and another for merchant marine type duties.  This branch of the Tigers 
maintained an extensive organizational structure, including a substantial female naval unit.661  
                                                 
657 Ibid. 
 
658 Ibid, p.265. 
 
659 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Vol.15 (2002), available at www.janes.com 
 
660 Fair, Urban Battlefields, p.29. 
 
661 Ibid, p.28. 
 
 237 
The Sea Tigers had their own naval intelligence cell and the group also worked closely with the 
Black Tigers.  The Black Tigers were suicide commandos selected from the most elite LTTE 
recruits.  This wing of the organization was “fully integrated” into the LTTE’s land and sea 
operations. 
 
4.3.2 Group Composition  
4.3.2.1 Velupillai Prabhakaran 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran was born in the northern coastal town of Velvettithurai on the Jaffna 
Peninsula in 1954 and grew up amidst poverty, violence and oppression, during a time when Sri 
Lankan Tamils struggled for equal status with the Sinhalese.  He was born into the Karaiyar 
caste, a relatively low ranking rung of Sri Lankan society.  The most common profession for men 
from Prabhakaran’s village was to become a maritime smuggler.  From the little that is known 
about the LTTE’s reclusive leader, he was married to Mathivathani Erambu and had two 
children, a daughter Duwaraka and a son Charles Anthony, named after one of the Tigers’ most 
famous fighters, Charles Lucas Anthony, who was killed in the early 1980s.  Physically, he was 
short and portly, which sometimes masked the steely determination hidden beneath an otherwise 
unassuming veneer of calm and quiet focus. 
 From an early age, Prabhakaran was fascinated by violence.  In his teens, he was an 
admirer of Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great, although he 
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eventually became transfixed by the teachings of Subhash Chandra Bose and Bhagat Singh.662  
Prabhakaran was particularly interested in Bose, who some Sri Lankan scholars cite as 
Prabhakaran’s hero, admired most for his combination of spiritualism and militancy. Bose was 
also known for his willingness to take on Mahatma Gandhi and for his legendary battles against 
the British Army as part of the Indian National Army.  The LTTE’s leader frequently quoted 
Bose to explain his own feelings on the Sri Lankan conflict, declaring “I shall fight for the 
freedom of my land until I shed the last drop of blood.”663  This quote symbolized what would 
become a Prabhakaran hallmark throughout his tenure as the LTTE’s leader—an unwavering 
commitment to action over rhetoric. 
 At the young age of 18, Prabhakaran founded the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), the 
predecessor to the LTTE.  Three years later, he became a household name following his 
assassination of Jaffna’s Sinhalese mayor, Alfred Duraiappah.  Duraippah was shot in the head at 
point blank range as he entered a Hindu temple.  He had attracted the scorn of Prabhakaran and 
other radical Tamils for his support of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and for his apparent 
unwillingness to side with the Tamil nationalist cause in Sri Lanka. 
 Within the LTTE, Prabhakaran was the group’s most committed and ardent ideologue.  
His views on ideology and nationalism are explained in more depth in the section on ideology 
below, but overall he remained a Tamil nationalist first and foremost.  While he could be 
extremely sensitive to criticism, Prabhakaran practiced what he preached.  Similar to other well-
known insurgent commanders, he was known to live a monastic lifestyle and mostly eschewed 
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material comforts while insisting that his fellow Tigers forgo sex and abstain from alcohol, 
drugs, and tobacco.  He went for more than a decade without having contact with his parents.  
Gordon Weiss characterizes Prabhakran, and similar insurgent leaders, by describing them in the 
following manner: “unlike ordinary mortals, they turn their backs on the ordinary relationships, 
quotidian fears and communal safety nets that nurture and restrain others.”664 
 The best insight into Prabhakaran’s belief system comes from his rare interviews, his 
annual speeches during Tamil Eelam Heroes Day, and the policies and actions he oversaw as the 
group’s top leader.  Like many other insurgent and terrorist leaders who grew to become 
radicalized and militant, Prabhakaran was convinced of the necessity of armed struggle after 
finding non-violent means to be an inferior and tepid response to increasing Sinhala chauvinism 
and anti-Tamil discrimination.  When asked in a 1986 interview why he was so uncompromising 
on the supremacy of armed struggle versus other, less-violent means, Prabhakaran responded,  
“It is the plight of the Tamil people that compelled me to take up arms.  I felt 
outraged at the inhuman atrocities perpetrated against an innocent people.  The 
ruthless manner in which our people were murdered, massacred, maimed and the 
colossal damage done to their property made me realize that we are subjected to a 
calculated program of genocide.  I felt that armed struggle is the only way to 
protect and liberate our people from a totalitarian Fascist State bent on destroying 
an entire race of people.”665   
 
 Two interesting aspects of Prabhakaran’s leadership were the cult of personality that 
formed around the leader and his constant paranoia throughout his tenure as LTTE leader.  Most 
accounts of Prabhakaran make reference to his status as a hero who was afforded a god-like 
worship by LTTE cadres and elements of the Tamil population.  Followers swore an oath of 
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loyalty to Prabhakaran himself, and referred to him strictly as “Leader,” because his actual name 
was known to inspire so much awe.666  In speeches, his language was both inspirational and 
visionary, and often evoked the nationalistic pride held by many of his followers.  As related by 
Post, a Jaffna psychiatrist described the impact of Prabhakaran’s leadership, noting that many 
LTTE members “regard Prabhakaran as higher than their own god,” and many would make 
pilgrimages to his former home as something akin to a spiritual ritual.667  Pictures of 
Prabhakaran adorned homes and businesses throughout rebel-held areas. 
 While the praise and worship that accompanied his position as the Tigers’ number one 
certainly contributed to his growing narcissism over the years, it did nothing to alleviate his 
constant paranoia.  Part of this paranoia stemmed from the fact that he spent most of his life on 
the run, traveling back and forth between Sri Lanka’s northeast to Tamil Nadu and moving from 
safe house to safe house to evade capture and avoid arrest.  Still, Prabhakaran wore his status as a 
wanted man as a badge of honor.  When asked what it felt like to be the most wanted man in Sri 
Lanka, he replied, “When the Sri Lanka government refers to me as the most wanted man it 
means that I am a true Tamil patriot.  Hence I feel proud to be indicted as a wanted man.”668 
 Throughout the entire three decade insurgency, Prabhakaran viewed compromise as 
futile, unless it would strengthen his cause and allow him to further consolidate his grip on 
power and the position of the LTTE.  Some leaders evolve over time, but Prabhakaran never did.  
He was wary of even his most-trusted companions and throughout his reign, he remained a 
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highly controlling authoritarian leader.  Dissent within the ranks, especially among the LTTE 
leadership, was unwelcome and frequently met with punishment, including death.  As detailed in 
the section on seminal events below, Prabhakaran’s rigidity lead to a split within the group and 
the defection of “Colonel Karuna” in 2004, a major blow to the cohesion of the organization.  
 Prabhakaran limited the emergence of potential competition by either marginalizing or 
murdering those who spoke out against him or questioned the LTTE’s strategy.  He viewed those 
who disagreed with him not as dissenters, or individuals with an alternative point of view, but 
rather as traitors.  “According to scores of accounts from defectors and others who escaped Tiger 
tyranny, many of his own lieutenants were murdered; Tamils who criticized him, even mildly or 
in jest, were banished to dungeons, starved and hauled out periodically for battering by their 
guards.”669 
4.3.2.2 Anton Stanislaus Balasingham 
While Prabhakaran was the unquestioned leader of the LTTE, revered for his aggressive posture 
and action-oriented style, Anton Balasingham served as the Tigers’ chief rhetorician, political 
strategist, and negotiator.  Balasingham was born to a Hindu mother and Roman Catholic father 
in Batticaloa, located in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, in 1938.  He spent significant time abroad, 
mostly in London, and worked as a translator to the British High Commission in Colombo.670  In 
1979, Balasingham penned the LTTE’s first major theoretical work, Towards Socialist Eelam, a 
highly ideological document infused with the author’s trademark views on Marxism.  The tome 
became popular among Jaffna’s intelligentsia and cemented Balasingham’s credentials as a 
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committed revolutionary.   
 Unlike Prabhakaran, though, Balasingham was open-minded, intellectually curious, and 
prone to exploring the complexity inherent in the several sides of politico-military matters.  
Though Balasingham served as somewhat of a mentor to the younger Prabhakaran, they did not 
always coexist easily, occasionally disagreeing on the centrality of Marxism to the movement.  
Furthermore, Prabhakaran had at times mocked Balasingham, assailing him as “an arm chair 
intellectual” who was “afraid of blood.”671 Balasingham was a moderating force on the group 
and furthermore, he held the dubious honor as the only member of the LTTE leadership who 
consistently criticized or disagreed with Prabhakaran and lived to tell about it.   
 The two maintained a unique partnership throughout the struggle for Tamil 
independence, as Prabhakaran ceded control of the LTTE’s political wing to Balasingham, 
although he still held the ultimate say over Tiger policy and strategy, especially as it related to 
the negotiation process with the Sri Lankan state.  According to Weiss, “In Balasingham, 
Prabhakaran recognized a man who could formulate and espouse a lucid ideology to underwrite 
the raw energy that he himself would provide for the brewing insurgency.  In Prabhakaran, the 
older man saw conviction, physical courage and steadfast commitment.”672  It was this 
combination of strength and reason that allowed the LTTE to fight and survive for over three 
decades. 
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4.3.3 Ideology 
The Tamil Tigers are often classified as an ethno-nationalist terrorist group.673  Translated 
loosely, this means the LTTE was comprised of ethnic Tamils and sought freedom for a clearly 
defined national territory (Eelam).  Still, because the Tigers’ core group was initially comprised 
of students living abroad, there was also the requisite Marxist influence of stereotypical “coffee 
house revolutionaries.”674  Among Tamil insurgent groups, the Tamil Tigers were not unique in 
their taste for left wing politics.  Both the PLOTE and the TELO were Marxist groups, and the 
JVP were Maoists.675   
Insurgent political thought, however nascent, requires a modicum of organization.  So 
when violence broke out in 1983, the ideologically- inclined Tamil groups were best placed to 
protect Tamil neighborhoods.  With this protection came a platform, which the various groups 
used to spread their ideologies.  After the 1983 riots, Marxist groups engulfed the non-Marxist 
groups through both persuasion and coercion.676  Though at first the LTTE adopted Marxism as 
an ideology of convenience, the intensity of the group’s radical leftist beliefs grew more fervent 
over time.677  Balasingham, the LTTE’s aforementioned theoretician, explained the LTTE’s 
ideology as follows:  “our total strategy integrates both the national struggle and class struggle, 
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interlinks both nationalism and socialism into a revolutionary project aimed at liberating our 
people both from national oppression and from the exploitation of man by man.”678 
The LTTE fought for a united Tamil Eelam homeland in Northeast Sri Lanka.  Like the 
PIRA, independence was considered the ultimate goals and objectives of the organization.  Some 
members figured that if Marxism could shepherd the process toward this end, then so be it.  Most 
foot soldiers fought for justice and the opportunity to redress grievances, while the leadership 
spoke of leaving behind the chains imposed by the twin evils of capitalism and imperialism.679 
Under the leadership of R.N. Dixit, the Indian High Commission in Colombo devoted 
significant resources to determine which groups were “really Marxist” and which groups were 
frauds.  But Dixit failed to understand the motivation of the insurgents, Marxist or otherwise.  
That the insurgents considered themselves Marxist, used Marxist models in their strategic 
analysis and decision-making, tactically employed classic Marxist clandestine techniques and 
couched their language in Marxist phraseology was most important.680    
4.3.4 Popular Support  
The popular support of the Tamil population for the LTTE’s insurgency can be broken down into 
three distinct periods.  First, largely due to Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and discriminatory 
policies, popular support was thrown behind a patchwork of Tamil militant groups who voiced 
their displeasure with the increasingly chauvinistic policies implemented by the Sinhala-
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dominated government.  Second, following the “Black July” riots of 1983, escalating violence 
between the two communities led the population to support the dozens of militant Tamil 
organizations.  Of these dozen, the Tigers managed to cement their reputation as the most 
respected and most feared.  By the 1990s, the LTTE still garnered widespread support, but had 
also resorted to coercion and intimidation to maintain the allegiance of the Tamil population, 
many of whom had become weary of the violence. 
The thirty five year period between independence and open warfare in Sri Lanka was 
characterized by the ongoing effort of the Sinhalese Buddhist majority to consolidate control 
over all aspects of society.  To achieve this, the Sinhalese-dominated government instituted a 
series of reforms aimed at scaling back the historical influence of the Tamil minority.  These 
reforms were widely interpreted as hostile acts of an ethnically homogenous group and thus, 
became major grievances of Tamils throughout Sri Lanka. 
Both insurgent theorists and social movement scholars highlight the importance of the 
links between grievances and the provision of popular support.  The “Sinhala Only” Act of 1956 
was the opening salvo in the area of language, making Sinhalese the sole official language of the 
country.  Affirmative action policies were then instituted in the country’s universities, making it 
more difficult for Tamils to receive a quality education.  In terms of employment, the proportion 
of Tamils employed by the Sri Lankan government decreased from 60% to 10% in the civilian 
sector and from 40% to 1% in the military between 1956 and 1970.  In 1972, the constitution was 
rewritten, and legal safeguards for minorities were excised from the document.681 
In the second phase of popular support, grievances remained a major reason for offering 
support to Tamil militant groups, but revenge and the themes of repression and occupation 
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became the overarching concerns of the Tamils.  Sinhala nationalism was on the rise and 
exploded with the anti-Tamil pogroms of July 1983.  The “Black July” riots of 1983 resulted in 
the deaths of between 1,000 and 3,000 Tamils with thousands more wounded and raped. 
Countless others had their homes and shops burned to the ground.682  In some areas, civilians 
were pulled from their homes by Sinhala mobs who carried voter registration lists to determine 
which families were Tamil.683  “Black July” was a watershed event in the conflict and one which 
caused the Tamil population to throw its support behind those who were willing and able to 
protect those that remained (hundreds of thousands of Tamils fled abroad, while an additional 
100,000 settled in refugee camps) and transformed Tamil militancy into “an engine of popular 
resentment.”684   
In the insurgency that ensued, the LTTE leadership followed a deliberate strategy of 
provoking COIN force overreaction and using the resulting collateral damage to generate popular 
support among its constituency.  To be sure, the Tamils needed little help in this area.  The 
SLAF’s “disordered brutality” led to the mass killing of civilians which throughout the conflict 
had been “one of the basic anti-insurgency tools of the security forces,” and earned it a 
reputation as an occupation force.685   
During the final period of the insurgency, the LTTE relied more on violent and coercive 
methods to generate and maintain popular support than it had at any point previously in the 
conflict.  The group employed what Jannie Lilja terms “territorial entrapment” and “social 
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entrapment” to induce cooperation and attitudinal support from its constituency.686  Social and 
cultural obligations to support the Tigers were reinforced by a mixture of propaganda speeches 
and restrictions on the movement of Tamils.  The recruitment patterns of fighters into the 
organization mirrored the evolution of the popular support of the Tamil population.   
 But much like Hizballah, the LTTE also received sympathy and support because it 
devoted a significant amount of manpower to social service provision.  A stated objective of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was to build legitimacy throughout the northeast by providing 
social services to areas beyond the reach of the Sri Lankan state, or in areas where capacity gaps 
and functional holes were present.  The LTTE has moved back and forth on this continuum 
throughout the course of the insurgency.  The insurgents would ideally like to be in the two 
darkest colored boxes further to the right, while the COIN force would like the situation to 
reflect the lightest colored box furthest to the left.  The light grey colored box second in from the 
left is not ideal for either the COIN force or the insurgents, but favors the insurgents in the short 
and medium term. 
 The 2002 cease-fire solidified the northeast as a Tamil home base by granting the LTTE 
autonomy and freedom of movement.  The Tigers recognized that the population was a contest 
between the insurgents and the COIN forces.  But because the LTTE lacked the resources of the 
NGO community, the Tigers’ political wing worked closely with civil society organizations.  
After the United States declared the LTTE a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997 and a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group in November 2001, became much more 
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difficult for the Tigers to raise funds through NGOs and related charities.687  Still, organizations 
like the Tamil Relief Organization (TRO) remained closely linked with the Tigers and were 
described as a veritable humanitarian arm of the LTTE.  This link grew stronger following the 
2005 tsunami.   
 The LTTE essentially controlled where and how NGOs operated, and then used its 
provision of services to enact support and even recruits.  Moreover, the group used a steering 
committee to direct aid from Colombo, in effect claiming good will for services provided by the 
state.  In the last several years of the conflict, the LTTE’s actions caused its popular support 
among the population to plummet.  As recruitment waned, the LTTE forcibly integrated child 
soldiers into its organization.688  After the defection of Karuna in 2004, the insurgents arrested, 
tortured, and killed scores of Tamil civilians suspected of being spies for the Karuna faction.689 
4.3.5 Public Relations/Propaganda 
Among insurgent groups, the LTTE was one of the first groups to realize the importance of a 
robust public relations and propaganda machine in winning the battle for hearts and minds.  The 
group’s activities were run by V. Manoharan, who operated a transnational network with offices 
located in the UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia.690  In Toronto, the 
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group operated four 24-hour radio stations, 10 weekly newspapers and Tamil language television 
programs.691  But of all its overseas bases, none was more integral to success than the LTTE’s 
British headquarters.  The LTTE International Secretariat has operated continuously in London 
since 1984.692 
 The bulk of the group’s efforts directed its message to various segments of the Tamil 
diaspora (those that would contribute money to the group) and politicians and human-rights 
activists who might be able to influence the situation from a diplomatic or political perspective.  
The primary messages put forth by the LTTE were the following: Tamils are the innocent 
victims of a Sinhalese orchestrated campaign of genocide and annihilation; Sri Lankan Tamils 
(who account for a mere 12.5% of the population) have been subjected to severe discrimination 
and both overwhelming and disproportionate military oppression; and due to the long history of 
discrimination and oppression, Tamils and Sinhalese can never co-exist peacefully in a single 
state.693    
 To get its message out, the LTTE distributed graphic videos, pamphlets, calendars, and 
other publications that demonstrated the Sri Lankan government’s deadly military strikes, with 
resulting collateral damage and the slaughter of civilians.  Sympathy for the plight of the Tamils 
helped generate a more pliable diaspora community, which responded in kind by donating 
money to the LTTE and offering its members sanctuary abroad.  Although foreign policy realists 
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often minimize the importance of domestic populations on how states behave, the Tamil 
population in India clearly held sway with politicians in that country and insisted on intervention 
by Delhi to resolve the conflict in one form or another.  The LTTE’s public relations machine 
became so effective that attempts by the government in Colombo to counteract its propaganda 
activities fell short.694  LTTE publications included journals and newspapers, and in North 
America alone, there were over 40 Sri Lankan Tamil newspapers, more than three-quarters of 
which were managed by the LTTE or associated front groups.  To put this in perspective, “the 
LTTE propaganda and fund raising network is superior to other extant networks such as Hamas, 
Hezbollah, Kashmiris, or the Basques,” judges Rohan Gunaratna.695   
 In 2002, the Sri Lankan government allowed the Tigers to broadcast their previously 
banned “Voices of Tigers” FM radio station throughout northern Sri Lanka.696  The LTTE also 
established an online presence, creating a “virtual Tamil nation,” that provided a treasure trove of 
information related to the LTTE, its origins, Prabhakaran, and atrocities committed by the Sri 
Lankan Armed Forces.697 
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4.4 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
Figure 12: Timeline of LTTE Seminal Events and Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
4.4.1 Goals/Objectives 
The LTTE is most accurately characterized as an ethno-nationalist organization.  The ultimate 
goal of the Tigers was the establishment of an independent and sovereign Tamil Eelam in 
northern and eastern Sri Lanka.698  The path to independence was to be achieved through the 
devolution of power and political self-determination.  While Anton Balasingham was the group’s 
ideological heavyweight and provided the Marxist backdrop to the LTTE’s propaganda and 
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public statements, Prabhakaran provided his most comprehensive answer to what a Tamil state 
would look like if it gained independence.  He proclaimed: 
“Tamil Eelam will be a socialist state.  By socialism I mean an egalitarian society 
where human freedom and individual liberties will be guaranteed, where all forms 
of oppression and exploitation will be abolished.  It will be a free society where 
our people will have maximum opportunity to develop their economy and 
promote their culture.  Tamil Eelam will be a neutral state, committed to non-
alignment and friendly to India, respecting her regional policies, particularly the 
policy of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.”699 
 
To Prabhakaran, an egalitarian society was one with only one political party supported 
thoroughly by the people.  To achieve the change that would be necessary, and to answer the 
needs of the Tamil people, a one-party state following the constructs of a socialist constitution 
was to be implemented.  By egalitarian, Prabhakaran was not alluding to a multi-party 
democracy.  Nine days after the founding of the Tigers on May 5, 1976, the LTTE’s leaders put 
forth the Vaddukoddai Resolution.  This document outlined the path to the ‘restoration and 
reconstitution of the Free Sovereign, Secular and Socialist State of Tamil Eelam based on the 
rights of self-determination inherent to every nation.’700   
 Anita Pratap’s interview with Prabhakaran is perhaps most revealing of the shadowy 
organization’s true objectives.  During the interview, Prabhakaran took time to clarify the 
LTTE’s classification as a separatist group.  He said, “It is wrong to call our movement 
‘separatist’…We are not fighting for a division or separation of a country but rather, we are 
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fighting to uphold the sacred right to live in freedom and dignity.  In this sense, we are freedom 
fighters not terrorists.”701 
4.4.2 Seminal Events 
4.4.2.1 “Black July” (1983) 
To understand the importance of the “July Holocaust riots,” more commonly known as “Black 
July,” it is essential to recount the events leading up to the violence.702  Recriminations among 
the population throughout the Jaffna peninsula was growing for years, hardening ethnic identities 
and reinforcing sectarian stereotypes of both Tamils and Sinhalese.  In June 1982, two Sinhala 
security force recruits were killed.  In response, Sinhalese gangs burned down the Jaffna library 
in what many Tamils interpreted as an act of cultural genocide.  With tensions already high, on 
July 24, 1983, thirteen Sri Lankan government soldiers were killed by a land mine in Jaffna.  
Their deaths sparked a week-long riot throughout the country, with violence the worst in parts of 
Jaffna and Colombo. 
 While figures vary, most estimates put the death toll at somewhere between 1,000 and 
3,000 people, with thousands more wounded and raped.  Government figures placed the death 
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toll at around 300.703  In what would mark the beginning of the worldwide Tamil diaspora, 
100,000 Tamils fled to refugee camps while countless others fled abroad, never to return to their 
homeland.  But even more troubling than the actual number of individuals killed is the manner in 
which they were murdered.  The violence between Tamils and Sinhalese, although based in 
ethnic conflict, seemed almost anomic in its nature. 
 In Colombo, Sinhala mobs took to the streets with sticks and clubs, pulled Tamils from 
their cars and beat them to death in the road.  Some were “necklaced,” a process that involves 
having a rubber tire filled with gasoline placed around a victim’s chest and arms and lit on fire 
until the individual burns to death.  Police either stood by and watched or participated directly 
themselves.  Roving gangs constructed roadblocks in the streets and stopped cars to check the 
identification cards of the passengers, occasionally quizzing them with difficult Sinhalese words 
in an attempt to determine their ethnicity.  Early on during the riots, 35 Tamil political detainees 
were beaten and hacked to death at Welikade prison. No charges were ever filed against the 
attackers.704 
 After the bloodshed ceased, the Sri Lankan government attempted to portray the riots as a 
spontaneous reaction to increasing ethnic discord.  But with the benefit of hindsight, it now 
seems clears that “Black July” was a deliberate campaign of intimidation and murder 
orchestrated by various elements of the Sri Lankan state.  Mob leaders carried voter registration 
cards and records of Tamil-owned businesses, information that could not have been obtained 
without the tacit collusion of government officials.  Members of the Jathika Sevaka Samithiya 
(JSS), the government-supported union with its own intelligence apparatus, helped develop 
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dossiers on Tamils, mapping out where they lived, worked, and owned property.705  Two weeks 
before the riots, President Jayawardene publicly stated that he did not care if the Tamils of Jaffna 
starved and even suggested that the Sinhalese people would be pleased if they did.  Many 
interpreted this as a “green light” to practice outright discrimination.  Some government 
ministers, including several prominent UNP members, even “directed violence, managed gangs, 
and assisted with the logistics of the attacks.”706   
 The “Black July” riots were far from the spontaneous reaction of increasingly clashing 
sectarian groups.  On the contrary, the riots and accompanying violence were the result of a 
convergence of political, economic, and ideological factors.  Blaming “the other,” in this case 
Tamils, is a classic political ploy to deflect negative attention from one’s own group and refocus 
feelings of ill-will on another entity.  This was the quintessential model of Middle Eastern 
dictators for decades, as they deflected popular anger against a collection of Western 
imperialists, Zionist Israelis, and other allegedly nefarious actors.  This same tactic was 
employed in Sri Lanka.  Tamil populism was spreading in both the north and the south during the 
early 1980s, and following a controversial 1982 referendum, the Sinhala-dominated government 
had grown insecure.   
 From an economic perspective, as Bandarage points out, reforms enacted to the Sri 
Lankan economy in 1977 led to a growing success among Tamil entrepreneurs.  Many Sinhalese 
businessmen saw this as a zero-sum game and resented the economic liberalization of the 
financial sector.  As a result, these individuals may have instigated the urban poor to burn down 
and destroy Tamil-owned shops and businesses, as well as Indian enterprises now being painted 
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as exploitative and foreign.707  On the ideological front, two prominent Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalists, Cyril Mathew and Elle Gunawansa, promoted Sinhala fundamentalism, which 
served to fan the flames of conflict.  Mathew, who at the time of the riots served as the Minister 
of Industries and Scientific Affairs, encouraged the violence as an effort to purge those who 
“have their cultural origins beyond the shores of the island.”708   
 The most far-reaching consequence of “Black July” was that it galvanized Tamil 
opposition groups and led the insurgents to reconfigure from the defensive to the offensive.  
While Sri Lanka itself was not immune to sectarian violence, experiencing communal rioting in 
1958, 1977, and 1981 respectively, “Black July” was on another level.  According to 
Tiruchelvam, there was “a qualitative difference in the intensity, brutality, and organized nature 
of the violence of July 1983.  There is no other event which is so deeply etched in the collective 
memories of the victims and the survivors.”709  Gunaratna argues that the events of “Black July” 
would serve as the final ingredient in a recipe for protracted internal ethnic conflict.  He 
observes:  
“The Tamils [now] had all the prerequisites in place for creating a state identity 
all of their own.  As the conflict deepened, the moderates were isolated.  This 
paved the way for extremists on both sides to ascent to decision-making positions.  
With no hope of a negotiated settlement, the political climate was gradually 
becoming favorable for [the] Tamil insurgency.  Within three months of the riots, 
the insurgents had increased their cadres’ strength by several folds and enjoyed 
wider public support.”710  
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 Almost every insurgency has a defining moment, an incident which upon looking 
back at history, scholars can pinpoint as the catalyst that helped propel the movement 
forward and symbolize the struggle.  For the PIRA, there were several of these, though 
“Bloody Sunday” stands out as the most important.  In Lebanon, Israel’s 1982 invasion of 
the country became Hizballah’s rallying cry for nearly two decades of conflict while in 
South Africa the Sharpeville massacre symbolized a tipping point for the black majority 
population in its struggle against apartheid.  The “Black July” riots of 1983 fulfilled this 
requirement for the LTTE.  The riots led to an increase in recruitment, popular support 
and sympathy for the insurgents.  This sympathy translated into a seemingly endless 
stream of money and weapons from a diaspora community that had initially been 
displaced as a result of the week of violence perpetrated against Tamils and sanctioned by 
the Sri Lankan state. 
4.4.2.2 Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) Intervention (1987-1990) 
The Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) deployed 13,000 troops to Sri Lanka in late July 1987 as 
per the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords.  Some figures place the number of Indian troops 
dispatched to Sri Lanka at between 50,000 and 100,000, numbers that the Indian military would 
likely play down lest it risk further embarrassment.711  Although the IPKF was sent as a 
peacekeeping force, shortly after reaching Sri Lanka it was forced to wage a counterinsurgency 
against the LTTE.  Four months after the Indians arrived, seventeen insurgents were captured by 
Sri Lankan naval forces which caught the LTTE members smuggling weapons.  While waiting 
                                                 
711 Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Services (Colombo: South 
Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993, p.269.   
 
 258 
for the IPKF and the Sri Lankan government to determine who would retain custody of the 
fighters, fifteen of the seventeen insurgents committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules. 
Less than a week later, the LTTE slaughtered five Indian para commandos, sparking all-out 
warfare between the insurgents and the peacekeepers.   
 The Indian force was plagued with difficulties from the very beginning of the 
intervention.  First, the LTTE never really bought in to the concept of a peacekeeping force.  
Prabhakaran was pressured to accept the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, which he did, although he soon 
reversed course and denounced the agreement.  The LTTE was supposed to disarm, but the 
insurgents mostly handed over outdated weapons and stockpiled its better weaponry.  Even 
though India is geographically proximate to Sri Lanka and shares many cultural similarities, the 
IPKF was still viewed by many, both Tamils and Sinhalese, as an occupying force.712  Being 
viewed as an occupying force makes it more difficult for the COIN forces to “win hearts and 
minds.”  This was a major challenge for the IPKF in Sri Lanka despite its efforts to avoid civilian 
casualties and an honest attempt to repair and rebuild critical infrastructure in war-torn areas. 
 Second, because the Sri Lankan police were viewed as a sectarian force and were already 
discredited in the eyes of the local population, the IPKF struggled with law and order issues as 
well as intelligence collection and analysis.  Compounding this problem was the fact that the 
IPKF initially deployed to Sri Lanka as a peacekeeping force.  However, shortly after its arrival, 
Indian troops found themselves fighting an insurgency for which they were woefully unprepared.  
The IPKF’s small numbers during its first wave of troops meant that it was “grossly under 
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strength.”713  This prohibited the Indians from conducting effective sealing operations against the 
insurgents.  Furthermore, Indian rules of engagement (ROE) were rather restrictive.  Limited 
mobility, inadequate weaponry, and the imperative to avoid civilian casualties at all costs 
hampered COIN forces that fought skilled insurgents with no such restrictions.714   
 Third, Indian forces had no experience fighting insurgencies in an urban environment.  
Though throughout its history the Indian state has battled multiple, overlapping insurgencies on 
its own soil (Kashmir, the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, the Naxalites in “the red corridor” in 
India’s east and northeast), its experience in urban settings has been minimal.  The IPKF had no 
contingency plans to guard against many of these shortcomings and its mission creep elicited 
comparisons to the US experience in Vietnam.715  The Indian government assumed that the IPKF 
would be welcomed in its role as a peacekeeping force and failed to prepare for the possibility of 
a protracted armed conflict with the LTTE.716  Finally, the inability of the Indian troops to 
conduct joint operations severely hindered its performance.  During this same time period, 
maintaining a strong posture vis-à-vis Pakistan took precedence over all else.  According to 
Ouellet, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Sunderji, took several smaller units to piece 
together the IPKF.  “The net result was a fair bit of confusion, as the IPKF became a heteroclite 
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construct of units.”717   
 Besides the shortcomings faced by the COIN forces, the insurgents enjoyed several 
advantages on their part.  First, unlike the IPKF, the LTTE was fighting on its home turf.  Even 
after the insurgents were pushed out of Jaffna City, they were able to transition to rural guerilla 
warfare without too much trouble.  Second, because they were operating in their own 
communities, the insurgents enjoyed a much higher level of popular support from the population.  
Effective propaganda techniques reinforced this level of support.  Third, even though the LTTE 
had discarded some of its weapons as stipulated by the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, it 
kept the lion’s share of its arsenal.  Moreover, the LTTE was resupplied with weapons from 
operatives working in Singapore, India’s RAW (working at odds with the Indian military), and 
even the Sri Lankan government once Sri Lankan president Premadasa requested the immediate 
departure of the IPKF on June 2, 1989.718  Most fighters preferred 7.62mm AK-47s and G-3 
assault rifles, although some used Chinese T-56s, M-16A1s, and an array of submachine guns 
(SMGs) and light and heavy machine guns (LMGs and HMGs), including both the American 
made .30 cal and .50 cal.719   
 From a tactical perspective, the LTTE demonstrated remarkable agility and battlefield 
innovation against the IPKF.  To further restrict the movement of the 36th Infantry Division, the 
insurgents placed IEDs along the most frequently traveled roads used by the COIN forces, 
including the Trinconmalee Vavuniua-Elephant Pass road, which was the major artery for Indian 
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personnel, vehicles, and supplies coming into Jaffna City from the port at Trinconmalee.720  The 
IEDs were constructed using plastic cylinders filled with 100 kilos of high grade explosives, 
buried beneath the road surface, and activated using pull and pressure switches which could be 
located away from the bomb.  The group also used remote control device and electric current to 
complete the circuit.721  
 The IPKF intervention was a major event in the course of the LTTE’s insurgency.  While 
the IPKF was not without its triumphs, including pushing the Tigers out of Jaffna City during 
Operation Pawan, on balance, “the IPKF actions are nearly universally recognized as a 
failure.”722 The experience gained from fighting Indian troops, at the time the world’s fourth 
largest army, during the thirty-two month interregnum in Tamil-controlled Sri Lanka enhanced 
the LTTE’s effectiveness by providing the group with invaluable experience in urban-rural 
insurgency.723 
4.4.2.3 Karuna Faction Split (2004) 
In early March 2004, Vinayanamoorthy Muralitharan, known as “Colonel Karuna,” defected 
from the LTTE.  Karuna took his autonomous, geographically concentrated Eastern Province 
army with him.  The Eastern faction became Tamil makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and 
subsequently joined the counterinsurgents in their fight against the LTTE, now mostly a 
Northern Province organization.  Karuna’s defection struck a blow to the LTTE’s command and 
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control.724  The split sapped the morale of the LTTE and limited its operational effectiveness.  
Karuna was well-regarded by his peers in the LTTE and rose to a senior rank in the group by 
conducting successful military operations throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  Once his 
Eastern faction split from the Tigers, the LTTE’s ability to conduct conventional operations was 
severely curtailed.   
 The rift occurred when Prabhakaran accused Colonel Karuna of corruption.  Rather than 
face Prabhakaran after he was summoned (he feared being killed), Karuna chose to break from 
the group and form his own organization.  After splitting from the LTTE, Karuna’s TMVP 
attacked their former comrades-in-arms.  Sri Lankan COIN forces benefited tremendously from 
TMVP intelligence and manpower in the Eastern Province.725  Karuna led his fighters against 
LTTE insurgents in the coastal areas of Batticaloa-Ampara in the east.  Throughout 2006, the 
TMVP killed 82 LTTE insurgents while the Tigers only managed to kill 27 TMVP fighters.726 
 Even for a group with traditionally high levels of fratricide like the LTTE, few could 
have predicted Karuna’s split and even fewer could have predicted the impact it would have on 
the Tamil Tigers.  Since Karuna was known within the group as a hard-liner—he had executed 
hundreds of prisoners, massacred Muslims in the east of Sri Lanka, and physically coerced child 
soldiers into joining the group—his defection was that much more devastating.  The TMVP 
quickly solidified the hearts and minds of the Tamils in Eastern Province.  To achieve this, 
Karuna disbanded police stations and law courts established by the LTTE, returned land and 
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livestock to people who had it confiscated by LTTE insurgents, and abolished LTTE taxes.727  A 
purely kinetic analysis of Karuna’s defection reveals that once his force of 500-600 fighters 
switched sides, the LTTE began to operate as more of a conventional military, rather than as an 
insurgent force.728  This strategic miscalculation played directly into the hands of the Sri Lankan 
COIN forces, which had spent much of the past decade upgrading its conventional forces with 
the help of China. 
4.4.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
4.4.3.1 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (1987) 
The Indo-Sri Lankan Accords of 1987 called for an immediate cessation to hostilities.  In 
accordance with a halt to the fighting, the insurgents were required to disarm and turn over 
weapons to Sri Lankan authorities at designated spots throughout the country.  For its part, India 
agreed to ban Tamil militants from using its territory as a safe haven while also contributing 
assets to jointly patrol the Palk Strait with the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN).  Per the terms of the 
agreement, the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) made the following concessions: troops in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces were relegated to their barracks; military bases recently 
constructed in the Vadaramachchi section of the Jaffna peninsula were shuttered; and finally, 
Sinhalese “home guard” militias were disarmed.729   
 In part, the political dimensions of the Accords proved to be the most problematic.  The 
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framework of the agreement, which was intended to resolve the conflict and provide an outline 
for institutional arrangements for power sharing, contained two controversial declarations.  First, 
the Accords stipulated that Sri Lanka was a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society.  
Second, the Northern and Eastern Provinces, traditional Tamil homelands, were recognized as 
the historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking population.  On their face, neither of these points 
should have been contentious.  Sri Lanka was obviously a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural 
society comprised of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, and Burghers (descended from the Dutch).  
All the Accords really did was to frame the policies of bilingualism, the provincial council 
scheme, and the temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces as the unit of 
devolution.  
 But the agreement alienated both the LTTE and the JVP.  The latter thought the Accords 
went too far, while the former believed that the agreement did not go far enough.  No amount of 
cajoling by the Indian government could convince Prabhakaran to accept an agreement that 
enshrined “the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.”  This protected the Sri 
Lankan state sui generis and precluded the possibility of an independent Eelam.  As indicated by 
the Tiruchelvam principles, Section 2 of the constitution entrenched Sri Lanka as a unitary state, 
and the agreement did nothing to change this.  Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amendment dictated 
that “national policy on all subjects and functions” remained the writ of the central government.  
In the end, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords were supposed to address devolution, but the center 
retained so much power, especially as embodied in the state bureaucracy and the judiciary, that a 
substantial devolution of power amounted to little more than an abstract.730   
 For the LTTE, the most lasting impact of the Accords was the deployment of the Indian 
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Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka.  Initially greeted with open arms, the IPKF would soon 
become the main target of the LTTE’s ire, as the two sides waged a bitter conflict against each 
other between 1987 and 1990. 
4.4.3.2 The Kumaratunga Accords (1994-1995) 
The Kumaratunga Accords were the centerpiece of the Sri Lankan government’s attempt at 
negotiating a peace process beginning in early 1994, following a cease-fire in mid-January.  Yet 
again, the take away from the Kumaratunga Accords was that the LTTE remained hesitant about 
committing to the process.  Without complete LTTE buy-in, and especially without the full-
backing of Prabhakaran, no peace effort could succeed.  The Tigers were far more concerned 
with the military effort than the political component of negotiations, but often made unrealistic 
demands for the Sri Lankan government to abandon certain military positions.  Moreover, the 
LTTE was consistently unwilling to review constitutional proposals.731   
 After only three months, what had been regarded as the most promising effort to end the 
conflict ended abruptly when the insurgents destroyed two Sri Lankan naval craft and over the 
next five days destroyed two Sri Lankan air force planes.  Perhaps the writing was on the wall.  
After all, an ominous sign for the ultimate success of the negotiations came very early on when 
the LTTE triggered a bomb blast that killed over fifty people, including the opposition 
presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake.  To be sure, the Sri Lankan government was also 
culpable for the way it handled the peace accords.  Kumaratunga organized an inexperienced 
staff whose disorganization and lack of overall strategy for dealing with the Tamil population 
was a major factor in the failure of the talks.   Still, the proposals put forth offered the LTTE the 
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most far-reaching benefits of any deal yet.  These included a federal system in all but name, 
resolution of the language issue, and a framework to return to the merger of the Northern and 
Eastern provinces, to be resolved at some point in the future. 
 So why did the Tigers leave the deal on the table?  Throughout the Kumaratunga 
Accords, as in previous and future negotiations, the LTTE wanted it all.  The group sought an 
enhanced political status, the preservation of its military positional and the retention of its 
“quasi-state” in Jaffna, and to avoid making a whole-hearted commitment to the process until it 
was guaranteed what it wanted.  To Prabhakaran, and many in the upper echelon of the 
insurgency, there was little to gain from negotiations that did not eventually lead to separatism.  
The fact of the matter is, “LTTE leaders entered the 1995 negotiations as an exploratory 
measure, to see what might lie down the road, but without having to make any fundamental 
decision that a successful negotiation was essential.”732  And with negotiations off the table by 
April 1995, the two sides went back to war.   
4.4.3.3 Norwegian Peace Initiative (2002-2008) 
In December 2001, the LTTE declared a unilateral cease-fire.  Two months later, Prime Minister 
Wickramasinghe arranged a formal cease-fire, thus paving the way for peace talks between the 
insurgents and the Sri Lankan government.  Over the next two years, the Norwegian government 
facilitated negotiations between both sides in various locales, including Thailand, Norway, 
Germany, and Japan.  Between April and June 2002, the LTTE rejected the Sri Lankan 
government’s proposals for an interim administration.  The insurgents argued that Colombo’s 
proposals failed to recognize the political dimensions of the conflict because they provided no 
                                                 
732 Ibid, p.138. 
 
 267 
autonomy to the proposed interim institutions.   
 In October 2003, the LTTE submitted proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA) for the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.733  Some observers believe that the 
LTTE never seriously considered negotiating an end to the conflict point to Clause 3 of the 
ISGA.  This clause stated that if a final settlement had not been reached and implemented within 
the five year window immediately following the ratification of the ISGA Agreement, then an 
independent election commission, appointed by the ISGA, shall conduct free and fair elections 
in accordance with international democratic principles and standards under international 
observation.734  But buried in the text of the clause was a provision that stipulated the right or 
power to secede after five years.  According to this provision, the LTTE could legitimately claim 
that an agreement had not been reached, hold an election, declare a separate state, and call for 
international recognition.735   
 Another indication the insurgents were not serious about negotiations was an insistence 
on negotiating an end to the conflict within the framework of the “Thimpu principles.”  These 
principles were first put forth during talks in 1985 and rejected outright by the Sri Lankan 
government.  In short, the “Thimpu principles” called for the recognition of (a) a Tamil 
homeland; (b) the right of Tamil self-determination; (c) Tamil nationalism as the basis of a 
solution.736  The Tigers entered the talks declaring that they were willing to negotiate peace talks 
without any conditions; yet somewhere along the way, the LTTE decided to revert back to the 
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“Thimpu principles,” as a pre-requisite for negotiations.   
 In conjunction with the peace talks, the LTTE ramped up its propaganda campaign, 
mostly in an attempt to regain its ebbing popularity within the Tamil community.  Following the 
9/11 attacks, the LTTE’s diaspora network had come under close scrutiny by Western 
governments.  As a result, the organization’s fundraising network was seriously compromised.  
In order to account for this shortcoming, the Tigers sought to press their domestic constituency in 
the Northern and Eastern provinces by demanding more money in taxes, as well as relying on 
extortion.  This alienated members of the Tamil community, who now more than ever hoped for 
an end to the conflict.   
 A series of events unfolded over the next several years that would place both sides firmly 
back on the road to conflict.  In March 2003, the LTTE boycotted negotiations and claimed that 
“excessive internationalization” of the peace process had unfavorably altered the balance of 
power against it.  A year later, in March 2004, the Karuna faction split from the LTTE.  This 
defection enervated the insurgents substantially.  With a considerably weakened LTTE, the Sri 
Lankan government and COIN forces began to reconsider their strategic calculus for engaging in 
negotiations versus organizing for one last push to defeat the insurgents militarily.  In April 
2004, the UNF coalition was defeated and a surge of Sinhala nationalist parties consolidated 
power in parliament.  The December 2004 tsunami further complicated peace negotiations, as all 
international efforts now focused on helping the victims.  Although the Sri Lankan government 
only formally abrogated the CFA in January 2008, the negotiations fell apart long before then.  
The LTTE resumed its violent activities in 2005 by embarking on a campaign of assassination 
targeting Tamil politicians and Sri Lankan government intelligence operatives.737  On July 26, 
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2006, COIN force fighter jets bombed several LTTE camps around Mavil Aru.  Eelam War IV 
had officially begun. 
4.4.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
4.4.4.1 Eelam War I (1983-1987) 
While it is not always easy to pinpoint the start of an insurgency, most scholars believe that the 
aftermath of the “Black July” riots mark the beginning of the Tamil insurgency against the Sri 
Lankan state.  Initially, the insurgency was inchoate in nature and unfocused in its goals.  The 
LTTE was merely one of several militant Tamil outfits fighting against the Sri Lankan Armed 
Forces and other elements of the state’s security apparatus.  Yet, from very early on, the Tigers 
fought to position themselves as the preeminent Tamil insurgent group.  In 1984, the LTTE 
began robbing banks in Jaffna to finance its organization.  That same year, much in a similar way 
as the PIRA engaged in self-policing around neighborhoods in Belfast, Prabhakaran’s group 
began executing suspected traitors by tying them up to lamp posts and shooting them one time in 
the head.738  “Lamp postings” were a clear sign to the community that the Tigers meant business.  
 In the nascent stages of an insurgency, the government often fails to recognize the true 
nature of the threat.  In 1984, several incidents took place that should have signaled to the 
government in Colombo that ongoing violence amounted to more than just aftershocks from the 
“Black July” riots.  In August 1984, a bomb attack claimed by the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) at 
the Madras airport in Tamil Nadu killed 30 civilians.  Two months later, 11 civilians were 
injured when the Fort Police station in Colombo was bombed.  When India’s Prime Minister 
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Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards that same month, Sri Lankan 
government authorities grew extremely concerned.  Indira Gandhi had been an ardent supporter 
of the Tamil cause, if for no other reason than the fact that 50 million Tamils living in Tamil 
Nadu represented a formidable political prize for her Congress Party’s electoral base. 
 With Indira Gandhi now dead, the authorities in Sri Lanka were worried about an even 
more pro-Tamil politician replacing her.  The Jayawardena government recognized the ineptitude 
of its military counterinsurgency forces.  In an effort to crush the various insurgent groups 
operating throughout the country, the Sri Lankan government hired a private British security firm 
as well as several Israeli intelligence experts from Mossad.739  Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his 
mother as the prime minister of India and as a political neophyte, was pliable to domestic 
influences, including manipulation at the hands of Tamil Nadu politicians like M.G. 
Ramachandran and domestic Indian security institutions, such as the Research and Analysis 
Wing, or RAW.   
 RAW supported the alphabet soup of Tamil insurgent groups (LTTE, TELO, PLOTE, 
EPRLF, EROS, TELA, ENDLF), and in April 1985 even masterminded the formation of the 
short-lived Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), which brought together some of the 
leading terrorists from these groups.  As the LTTE struggled to differentiate itself from the other 
Tamil groups, a pattern of violence and counter-violence emerged in early 1985, including the 
Kokkilai offensive in February, which was the first LTTE attack on a Sri Lankan army barrack.  
Two months later, in April 1985, Tamil groups attacked Sri Lankan Muslims throughout the 
Eastern Province.  Then in May, the LTTE conducted an attack in Anuradhapura that killed over 
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150 Buddhist pilgrims in response to killing of 70 Tamils in Valvettihurai earlier that year.740  
1985 culminated with a December bomb blast at the home of the LTTE’s number two, Anton 
Balasingham, although he managed to survive unscathed.    
 A mutually hurting stalemate became apparent very early on.  Throughout Eelam War I, 
neither the COIN force nor the insurgents could muster the strength to subjugate the other.  The 
Tigers demonstrated their potency by conducting high profile attacks at will.  In May 1986, an 
LTTE attack destroyed an Air Lanka plane, killing 17 passengers. This was followed less than a 
week later by a bomb attack against the Sri Lankan government’s central communication office 
in Colombo, which killed 14 people.741  By 1986, the LTTE had focused much of its violence on 
a campaign to consolidate control of the Tamil insurgency.  The ranks of the organization 
swelled as Prabhakaran gave his blessing to begin recruiting women and children.  Between 
April and May of 1986, the LTTE killed 150 TELO members and 70-80 EPRLF insurgents.  742  
The Tigers compiled 600 casualties between 1986 and 1988.   TELO was decried as an Indian 
puppet and subsequently decimated.  By the end of 1986, both PLOTE and the EPRLF had been 
eliminated.   
 To begin 1987, the SLAF launched several small scale operations aimed at disrupting the 
insurgency, but the operations had little effect and merely served to elicit counter-reprisals from 
the LTTE.  In April 1987 the Tigers pulled off two devastating attacks.  In the first incident, 
known as the “Good Friday Massacre,” the LTTE slaughtered 126 Sinhalese bus passengers and 
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injured another 60 in Kituluttuwa, North Central Province.743  That same month, a joint LTTE-
EROS operation detonated a car bomb in the capital, killing 113 and injuring over 200.744 
In response, the COIN forces launched Operation Liberation (Vadamarachchi Operation) from 
May to June of 1987 in LTTE-controlled Jaffna.  By the end of May, the COIN forces had 
achieved their objective of capturing Velvettiturai, symbolic as Prabhakaran’s hometown.   
Although the SLAF had secured a partial victory, the LTTE was far from impotent.  In June, the 
insurgents shot 33 people, including 29 Buddhist monks, in Arantalawa in Ampara in Eastern 
Province.  With international pressure mounting to stop the violence, India intervened in an 
attempt to bring a peaceful end to the four year-old insurgency.745 
4.4.4.2 Eelam War II (1990-1995) 
The Indian Peacekeeping Force intervention began to wind down in 1989.  In April, the 
Premadasa government declared a cease-fire and offered the LTTE a peace package which 
included amnesty and rehabilitation (LTTE disarmament was not required).  The agreement was 
formalized in June and by October the Sri Lankan government released LTTE prisoners and 
promised to close down army bases in Thondaimannar, Velvettiturai, and Point Pedro.  But even 
as the Sri Lankan government capitulated to LTTE demands, Prabhakaran never took peace talks 
seriously.  “While maintaining the ‘charade’ of negotiating a political settlement, the LTTE 
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prepared for war,” notes Bandarage.746  It was a cycle that would repeat itself throughout the 
course of the insurgency and one that would ultimately undermine the credibility of the 
moderates within the LTTE’s ranks. 
 In March 1990, the IPKF withdrew its troops from Sri Lanka.  The resulting power 
vacuum led to the beginning of Eelam War II in June 1990.  The LTTE used Premadasa’s refusal 
to repeal the 6th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution to dissolve the North East Provincial 
Council (NEPC) and officially end negotiations.  The opening year of Eelam War II got off to a 
bloody start.  The SLAF enjoyed some early successes, capturing Mannar and several islands 
near Jaffna.  But for the most part, the LTTE’s violence characterized the opening stage of Eelam 
War II.  In June 1990, the Tigers killed the EPRLF’s leader, Padmanabha, and also slaughtered 
600 Sinhalese and Muslim policemen, who were lured with an offer of safe passage by the LTTE 
on their way to Colombo.747   
 From June to July of 1990, the LTTE fought Sri Lankan COIN forces in the Battle of 
Kokavil.748  After two weeks of intense fighting, the insurgents prevented the SLAF soldiers 
from resupplying themselves with food, water, and ammunition. The insurgents eventually 
captured the military camp, but the COIN forces would not have to wait long for a victory.  
Shortly after losing at the Battle of Kokavil, the Sri Lankan Air Force launched Operation Eagle, 
which resupplied and rescued critically wounded soldiers from the old Dutch fort at Jaffna.  The 
operation was widely hailed as a success, providing the COIN forces with a much –needed 
morale boost at a time when LTTE victories seemed to dominate the headlines.   
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 Two months after the Battle of Kokavil, in August 1990, the insurgents turned their 
attention toward Sri Lanka’s Muslim community.  In early August, the LTTE killed 122 Muslims 
in Eravur, Easter Province and punctuated this assault three months later by expelling between 
75,000 and 100,000 Muslims from Jaffna in a blatant campaign of ethnic cleansing.749  In 
between those two incidents, further evidence of a stalemate came in the form of Operation Sea 
Breeze, which was a combined military operation launched by the COIN forces in Mullaitivu, 
the first amphibious operation launched by the Sri Lankan armed forces in their history.  The 
result was a successful breakthrough of a LTTE siege in which the COIN force was able to 
resupply its Army camp.   
 Eight insurgents were arrested in January 1991 as they attempted to smuggle 3,000 liters 
of petrol through Puddukotai and Ramanathapuram.  While it was not apparent at the time, it is 
now clear that the LTTE was stockpiling resources, including bomb making materials, in 
preparation for a campaign of high-profile attacks.  In March 1991, a suicide car bomb killed the 
Sri Lankan Defense Minister, Ranjan Wijeratna.  But the most significant attack of Eelam War II 
and some argue of the entire insurgency, was executed in May 1991 when a young woman 
named Dhanu detonated an explosive belt, killing herself, seventeen bystanders, and her intended 
target, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.750  Gandhi’s assassination was major turning 
point in the LTTE’s relations with India, both the state and its population.  From May 1991 on, 
the Tigers stepped up their effort to expand internationally and sought external sources of 
weapons, money, and safe haven.  The Tigers followed up their assassination of Gandhi by 
bombing the Sri Lankan government’s Joint Operations Command Center in Colombo in June 
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1991.751   
 The COIN forces soon realized, correctly, that they needed to answer the LTTE’s 
assassination and bombing campaign with some serious firepower.  From July to August 1991, 
the SLAF deployed nearly 11,000 troops to fight against the insurgents in the First Battle of 
Elephant Pass.  Between 500 and 1,000 insurgents were killed as the Sri Lankan army gained 
control of the strategically important strip of land that linked the northern mainland, known as 
Wanni, with the Jaffna Peninsula.  From 14 July through 9 August , the COIN forces executed 
Operation Balavegaya, their most successful operation of the entire second phase of the 
insurgency.  The amphibious assault helped the SLAF win the First Battle of Elephant Pass and 
further develop its ability to conduct joint operations. 
 As the Sri Lankan military built up its maritime and amphibious capabilities, the LTTE 
also expanded its operations on the seas.  In November 1991, an Indian Navy vessel detained the 
Tongonova, a small LTTE-owned freighter, off the coast of Karaikal.  The Tongonova carried 
arms and ammunition, Mh-2 transmitters, 13,000 liters of diesel, 10,000 liters of petrol, and 
explosives while en route to Jaffna.752  The arrest of Ravi (aka Ravichandran) and 18 others in 
December 1991 demonstrated the LTTE’s desire to reestablish its sanctuary in Tamil Nadu, as 
well as its attempts to forge links with militant groups operating in India.  Two of these groups 
were the People’s War Group (PWG) of Maoists and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK).753   
 The back-and-forth between the insurgents and the COIN forces continued during the 
summer of 1992.  In June, the SLAF advanced on Tellipalai while the Sri Lankan Navy 
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destroyed two Sea Tiger bases off the coast of Jaffna.  To strike back, the LTTE assassinated two 
Sri Lankan generals and eight other soldiers with an IED on Kayts Island.  In that attack, Lt. 
Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa, Commander of Northern Operations, and Brig. Gen. Vijaya 
Wimalratne, were both murdered.754  But an even more high profile attack occurred in November 
1992 when the LTTE killed the Sri Lankan Navy Chief, Vice Adm. Clancy Fernando.  That 
same month, the insurgents massacred Muslim and Sinhalese farmers in the Polonnaruwa district 
near Batticaloa, killing 161 civilians, as well as eight soldiers and twelve policemen.755   
 The LTTE suffered a devastating loss in January 1993 when one of the group’s top 
cadres, known as Kittu, killed himself after the ship he was traveling on was intercepted by the 
Indian Navy off the coast of Madras.  The four hundred ton ship, the M.V. Yahata, was carrying 
25,000 liters of petrol as well as arms and explosives destined for the Tigers.  In retaliation for 
the death of Kittu, the LTTE ramped up its assassination campaign of high-ranking Sri Lankan 
officials.  In April 1993, the Tigers assassinated Sri Lanka’s former National Security Minister, 
Athulathmudali, at a rally in the capital.  An even bigger blow came two weeks later when, on 
May 1st, an LTTE suicide bomber from the group’s elite Black Tigers unit detonated an 
explosive-laden vest at an election rally in Colombo.756 
To stem the tide of the insurgents and gain the upper hand, the COIN forces initiated the 
Yal Devi offensive in September 1993.  The offensive sought to take control of insurgent-held 
territory from Elephant Pass to Kilali and seal off routes across the Jaffna lagoon all the way to 
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the Jaffna peninsula.  But rather than occupy the area, the SLAF destroyed 120 insurgent swamp 
boats and outboard motors before retreating back to its military base at Elephant Pass.757 
To close out the year, the LTTE planned to counter the COIN forces’ Yali Dev offensive 
and reverse some of its losses.  In November 1993, the two sides fought the Battle of Pooneryn.  
This two day skirmish saw the LTTE overrun the Sri Lankan naval base in Pooneryn, located in 
the north of the country, leading to the death of approximately 600 Sri Lankan troops.  By the 
end of 1993, nearly one-third of the Sri Lankan Navy had been destroyed.758  Still, the insurgents 
had suffered great losses as well.  In 1993 alone, the Tigers had lost Kittu, as well as 
Gopalaswami Mahendrarajah (aka Mahatiya) and Yogaratnam (aka Yogi), two high-ranking 
cadres whose leadership during the IPKF insurgency had been critical.759  Undeterred, the LTTE 
shifted its focus to employing its specialized units to greater effect.  In September 1994, the Sea 
Tigers destroyed a Sri Lankan navy offshore patrol vessel, the Sagarwardene.760  
 A new era was ushered in with the November 1994 election of Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, the head of the People’s Alliance (PA).  As the LTTE continued a wave of 
fratricidal killings, eliminating Tiger cadres judged to be too close to India’s intelligence 
services, President Kumaratunga undertook one of the most ambitious attempts at peace in the 
history of the conflict.  Fulfilling her campaign promises, throughout late 1994 and early 1995 
Kumaratunga engaged the LTTE in the most earnest negotiations since the Indo-Lanka Accord 
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of 1987.  The negotiations broke down on April 19, 1995, when the LTTE sabotaged 2 Sri 
Lankan Navy gun boats, resulting in the death of 22 sailors and destroyed an additional five Sri 
Lankan Air Force planes.761  
4.4.4.3 Eelam War III (1995-2001) 
The breakdown of the Kumaratunga peace talks initiated an insurgent-led offensive that included 
a string of bombings and shootings over the next several weeks, resulting in the death of 264 
security personnel and 57 civilians throughout the North and East of the country.762  On May 25, 
1995, the LTTE perpetrated the Kallarawa massacre, in which insurgents murdered 42 Sinhalese 
civilians, including women and children, in a small fishing village on the Eastern seaboard of Sri 
Lanka.763  In July, the COIN forces launched a major military offensive to retake the Jaffna 
Peninsula.  The offensive failed to displace the insurgents, but it did have the unintended effect 
of causing mass refugee flows, as civilians escaping the violence moved east to Vanni.   
 With many civilians now outside of Jaffna, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces hoped to 
capitalize on gains from its July offensive.  In October 1995, the SLAF conducted a combined 
military operation code named Operation Riviresa.764  Insurgent to COIN force deaths were 4:1, 
and when the forty-nine day battle ended, the Sri Lankan military had captured Jaffna city and 
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extended its writ throughout most of the peninsula.765  The Sri Lankan victory came at a high 
cost.  During the fighting, the LTTE broke through the SLAF formation and ignited two oil 
installations in Colombo.  Furthermore, the Tigers continued a systematic campaign of ethnic 
cleansing against both Sinhalese and Muslim civilians.  By the end of the year, an estimated 
130,000 civilians had been displaced as a result of the violence and were living in over 90 
refugee camps scattered throughout Northern Province.766   
With its Jaffna sanctuary under attack, the LTTE took its war out of the North and East 
and into other parts of the country.  In January 1996, the insurgents unleashed a series of 
bombings and assassinations, including a bomb blast at the Colombo Central Bank which killed 
90 civilians and injured an additional 1,400.767  In July, the Tigers attacked an Army base at 
Mullativu, killing 1,200 Sri Lankan soldiers, including the Jaffna commander.  That same month, 
the LTTE bombed a train in Dehiwala, resulting in the death of between 60 and 70 civilians.  
Neither side— insurgents nor COIN force— could break the stalemate.  In May 1997, Sri 
Lankan military operations against the LTTE in Vanni and Mullativu had little effect, other than 
enraging the Tigers.  The LTTE exacted revenge on 15 October 1997 when it bombed the 
Colombo World Trade Center.  This attack killed 15 and wounded 105, but the psychological 
damage it inflicted was immeasurable.  Another major attack occurred in January 1998 when a 
four-man LTTE Black Tiger squad detonated a car bomb outside of the Temple of the Tooth, a 
sacred Buddhist shrine in Kandy.768  Though the attack only managed to kill seven and injure 
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another 25, it was highly symbolic in nature.   
 It is important to keep in perspective the number of people killed in LTTE attacks.  While 
in some insurgencies, to kill 10 members of the enemy in one attack is considered an 
overwhelming success, the Tigers sought for and achieved a much higher casualty threshold.  In 
March 1998, LTTE suicide bomb killed 36 and injured an additional 250 to 300 people.  Two 
months later, the Black Tigers assassinated Sarojini Yogeswaran, Jaffna’s mayor, and Brig. Gen. 
Wijeratne.  In September 1998, the two sides faced off in the Battle of Kilinochchi.  COIN forces 
captured Mankulam, although the LTTE launched Operation Unceasing Waves II, an offensive 
that allowed it to recapture a supply route and several villages. Perhaps one of the most 
devastating blows to a possible peace deal came on July 29, 1999 when Neelan Tiruchelvam, a 
TULF politician and the architect of the devolution process, was killed in Colombo by a suicide 
bomber.  A mere two months later, in September, the insurgents murdered 54 ethnic Sinhalese in 
retaliation for a Sri Lankan Air Force bombing that had killed 22 Tamils weeks earlier.   
 With no end to the violence in sight, the LTTE succeeded in regaining valuable ground 
from the COIN forces with the military triumph of the Oddusuddan offensive in October and 
November of 1999, followed by the Second Battle of Elephant Pass in April 2000.  To complete 
its string of spectacular attacks against the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE simultaneously 
attacked the Katunayake Air force base and the adjacent Bandaranaike Airport in July 2001. 
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4.4.5 Decision-Making Structure and Process 
4.4.5.1 Suicide Terrorism and the ‘Cult of Martyrdom’ 
In contemporary terrorism research, suicide terrorism has been over-associated with Islam and 
groups like Al-Qaida, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).  As in most cultures, the topic 
of suicide terrorism as a tactic of warfare is a matter of debate for Tamils, Hindus, and Sri 
Lankans alike.  But what it is not a matter of debate, is that these attacks were extremely 
successful.  Beyond the immense psychological damage inflicted by the Black Tigers, LTTE 
suicide attacks “hindered the Sri Lankan government’s ability to plan and execute COIN 
operations by eliminating the nation’s senior military and political leadership, damaging the 
economy and crippling the population’s morale.”769  Furthermore, for the Tigers, suicide attacks 
functioned at both the tactical and the strategic level.770  While they were clearly useful in 
eliminating LTTE rivals, suicide bombing was a strategic decision undertaken by Prabhakaran 
and the Tiger leadership in order to force the government to the negotiating table in hopes of 
gaining the ultimate concession—an independent Tamil Eelam.771  Perhaps more importantly, 
suicide bombing helped create a culture of martyrdom within the organization.  This culture 
would help sustain the LTTE and contributed to its longevity through building popular support 
and elevating suicide bombers to the status of great heroes (maha veerer), or more appropriately, 
martyrs within the Tamil community. 
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 The first LTTE suicide attack was executed by “Captain Miller” on 5 July 1987.772  The 
attack was directed at a Sri Lankan army camp in Vadamarachi and resulted in the death of 70 
Sri Lankan soldiers.773  The inspiration for the attack came from Hizballah, a group the Tigers 
came into contact with when LTTE fighters were sent to Lebanon to train with the PLO and 
other militant groups in the Bekaa Valley in the mid-1980s.  July 5th is now celebrated as “Black 
Tiger’s Day,” to promote the death of the group’s first self-martyr.  In Sri Lanka, martyrdom 
encompasses public displays of commemoration like “Black Tiger’s Day,” but also newspaper 
articles, special commemorative albums, monuments and statues.  Suicide terrorism expert 
Robert Pape has observed that the “expectation of community support is a key reason so many 
individuals are willing to commit suicide for the Tamil Tigers.  Those who carried out suicide 
attacks for the LTTE attached great importance to how the community would interpret and 
remember their actions.”774   
 Several schools of thought exist on exactly why the LTTE made the strategic decision to 
adopt suicide bombing in their campaign against the Sri Lankan state.  Pape argues that the fear 
of religious persecution initially drove the Tigers to adopt this method of terrorism as a tactic.  
According to this view, the Tamil community was convinced that the Sinhalese government was 
deliberately pursuing policies designed to exterminate the Tamil culture and snuff out the true 
essence of Tamil national identity.  Ironically, Buddhism was the driving force behind this 
repression.  Although the LTTE was an avowedly secular group, for the most part, it did in fact 
incorporate traditional Hindu themes of self-sacrifice, asceticism, and obligation to justify and 
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promote the use of martyrdom within the community.775 
 Bloom’s research, on the other hand, finds that the LTTE initially decided to wage a 
campaign of suicide terrorism in order to distinguish itself from the various Tamil groups 
operating in Sri Lanka throughout the 1980s.  Whatever the reason, Prabhakaran wanted it done 
and the “cult-like” behavior of the organization allowed it to take root with relatively little 
debate.  Once suicide terrorism was accepted, the notion of martyrdom became an intrinsic 
element of Tamil culture.  Michael Horowitz, on the other hand, explains the LTTE’s decision to 
adopt suicide terrorism through the lens of adoption-capacity theory.  In contrast to groups like 
the PIRA and ETA, the LTTE’s broad tactical setup and less clearly defined critical tasks made it 
easier for the Tigers to adopt and successfully employ suicide bombing as an effective 
weapon.776 
 The ability to conduct successful suicide attacks, particularly those executed as part of a 
more comprehensive strategy, are evidence of the LTTE’s position on the higher end of the 
organizational development spectrum.777  The Black Tigers were the group’s elite suicide units, 
comprised of both men and women who launched attacks on land, sea, and air.  To date, the 
Black Tigers are responsible for more suicide attacks than all Palestinian groups combined.  
Between 1987 and 2001, the group launched 76 suicide attacks, and count over 200 suicide 
terrorist incidents over the course of its existence.  Tacit knowledge played a significant role in 
the LTTE’s ability to execute increasingly lethal suicide operations.  Obviously, the insurgent 
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who acts as a human bomb is no longer of any use to the group, since the individual is killed 
when the device explodes.  Yet, because of the frequency with which this tactic was employed, 
LTTE bomb makers were able to learn what worked and what did not.  Tacit knowledge is about 
more than just learning how to use a technology, the overall intent is learning how to use 
technologies or execute technologies to the greatest effect.  Insurgents are unable to do this 
strictly through explicit knowledge.778   
 As detailed in Table 9 (below), suicide attacks were directed against a range of political, 
military, and economic targets.  In addition to achieving specific tactical objectives through the 
attacks, according to Pape, “the Tamil Tigers also achieved significant coercive success, twice 
compelling the Sri Lankan government to engage in serious sovereignty negotiations.”779 
Table 5: Prominent LTTE Suicide Attacks, 1987-2002780 
Date Target Purpose Remarks 
1987 Tamil University taken 
over by SLAF 
Destroy strategic military 
location 
Attack modeled on the 1983 
Hizballah truck bombing in 
Beirut; 75 people died in the 
assault 
1991 Rajiv Ghandi (Indian 
prime minister) 
Political assassination Ghandi was assassinated for 
his decision to curtail Indian 
support for the LTTE and lead 
a peacekeeping force to 
stabilize the situation in 
Jaffna.  This is the only act of 
concerted terrorism that the 
LTTE has carried out beyond 
the Sri Lankan theater.  Eleven 
others were killed in the 
attack. 
1991 Joint Operations Center Destroy strategic military The blast killed over 20, 
                                                 
778 Horacio R. Trujillo and Brian A. Jackson, “Identifying and Exploiting Group Learning Patterns,” in Hsinchun 
Chen, Edna Reid, Joshua Sinai, Andrew Silke, and Boaz Ganor, eds., Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge 
Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, New York: Springer Science and Media, 2008, pp.179-180. 
 
779 Pape, Dying to Win, p.139. 
 
780 Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda Part 2: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe, pp.74-75. 
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(JOC), Ministry of 
Defense 
location wounded 50, and destroyed 
vehicles as far away as 300 
yards from the JOC premises. 
1993  Ranasinghe Premadasa 
(Sri Lankan president) 
Political assassination Premadasa was killed by a 
deep penetration mole who 
had been on the presidential 
staff for several years.  He was 
targeted for his endorsement 
of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan 
Peace Accord.  The attack 
killed 17 and wounded over 
60. 
1994 Gamini Dissanyake 
(opposition leader 
running in the 1994 
presidential elections) 
Political assassination Dissanyake was targeted for 
his key role in arranging the 
details of the 1987 Indo-Sri 
Lankan Peace Accord; an 
additional 50 people were 
killed in the attack (which 
bore strong resemblances to 
the Ghandi assassination) 
1995 Naval gunboats (SLNS 
Suraya and SLNS 
Ranasuru) 
Destroy strategic naval 
asset 
Both ships were completely 
destroyed in the win assaults, 
which left 11 sailors dead (the 
two ships were berthed with 
skeleton crews at the time of 
the strikes).  It has been 
speculated that al-Qaeda’s 
attack on the USS Cole was 
modeled on this operation. 
1995 Ceylon Petroleum 
Corporation oil facility 
Destroy strategic 
economic target 
Four oil storage tanks were 
destroyed, triggering one of 
the largest fires ever seen in 
Colombo.  Twenty-one 
persons were killed in the 
operation. 
1996 Central Bank Destroy strategic 
economic target 
This is the most destructive act 
of terrorism to have ever taken 
place in Sri Lanka, killing 91 
and injuring in excess of 1,400 
1997  Colombo World Trade 
Center 
Destroy strategic 
economic target 
The WTC was hit just one 
week after it opened.  The 
attack, which killed 15 and 
injured over 100, was thought 
to be in retaliation for the US 
decision to designate the 
LTTE as a terrorist 
organization (the bombing is 
one of the few conducted by 
the Tigers that has made no 
attempt to limit foreign 
casualties). 
1999 Chandrika Kumaratunga 
(Sri Lankan president) 
Political assassination Kumaratunga was targeted for 
her hard-line stance against 
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the LTTE and (then) refusal to 
negotiate with the group.  
Although the president 
survived the attack, which was 
carried out by a male Black 
Tiger dressed as a woman, she 
suffered damage to her face 
and lost her right eye.  
Fourteen other people were 
killed, including a top officer 
in charge of Kumaratunga’s 
security. 
2001 Bandaranaike 
International Airport 
Destroy strategic 
economic target and hub 
of critical transportation 
infrastructure 
Twenty-six civil and military 
aircraft were destroyed in the 
attack; it is estimated that 
losses to Sri Lankan Airways 
exceeded $350 million. 
 
An interesting note about the attacks listed in Table 9 (above) and one that lends credence to 
Pape’s argument about the salience of the religious difference between the Tamils and Sinhalese 
as a motivating factor, is the complete absence of suicide attacks directed against Indian forces 
during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation of Sri Lanka from July 1987 to April 
1990.  By March 1988, the Indians had deployed over 100,000 troops to Sri Lanka (nearly three 
times the size of the entire SLAF) and throughout the roughly three year occupation, the IPKF 
killed between 3,000 and 4,000 civilians, raped Tamil women, and used air power and heavy 
artillery with wanton disregard, leading to the depopulation of large areas and untold collateral 
damage.781  Despite this, the LTTE never launched a suicide attack against the IPKF on Sri 
Lankan soil. 
 All told, LTTE suicide attacks killed over 900 people, including two heads of state.  
Interestingly, and in contrast to Palestinian groups that have relied on suicide terrorism, most 
LTTE suicide attacks were carried out by women.  From an operational standpoint, women more 
                                                 
781 Pape, Dying to Win, p.152. 
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easily evaded detection at checkpoints and were able to get closer to their victims than LTTE 
men could have.  Moreover, within the organization, women were viewed as “tougher and more 
willing to sacrifice for the cause.”782   
 
4.4.5.2 Role of Women  
As with all decisions made by the LTTE, Prabhakaran had to agree that allowing women to take 
a more prominent role within the organization was a smart idea.  Once females began to prove 
themselves on the battlefield, however, the decision was an easy one.  Women comprised 
approximately 15-20% of the LTTE’s entire organization.  While initially women were relegated 
to the traditional gender roles of females in terrorist organizations—propaganda, medicine, 
intelligence, recruitment, and fundraising—during the 1990s female Tiger members assumed 
combat-related roles.783   
 The motivation of women for joining the LTTE varied, but similar themes emerged as to 
why they ultimately made the decision to accept combat missions.  First, many women were 
enraged at the COIN forces for killing or injuring their family members.  This reinforced the 
narrative of communal suffering, oppression, and an overall sense of injustice at the hands of the 
Sri Lankan state.  Second, many women associated their acceptance into the group as a sign of 
female emancipation.  As Schalk notes, women who participated in violent struggle believed that 
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they would be afforded a higher status in a future society at peace.784  Third, many women joined 
the LTTE as a response to sexual violence they experienced, either harassment or rape from the 
Sri Lankan forces or the Indian Peacekeeping Force.   Finally, some women were angered by the 
disruption of their everyday lives, particularly their attempt to earn an education.785  Restrictions 
on movement, including curfews, and periodic displacement prevented many women from 
finishing school, thus limiting their future options in society at large. 
4.4.6 Why did the LTTE refuse to negotiate? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the breakdown of the Norwegian-led peace process in 2006, and “Colonel Karuna” now 
siding with the Sri Lankan government, the COIN forces and the LTTE went back to war in late 
July.  After the insurgents cut off water to the paddy fields surrounding Mavil Aru, COIN force 
jets attacked LTTE camps in the area.  Bitter fighting ensued and continued to ebb and flow over 
                                                 
784 Peter Schalk, “Women Fighters of the Liberation Tigers in Tamil Ilam, the Martial Feminism of Atel 
Palacinkam,” South Asia Research, Vol.14, No.2, Autumn 1994, pp.163-183. 
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the next two years.  In March 2007, the LTTE’s Air Tigers struck a COIN force airbase in 
Katunayake.  This was the first recorded insurgent air strike without the assistance of an external 
state supporter in history.  “Colonel Karuna’s” defection provided the Sri Lankan government 
and military with a treasure trove of intelligence while serving the dual purpose of attenuating 
the strength of the group.  With Karuna and his troops no longer defending the East, but instead 
helping to overtake it, the COIN forces captured Sampur, Vakarai, and other parts of the Eastern 
province.  Between 2008 and 2009, the COIN forces launched an offensive in the northern part 
of the island and won the Battle of Kilinochchi in the Eastern theatre, effectively tightening the 
noose on the LTTE’s top leadership.786  The Tigers’ demise was cemented on May 18, 2009 
when Prabhakaran was killed in fighting near Nandikadal Lagoon in northeastern Sri Lanka.   
 Since the defeat of the LTTE after thirty plus years of war, numerous articles have been 
written debating the merits of Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign during Eelam War IV.  
But perhaps a more important question, and certainly one more germane to this study, is why 
didn’t the LTTE negotiate?  To answer that question, it is important to examine the analytic 
framework constructed in this research to discern what variables might provide a sound 
conclusion.  To be sure, there is no one overarching reason why the insurgents continued to fight.  
Indeed, to those following the conflict closely, there were important indicators suggesting that 
the Sri Lankan government had gained the upper hand in the last years of the war.   
 Following 9/11, the LTTE’s financial architecture came under increasing scrutiny, 
limiting the amount of funding the group received for weapons and sustainment.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
786 In an interesting paper, Albert Wesley Harris utilized prospect theory to analyze the LTTE’s decision to mount a 
stand at Kilinochchi.  He concludes that the insurgents preferred to accept the risk of losing the battle, incurring 
significant casualties, and potentially losing the war in return for the chance that they could win the battle and turn 
the tide of the war.  See Albert Wesley Harris, “Insurgency Decision-making under Conditions of Risk,” 
International Journal of Psychological Studies, Vol.4, No.3, 2012, pp.43-47. 
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Karuna’s defection constrained the Tigers geographically, relegating the insurgents to the 
Northern part of the country.  The LTTE’s refusal to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict is 
best explained by analyzing a combination of sub-variables, which can help shed light on 
different elements of the group’s operational and organizational tools, as well as its strategic 
decision-making process.  Because the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state were locked in an 
asymmetric process of negotiations, both parties spent an equal amount of time during each of 
the stages displayed above, with unequal amounts of gains and losses sustained during the 
various outcomes of those stages.787  The result is asymmetrical expectations of victory.  As 
Zartman notes, the greater the structural imbalance between the parties involved, the more likely 
it is that “elements other than negotiation,” in this case war, will ultimately determine the 
outcome.788 
 Of all the reasons why the LTTE never experienced a tipping point toward negotiation, 
none is more apparent than the issue of group composition, most notably the leadership.  Like the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, the insurgency in Sri Lanka was affected by Gladwell’s notion of 
the “Law of the Few.”  However, instead of working to produce a positive outcome, Prabhakaran 
remained the ultimate obstructionist up until his death.  Indeed, Prabhakaran was the 
quintessential hard-liner, a true ideologue who believed in the utility of violence and the futility 
of negotiations to achieve victory.  For the LTTE’s leader, compromise was equal to an act of 
treason.  The conflict was always viewed in zero-sum terms.  Prabhakaran considered any gain 
for the government in Colombo as a net loss for the Tamils.  During each of the three primary 
                                                 
787 For more on the micro-cycle of asymmetric bargaining power, specifically with regard to access to resources, see 
Benedikt Korf, “Rethinking the Greed-Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri 
Lanka,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.42, No.2, 2005, pp.201-217. 
 
788 I. William Zartman, The 50 Percent Solution, New Haven: Yale University, Press, 1983, pp.120-121.  
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respites in the fighting—the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, the Kumaratunga Accords in 1994-1995, 
and the Norwegian facilitated peace initiative of 2002-2008—Prabhakaran and the LTTE 
continued to plan, train, and equip guerilla fighters.  “For Prabhakaran, ceasefires and 
negotiations were merely tactics to give the LTTE time to rest, rearm, and prepare for the next 
round of war until it achieved an independent Eelam,” according to Mitchell B. Reiss.789     
 During the Indo-Lanka Accords, Prabhakran agreed to “fully cooperate” with the terms, 
which included surrendering weapons (not including those needed for personal security) and 
ceasing its campaign of violence.790  Yet, on October 3, 1987, the Sri Lankan navy interdicted an 
LTTE arms shipment in the Jaffna harbor.  Prabhakaran never took negotiations seriously and 
believed the Tigers could use cessations of violence for growth and survival as the group 
prepared for the next interregnum.   
 During the negotiations with the Kumaratunga government, Prabhakaran and the Sri 
Lankan president exchanged letters that led to a cease-fire and an ensuing six month dialogue.  
This would have been difficult to imagine only a year prior, when the LTTE’s military campaign 
had Colombo on the ropes, and Prabhakaran openly declared, “We are firmly convinced that the 
creation of an independent sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is the only and final solution to the 
Tamil national question.  Our position is well known to the enemy and the world.”791  
Nevertheless, Balasingham urged Prabhakaran that it was “politically prudent” and in the interest 
of the Tamil population for the LTTE to engage in dialogue with Kumaratunga’s government.792  
Prabhakaran’s mistrust of the government and the military proved to be the deciding factor in 
                                                 
789 Mitchell B. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists, New York: Open Road, 2010, p.224. 
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791 Ibid, p.251. 
 
792 Ibid. 
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abandoning the peace process.  In April 1995, after putting forth a series of outrageous demands 
that he knew the Sri Lankan government and military could not meet, Prabhakaran broke the 
cease-fire and ordered the attacks that would signal the end of the peace negotiations and the 
beginning of Eelam War III.   
 In addition to leadership, a second significant factor in the LTTE’s unwillingness to 
negotiate was the absence of a prolonged mutually hurting stalemate.  Each time the insurgents 
suffered major losses, either in terms of personnel, territory, or resources, they were able to 
regroup and continue fighting.  The LTTE never viewed negotiations as necessary for victory.  
Prabhakaran and his leadership cadre always believed that victory could be achieved through 
military means.  The command and control structure of the organization reinforced this belief.  
The LTTE was a highly authoritarian organization.  Once negotiations were interpreted as 
placing constraints on the guerillas freedom of action, the response was not compromise but 
recidivism, or a return to terrorism and violence.793  Prabhakaran refused to tolerate dissent, so 
those who disagreed with his worldview were eliminated from his inner circle.  After purging 
those whose view did not complement his own, he was able to surround himself with a close-knit 
group of “yes men” who reinforced his belief that the only way to achieve the group’s objectives 
was through violence—and violence alone.  The government and security forces would be 
defeated on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table.   
 Of course, not all of the blame for a failure to negotiate can be placed squarely on the 
shoulders of the LTTE.  A third reason why the insurgents failed to negotiate an end to the 
conflict was a pervasive climate of Sinhala chauvinism in the Sri Lankan political system.  This 
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chauvinism or ultra-nationalism was often the result of what Neil Devotta terms “ethnic 
outbidding,” which he describes as an “auction-like process wherein politicians create platforms 
and programmes to ‘outbid’ their opponents on their ‘anti-minority’ stance.”794  While this was a 
factor at various times throughout the Northern Ireland conflict, in Sri Lanka, the problem of 
ethnic outbidding was particularly acute.  So just as Prabhakaran was absolute in his demands for 
an independent Tamil Eelam, his opponents in the majority Sinhalese community were just as 
adamant in their opposition to any proposal that promoted devolution of power to the Tamils.  
The result of this behavior was that whenever a peace-minded government came to power, i.e. 
the Kumaratunga administration, the opposition party sought to paint the government as weak on 
security and bending to the wishes of the terrorists.   
 When Sinhala nationalist parties ratcheted up their extreme rhetoric, the LTTE concluded 
that none of these political organizations were prepared to recognize even the most fundamental 
issues regarding the prospect of Tamil independence.  This process of ethnic outbidding was not 
reserved strictly for the Sinhalese though.  Before eliminating all of its rivals, the LTTE 
consistently attempted to portray itself as the vanguard of the Tamil people and the only Tamil 
party willing to fight for the independence of Tamil Eelam.   
 To recap, the three main reasons why the LTTE did not negotiate an end to the conflict in 
Sri Lanka were leadership, the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate, and a process of ethnic 
outbidding which took root in both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities.  When it came to 
negotiations, failure begot further failure.  Failed negotiations between the Sri Lankan 
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government and Tamil representatives, both leading up to and during the insurgency, produced a 
climate of mutual distrust and suspicion.  In all, negotiations failed in 1957, 1965, 1984, 1985, 
1987, 1989, 1995, and finally during the Norwegian-sponsored peace talks of 2002-2008.  These 
repeated unsuccessful negotiations “acted as a negative force on the settlement of the conflict by 
pushing the parties to abandon negotiations out of disinterest or exhaustion.”795  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Analytic Framework Summary Analysis 
Operational Tools 
                                                 
795 Sonia Bouffard and David Carment, “The Sri Lanka Peace Process: A Critical Review,” Journal of South Asian 
Development, 1:2 (2006), p.166. 
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Weapons The LTTE weapons procurement network ensured that the group would never be left defenseless.  As a whole, 
LTTE operational tools proved to be a strong deterrent to any form of negotiation, since the insurgents’ arsenal 
meant that it was always prepared to fight. 
Sanctuary Sanctuary allowed the group to establish a system of governance to rival that of the Sri Lankan state.  It also 
prolonged the duration of the conflict because it allowed insurgents to evade arrest and offered the Tigers a secure 
area to rest, recuperate, replenish, and rearm. 
Funding The Tamil diaspora and the LTTE’s fundraising network kept the insurgents flush with cash for the majority of 
the conflict.  However, following the 9/11 attacks, the international community cracked down on LTTE 
fundraising, which should have exerted pressure to negotiate an end to the conflict, but Prabhakaran refused. 
Organizational Tools 
Command & Control Unlike the PIRA/Sinn Fein relationship, the LTTE’s political wing remained subordinate to the group’s military 
wing throughout the duration of the insurgency.  The LTTE was a rigidly hierarchical group with a leadership that 
left little room for dissent. 
Group Composition Some scholars argue that Prabakharan was too much of an ideologue to ever seriously consider a negotiated 
settlement with the Sri Lankan government.  Instead, he and his group reaped the benefits of several cease-fires to 
reorganize for the next offensive. 
Ideology LTTE ideology, although at times influenced by aspects of Marxism, could most aptly be characterized as ethno-
nationalist.  When the government ramped up its nationalist rhetoric, the Tamils responded by engaging in a 
campaign of ethnic outbidding, escalating sectarian violence and lessening the possibility of negotiations. 
Popular Support Following the 2004 tsunami, the LTTE’s support among its constituency plummeted. LTTE extortion, 
recruitment of child soldiers, and an inability to manage development funds following the tsunami made the 
insurgents vulnerable.  The government exploited this weakness and therefore eschewed negotiations. 
Propaganda The LTTE’s propaganda machine operated at the behest of its leadership and unrelentingly pushed for the Tigers’ 
goal of an independent Tamil Eelam.  Overall, it is assessed that propaganda had relatively little impact on the 
decision to negotiate or continue fighting. 
Strategic Decision Making 
Goals The LTTE never wavered on the goal of establishing an independent Tamil Eelam.  For the insurgents, acquiring 
an independent homeland was a zero-sum game and negotiations only served to further this goal. 
Seminal Events The Karuna faction split proved a devastating blow to any chances of negotiation during Eelam War IV.  By the 
time the LTTE recognized the possible need to negotiate, the COIN forces surrounded a beleaguered insurgent 
force and employed unrelenting firepower to kill Prabhakaran and decimate the organization. 
Previous attempts at 
conflict resolution 
By the time Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power in Sri Lanka in 2005, the LTTE had broken numerous cease-fires 
and reneged on multiple peace negotiations.  Prabhakaran overplayed his hand, and at the time of the final phase 
of the conflict, Sri Lanka’s leader determined that only force could end the insurgency. 
Mutually hurting stalemate Despite the casualties incurred by both sides in the conflict, a true mutually hurting stalemate was never fully 
achieved.  Because Prabhakaran utilized negotiations to recuperate and rearm, the COIN force was never able to 
escalate the conflict to a decisive point until 2009, at which negotiation was not an option. 
Decision-making structure 
& process 
Following the death of Balasingham, the organization lost its counterbalance to Prabhakaran’s authoritarian 
nature.  With no senior figures able to contest his decisions or provide an alternative point of view, 
Prabhakaran’s intransigence came to define the group’s relations with successive Sri Lankan leaders. 
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5.0  AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) 
5.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND 
The African National Congress (ANC) has ruled South Africa’s government since the mid-
1990s.  However, for the better part of three decades, the ANC was an outlawed insurgent 
organization that waged a campaign of terror against the government in Pretoria.  Universally 
known for the iconic figure Nelson Mandela, the ANC actually traces its roots back to 1912 
when it was founded as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC).  The ANC was 
initially formed to advocate the rights of Black South Africans, who were dominated, politically 
and economically, by the minority Afrikaner population and the ruling government, the National 
Party (NP).  Over the next several decades, the NP passed a series of laws that restricted the 
rights of Blacks in South Africa based on a system of racial segregation that came to be called 
apartheid.   
 Beginning in the 1950s, the ANC organized the Defiance Campaign, which was a mass 
movement that called for general strikes, defiance of the authorities, and an overall resistance to 
apartheid.  In 1955, the ANC and its allies in the South African Communist Party (SACP), South 
African Indian Congress, South African Congress of Democrats (COD), and Coloured People’s 
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Congress formed the South African Congress Alliance.796  The Alliance subsequently adopted 
the Freedom Charter, which laid out the core principles of a “non-racial” South Africa governed 
by the people.   
 In 1960, both the ANC and a radical black militant splinter group from the ANC, known 
as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), were outlawed in South Africa under the Unlawful 
Organizations Act.  Up until the early 1960s the Black Nationalist political parties in South 
Africa adhered to a non-violent ideology based on the tenets of Gandhi and non-violent 
confrontation.  Pass burning campaigns and peaceful, though persistent, protest had characterized 
the anti-apartheid movement up until this point.797  However, after the ANC and the PAC were 
branded as illegal organizations, Mandela orchestrated the formation of ANC’s military wing, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, also known as ‘Spear of the Nation,’ or MK.798  On December 16, 1961, 
MK detonated a series of explosions throughout the country, effectively marking the beginning 
of an insurgent campaign that would span three decades and result in the upheaval of a political 
system that had been in place since the beginning of the century. 
                                                 
796 The SACP had been illegal since the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, although it later emerged 
underground three years later. 
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5.1.1 Operating Logic 
The ANC’s operating logic was heavily influenced by classic insurgent doctrine, drawn from the 
teachings of Mao, Che, and Giap.  The insurgents’ strategy was tailored to Mao’s three phases 
and rested upon four fundamental pillars: mobilization and organization of the masses; building a 
robust underground network and intelligence capability; a sustained armed offensive; and the 
isolation of the apartheid government in the international community.799  Top ANC leaders, 
including Joe Slovo, the chief architect of its guerilla strategy, passionately argued against other 
popular insurgent theories like Regis Debray’s focoist approach.  For Slovo and much of the 
ANC leadership, the focoist approach placed too great an emphasis on the military over the 
political.  To be sure, a sound military component would be critical to success, but elevating it in 
importance over the political aspect of the conflict was widely viewed as a mistake.800   
 From a practical standpoint, the nascent insurgent group was outmanned and outgunned.  
The South African Defense Forces (SADF) was the most potent force on the continent; its elite 
units ranked among the best in the world.  This was an incentive for the ANC to focus significant 
resources on the political front.  The group’s documents are unequivocal about this, declaring 
that “the victory we strive for has at its aim the seizure of power by the people led by their 
political vanguard, the ANC.”801  According to both Mao and Giap, the first phase of insurgency 
was a slow and arduous process that involved mobilizing support at the grassroots, or local level.  
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Phase I revolutionary warfare should limit the use of violence, where possible, lest the proto-
insurgency risk being crushed in its embryonic stages.  The ANC recognized this, and in 
accordance with classic Maoist doctrine, the years 1961-1965 were characterized by acts of 
sabotage and the avoidance of head on clashes with the South African security forces, including 
the South African Police (SAP). 
 The political was supreme over the military from the beginning.  To swim like fish in the 
sea, as Mao urged, the ANC needed to galvanize widespread popular support in the cities and the 
townships.  To accomplish this, its political message had to be both clear and convincing.  But 
there were still voices within the organization that favored Guevara’s focoist approach.  These 
individuals argued that focoism had been successful for Castro in Cuba, where the insurgents 
eschewed lengthy political preparation at the local level.  But Cuba was an anomaly.  The record 
for focoism, historically, is mixed at best and disastrous at worst.802  Guevara’s bastardization of 
Maoism, while open to criticism, did contribute the idea that the people were the ‘vanguard of 
the army,’ a tenet which became central to ANC recruiting strategy. 
5.1.2 Type of Insurgency 
What began as a local insurgency expanded to become a “Global-Local”-type insurgency.  A 
“Global-Local” insurgency receives outside support (as the ANC did from numerous states, 
including the USSR and East Germany) and also becomes part of a wider regional struggle.  In 
the 1980s, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal each regularly contributed 
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$1 million per year to the ANC.803 As detailed in greater depth in subsequent sections of this 
chapter, the ANC’s most effective fighting units were based primarily outside South Africa, in 
countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.  Inevitably, ANC insurgents came into contact with 
revolutionaries in each of these countries. At one point, the insurgents established an ANC-
ZAPU-FRELIMO-MPLA-SWAPO alliance with guerillas fighting host-nation governments in 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia, respectively.804  MK guerillas could be 
considered the predecessors to the roving bands of mujahedin fighters that traveled the globe 
from the Balkans to the Caucasus to Afghanistan and Pakistan in search of a fight.  The 
conditions that spawned the insurgency were local, but the fighters that the conflict produced 
were unconstrained by national borders.   
5.1.3 Approach 
One of the ANC’s guiding documents, ‘Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress,” 
laid out the blueprint for the approach that the insurgency would follow over the next two 
decades.  While the primary theatre of operations was supposed to be located in the countryside, 
the lack of a rural black peasantry in South Africa led the ANC’s leaders to focus on urban areas, 
including major townships and cities.  These areas would serve as the focal point of what came 
to be called ‘Revolutionary Onslaught,’ a phrase that translated to a wide range of activities 
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including political struggle, trade union activity, mass women’s campaigns, school boycotts, 
participation of religious organizations, and peasant revolts.805   
 To complement these activities, the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’ followed a three-pronged 
military effort.  First, insurgents operating in rural areas connected with villagers and farm 
workers.  Next, underground urban combat groups that worked in factories during the day 
conducted operations under the cover of darkness at night.  Finally, militias operated as self-
defense units that were then coopted and led by more experienced, well-trained MK fighters.806 
 At the 1985 Kabwe Conference in Zambia, several influential ANC leaders complained 
about the urban focus of the insurgency.  They insisted that the dearth of operations in the 
countryside had provided the South African security services free reign to operate with relative 
impunity.  Indeed, in many of the rural areas, the government established SADF tribal battalions, 
created homeland administrations, and coerced tribal elders to cooperate.807  The tension 
between finding the right balance between urban and rural operations would frustrated the 
ANC/MK leadership throughout the insurgency. 
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5.2 OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Sanctuary  
Throughout most of the three and half decades of the insurgency, South Africa remained 
inhospitable territory for ANC guerillas.  Between 1961 and 1962, Mandela sought safe haven in 
both Algeria and Ethiopia.808  For the rest of the ANC’s terrorist campaign, its fighters utilized 
external sanctuary to network with other insurgent groups, develop a military infrastructure 
designed to be transplanted back into South Africa, lobby for political support, and plan 
operations in South African townships and cities.  In the early 1960s, the territories immediately 
bordering South Africa—Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), Bechuanaland (present-
day Botswana), Basutoland (present-day Lesotho), Swaziland, and Mozambique—denied the 
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ANC sanctuary, which forced the insurgents to seek refuge in far-flung corners of the continent, 
as well as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.809  Other ANC-friendly regimes included 
those in Zambia, Tanzania, and Egypt. 
5.2.1.1 Why was sanctuary such a valuable resource? 
 
Networking  
In its search for sanctuary abroad, the ANC came into contact with myriad other insurgent 
groups.  One of these groups was the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and its armed 
wing, the Zimbabwean Independent People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), a group the ANC 
launched a joint operation with during the ‘Wankie’ Campaign of 1967-1968.  In 1980, South 
African COIN forces disrupted a plan to integrate MK fighters into the newly formed Zimbabwe 
Defence Force.  The insurgents traded tactics and best practices, reflected in an MK Special 
Operations attack on the Sasol oil refinery complex. The South African intelligence services 
believed that the Sasol attack was modeled closely on a similar attack against an oil refinery in 
Salisbury carried out by ZIPRA insurgents.810   
 Besides sharing similar military objectives, the ANC and ZAPU followed similar 
ideologies, had close ethnic links (the Ndebele and Zulu-speaking South Africans and their 
Matabele cousins in Matabeleland), and both political parties maintained bases in urban 
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redoubts.811  In the mid-1970s, following insurgent victories in Angola and Mozambique, the 
ANC continued cooperating with the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 
and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO).  Indeed, MK insurgents had fought 
alongside FRELIMO guerillas in the mid-1970s, and even participated in the liberation of Tete 
Province in Mozambique.  In what came to be called the “Northern Front,” the MK allied with 
the MPLA against UNITA rebels in Angola in 1987.  Fighting on the “Northern Front” 
demonstrated just how skilled MK insurgents had become.  For over two years, in addition to 
conducting patrols and convoys on UNITA strongholds, the MK attacked UNITA fighters with 
anti-aircraft artillery (ZGUs), 122 mm rocket launchers, and 81 mm and 60 mm mortars.812   
 By operating alongside groups like FRELIMO and the MPLA, the ANC was able to learn 
by doing.  This experience would prove to be the insurgents’ main body of tacit knowledge, 
which it would then transfer back to ANC cadres operating within the townships of South Africa.  
For the most part, though, tacit knowledge transfer was a less important factor for the ANC than 
it was for the other three groups analyzed in this dissertation.  The primary reason for this is 
because most ANC/MK involved rudimentary methods, such as sabotage, ambushes, and small 
arms fire. 
Military Infrastructure 
For the majority of the conflict, the ANC was vexed by an inability to establish a sound military 
infrastructure within the borders of South Africa.  Without such an infrastructure, it would be 
impossible to achieve Mao’s third phase of warfare, which is focused on launching an orthodox 
military campaign against the state, with the destruction of the ruling regime as the ultimate aim.  
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In lieu of favorable conditions for an internal military infrastructure, the ANC developed bases in 
Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland.  By the mid-1970s, major MK bases were set 
up in Maputo, Mozambique, as well as Gaborone, Botswana.  Toward the end of the decade, 
similar camps had been established in multiple areas of Angola, including Luanda, Fundo, Nova 
Katenga, Viana, Quixae, Pango, and Quatro.813  The MK base in the Angolan capital of Luanda 
proved extremely valuable, as it put the ANC in contact with fighters from the South West 
Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) who had established their own base of operations there 
around the same time. 
Political Support 
Besides sending ANC members abroad to enhance the group’s military capabilities, insurgents 
sought sanctuary in other countries to lobby for political support.  Political work often took the 
form of political education, diplomacy, coordination, and organization.  Not only did the ANC 
try to garner support for its own purposes, but it also worked tirelessly to generate a steady level 
of opprobrium against the apartheid system among a variety of interest groups, both in South 
Africa and among the wider international community.  Diplomacy was at the heart of much of 
the ANC’s political activities.  The diplomatic component of the organization was placed in 
charge of securing financial and other forms of assistance from foreign allies, thereby 
diversifying the group’s sources of support.  To accomplish this mission, the ANC created 
Internal Political Reconstruction Committees (IPRCs).   
 In Botswana, members of the local IPRC spread the ANC’s message and talked to locals 
about the situation in South Africa.  Over time, IPRC functionaries encouraged Botswanans to 
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create local political organizations.814  In Lesotho, the ANC cultivated a “train- the- trainers” 
program with a political flavor.  Courses on South African politics, trade unionism, and 
underground political organization were offered; eventually, the Lesotho “machinery” matured 
to the point where it became self-sufficient in the politics and propaganda of the ANC.  While 
many officials in the South African government viewed the ANC not as a liberation movement 
but rather a terrorist movement, Swaziland’s ruler, King Sobhuza II, was an ardent ANC 
supporter.  In 1975, the ANC persuaded the Swaziland government to accept Thabo Mbeki and 
Albertina Sisulu as representatives to a United Nations conference held in the country.815  In 
neighboring Mozambique, Jacob Zuma was tasked with inculcating new recruits regarding the 
importance of a political education.  
5.2.1.2 How did it change over time? 
The availability of safe haven was constantly in flux.  In the early years of the conflict, the 
countries bordering South Africa were either ruled by settler regimes sympathetic to the 
apartheid government in Pretoria or economically dependent on the government.  In either case, 
challenges to the status quo were rare.  Unbeknownst to the ANC at the time, an event that took 
place over 10,000 miles away would have a momentous impact on the group’s use of external 
sanctuaries.  In 1974, the Carnation Revolution swept through Portugal.  Though the military 
coup ended without any shots fired, it would have major ramifications for liberation movements 
across Sub-Saharan Africa.   
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 Following the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano government, Portugal moved to shed its 
vast colonial holdings in Africa.  Angola and Mozambique, both former Portuguese colonies, 
gained independence between 1974 and 1975.  What followed in those two countries were 
protracted insurgencies that played out over the course of the next three decades.  According to 
Williams, “the independence of Mozambique and Angola provided MK with access to either 
training facilities or conduit opportunities through these countries that were considerably closer 
to home than before.”816  The ANC retained its sanctuary in Angola for many years to come, but 
its safe haven in Mozambique ended in 1984 when the government of South Africa and the 
government in Maputo signed the Nkomati Accord.  This agreement was essentially a non-
aggression pact between the two countries with a quid pro quo at its core—the South African 
government would no longer support Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents if 
the Mozambican authorities denied the use of its territory as a sanctuary to the ANC.  A less 
significant change occurred toward the end of the conflict when the ANC began operating freely 
in the Transkei Bantustan, an area essentially governed by a de facto alliance between the 
Holomisa Administration and the ANC/MK. 817 
5.2.2 Intelligence 
For a guerilla army without a steady supply of weapons, an effective intelligence service is 
critical.  During the first five years of the insurgency, the ANC leadership insisted on limiting its 
operations against the South African state to acts of sabotage.  In order to successfully execute 
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attacks against pass offices, power stations, and government buildings, the ANC needed to 
construct a clandestine intelligence network that was expansive in both its breadth and its depth.  
Complicating matters was the strength of South Africa’s Directorate of Military Intelligence 
(DMI), a well-equipped and steadily-resourced branch that sent its officers abroad for advanced 
training in countries including France, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain.818  A 
civilian counterpart to the Directorate of Military Intelligence, known as Republican Intelligence, 
was created in 1961 with the rather broad mission to contain and eliminate MK activities within 
South Africa. 
5.2.2.1 Why was intelligence such a valuable resource? 
Development of the Underground Network 
The development of an underground network was a paramount goal of the ANC during its 
formative years.  Operation Mayibuye, or Operation Comeback, was a plan designed to bring 
insurgents back into South Africa from the surrounding territories with the explicit purpose of 
building a clandestine intelligence network that could play a leading role in battling the South 
African security services.  The decision to build this network was born of necessity.  With the 
passing of the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, the ANC was officially outlawed in South 
Africa—membership in the organization was therefore illegal and punishable by imprisonment.  
In 1963, the South African government passed the General Law Amendment (also known as the 
Sabotage Act), which allowed a South African police officer to detain, without warrant, a person 
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suspected of a politically motivated crime for up to 90 days without access to a lawyer.  This 
draconian measure was similar to the policy of internment without trial in Northern Ireland.   
 Another major impetus that contributed to the sense of urgency the ANC felt in 
developing an underground intelligence network was the “Rivonia Raid” on Lilliesleaf Farm in 
1964.  During this raid, South African COIN forces decimated the insurgency’s command 
structure by capturing the top leadership of both ANC and SACP.  Most of the senior figures in 
both groups were apprehended, interrogated, and subsequently imprisoned on Robben Island.  
The ANC learned a valuable lesson from the “Rivonia Raid” and would launch Operation ‘Vula’ 
in the 1980s to further the development of intelligence cells, arms caches, networks of informers 
and other clandestine structures.819   
 Since the ANC never enjoyed the luxury of a surplus of weaponry, it was important for 
the insurgents to hide and preserve the weapons they did have.  The group primarily maintained 
an arsenal of light weapons and explosives, including Makarov pistols, AK-47s, TNT, and hand 
grenades.  In order to stash these weapons in advance of an operation, they would be placed in 
trunks and buried in the ground.  For preservation, MK fighters used caustic soda mixed with ash 
to retard the corrosion process and prevent rust.820  In different parts of the country, the South 
African Students’ Movement (SASM) formed ‘shadow committees’ to further the reach of the 
ANC underground.  A major preoccupation for these committees was how to establish cells 
without exposing other cells operating throughout South Africa.   
 The main internal underground organ of the ANC, however, was Sechaba-Isizwe, which 
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had a three-pronged strategy for conducting clandestine political work: consolidating mass legal 
organizations and preparing them to undertake an active mass struggle in the country; 
galvanizing underground units that would engage in armed activities against the South African 
state; and lastly, coordinating mass levels of struggle against all types of apartheid while 
simultaneously making the struggle visible to those outside of the country.821 
Surveillance & Reconnaissance 
In the first two years of its existence, MK conducted over 200 acts of sabotage against the state.  
To sustain such an op tempo, an insurgency needs a fairly widespread intelligence network on 
the ground in order to coordinate attacks.   Such a network includes lookouts, facilitators, those 
willing to hide and store explosives (sometimes for extended periods of time) and others who 
would risk imprisonment by harboring insurgents, etc.   
 MK units gained combat experience in reconnaissance missions in Southern Rhodesia, 
where the “Luthuli Detachment” operated alongside ZIPRA insurgents.822  Without surveillance 
and reconnaissance, fighters are unable to infiltrate an area without being detected by the 
security forces. Most importantly, the insurgents needed to know the quickest and safest ways 
into and out of the country.  Depending on the presence of the COIN force in specific locales, 
some areas of the country proved far more challenging than others for the insurgents to grow and 
sustain an effective intelligence capability.  For example, the South African capital of Pretoria 
was the ‘citadel of power for apartheid,’ and remained so for the duration of the conflict. 
 
 
                                                 
821 The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, pp.411-412. 
 
822 Williams, “The Other Armies.” 
 311 
Infiltration  
Infiltration took place on two levels.  First, since the insurgents operated in exile, outside the 
borders of South Africa, they needed to infiltrate the country in order to conduct attacks.  
Second, and this is a classic insurgent tactic, the ANC used infiltration as a form of subversion in 
its efforts to penetrate the South African security services.  To ease the burden of infiltrating the 
country, the ANC established an intelligence network both inside and outside the country.  The 
intelligence component of the organization was responsible for smuggling fighters into and out 
of the country.  Only in the mid to late 1980s was an open pathway established that allowed for a 
steady stream of fighters to traverse the border.  The result was a sustained bombing campaign 
by the MK that included launching “spectaculars,” or high-profile attacks against government 
buildings and infrastructure.   
 The critical nodes in the intelligence network were known as political-military 
committees, or PMCs.  Area PMCs (APMCs) were set up in every part of South Africa and 
worked closely with the Regional PMCs (RPMCs) outside of the country to assist MK fighters 
infiltrating South Africa from an external sanctuary.  The PMCs were aided by a communication 
system that used computers linked between South Africa and London.823  Once inside the 
country, the APMCs could help the insurgents navigate the local urban terrain.  During 
Operation Vula, leading insurgent figures, including Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nuanda, were 
smuggled back into the country.824  Operation Vula also helped put in place an arms smuggling 
network which provided the insurgents with consistent access to large quantities of weapons.   
 As mentioned above, the ANC’s intelligence network relied on infiltration as a form of 
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subversion.  This strategy entailed the penetration of both the Special Branch and the National 
Intelligence Service.  The development of “moles” inside the South African security forces 
allowed the MK to access National Intelligence Service files and other intelligence-related 
reports.825  MKIZA infiltrated the SADF itself which then provided the MK with the capability 
to conduct analyses of the SAF’s order of battle, operations in planning, and the general mood of 
the leadership (e.g. pro-negotiations, anti-negotiations). 
Harmonization of Military and Political Wings 
With the advent of the insurgency in 1960, the ANC faced two major challenges.  First, the 
leadership was unfamiliar with the intricacies of underground work.  This led to continuous 
tension between the political and military wings of the organization.  This tension became more 
pronounced as a separate cleavage deepened between the old guard and the younger 
generation.826  Secondly, because the ANC existed largely in exile, there was a need to publicize 
the group’s actions and statements.  This meant that the public recognition of its leaders was a 
necessary evil.  Once these individuals were identified publicly, it was much easier for the COIN 
force to track and monitor them.  The harmonization of the political and military branches of the 
ANC was a key issue at the 1969 Morogoro Conference.  One byproduct was the establishment 
of the Revolutionary Council, tasked with the difficult job of streamlining activities of those two 
elements.  Some progress was made, but these dual tensions dogged the ANC throughout the 
conflict. 
 By the mid-1970s, the ANC still struggled to mobilize enough resources and recruits to 
                                                 
825 Henderson, “Operation Vula,” p.419. 
 
826 This point is underscored with a lengthy analysis in the section on group composition later in the chapter. 
 
 313 
launch a full-scale ‘people’s war.’  In an attempt to revive these efforts, the leadership created a 
Department of Intelligence and Security (DIS), which included the following sub-departments: 
Counterintelligence, Security (Mbokodo), VIP Protection, and Central Intelligence Evaluation.827  
The MK Intelligence Division (MZIKA) was the Special Forces intelligence wing of the 
insurgency and the ANC Civilian Intelligence (NAT) coordinated civilian intelligence, counter-
intelligence and security.   A considerable challenge for these organizations was dealing with 
perpetual infighting and thinly veiled jealousy.  The MK consistently adopted a more militaristic 
line than the ANC, which often aroused suspicion and doubt about the true intentions of the 
respective units.828  
5.2.2.2 How did it change over time? 
As the ANC intelligence infrastructure grew more sophisticated in the mid-1970s, then-Defense 
Minister P.W. Botha put forth a 1975 White Paper on Defence, which laid out the South African 
State Security Council’s (SSC) ‘Total National Strategy.’829  In essence, this strategy drew from 
the works of well-known COIN theorists Sir Robert Thompson, John McCuen, and General 
Andre Beaufre, and laid out an integrated approach to fighting the ANC and MK.830  With a 
formidable ANC intelligence network now operating both inside and outside of the country, the 
SADF realized that it too needed to operate outside South Africa if it was going to have the 
chance to disrupt the network.  What this meant was an increased role for South African special 
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operations units to counter the ANC.  In 1982, over 100 COIN force commandos launched an 
operation in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho.  Thirty ANC insurgents were killed in the raid.831  
Between 1981 and 1984, over 12 raids were executed against the ANC intelligence presence in 
Mozambique.   
 So even as the ANC’s intelligence network expanded and increased its operational 
capacity, the COIN force countered by relying more on its most elite units.  By the late 1980s, a 
significant number of insurgents had been smuggled back into South Africa.  But just as the 
underground intelligence infrastructure began to take root, geopolitical events overtook this 
development.  As the Cold War came to a close, intelligence training from the East Germans also 
ceased.  An interesting development that few saw coming occurred as the insurgents and 
counterinsurgents started to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace.  The intelligence 
apparatuses of each side played an indispensable role in the negotiation process.  The 
Department of Constitutional Planning and the National Intelligence Service worked in tandem 
with the ANC’s Department of Intelligence and Security to make the transition from war to 
peace a smooth one.  According to O’Brien, “the civilian spies would see in the new era.”832  
5.2.3 Training 
As noted in the sections on sanctuary and intelligence, ANC fighters were trained abroad and 
then infiltrated back into the country to conduct attacks.  The first ANC training camps were 
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located in Zambia, and several countries in North Africa, including Algeria and Egypt.833  In the 
early-mid 1970s, the ANC offered military instruction to insurgents at bases in Tanzania.834  By 
1977, five major training camps were located in Angola—two in Luanda, and the other three in 
parts of the north and northeast of the country.  MK fighters typically spent two years in Angola, 
while elite soldiers were sent to the USSR and East Germany for advanced training.835  Although 
the conditions in many of the camps were spartan, the training itself was hardly rudimentary.  
There was different training for rural and urban warfare, with tactics specialized and tailored to 
the environment.  Moreover, as the camps grew in size, they needed to be staffed and defended.  
As such, many bases included an entire infrastructure complete with security, educational 
instruction, and food allotments through maintenance of a farm.  So even while the ANC was 
considered organizationally challenged, it was also “bureaucratically complicated.”836  
5.2.3.1 Why was training such a valuable resource? 
Lethality and Optempo 
Initially, since MK fighters lacked skills and comprehensive training, most of the group’s attacks 
in the early stages of the conflict were amateurish and sloppily executed.837  But once the 
leadership made the decision to abandon sabotage operations in favor of more lethal attacks, 
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including those targeting civilians, the insurgents received training in a range of military tactics 
and weapons, such as automatic rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, hand-grenades, and other light 
weaponry.  This instruction was provided by Cubans and according to South African police 
sources interviewed at the time, the “quality” was deemed to be “excellent.”  Explosives training, 
ordnance detonation, and logistical support focused on the use of land mines, which were 
introduced to the battlefield in South Africa as early as 1977.  MK fighters placed landmines on 
the roads in the border areas frequently traveled by farmers known to be active within the SADF 
commando system.838  In addition, the insurgents were trained with the intent to train others.  
Fighters were given several hundred grams of TNT, detonators (regular/standard or electric 
depending on what was available) and a length of safety fuse.839   
 MK attacks increased exponentially in the late 1970s into the early and mid-1980s.  
Much of this was due in large measure to the establishment of MK’s Special Operations 
Division.  This division was created because the insurgency recognized the urgency of 
conducting attacks deep within South African territory.  Only by striking at the heart of the 
apartheid regime could the ANC galvanize the black population to throw the full weight of its 
support behind the insurgents, thus transforming the conflict.  
 A more nefarious motive for the creation of the Special Operations Division, however, 
was the desire by elements within the MK to plan and conduct operations without consulting the 
ANC hierarchy.  By circumventing the chain of command, or being less than forthcoming on the 
specific details of an attack, MK fighters felt that they could operate with more autonomy and 
flexibility.  Oliver Tambo, who maintained control over Special Operations, argued that for 
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reasons of operational security, the details of a planned attack would only be available on a need 
to know basis.  While the secrecy surrounding MK Special Operations units caused consternation 
among both MK rank-and-file fighters and ANC officials, there was no doubt that the newly 
formed units attacks were successful, as demonstrated in both the 1980 Sasol oil refinery 
complex attack and another attack two years later against the Koeberg nuclear power plant near 
Cape Town. 
Military Prowess and Overall Professionalization  
Another reason why training was so critical to the ANC was to increase the organization’s 
military prowess and professionalization so it could face the well-trained and highly motivated 
South African COIN forces.  Accordingly, the insurgents training went beyond strictly kinetic 
activities and included map reading, South African history and politics, physical endurance and 
exercise.  Moreover, the guerillas received training in the basic principles of logistical support to 
combat units, operational security and clandestine communications, as well as other professional 
military drilling such as musketry, typography, and engineering. 
 Even though South Africa remained primarily a guerilla environment, elite insurgents 
were trained in Ukraine and other Soviet Cold War satellites to use sophisticated weaponry, 
including Grad P rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons, mortars, and heavy machine guns.840  This 
points to the degree of planning and organization involved in the ANC’s strategy.  Although the 
use of these weapons never actually took place in battle, knowledge and training related to their 
use was consistent with the group’s goal of escalating the conflict to the level of Phase III 
warfare.   
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Ideological Support 
The ANC was imbued with a heavy dose of Soviet influence, which extended to Soviet-inspired 
military practices (drill, instructor and officer training, weapons techniques, etc.) and classic 
guerilla army traditions (minimal rank structure, emphasis on self-sufficiency, innovation and 
mission-orientation focus).841  There was a political education component of training that helped 
to furnish the development of a ‘corporate identity’ while also stressing the importance of the 
commissary system.  Banned books on the various aspects of Marxism and Communism were 
smuggled from abroad and into South Africa.  Leninism was taught in many of the camps and 
served as a unifying theory.  And although the assistance of a superpower like the Soviet Union 
went a long way toward organizing the insurgency, things did not always work according to 
plan.  In 1984, a breakdown in communication between the training camps and the political 
leadership in Lusaka led to mutinies at bases in Angola.  This reinforced the division of the 
kinetic and non-kinetic components of the ANC, which were separated both physically and 
metaphorically. 
Recruitment 
The strategy envisioned by the ANC was to train its fighters to the standard where they could 
train other fighters, thus multiplying the ranks of the organization and broadening its appeal.  
According to this plan, each guerilla unit would recruit and train four insurgents, who would 
subsequently train four more insurgents, thus growing the organization exponentially.842  In 
1975, the Revolutionary Council created a special sub-committee on recruitment and training.  
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Universities remained a favorite ANC recruiting spot, but with prison serving as a veritable 
revolving door for ANC members, South African jails became “breeding nests for ANC 
revolutionaries.”843  
 In keeping with its vision of a well-rounded organization bilingual in both politics and 
force, ANC training included instruction in the principles of the Freedom Charter.  Similarly, 
recruiters looked for individuals who did not shy from taking action.  This dynamic was evident 
with certain SSRC members, including a militant group of young members recruited into the 
ANC known as the ‘suicide squad.’  This unit was determined to eliminate COIN force elements 
like the special branch in the township.  The ‘Suicide Squad’s main job was to gather explosives.  
They accomplished this by raiding mines and then using the explosives to carry out bomb attacks 
throughout Soweto.  Once established, they would then train others to use explosives.   
 The Soweto Uprising of 1976 was a major turning point in the conflict.  For the ANC, it 
led to an influx of recruits who demanded training so they could protect their neighborhoods.  
Many were young, university-educated students who were upset over a general sense of 
lawlessness, crime, and gangsterism that swept throughout the townships.  In response, Black 
South Africans began to organize, much in the same way that the Catholic community in 
Northern Ireland mobilized throughout the “no-go” areas before these were broken up following 
Operation Motorman. 
5.2.3.2 How did it change over time? 
In 1965, MK counted an estimated 800 insurgents trained and on bases throughout Southern 
Africa.  By 1976, this number grew to 1,000.  In 1980, it had reached 9,000 and by 1990 it stood 
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at an estimated 11,000 trained insurgents (the MK claimed 16,000 but this figure is often 
disputed).844 On the whole, the ANC’s ability to train dovetailed with the group’s ability to 
locate and maintain safe havens.  In its formative years, these bases were few and far between, 
scattered mostly through North Africa.  In the 1970s and 1980s, before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, training was provided by “virtually all the former socialist countries as well as in a range 
of African countries.”845   
 When the government in Portugal fell, the ANC moved into Angola.  These camps were 
initially based in southern Angola, but with the increasing frequency of SADF attacks, the camps 
and bases were moved up north, to Malanje, Quibaze, Pango, Caculama, Funda, and Fazenda.846  
When the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) gained control over large swaths of 
Mozambique, the ANC sent fighters for training in firearms, guerilla tactics, underground work, 
and explosives.847 In 1988, all ANC forces in Angola migrated east to camps in Tanzania and 
Uganda.  The following years saw the disintegration of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, and 
along with them, opportunities for elite ANC fighters to be trained abroad. 
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5.3 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS 
5.3.1 Command & Control 
Following the Sharpeville massacre and the declaration of martial law, the ANC (along with the 
PAC) was outlawed under the Suppression of Communism Act.848  With the implementation of 
the M-Plan, the ANC organized its members into a cellular structure.  Each township street 
consisted of one cell, which was then subdivided into blocks.  Blocks were comprised of seven 
households.  Seven cells made up a zone and four zones constituted a ward, which was itself led 
by a prime steward. 849  
 For the first several years following the Rivonia raid, the ANC command and control 
network was in disarray.  To remedy this, the group arranged the First Consultative Conference 
of the ANC in Morogoro, Tanzania from April-May 1969.  One of the primary aims of the 
conference was to reestablish a functioning command and control structure.  To achieve this, the 
ANC created a ‘Revolutionary Council’ to direct the insurgency.  The council was headed by 
Tambo and consisted of both ANC and SACP representatives.  The 30-member National 
Executive Committee (NEC) was elected by a general congress of the ANC’s voting members,  
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though the final call was left to the group’s president.  The executive body of the NEC was the 
National Working Committee (NWC)—elected by the NEC within its ranks—in between its 
congresses.850 
 The ANC external organizational structure was based in Lusaka during the early 1970s.  
A secretariat headed the organization, and was in charge of three sections: president’s office, 
treasury department, and a division of external affairs.  The division of external affairs 
administered the organization’s vast diplomatic apparatus, which maintained a presence in 
twenty-two countries.851  The MK was the largest structure within the exile organization and had 
its own structure.  MK activities were controlled and directed by a National High Command, 
which in turn appointed Regional Commands.  While the High Command was responsible for 
tactics and targets, as well as finance and training, the Regional Commands were in charge of 
directing the local sabotage groups operating within their respective areas.852 
 By the early 1980s, despite progress in several critical areas of the conflict, the ANC had 
failed to spread the insurgency throughout the population.  A ‘people’s war’ did not seem 
imminent, and so in 1982 the ANC tinkered with its organizational structure once again.  In an 
attempt to revamp its local infrastructure, the insurgents created a Politico-Military Council to 
replace the Revolutionary Council. 
 In conjunction with the External Coordinating Council (ECC), the Politico-Military 
Council was now one of two coordinating bodies with the executive power to make decisions.853  
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Three offices, including the Office of the President, the Office of the Secretary General, and the 
Office of the Treasurer General oversaw all of the organization’s departments.  Responsibilities 
were divided among the following components854 
 
Table 7: ANC Sections and Responsibilities 
Section Responsibilities 
Political Committee - Mobilize mass action 
 
- Establish underground units 
 
- Maintain contacts with legal organizations 
within the country 
 
- Create legal organizations for mass 
mobilization and mass action 
 
- Report to the PMC on the state of internal 
organization and political activities 
 
Women’s Section - Mobilize women inside and outside of 
South Africa 
 
- Organize international material and 
political support from women overseas 
 
- Issue internal and external propaganda 
 
- Report regularly to Secretary General 
ANC Youth League - Recruit young students into ANC 
 
- Organize ANC youth abroad into active 
units 
 
- Issue internal and external propaganda 
Military Headquarters - Direct military operations inside and 
outside  South Africa855 
 
- Establish underground MK cells inside the 
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country 
 
- Report regularly to the NEC on the state of 
the army and the conduct of military 
operations 
 
 The PMC was created in the image of the COIN force security services, complete with 
committees and sub-units developed to improve the coordination of the ANC and the MK.  The 
PMC was first led by Joe Nhlanhla and allowed for a far more decentralized structure than the 
Revolutionary Council.856  The Military Headquarters split its responsibilities geographically, 
designating the area from Mozambique to Swaziland as the Eastern Front and the area from 
Zambia to Botswana as the Western Front.857  The PMC model was found to be effective and as 
a result, was replicated at the level of external Regional Political Military Councils (Swaziland, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswa and London), internal Regional PMCs (Western Cape, Border 
region, North Transvaal), Area PMCs (Durban, Pretoria), and local PMCs in the towns and 
villages.858 
5.3.2 Group Composition 
In his analysis of the African National Congress’ leadership, Lodge differentiates between the 
old guard and the new generation.  Each group is then broken down further for a total of four 
separate clusters within the ANC.  The first group consisted of those whose experience dated 
back to the nationalist revival of the ANC Youth League in the 1940s.  Tambo was 
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representative of this class of ANC leaders, most of who participated in the mass-based militant 
populist campaigning of the 1950s.859   
 The second group in the old guard category was made up of the working-class leaders of 
the 1940s and 1950s.  These individuals were mostly former trade unionists and SACTU officer 
holders, including some former Communist office holders.  John Nkadimeng, Moses Mabhida, 
and Joe Slovo represented this sect.  They tended to adhere to a more radical socio-economic 
philosophy than Tambo’s group.  Further, these individuals were part of the multi-class and 
multi-communal campaigning of the 1950s and maintained an aversion to extreme violence.  
Their message was one of patience and caution developed through years in exile and a dislike for 
utopian sectarianism.860  
 The third group is one half of the younger generation of ANC members and included 
NEC leaders who spent their politically formative years in clandestine action perpetrating 
political violence.  These members were more comfortable with these methods than the old 
guard and became radicalized during their years working underground.  Mac Maharaj and Jacob 
Zuma, who did time at Robben Island for his role in the first MK campaign, were considered 
within this category.861 
 The fourth and final group was the latter half of the young guard and was made up of 
those ANC members that spent most of their time in exile.  Nearly their entire political 
experience has been in the external bureaucracy and they more than likely completed academic 
training at a foreign university.  This group included Simon Makana, Francis Meli, and Thabo 
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Mbeki.862  The final two groups of the younger generation were more radical and less 
conciliatory, which impacted the trajectory of peace talks during the negotiations phase of the 
conflict in the 1990s. 
5.3.2.1 Nelson Mandela 
Nelson Mandela was a member of the Xhosa clan, which maintained close connections to the 
royal house of the Transkei.  Rare among black South Africans at the time, Mandela was 
educated in the British tradition at a Methodist school.  Perhaps due to his studies, Mandela 
remained a fond admirer of British institutions for most of his life.  Following his studies, he 
went on to become a lawyer and founded his own practice in Johannesburg with his friend and 
future ANC compatriot Oliver Tambo.   
 Mandela was an eclectic personality who quoted Nehru and hung pictures of Lenin and 
Stalin in his office.  Lodge notes that Mandela found the moral absolutism of the ‘professional 
revolutionary’ compelling and persuasive.863  He was also a cerebral leader who read widely.  
When he first began contemplating the move from non-violence to more aggressive actions, he 
studied classic military texts including Clausewitz’s On War, Mao’s Strategic Problems of 
China’s Revolutionary War, The Revolt by Menachem Begin, and several other legendary works 
on military strategy by Castro, Che Guevara, and like-minded revolutionaries.864  During his stay 
at Lilliesleaf farm in Rivonia, Mandela was influenced by Arthur Goldreich, a veteran of the 
Israeli Irgun and SACP member.  Goldreich encouraged Mandela’s intellectual curiosity, and in 
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addition to the aforementioned texts, Goldreich introduced Mandela to Lui Shao Chi’s How to be 
a Good Communist, Harry Miller’s Menace in Malaya, a book about the Filipino Huq guerillas, 
Field Marshall Montgomery’s memoirs, and Eric Rosenthal’s biography of General de Wet.865 
 Mandela’s transformation from politico to radical occurred sometime in the mid-1950s.  
By definition, politicos reject acts of political violence because they are thought to encourage 
government repression and backlash from an organization’s constituency.866  In the early 1950s, 
when Walter Sisulu was preparing to travel to China, Mandela asked his comrade to feel out the 
Chinese on whether or not they would be willing to supply the ANC with weapons, should the 
organization make the strategic decision to abandon non-violence for more a more militant path. 
 Mandela remained a radical, in accordance with Irvin’s theory of militant nationalism, 
never making the next step to ideologue.  In fact, when the decision to wage a campaign of 
sabotage was first adopted, it was Mandela who argued that this style of warfare was preferable 
because unlike a no-holds-barred insurgent campaign against civilians and soldiers alike, the 
sabotage campaign would still leave the option of negotiations a strong possibility.  Even though 
the ANC would embark on a campaign to make South Africa ungovernable in the penultimate 
stage of the conflict, by that time the strategy of “talks about talks” was being implemented as a 
complement to the MK’s relentless assault on South African COIN forces. 
 Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island on June 12, 1964.  Much 
like his contemporaries in Northern Ireland, throughout his time in prison Mandela remained an 
active participant in the politics of the struggle.  In 1965, in conjunction with Sisilu and other 
members of the ANC leadership on Robben Island, Mandela created the High Organ.  This 
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unofficial organization was dedicated to the daily concerns of prison life, as well as to 
maintaining a degree of cohesion among the group’s members.  The following year, Mandela 
went on hunger strike to protest the subpar living conditions within the prison.  On two separate 
occasions, in 1976 and again in 1985, Mandela refused a reduction of his sentence on the 
grounds of conditionality.  His stance was clear—the only way the insurgency would end is if the 
South African government legalized the ANC, dealt with the organization as a political party, 
and treated the group as a legitimate negotiating partner.  Mandela was released from prison on 
February 11, 1990, and immediately began the next chapter of his storied career, suddenly recast 
as a savior and a proponent for peace. 
5.3.2.2 Oliver Tambo 
Oliver Reginald Tambo, or O.R. as he was known to his comrades, was born in 1917 in a 
rural town known as Mbizana, located in eastern Mpondoland.  Along with Mandela, Tambo was 
one of the founders of the ANC Youth League (ANC YL) and served as its first National 
Secretary beginning in 1944.  Four years later, in 1948, Tambo and Walter Sisulu were elected to 
the National Executive Committee of the ANC.867 
 The one-time attorney and schoolteacher, Tambo was one of the ANC’s more militant 
leaders in his younger years.  In 1949, he was one of the architects of the Program of Action, 
which sought to transform the ANC from a group that held meetings and petitioned the 
government to an organization capable of taking action, attracting a broad cross-section of 
people through mass actions, and launching campaigns of civil disobedience, including strikes, 
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boycotts and other forms of non-violent resistance.  Tambo participated in the Defiance 
Campaign in 1952 and was later one of 156 activists accused in the marathon 1956 Treason 
Trial.  Following the Sharpeville massacre, the ANC handpicked Tambo to travel abroad to set 
up the organization’s external infrastructure.  With external support, he eventually established 
ANC missions in Egypt, Ghana, Morocco and London.  By 1990, ANC missions operated in 27 
countries around the world.868   
 From January to July 1961, Tambo traveled with Mandela all over Africa in an attempt to 
secure training and camp facilities for the MK, the ANC’s nascent armed wing.  The two lifelong 
friends and colleagues traveled to Tanzania, Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Zambia, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and several other African nations in a desperate effort to garner 
support for their struggle.869  In 1967, following the untimely death of ANC President General 
Chief Albert J. Luthuli, Tambo was appointed the acting president of the ANC, which was later 
officially confirmed at the Morogoro Conference in 1969.  Tambo, who Mandela called 
“articulate yet not showy, confident but humble,” received the endorsement of the majority of the 
ANC’s top leadership.870   
 In addition to his duties as president of the ANC, Tambo served as the group’s 
representative at the United Nations and was a member of the Revolutionary Council (RC).  In 
1985 he was re-elected as president and headed the Politico-Military Council (PMC) of the 
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ANC, as Commander in Chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe.871  Though often overshadowed by the 
lore of Mandela, Tambo was indefatigable in his quest to transform the ANC from a liberal-
constitutionalist organization into a radical national liberation movement and then into a 
legitimate political party within South Africa.   
 Former ANC cadre Padraig O’Malley described Tambo as follows: “He could preside 
over meetings of forty people, very strong-willed people, and steer them in such a way that by 
the time he summarized the meeting’s consensus, he managed to include everyone.”872  
O’Malley paints the picture of a true radical—prepared to use violence when and where 
necessary but also adept at political maneuvering where it proved advantageous.  He similarly 
describes his former colleague as “very sharp,” “irreplaceable,” and “a man whose leadership 
you could not doubt because you could see that he gave everything of himself.”873   
 Yet for all of his pragmatism and political savvy, Tambo did not shy away from using 
violence.  His own words make this apparent.  Speaking about the utility of continuing to rely on 
passive resistance in South Africa, Tambo proclaimed: “Today the oppressors are arming 
feverishly…The army buildup and the new Anti-Sabotage Act have completely nullified the 
strategic value of nonviolence, leaving the African with no alternative but to pursue the goal of 
freedom and independence by way of taking a ‘tooth for a tooth’ and meeting violence with 
violence.”874  After three decades in exile, Tambo returned to South Africa in 1991.  The ANC's 
                                                 
871 African National Congress, “Oliver Tambo: Biography,” http://www.anc.org.za/showpeople.php?p=5, site 
accessed April 24, 2012. 
 
872 Padraig O’Malley, Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa, New York: Viking, 
2007, p.333. 
 
873 Ibid. 
 
874 Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr. eds., Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle 
Against Apartheid, 1948-1960, A Documentary Survey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.136.  
 331 
first legal national conference inside South Africa took place in Durban in July 1991, where 
Tambo was elected National Chairperson of the ANC.  Before his death in 1993, Tambo would 
play a major role in the negotiations between the ANC and the South African government. 
5.3.2.3 Joe Slovo 
Joe Slovo was born Yossel Mashel Slovo in Lithuania in 1926.  The son of a Jewish family that 
moved to South Africa when he was just nine, Slovo emerged as one of the most well-known 
leaders of the struggle against apartheid.  He was also the face of the ANC’s armed wing, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe.  Before his stint as a leader of MK, he had served with the Allied forces 
during World War II and upon returning to South Africa he reenergized left-wing politics in that 
country.875  He joined the SACP in 1942 and was listed as a communist under the suppression of 
Communism Act.  Throughout his life, Slovo remained an ardent Communist and committed 
believer in classic Marxism-Leninism.  In June 1955, he represented the South African Congress 
of Democrats as a delegate to the Congress of the People.  The same year, he was one of the 
authors of the Freedom Charter.876 
 As one of the leaders of the MK, Slovo was forced into exile in 1963 and lived at various 
times in the United Kingdom, Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia.  Ellish and Sechaba remark, 
Slovo was the “key strategic thinker” in the underground army.  He provided the intellectual and 
legal punching power behind the publication of the Strategy and Tactics document, authored at 
the Morogoro Conference.  The Strategy and Tactics document guided ANC operations for two 
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decades. Writing under the pen name Sol Dubula in 1972, Slovo published a strategic 
memorandum that called for a greater emphasis on insurgent operations in the rural areas of the 
country.877 
 Slovo was married to Ruth First, the Communist Party Treasurer’s daughter and avid 
anti-apartheid activist who was assassinated by a parcel-bomb constructed by the South African 
Security Police in 1982.  By the end of his career with the MK, he rose to the rank of Chief of 
Staff.  Like both Tambo and Mandela, Slovo was a radical—ready to use violence, as he 
demonstrated by helping plan the 1983 Church Street bombing, but open to talking as well, 
evidenced by his role in the negotiations during the early 1990s.  In fact, Slovo is credited with 
inserting the “sunset clause,” included in the new constitution.  This clause, which proved 
instrumental in reaching an agreement, allowed for “compulsory power-sharing for a fixed 
number of years in the period immediately following the adoption of the constitution.”878  Much 
of the South African state’s propaganda efforts were directed against Slovo.  Pretoria painted 
him as “a devil in human form” and planted stories that he was a colonel in the Soviet KGB.879 
5.3.3 Ideology 
The ideology of the African National Congress has been summarized by Tom Lodge as a blend 
of “African nationalism, Christian liberalism, clandestinity, technocracy, communist popular 
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frontism, Western Marxism, and indigenous working-class radicalism as well as residual 
elements of black consciousness.”880  This description may be an apt characterization of the 
totality of the ANC’s beliefs and evolution over the years, but the organization did undergo 
several identifiable shifts in its belief system between the 1950s and 1990s.  In the 1950s, the 
ANC’s ideology was considered liberal and all-encompassing—based upon a political ideal of 
multiracialism and black majority rule through the parliamentary system.  The most important 
strands of ANC ideology to untangle are communism, black consciousness, and nationalism.  
Each of these elements can only be analyzed when properly juxtaposed with the draconian nature 
of the South African apartheid system. 
Apartheid Doctrine  
The doctrine of apartheid called for the separate development, or “apartness,” of the various 
racial groups within South Africa.  They system was institutionalized under the Afrikaner 
doctrines of the Dutch Reformed Church which stressed the superiority of white and European 
peoples over native Black Africans, Coloureds, and Asians.881  The Afrikaners saw themselves 
as god’s “chosen people,” with the mission to protect and preserve the white race.882  With the 
election of the all-Afrikaner National Party in 1948, apartheid was implemented thoroughly in 
the South African political system.  The NP built upon decades of discriminatory laws including 
the Native Land Act (1913), the Immorality Act (1927), the Black Representation Act (1936), 
and the Native Trust and Land Act (1938), to enact further legislation marginalizing South 
                                                 
880 Lodge, “State of Exile,” p.24. 
 
881 The term “Coloured” refers to individuals of a ‘mixed’ racial background. 
 
882 Gerhard Schutte, “Afrikaner Historiography and the Decline of Apartheid: Ethnic Self-Reconstruction in Times 
of Crisis,” in Elizbaeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald, and Malcolm Chapman (eds.), History and Ethnicity, London: 
Routledge, 1989, pp.216-231. 
 
 334 
African Blacks, such as the Group Areas Act (1949), the Population Registration Act (1950), the 
Pass Laws Act (1952), and the Separate Amenities Act (1953).  As a result of the homeland 
system, which divided the country into separate mini-states according to ethnic group, the Black 
population lived on 13 percent of the land, although it comprised 80 percent of the population.883  
This policy of separate development was certainly separate, but far from equal.  This brief 
overview of the apartheid system is therefore instrumental to the forthcoming analysis of the 
ANC’s ideology, as much of the group’s politics and policies were driven by a reaction to the 
dominance of the Afrikaner-led government. 
Communism 
Throughout the Cold War, the mere mention of the word Communism sounded alarm bells in 
Washington.  So when the ANC began receiving external support from the Soviet Union and its 
coterie of Marxist- inspired allies, many observers jumped to the conclusion that the ANC was 
just another Communist lackey in the global proxy war between the Soviets and the Americans.  
Yet, a closer look reveals something different.  To be sure, the ANC leadership (as well as its 
ranks-and-file) counted among its members ardent Communists of varying stripes.  And the 
group’s alliance with the SACP undoubtedly resulted in an intellectual exchange of ideas, with 
Marxism a prevailing theme in discussions on economic policy.  But at its core, as Robert Fatton 
Jr. and several other South Africa experts have argued, the ANC was a populist movement first 
and foremost.  In fact, in the 1980s, the Marxist wing of the ANC was expelled from the 
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movement in a clear rejection of those who espoused an ideology “unambiguously rooted in the 
ideals and principles of socialism.884   
 Thomas Karis has traced the evolution of the ANC’s relationship with Communism and 
has broken it down into three distinct phases: distance from the Communists; joint action with 
the Communists (and all races); and an increasing reliance on Communists in South Africa.885  
More often than not, the ANC and the SACP had no significant differences on issues of strategy 
or policy.  Both groups held an anti-imperialist stance and fought for national liberation.  But the 
Communists’ ideological convictions and long-range agenda differed from the ANC, which 
viewed its relationship with the SACP as the means to an end of countering white domination in 
South Africa. 
Black Consciousness 
The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was a movement that flourished in defiance to, and 
as a direct result of, the apartheid movement.  The crux of Black Consciousness can be 
summarized as follows: “black people could not expect help of any sort from whites” and as such 
“must work for their own self-improvement by their own efforts, first and foremost by rejecting 
the inferiority which had been thrust upon them by the apartheid government and by whites in 
general.”886  The leading spokesman and public face of the Black Consciousness Movement was 
a University of Natal medical student named Steve Biko, who himself was heavily influenced by 
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the Black civil rights movement in the United States.  Biko helped found the all-black South 
African Students’ Organization (SASO), which went on to play an instrumental role in 
organizing support for the ANC and other black national groups, including the PAC.   
 Critics of the BCM argued that its rhetoric and insistence on black pride was no different 
than the discriminatory language of apartheid.  Furthermore, many liberal White South Africans 
played a leading role in the various Black Nationalist movements, including both the ANC and 
the MK.  Indeed, the MK itself was a multi-racial and multi-ethnic organization, reflective of 
South Africa’s diverse population.  But to many recruits entering these organizations in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Black Consciousness was a welcome message to the banal and at times 
out of touch ramblings of ANC/SACP leaders who preached about the vagaries of class warfare.  
The “young lions” seduced by the BCM were less interested in leftist politics and Marxism and 
instead united by ‘neo-Africanism.’   
 The ANC and BCM did not always coexist peacefully.  In an attempt to broaden its 
ideological appeal the ANC criticized the BCM and its “continued idealism, [its] ‘confusion’ 
over economic issues, and its inability to organize large-scale resistance.”887  At other times, 
especially following the ban of BCM organizations, the ANC tried to poach BCM members by 
recruiting them into the organization and softening its criticism of Biko and his adherents.  
 Like other groups of its era, the ANC was far from a monolithic entity.  Accordingly, its 
members adhered to a broad range of views, all of which affected the group’s overall ideology.  
Obviously, organizations change over time.  This is especially true of insurgent organizations, 
and even more so of insurgent organizations that enjoy longevity.  For the ANC, anti-oppression 
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and anti-racism were used the same way ‘national liberation’ was used in Cuba and Vietnam and 
anti-colonialism was used in Malaya and Kenya.888  
5.3.4 Popular Support 
In October 1978 the leadership of the MK traveled to Vietnam to meet with General Vo Nguyen 
Giap, a legendary insurgent theorist and practitioner.  Giap’s advice to the Black South Africans 
was to work for the ‘support of the masses’ and to elevate ‘the primacy of the political.’889  
These overlapping themes dominated the centerpiece of the ANC’s strategy and inexorably tied 
to the importance of gaining popular support from the population.  The ANC followed a dual 
track approach toward realizing its popular support strategy.   
 First, by increasing operations within South Africa, the MK wanted to portray itself as the 
side with the most staying power.  If the population saw the ANC/MK as the side most likely to 
win, support was sure to follow.  The population had been subjugated for so long it needed the 
confidence necessary to join the struggle.  According to this mindset, the frequency and impact 
of the attacks would raise the level of mass action inside the country, which would then give the 
insurgency strength in numbers.  This could enable further attacks, leading to a mutually 
reinforcing cycle.  Once the decision to switch from sabotage to violence in order to make the 
country ‘ungovernable,’ was taken, the ANC knew the support of the population was an absolute 
prerequisite.   
 Second, building a sound political base within South Africa allowed the insurgents to 
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‘exist, survive, grow and expand.’  ‘The primacy of the political’ meant that popular support for 
the ANC must be gained in the political realm first, which could then facilitate the military 
strategy.  Remarkably, the emphasis on developing such a widespread political base would 
benefit the ANC tremendously when it came time for negotiations.  By the 1990s, its leaders 
were seasoned diplomats. 
 The support of the population was not a fait accompli.  The ANC knew this and therefore 
engaged in debates over changes in the group’s strategy.  Whether or not to begin targeting 
civilians was a matter of serious disagreement within the group’s ranks.  Many feared that the 
population would not support this strategy and the South African government would attempt to 
portray the insurgents as barbarians, inimical to negotiation and as a result, only to be dealt with 
through force, and force alone.   
 Backlash in the towns and villages was a palpable concern.  At times, the ANC risked 
losing support as a result of intra-black violence in Natal between the Zulu-dominated Inkatha 
Movement and the Xhosa-dominated ANC.  During the last decade of the conflict, the South 
African security services funded and trained Inkatha paramilitary fighters to wage a war within a 
war against the ANC.  Occasionally, there was also violence between ANC and more militant 
black republican organizations.890  But the ANC’s support was not coerced or earned through 
fear.  The argument could be made, and certainly was, that the continued South African riposte 
waged by the government under the banner of the apartheid system had much to do with the high 
levels of ANC popular support.  “Every time this old firm [the SADF] launches a salvo against 
us [ANC/MK], our popularity rating among blacks takes a further leap,” remarked Joe Slovo in 
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his memoirs.891 
 Like any successful insurgent group, the ANC supplied public goods to the community.   
The ANC in exile provided a nursery school, food, health care, clothing, and a salary (14 
kwacha/month) to all members.892  The ANC Department of Education and Culture offered 
secondary schooling to its constituents and had a staff of teachers and administrators.  One of the 
most well-known institutions was the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO), 
named after an MK cadre who was accused of murder and terrorism in 1977 and executed by 
hanging in 1979.893 
 So how successful was the ANC in gaining popular support?  Marsh and Szayna 
reflect: 
 
“Regarding popular support for the ANC mobilization, there is little question that 
the ANC had the support of the majority of the black population of South Africa.  
Neither the Black Nationalist organizations that competed with the ANC for 
support among blacks nor the group-based organizations (such as IFP) ever 
achieved anywhere near the influence of the ANC.  And whereas the ANC could 
subsume the other groups under its umbrella, the other groups could not do the 
same with the ANC.  In the same vein, the multiracial unionism represented by 
the ANC also elicited support from segments of all other groups in South Africa 
(coloreds, Asians, and whites).”894 
 
Important to keep in perspective is that while the ANC deserves credit for gaining the popular 
support of the population, this was never a difficult choice for South African blacks.  Unlike in 
other conflicts, where the COIN force and the insurgents duel for the support of the population, 
the Afrikaner government of South Africa failed to make an honest attempt to win the “hearts 
and minds” of black civilians.  Some have argued that the Christian nationalism of the Afrikaner 
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government, whose arguments were underpinned by strands of cultural essentialism, was behind 
the government’s decision to eschew any serious attempts to positively influence the black 
population.895  Needless to say, the apartheid regime in South Africa included numerous racists 
among its ranks.  When the NP first ascended to power, it granted amnesty to men serving jail 
sentences for colluding with the Nazis.896  Nevertheless, one key challenge the ANC faced in 
gaining popular support was publicizing its cause.  This was achieved through growing its 
political base.  Once a broad enough was formed, the group’s political aims and its ongoing 
operations were communicated to the people—supporters, opponents, and undecided alike. 
5.3.5 Public Relations/Propaganda 
As a banned organization, information—including propaganda—was used to keep the population 
informed of the ANC’s political views and aims, as well as on the operations of the ANC and its 
armed wing, MK.  Since the population was only going to join the movement in large numbers if 
there was a groundswell of support and success was evident, propaganda helped bring the 
group’s successes and achievements to light.  Underground cells advocated the ANC cause 
through the distribution of literature, political discussions, and the recruitment of other 
individuals who could then participate along these same lines.  Mphakama Mbete, an ANC 
underground activist who worked in Durban and KwaZulu-Natal, remembers, “lots of 
discussions, we reproduce some of the pamphlets, very selectively give them to people we trust 
outside this unit…we begin to identify individuals who we can trust, who we are sure of,” in 
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different areas throughout the country.897   
 Existence in a state of exile poses serious challenges for an insurgent organization.  By 
maintaining a strong link between the internal and external structures of the ANC, the group 
sought to ensure that cells outside of South Africa could keep those within the country 
functioning at a high level.  Certainly, there were periods when the internal structure of the ANC 
was considered on life support.  To counter this, and guard against extinction, the external 
machinery developed ‘production and propaganda units,’ which produced news sheets.  The 
propaganda was then passed to the internal political machinery for distribution throughout the 
country.898   
 No analysis of the ANC’s public relations dimension would be complete without mention 
of the anti-apartheid newspaper, The Guardian.  For nearly thirty years, from 1937 to 1963, this 
“white run black paper” served as the voice of the oppressed.  Because the newspaper was a 
veritable as a mouthpiece for the ANC (and even included ANC members among its staff) it was 
banned in 1952 and again in 1954.  When the paper reappeared it would do so under a new 
name.  One of these was New Age, which, when it reappeared in the early 1960s, immediately 
took up the banner of the ANC.  Following the proscription of the ANC, New Age provided an 
outlet for official statements from the group and its leaders.899  
 Complementing the ANC’s print propaganda was Radio Freedom, the radio propaganda 
arm of the ANC.  Radio Freedom broadcast from different locations, including Tanzania, 
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Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Madagascar, but its station identifications all began the same 
way: “This is Radio Freedom, the voice of the African National Congress and its military wing 
Umkhonto We Sizwe.”900  This introduction followed a song called “3 a.m. Eternal,” by the 
British acid house band KLF, accompanied by the sound of machine gun fire.  Radio Freedom 
emerged as a rallying cry for the struggle against apartheid and would prove to be a significant 
factor, along with New Age, in providing information about the ANC’s activities to its followers. 
5.4 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
Figure 14: ANC Timeline Seminal Events and Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
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5.4.1 Goals/Objectives 
Shortly after its formation, the ANC stated its primary goals as the removal of racial 
discrimination from government, including parliament, as well as in areas of employment and 
education.  To achieve this, the ANC employed peaceful propaganda, passive action, and 
continued movement, modeled after Gandhi’s struggle for freedom and equality in India.901 
 The Freedom Charter expressed grandiose political ideals, but ideals nonetheless 
grounded in the principles of those who advocated equality and proportional representation.  
“The people shall govern” and “All shall be equal before the law” were more than mere slogans 
of the anti-apartheid movement.  They were also an invitation to the people of South Africa to 
create a democratic, nonracial, and undivided nation.902  The Strategy and Tactics document 
produced at the Morogoro Conference called for the establishment of an independent black 
republic, which would represent the first step in the process of creating a socialist South Africa.  
This document was the ANC’s first written program since the publication of the Freedom 
Charter fourteen years earlier. 
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5.4.2 Seminal Events 
5.4.2.1 Sharpeville Massacre (1960) 
On March 21, 1960, several thousand protesters gathered at a local police station in Sharpeville 
Township, located in the Transvaal (modern day Gauteng).903  The mobilization was in response 
to the Pass Laws, which required black South Africans to carry passes with them whenever they 
traveled outside their home districts.  To ensure that a sizeable crowd would gather the day of the 
protest, PAC activists organized into task forces and went house to house to demand that people 
stay home from work and children stay home from school.  In some cases, coercion was used to 
intimidate those who were unsure about participating in the protests.904  At the police station, 
some protesters offered themselves up for arrest since they did not have their pass books (they 
either burned them or purposefully left them at home), while the majority of the crowd was there 
to offer moral support.   
 Owing to the large crowd which had gathered by around 1 p.m. on the day of the 
incident, reinforcements were summoned from the Vereeniging district.  Of the 400 policemen 
on the scene, 200 were white officers armed with guns (.303 rifles), and 200 were black officers 
armed with knobkerries, or clubs.905  There were also three armored cars equipped with heavy 
machine guns as well as additional ammunition.  Though it is still a matter of debate, some 
accounts of the protest recalled the crowd as aggressive and hostile.  Allegedly, protesters were 
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spitting at the police and chanting slogans such as ‘Izwe lethu,’ which translates to ‘this land is 
ours,’ and ‘Cato Manor,’ which was the site where nine policemen had been killed, less than a 
month before the Sharpeville protests.  Others in the crowd offered the thumbs up ‘Africa’ sign 
frequently used by the ANC.   
 A disconnect between the South African Special Branch and the local police in 
Sharpeville further contributed to the confusion on that fateful day.  Lodge notes that the Special 
Branch officers were “contemptuous of the local police” and instead relied on the township 
superintendent for intelligence.  The Special Branch in Johannesburg also retained a dense 
network of informants within the PAC.906  The disconnect between state and local security forces 
contributed to differing perceptions of the threat posed by the protests.  In short, the local police 
were less experienced in dealing with instances of mass protest and as a result, were both over-
armed and over-zealous.  Moreover, the night prior to the protests, small-scale skirmishes broke 
out between the police and Task Force members in Sharpeville.  The security forces were pelted 
with rocks and threatened with iron bars.907 
 To disperse the crowd, police fired tear gas and used baton charges, both of which were 
unsuccessful in breaking up the protest.  Sabre jets and Harvard trainers flew overhead in an 
attempt to scare those gathered, but to no avail.  At one point, a small-time crook named 
Geelbooi Mofokeng, who had been interrogated and beaten by the police following the 
skirmishes the night before the protests, made his way to the front of the crowd with a gun.  He 
raised the gun to shoot and when a protestor saw this, the individual diverted Mofokeng’s gun 
skyward, as he fired two shots directly into the air.  In response, the police opened fire into the 
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crowd, unleashing a total of 1,344 rounds of ammunition.908  In all, 69 protesters were killed.  
The events in Sharpeville on Monday March 21, 1960 became a symbol of injustice for the anti-
apartheid movement and especially for the ANC. 
 Clear parallels can be drawn between the events at Sharpeville and Bloody Sunday in 
Northern Ireland.  In both cases, the security forces were disproportionately armed for the threat 
that presented itself.  Undisputedly, in both situations unarmed civilians were killed by the 
police.  Finally, both incidents served as a major rallying cry and recruiting boon for the 
organizations under examination in each case, the ANC and the PIRA, respectively. 
 When applied to contemporary counterinsurgency, the lesson seems obvious: security 
forces should avoid killing unarmed civilians, especially at a public event like a protest or a 
march, where escalation can be avoided through carefully orchestrated contingency planning.  
Civilian casualties are a regrettable fact of warfare.  This is particularly the case when insurgents 
use civilians as human shields or melt into the surrounding population following an attack.  It is 
difficult to predict which incidents will resonate and which will not.  Therefore, COIN forces 
must minimize the opportunity for seminal events, like a Sharpeville, Black July, or a Bloody 
Sunday, to act as a catalyst for the insurgency.  
5.4.2.2 Soweto Uprising (1976) 
The Soweto Uprising, also known as June 16th, took place on that date in 1976 in Soweto 
Township.  The uprising began as a series of high school student-led protests, organized by the 
SASM Action Committee, in response to the introduction of the Afrikaans Medium Decree of 
1974 which declared Afrikaans as the official language of instruction in local schools for science 
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and tradecraft subjects.  Approximately 15,000 students assembled and marched to Orlando West 
Junior Secondary School.  The police initially attempted to disperse the crowd through tear gas 
but when that failed, they shot into the crowd, killing two children.909  When news of the killings 
spread, others joined the protest, including Indian and Colored teens.  Violent riots spread 
throughout Soweto, the Transvaal and to the Cape.  Government buildings were vandalized.  A 
favorite target was state-owned beer halls and liquor shops, two sources of revenue that 
generated funding for township administration.  According to Price, the response to police 
brutality that ignited the Soweto Uprising was “unprecedented in its scope and endurance” and 
transformed Soweto into a “war zone.”910 
 In clashes throughout the township, protesters hurled rocks, bricks, and stones at the 
police, who responded in kind with gunfire from pistols and automatic rifles.911  After the first 
three days of the uprising, the press reported that 97 people (including two whites) had been 
killed and another 1,118 individuals wounded.  In total, 430 schools were burned down, 124 
administration board buildings were destroyed, and 222 board vehicles were put beyond use.912  
In the beginning of the uprising the protestors’ anger was directed at Bantu education and 
Afrikaans instruction, but soon evolved into an outpouring of hatred whose ire became the 
apartheid system as a whole.   
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 Soweto was yet another turning point in the conflict.  To the ANC, it was proof that there 
was such a high degree of virulence for the South African state that mass mobilization against 
apartheid was possible on previously unthinkable levels.  Up until 1976, the insurgency had not 
enjoyed a groundswell of spontaneous action as it did during the Soweto Uprising.  In response 
to the violence, the COIN force reacted by clamping down even harder on suspected insurgents.  
In the years immediately following the uprising, the number of “deaths in detention” 
skyrocketed.913 “Deaths in detention” was a euphemism for prisoners killed by the security 
services while being detained.  Official causes of death offered by the authorities ranged from 
death while “attempting to escape” to “suicide” to “unknown causes.”914 
5.4.2.3 Botha’s Rubicon Speech (1985) 
A new constitution was approved by an all-white referendum in November 1983 and took effect 
in September 1984.  Discussions on changes to the constitution had occurred for several years 
leading up to its implementation and the anticipation of the black community for tangible 
changes was palpable.  However, even though the new constitution granted more political rights 
to both the Coloured and Asian populations, it did nothing to address many of the grievances 
voiced by the black community leading up to this point.  Massive riots erupted throughout the 
townships over the course of the next ten months.  Then, in July 1985, the government declared a 
state of emergency in 36 districts.  A month later, in August 1985, South African president P.W. 
Botha delivered his now infamous “Crossing the Rubicon” speech, which dispelled any hopes of 
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addressing black citizens’ demands.915  This speech was a bold affirmation of the apartheid 
system and a clear signal to the ANC that Mandela would not be released from prison, nor would 
the pass laws be completely eliminated.  Furthermore, there would be no fourth chamber in the 
South African parliament reserved for ‘urban’ Africans and there would also be no declaration of 
a South African unitary state.   
 Botha’s ‘Rubicon’ speech alienated Pretoria from the international community even 
further.  Efforts to impose economic sanctions on the government intensified.  In 1986, the 
Reagan administration introduced the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in the United States.  
The value of South Africa’s currency, the rand, declined in value and Botha’s cabinet worried 
that if the government failed to make preparations for negotiating with the insurgents, the ANC 
would achieve its goal of making South Africa ungovernable and the country would slide further 
into a state of anarchy. 
5.4.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
5.4.3.1 Nkomati Accord (1984) 
The Nkomati Accord was a non-aggression pact signed by the governments of South Africa and 
Mozambique on March 16, 1984.  While not an attempt at conflict resolution between the 
government and the insurgents, this particular accord is relevant to this analysis because of the 
effect it had on the conflict.  Although it did not involve the insurgents per se, it did involve the 
COIN force/host-nation government, and a government that provided valuable support to the 
insurgents. 
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 The crux of the agreement was that each state would stop supporting active insurgent 
movements targeting the others’ government.  In the years leading up to the accord, the People’s 
Republic of Mozambique had provided support to the ANC while the Republic of South Africa 
assisted RENAMO in its quest to destabilize the FRELIMO-controlled government of 
Mozambique.916  RENAMO was the brainchild of Portuguese and Rhodesian Special Forces and 
had no ties to the tribal structure in Mozambique.917  At first, Mozambique’s leader Samora 
Machel, failed to follow through on his end of the bargain.  In turn, Pretoria continued to supply 
RENAMO with weapons and supplies.  RENAMO insurgents conducted deadly operations 
against the government in Maputo.  No longer able to withstand the attacks, Machel agreed to 
expel the ANC/MK from Mozambique and close down the group’s bases.  For its part, South 
Africa offered economic and infrastructural aid and support to the government of 
Mozambique.918  The regional proxy war ended with the signing of the Rome General Peace 
Accords, signed as part of the end of the Mozambican civil war.  The United Nations Mission to 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) supervised the détente until 1994.  Following the Nkomati Accords, 
MK moved its command structure from Maputo, Mozambique to parts of Zambia and Angola.919 
5.4.3.2 Harare Declaration (1989) 
Adopted on 21 August 1989 by an Organization of African Unity (OAU) sub-committee on 
Southern Africa, the Harare Declaration laid the groundwork for the negotiations that would 
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commence the following year.  The declaration stated, in no uncertain terms, that a 
“demonstrable readiness on the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and 
seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations.”920  This unilateral 
declaration on the part of the ANC presented the group in a conciliatory light.  It was also a 
response to changing conditions on the ground.  Leading up to this point, Mandela was moved to 
less restrictive quarters where he met with a wide range of political contacts from all sides of the 
ideological spectrum.  The most promising meetings were those with the individual who would 
eventually become his counterpart, F.W. de Klerk.   
 Just as with every facet of the negotiating process between the ANC and the South 
African government, the Harare Declaration was not without its caveats.  In all, six preconditions 
were outlined921: 
• Lifting the state of emergency 
• Ending restrictions on political activity 
• Releasing those jailed without trial 
• Legalizing all political organizations 
• Releasing all political prisoners 
• Granting clemency to those on death row 
 
 The insurgents made it clear that they were prepared to continue their guerilla campaign 
                                                 
920Kgolane Alfred Rudolph, “Celebrating and Commemorating Twenty Years of the Harare Declaration,” South 
African History Online (SAHO), http://www.sahistory.org.za/articles/harare-declaration, site accessed April 27, 
2012. 
 
921 For further reading, see Organization of African Union Ad-Hoc Committee on South Africa, “Harare 
Declaration: Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa,” 
African National Congress, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3856, site accessed April 28, 2012. 
 352 
against the state.  The Harare Declaration demonstrated to the South African government that the 
ANC leadership was also prepared to think about a peaceful solution to the conflict in very 
concrete and achievable ways.  The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) followed the Harare 
Declaration with anti-apartheid protests throughout the country.  De Klerk recognized the olive 
branch and responded in kind by easing restrictions on antigovernment marches in Cape Town 
and the surrounding areas, so long as they remained peaceful and non-violent.  In addition, de 
Klerk authorized the release of several high profile political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu, 
who went on to work with Archbishop Desmond Tutu to help move even closer to a peaceful 
transition away from apartheid. 
5.4.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
The ANC insurgency in South Africa featured a powerful concoction of factors, including 
external support from the USSR, the growing unpopularity of the apartheid system, and 
numerous safe havens that abutted the South African state at different points throughout the 
conflict.  When weighed alongside the military acumen of the South African COIN force, these 
factors combined to produce a mutually hurting stalemate.  After passing through three phases, 
described in detail below, the insurgency became ripe for resolution and led to a political 
agreement between Pretoria and Mandela’s ANC.   
5.4.4.1 Sabotage and Phase I Revolutionary Warfare (1960-1965) 
When the ANC was initially declared illegal in 1960, some in the South African security 
establishment thought that this would be a debilitating blow to the group.  The result, however, 
was to push the insurgents underground and hasten the start of the conflict.  By the time it was 
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officially banned, the ANC had been planning a move to the underground for the better part of 
the previous decade.  The Mandela Plan, more commonly referred to as the M-Plan, was outlined 
seven years before the group was ever banned.  The M-Plan was a watershed event in the history 
of the ANC because it marked the point where the organization transitioned from mass 
democratic politics to revolutionary warfare.922 
Sometimes forcing an insurgency underground is the prelude to destroying the 
organization.  But the underground structures laid out by the M-Plan actually called for an 
expansion, not a retraction or stasis of the ANC.  “This was not a classic conception for a tightly-
knit vanguard underground,” according to Suttner.923  This organizational structure would 
remain the style of the ANC for most of the duration of the insurgency.  In 1963, the Sabotage 
Act was passed.  Like internment without trial in Northern Ireland, the Sabotage Act gave the 
authorities the right to detain individuals for up to 90 days without trial.  Many prominent ANC 
leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested under the Sabotage Act and placed in jail for 
extended periods of time.  In response to the raid on Lilliesleaf farm and the Rivonia trial that 
followed, the insurgents looked to move their operations outside South Africa.  Operation 
Mayibuye was the ANC’s plan to establish an external network and was implemented beginning 
in 1963.   
 During the first phase of the insurgency, there was little evidence of the stalemate that 
was to ensue years later.  On the contrary, the COIN force most certainly retained the upper 
hand.  In 1963, the Security Branch began conducting ‘pseudo-operations’ against the insurgents.  
‘Pseudo-operations’ are operations where government forces disguise themselves as insurgents 
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and infiltrate insurgent-controlled territory.  These operations are typically conducted alongside 
insurgent defectors who have been ‘flipped’ by the COIN force.924  In the case of South Africa, 
the insurgent defectors were known as askaris (Swahili for fighters) and were recruited from 
both the ANC and the PAC.925  Pseudo-operations in South Africa were modeled on similar 
British operations against the Mau Mau (1952-1960) as well as on the Selous Scouts in 
Rhodesia.  Used to great effect, pseudo-operations involved askaris leading unsuspecting ANC 
fighters back into South Africa where they would be ambushed, abducted, or killed by the South 
African security forces.  The aksaris were able to provide the COIN force with extremely 
valuable intelligence on the current state of the ANC/MK, which was then used against the 
insurgents.   
 Another genuine effort to blunt the insurgency during its initial phases was the creation of 
the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) Z-Squad, formed in the mid-1960s.  As will be discussed 
further in the next section on underground networks and the ANC in exile, the Z-Squad was a 
unit with the responsibility of eliminating ANC activists in the townships.  Since bringing the 
supporters and sympathizers of the ANC to trial was both difficult and costly, the Z-Squad 
circumvented this problem by killing these individuals.926 
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5.4.4.2 Underground Networks and the ANC in Exile (1966-1976) 
The second phase of the insurgency was a decade-long block stretching from 1966 to 1976.  
During this period, the insurgents steered their efforts toward spreading the reach of their 
underground networks within South Africa while building a mobile force in ANC-friendly 
countries.  In August and September 1967, the Luthuli Detachment of the ANC/MK teamed with 
ZAPU/ZIPRA to fight a pitched battle against Rhodesian COIN forces in the Wankie Game 
Reserve near the border of Zambia and Botswana.927  MK/ZIPRA joint operations continued 
from December 1967 until July 1968 during the Sipolilo Campaign fought against a combined 
South African-Rhodesian security force detachment.   
 To deal with the mounting threat posed by the insurgents, the South African government 
passed the Terrorism Act Number 83 of 1967, which similar to the Sabotage Act of 1963, 
allowed the authorities to detain individuals suspected of terrorist activities for up to 60 days 
without trial.  At this point in the conflict, both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents began to 
abandon prior restraints.  At the Morogoro Conference in 1969, the MK presented the Strategy 
and Tactics document which signified the official beginning of no-holds barred armed struggle.  
Not to be outdone, the Z-Squad stepped up its campaign of assassinations.928  As assassination 
became a favored tool of the COIN force, South African Special Forces assumed an even greater 
role in the conflict. 
 For the majority of this phase, Pretoria enjoyed a cordon sanitaire; until 1974,  white 
settler governments or nations too economically dependent on the apartheid regime to make 
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independent foreign policy decisions buffered South Africa.  When the last Portuguese troops 
left Mozambique and Angola, and the government of Rhodesia collapsed, the ANC moved into 
these countries and devised a strategy referred to as “hacking the way home,” back to South 
Africa.  The COIN force countered with its ‘Total National Strategy Policy,’ announced in a 
1975 White Paper on Defense.  This document laid out Pretoria’s intention to conduct total and 
complete warfare.  It explicitly made reference to the ‘total onslaught’ being waged by the ANC 
insurgents and countered that the South African government needed to meet this ‘total onslaught’ 
with a ‘total strategy.’929   
 The ‘total strategy’ included incorporating lessons from conflicts in Rhodesia and 
Namibia as well as implementing British imperial policing techniques used in Kenya.  The 
security forces, including the British South African Police (BSAP) and SAP personnel, were 
trained in sabotage, assassination, and counterinsurgency.930  No longer surrounded by friendly 
states, South African COIN forces went beyond their borders to capture and kill insurgents in 
what were termed “hot pursuit” operations.931  From 1975-1976, South Africa participated in the 
civil war in Angola under the banner of Operation Savannah.932  ‘Operation Disa’/’Silwer’ was 
another operation launched to support UNITA in Angola.933  With the COIN forces focusing on 
events outside its own borders, the Soweto Uprising erupted in 1976 and altered the domestic 
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political landscape entirely.  Now that the ANC perceived a broad enough base of support within 
South Africa, and with Pretoria distracted, the insurgents launched a campaign of armed 
propaganda and ‘People’s War.’  
5.4.4.3 Armed Propaganda and People’s War (1977-1984) 
The ANC leadership visited Vietnam in 1978 to meet with former insurgents to learn Vietnamese 
lessons that could benefit the ANC.  The report for this trip became the basis for the ANC’s 
‘Green Book,’ also known as the “Theses on our Strategic Line,” and influenced by the Politico-
Military Strategy Commission meeting involving Tambo, Mbeki, Joe Modise, Moses Mabhida, 
Joe Gqabi, and Joe Slovo.  One of the takeaways from the Vietnam trip was the need to increase 
operational tempo, or optempo.  Indeed, the ANC increased its activity steadily between 1977 
and 1986. 
 With the increase in insurgent incidents, SADF Chief General Magnus Malan ordered the 
South African Police to create an intelligence collection capability in neighboring Namibia, 
modeled on Rhodesia’s Selous Scouts.  The unit formed under Operation ‘K’ and came to be 
called Koevoet (Afrikaans for crowbar), although its’ official title was The South African Police 
Counter-Insurgency Unit.  Koevoet went operational in 1979.934  That same year, the National 
Security Management System (NSMS) was created following a series of committees designed to 
think about the best ways to fight insurgents operating in South West Africa.  The Territory 
Counterinsurgency Committees (GTK) was the most popular of these.935  In 1983, the Koevoet 
leadership was sent to a farm outside of Pretoria called Vlakplaas and set about reconfiguring 
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different elements of the covert operators structure and command.  The result was the creation of 
C1, a unit designed to identify and track ANC and PAC insurgents in order to ‘flip’ them to work 
against their former comrades.936 
 Rearranging sub-units within the security forces did help the COIN forces become better 
organized, but it did not put an end to increasingly bold insurgent attacks.  In 1980, the same 
year that the SADF absorbed soldiers from Rhodesia, the ANC conducted a spectacular attack on 
the SASOL oil refinery.  In a February 1981 speech to Parliament, Chief General Malan 
declared, “we shall, by means of our security forces, locate and destroy hostile terrorist bases, 
wherever they may be established.”  This statement would guide the Special Forces’ security 
strategy throughout the 1980s.937   
 In January 1982 the ANC attacked the Koeberg nuclear power plant.  At the end of the 
year, the COIN forces conducted a cross border raid into Lesotho that killed 42 people, 30 of 
whom were ANC fighters.938  Operation Drama was set into motion in 1983.  The crux of this 
effort was the creation of ‘Super ZAPU,’ a spoiler group used to destabilize the government of 
Zimbabwe.  Also in 1983, ‘Delta-40’ was set up within the DMI.  ‘Delta-40’ replaced the ‘Z-
Squads’ as the primary vehicle for the South African security forces policy of assassination.  
These covert units were not constrained by territory or boundaries; instead, they were sanctioned 
to chase insurgents into any country where they fled.  Between 1981 and 1984, Mozambique was 
raided twelve separate times. 
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5.4.4.4 Insurrection and Ungovernability (1985-1987) 
Government ministers and military leaders within South Africa’s security establishment 
were confounded that a poorly organized, ill-equipped insurgent force like the ANC could pose 
such a serious challenge to the hegemony of the state.  To fix the problem, they decided to throw 
money at it.  Between 1985 and 1990, the South African Police (SAP) budget more than 
doubled.939  The SAP and what came to be known as the ‘Third Force’ were foundational 
elements of the South African government’s new strategy, known as ‘Total Counter-
Revolutionary Strategy.’  The ‘Third Force’ was the column of security force personnel that 
operated outside of the law, beholden to no particular agency or organization.940  Under 
Operation Marion, DMI and Special Forces personnel trained members of the Zulu-based 
Inkatha Freedom Party in the Caprivi Strip in northern South West Africa.941  Due in large 
measure to the upsurge in attacks during this period, it was not uncommon for the COIN forces 
to overreact.   
 In June 1985, the South African unit known as Recce 5 launched a raid into Botswana 
that killed 12 people, injured six, and destroyed five houses.942  Unfortunately, the operation was 
based on faulty intelligence and the individuals targeted were not ANC insurgents.943  During 
Operation KATZEN in July 1986, the Army Intelligence unit affectionately known as ‘The 
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Hammer’ was conducting urban counterinsurgency operations in the Eastern Cape when it shot 
and killed four activists from Cradock.944  In 1986, ‘Delta-40’ was transformed into the Civil 
Cooperation Bureau.  While this was a far more benign sounding name, the unit was no less 
deadly.  Other changes during this same period included the establishment of the Joint Security 
Staff (Gesamentlike Veiligheidstaf, referred to as Geveilstaf, or GVS) within the Strategic 
Communications (Stratkom) and the formation of the Teen Rewolusionere Inligting Taakspan 
(Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence Task Team, or Trewits).   
 Each reorganization was accompanied by more sophisticated operations on the part of the 
South Africans, but as the mid-1980s wore on, the stalemate grew further entrenched.  
Undeterred, Pretoria fought on.  In August 1986, one month after the Cradock debacle, the COIN 
forces adopted a document entitled Strategie ter bekamping van die ANC, or Strategy for the 
Combating of the ANC, which had at its core two objectives: neutralize the ANC leadership; and 
neutralize the power and influence of well-connected individuals within the organization.945  
Four months later, the document was updated with more specific goals this time—neutralize 
‘intimidators’ through formal and informal policing; and identify and eliminate insurgent leaders, 
“especially those with charisma.”946  The reference to ‘informal policing’ built upon a report 
proposed by Major General Abraham ‘Joup’ Joubert, Commander of the South African Special 
Forces.  In his report, known as the ‘Joubert Plan,’ the SF leader argued for increased autonomy 
for the Special Forces and an expanded role to go after MK fighters. 
 As the late 1980s approached, a mutually hurting stalemate was apparent to even the 
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most biased observers.    The apartheid system was buckling from a combination of international 
pressure, a faltering economy, and relentless attacks by the insurgents, even in the face of 
stepped up efforts by the security forces, to include extralegal actions like assassinations.  The 
final phase of the conflict, “Laying the Groundwork for Negotiations,” will be analyzed at the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
5.4.5 Decision-Making Structure and Process 
5.4.5.1 The Decision to Use Violence 
The ANC’s decision to abandon sabotage and embark on a campaign of violence against 
the South African state was made following years of on-again, off-again discussions among the 
group’s leadership.  In July 1960, the SACP secured a promise from the Chinese to provide its 
members with military equipment and training once a guerilla campaign was initiated.947  The 
actual move to violence did not occur until July 1961 at a meeting in Stanger.  Though Chief 
Luthuli was opposed to the move, he eventually capitulated and Mandela went on to form MK 
shortly thereafter.  Those in attendance at the meeting recall Mandela as “unrelenting in 
championing the turn to violence.”948  This was a far cry from the same individual who, only a 
few years earlier, believed that the blacks in South Africa, as well as most of the ANC’s 
members were “morally unready for direct and forceful confrontation with state authority.”949   
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 So what made Mandela switch his position on the utility of violence in against Pretoria?  
While it is difficult to isolate one factor that contributed to Mandela’s conversion from politico 
to radical, several events likely played a role, including the failure of the anti-pass law campaign, 
the Sharpeville massacre, mass detentions and arrests throughout the country, and the banning of 
the ANC and other Black Nationalist organizations.  Perhaps one comment, offered to the court 
by Mandela following his 1964 arrest for sabotage, best summarizes his thinking at the time of 
MK’s founding.  The ANC, he explained, could not “continue preaching nonviolence at a time 
when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.”950   
While there were undoubtedly elements within the ANC and SACP that were uneasy 
about using violence, many members of the MK were more certain.  Since the leadership and 
rank and file MK members were typically well-educated professionals and trade unionists, these 
were the individuals most directly affected by the policies of the apartheid state.951 
5.4.5.2 Talks about Talks 
In South Africa, “talks about talks” was a euphemism for the informal and secret talks that took 
place between representatives of the South African apartheid government and members of the 
ANC’s leadership cadre.  Since the talks were informal and secret, they were construed as having 
low exit costs; the participants could withdraw at a moment’s notice and maintain plausible 
deniability about participating in the first place.  Talks about talks in South Africa were a three-
track process that included a troika of initiatives—the Mandela initiative, the intermediary 
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initiative, and the civil society initiative.952   
 The Mandela initiative began in earnest in 1985 when the ANC statesman sent a letter to 
the South African Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee.  The two maintained an informal, but 
ongoing dialogue for the next several years.  Coetsee visited Mandela when he was hospitalized 
and later when Mandela was moved to Pollsmoor prison.  A committee of National Intelligence 
Service (NIS) members also attended some of these talks.  The three most important issues 
during these discussions were the fate of ANC political prisoners, the continued criminalization 
of ANC membership, and the increased levels of violence between both insurgents and the state 
but also within black communities and townships.  Mandela made clear that certain issues were 
non-negotiable at this stage—violence, the ANC’s relationship with the SACP, and relinquishing 
the demand for majority rule.953  In no small measure due to these ongoing talks, when De Klerk 
succeeded Botha at the President of South Africa, he knew that in Mandela he was dealing with a 
pragmatist whom he could trust.  Preliminary talks bred familiarity. 
 The second major negotiating track was the intermediary initiative.  Intermediaries were 
a logical path to pursue because of the need to retain low exit costs and the desire of those 
involved to avoid any perceived weakness that would result if the talks were made public.  In 
effect, this negotiating track was started by a small group of British business leaders who then 
arranged for follow up meetings between ANC members and influential Afrikaners in 
London.954  Eight separate meetings were held between October1987 and July 1990.955  The 
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negotiations went through iterations of what issues were most important and refined them to 
focus almost exclusively on those issues deemed most salient to the commencement of official 
negotiations.  These included the release of Mandela from prison, the support of white South 
Africans for a peace process, ANC violence, a realistic timetable for transition, the Communist 
factor, sanctions, ANC views on power sharing, and the composition of the ANC leadership.956 
 The third line of operation in the “talks about talks” process was the civil society process.  
Unlike the Mandela initiative or the intermediary initiative, the civil society initiative was public.  
Between 1985 and 1989, over seventy five meetings took place, most of them organized by the 
Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Africa, or IDASA.957  The goal of all “talks about 
talks” was to elevate the pre-negotiations to actual negotiations but ironing out the seemingly 
intractable debates before agreeing to sit down for official negotiations.  This strategy 
undoubtedly had a positive impact on official peace talks once these begun and paved the way 
for the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). 
5.4.6 Why did the ANC negotiate?  
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Following over thirty years of armed insurrection against the South African state, by 1990 the 
African National Congress believed that significant changes were on the horizon.  Part of this 
was the ascension of F.W. De Klerk, who succeeded Botha in late 1989.  In De Klerk, the ANC 
believed they had someone they could negotiate with.  But this alone would not be enough to 
countenance a transformation from insurgent group to political party.  Even with the benefit of 
hindsight, disentangling the many factors leading up to the ANC’s decision to negotiate with the 
South African government is difficult.  Yet, three main factors account for this phenomenon: the 
recognition of a mutually hurting stalemate on multiple levels (political, social, and military); a 
drastic change in both the domestic and international contexts; and a faltering economy that 
promised to make life intolerable for whichever group ultimately prevailed in the struggle. 
 The section in this chapter covering the mutually hurting stalemate describes the deadly 
back and forth of the South African security forces and the ANC insurgents and their allies.  In 
1988, a contributor to the ANC journal Sechaba lamented, “we are confronted with conditions in 
which an absolute victory is impossible.”958  But this stalemate was locked in place on more than 
just a military level.  Further, as Lodge notes, besides not gaining ground on the battlefield, 
“neither party could eliminate the other from the political terrain,” either.959   
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 To understand what tipped the conflict toward negotiation it is crucial to recognize the 
importance of context.  By 1990, the South African government had become increasingly 
isolated and treated as a pariah in the international community.  The apartheid system was 
collapsing under its own weight and white South Africans began mobilizing against conscription 
into the security forces.  Moreover, the security forces had accrued so much power that 
numerous covert organizations were no longer beholden to the state.  Private companies staffed 
by ex-commandos were involved in smuggling ivory, hardwood, diamonds, and other 
products.960  Others, like 32 Battalion and C 10, had morphed into death squads. 
 After decades of discriminatory practices, many whites began to see their own 
government for what it was—a racist and often brutal tool of repression.  This mindset swept 
through white South Africa and as the conflict dragged on, fewer whites saw joining the security 
services as a matter of pride.  People no longer wanted to risk life and limb for something they 
were not sure they believed in.  From 1976 onward, the police were attacked 485 times, more 
than a third of all terrorist attacks. 
Loss of External Support 
The loss of the Soviet Union as an external sponsor caused the ANC to reevaluate its position in 
South Africa.961  Without the training, logistics, and financial backing of the USSR, could the 
insurgency expect to sustain a level of violence sufficient enough to threaten Pretoria?  
Moreover, the collapse of the world’s Communist superpower sewed doubt into those within the 
ANC leadership that dogmatically promoted the virtue of a centrally planned economy.  The 
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distance between Moscow and the ANC accelerated in the fall of 1991 following a power grab 
by Boris Yeltsin.  
 The USSR was formally disbanded in December of that year and in February 1992, 
Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, established diplomatic relations with 
the South African government.962  According to Lou Picard, “the loss of the sugar daddy for the 
ANC spelled the beginning of the end.  The leadership knew it had to move and move fast.”963  
Without the support, both economic and political, of the world’s other superpower, the ANC 
leadership began looking for a way to capitalize on the leverage it still maintained.  Negotiations 
presented the most logical way to accomplish this. 
Economic Factors  
Increasing economic sanctions against South Africa’s apartheid government placed mounting 
pressure on the government to begin implementing changes.  A fissure emerged between South 
Africa’s political leadership and the country’s economic elites.  The “insurgent counter-elite” 
were economically subordinate and socially marginalized actors who were able to sustain an 
insurgency which forced the other side to take notice.964   
 Private investment in South Africa declined steadily over the course of the conflict.  
Economic elites were able to pressure state elites to the point where the balance of power 
between moderates and hardliners finally tipped in favor of those desperate to end the conflict 
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through peaceful means.965  The insurgent leadership recognized the change in the balance of 
power and moved to take advantage.  When the ANC negotiating team was promised substantive 
leadership roles in a post-apartheid government, the dye was cast.  “From an economic 
standpoint, both sides were really hurting,” notes Picard.966  Finally, the ANC saw an 
opportunity to become relevant, both politically and economically.  Those on the other side of 
the negotiating table had it in their best interest for the transition to democracy to be both 
peaceful and wholesale.  
Table 8: African National Congress Analytic Framework Summary Analysis 
Operational Tools 
Sanctuary A lack of internal sanctuary was a definitive factor in the ANC’s decision to negotiate.  Throughout the conflict, 
the insurgents attempted to establish a formidable presence within South Africa but were primarily relegated to 
regional bases.  The opportunity to return to South Africa weighed heavily in the decision. 
Intelligence Intelligence played a major role in the negotiations phase of the insurgency.  Sensing that the geopolitical 
situation was changing and apartheid was not sustainable, the ANC’s Department of Intelligence and Security met 
with its COIN force counterparts to discuss possible details and challenges of a transition. 
Training The ANC lost its Eastern Bloc sponsors after it seemed that negotiations were imminent.  Further, by this time, 
MK special units had already achieved a level of professionalism that were placing significant pressure on the 
COIN force militarily, thus adding to the group’s growing leverage. 
Organizational Tools 
Command & Control By the time of CODESA 2, the ANC’s command and control had become a serious factor in the drive toward 
peace.  ANC chief negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa and his inner circle, including Joe Slovo, Valli Moosa, and Mac 
Maharaj, had proved themselves far more skilled negotiators than any NP politician.    
Group Composition Nelson Mandela’s ability to emerge from prison and steer the insurgents away from violence was the difference 
maker in terms of avoiding a return to conflict.  Mandela was one of the few figures within the ANC that had the 
clout to convince MK ideologues that the best chance for power was through peace. 
Ideology The Communist factor ceased to be an important factor after the USSR began to disintegrate in 1989.  First, the 
ANC’s commitment to Communism had always been purposefully overplayed by Pretoria.  Second, with the ‘red 
threat’ no longer an issue, Western countries pressured the NP to end apartheid. 
Popular Support In the battle for “hearts and minds,” history was on the side of the ANC.  COIN force repression and insurgent 
political mobilization were complimented by shifting geopolitical dynamics which had the effect of emboldening 
the politicos within the group. 
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Propaganda ANC propaganda outlets were instrumental in consolidating support for the ANC’s transition to politics.  This 
effort accelerated after the group was made legal and the newspapers and magazines no longer had to fear 
reprisals from the COIN force or government. 
Strategic Decision Making 
Goals The ANC’s goals/objectives were conducive to negotiations.  Consider, the movement began as a political 
organization and then adopted militancy as a tactic thereafter.  With the tide of history sweeping against 
apartheid and Pretoria, the ANC capitalized on the timing of negotiations to maximize its political power. 
Seminal Events Incidents like the Sharpeville massacre and the Soweto uprising convinced many within the ANC that 
negotiations would not be an option.  With the development of South Africa’s “Third Force” in the later phases 
of the conflict, MK fighters were bent on revenge, and bloodlust competed with pragmatism. 
Previous attempts at 
conflict resolution 
Previous attempts at conflict resolution dissuaded the insurgents from talking to the government.  Pretoria was 
not viewed as credible because from an ANC perspective, the HNG/COIN force was comprised of rogue 
elements and independent actors that would either sabotage negotiations or act independently. 
Mutually hurting stalemate A mutually hurting stalemate between the COIN forces and insurgents had been recognized by all sides by the 
mid-1980s.  This was a major factor in bringing previously irreconcilable competing interests together to figure 
out a solution to the ongoing deadlock in South Africa. 
Decision-making structure 
& process 
Even though previous attempts at conflict resolution argued against the wisdom of negotiating, the insurgents 
made the decision to engage in “talks about talks,” which did have a decidedly positive impact on the ultimate 
decision to negotiate an end to the insurgency and renounce violence permanently. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
Table 9: Comparative Analysis of Operational and Organizational Tools 
Overall impact on the 
decision to negotiate 
PIRA Hizballah LTTE ANC 
Weapons     
Funding     
Sanctuary     
Intelligence     
Training     
Command & Control     
Group Composition     
Ideology     
Popular Support     
Public 
Relations/Propaganda 
    
 
 
 
       Moderate            Low High 
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6.1 OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
6.1.1 H1: Weapons/Ammunition 
Overall, research findings offer a moderate level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency 
with limited or antiquated weaponry/ammunition is less capable of sustaining successful attacks 
on COIN forces and thus more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the section 6.3.6., 
“A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” weapons/ammunition is represented by the letter l.  This 
sub-variable is not considered to have explanatory value in the theory of insurgent negotiation. 
 
If insurgents have no access to weapons, or struggle to arm themselves, there is little chance that 
they can prevail militarily.  Effective COIN forces disrupt or prevent insurgents from acquiring 
weapons.  As recent history has proven, weapons as basic as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons 
can be a great equalizer in an insurgency.  Groups like Hizballah that are able to equip 
themselves like the army of a nation state have a greater ability to neutralize COIN force 
advantages.  This operational tool is straightforward.  The better armed and equipped a group is, 
the greater the chance of battlefield success, making negotiations less likely.   
 In Northern Ireland, the capture of the weapons-laden ship the Eksund, prevented the 
insurgents from launching their own version of the ‘Tet Offensive’ in a final push to expel 
British soldiers in 1987.  The loss of this shipment of weapons made many high-ranking 
insurgents seriously consider cutting a deal to end the conflict.  Without an influx of weapons, 
the PIRA realized it would never be able to raise the death toll past an “acceptable level of 
violence.” 
 Weapons were among the most important operational tools for both Hizballah and the 
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LTTE.  In all four cases, the insurgents relied on a combination of external sponsors and internal 
support to meet their weapons needs.  In South Africa, the ANC consistently lacked a supply of 
modern weaponry.  To compensate for this shortcoming, Mandela and the group’s leadership 
placed a greater emphasis on building a political infrastructure, which proved a boon to the ANC 
when it made the transition to government in the early 1990s.    
 Iranian-supplied weaponry transformed Hizballah into the most formidable non-state 
actor in the region.  Hizballah’s weapons supply gives the group a wide-ranging attack capability 
and versatility in what types of targets it can attack.  Furthermore, its weapons have contributed 
to the group’s longevity and sustainment as well as the ability to psychologically impact its 
adversaries, most notably the Israelis.  The group’s arsenal has been a stumbling block in 
discussions over peace negotiations.  First, Hizballah’s weaponry affords it significant leverage 
and political clout.  The group is still responsible for providing security to southern Lebanon.  
The issue of disarmament has proved to be intractable in Lebanon.  Until an agreement on this 
front is reached, Hizballah will maintain its army while continuing to sit in parliament.  For 
Hizballah, weaponry has proved to be an obstacle to further negotiations.   
 In Sri Lanka, the LTTE’s access to weapons and ability to innovate allowed the 
insurgents to achieve parity with government forces in the early stages of the conflict.  The 
Tigers diversified both the types of weapons they used as well as the sources from which they 
obtained the weapons, hindering government efforts to curb the insurgents resupply.  This 
diversification of sources put the LTTE in touch with numerous other insurgent groups, which in 
turn linked its members into other ‘dark networks’.  Finally, the insurgents’ superiority in 
weaponry allowed it to strike the government at will, assassinating politicians and military 
leaders on the COIN side with regularity.  In turn, this provided Prabhakaran with confidence 
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that the insurgents could defeat the Sri Lankan government militarily.  This confidence never 
wavered, and the LTTE’s impressive arsenal and ability to establish sea, air, and land forces in 
addition to the Black Tigers suicide squad meant that negotiations were not an option, at least as 
long as the insurgents remained a potent military force within Sri Lanka.   
 As an operational tool, the availability of or access to weapons was a central factor 
influencing the trend toward continued conflict.  Similarly, when the COIN force was able to 
restrict the insurgents’ ability to resupply itself with weaponry, fighters within the group were 
thereby convinced that negotiations were the most effective way for the insurgents to achieve 
their objectives. The refusal to decommission its weapons is one of the last remaining obstacles 
to seducing Hizballah away from non-state militarism and toward a more comprehensive 
accommodation within the Lebanese state.   
 Still, there are very few cases in the history of insurgency where the insurgents do not 
have access to any weapons.  Where their resources are limited or restricted, insurgents will 
fashion crude or improvised weaponry and explosives to continue the fight.  In many conflicts, 
weapons are stolen from the COIN force, either through raids on weapons depots or taken from 
dead soldiers in combat.  Overall, an insurgency with limited or antiquated 
weaponry/ammunition is indeed less capable of sustaining successful attacks on COIN forces, 
however, this operational tool only has a moderate influence on the decision of insurgents to 
negotiate an end to the insurgency.   
6.1.2 H2: Sanctuary/Safe Haven 
Overall, research findings offer a high level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
limited or no access to sanctuary/safe haven is less capable of sustaining successful attacks on 
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COIN forces and thus more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the section 6.3.6. “A 
Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” sanctuary/safe haven is represented by the letter m.  This sub-
variable is an essential component helping to explain the theory of insurgent negotiation. 
 
Among operational tools, sanctuary (along with training) proved to be one of the most important 
factors for insurgents.  With sanctuary/safe haven, an insurgency can continue indefinitely, 
especially if the safe haven is impenetrable or unable to be contested by the COIN force. 
 Sanctuary afforded the PIRA with the ability to rest, recuperate, and plan operations; hide 
weapons; train; avoid arrest/detection; and finally, recruit, fundraise, and lobby for political 
support.  Without question, PIRA sanctuary in the United States and the Republic of Ireland 
contributed to the leadership’s intransigence in terms of negotiating an end to the conflict.  From 
an operational perspective, with sanctuaries nearby and abroad, the insurgents could carry on 
their activities without accounting for the robust British intelligence network.   
 For the LTTE, sanctuary in India, Canada, and elsewhere served as territory for the 
insurgents to train and manage logistical tasks.  Within Sri Lanka, jungle sanctuary offered room 
for the LTTE to set up and administer a “state within a state.”  It also gave the insurgents the 
space necessary to build a robust military infrastructure.  With these elements in place, the 
insurgents reached a stage of invulnerability, assuming that any negotiations would inevitably 
involve the successful secession of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka leading to an 
independent Tamil Eelam.   
 In South Africa, the ANC used sanctuary in order to spread its network, develop a 
military infrastructure, and galvanize political support among the population.  Unlike in Sri 
Lanka, however, the ANC struggled throughout its existence to establish safe havens within 
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South Africa proper.  Instead, the group maintained a robust external sanctuary in various 
countries in the region, but never managed to build an internal sanctuary within South Africa to 
the level it had hoped.  This was a COIN force advantage and worked against the insurgents on 
an operational level.  Without an internal safe haven, the ANC’s leaders felt pressured to 
capitalize on negotiations with Pretoria and this can be considered a factor in bringing the group 
to the negotiating table in the early 1990s.   
 Sanctuary was less of a factor in Lebanon than in the other three cases analyzed, but 
Hizballah is also unique in that its primary adversary is not co-located physically.  However, in 
the case of the ANC and the PIRA, a loss of sanctuary was a major factor in moving each group 
closer toward negotiations, while the LTTE’s sanctuary in the northern and eastern provinces of 
Sri Lanka made its leader less willing to quit the fight.  Overall, an insurgency that lacks access 
to sanctuary or safe haven is less capable of sustaining successful attacks on COIN forces.  
Sanctuary/safe haven, along with funding/financing, is one of two operational tools critical to the 
theory of insurgent negotiation.   In sum, this research finds that sanctuary has a significant 
influence on the decision of insurgents to negotiate an end to the insurgency.   
6.1.3 H3: Intelligence 
Overall, research findings offer a moderate level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency 
with compromised intelligence is less capable of sustaining successful attacks on COIN forces 
and thus more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of 
Insurgent Negotiation,” intelligence is represented by the letter n.  This sub-variable is not 
considered to have explanatory value in the theory of insurgent negotiation. 
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On both sides of the conflict, insurgency and counterinsurgency, intelligence remains one of the 
most critical operational tools.  Intelligence operatives are involved in each facet of the 
organization and often have the most intimate view of the adversary.   
 For the ANC, the focus on intelligence led the group to establish an underground 
network, conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, infiltrate the COIN force, and integrate 
members of the political and military wings.  During the final stage of the insurgency, the ANC’s 
intelligence network played a leading role in exploratory talks aimed at jumpstarting 
negotiations.   
 Hizballah’s intelligence apparatus also allowed it to conduct surveillance and 
reconnaissance on its adversaries (both internal and external) as well as infiltrate the COIN force 
and master the art of subversion.  Moreover, its PSYOP capabilities and operational security are 
among the most advanced of any insurgent group worldwide.  These enhanced capabilities have 
emboldened its leadership and contributed to an aversion to conciliation.   
 Intelligence can influence the insurgents in the direction of multiple outcomes.  A solid 
intelligence infrastructure can be an extremely valuable operational tool against an adversary.  
However, as occurred in South Africa and to a lesser extent in Northern Ireland, intelligence 
operatives can shepherd the process of negotiations in the initial stages and even remain engaged 
parties throughout.  In Sri Lanka, India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) liased with LTTE 
intelligence operatives to broker negotiations between the LTTE and various Sri Lankan 
government administrations. 
 In an insurgency, intelligence personnel are on the front lines.  An insurgent organization 
with a compromised intelligence apparatus is less capable of sustaining successful attacks on 
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COIN forces, although this research finds that as an operational tool, intelligence only had a 
moderate influence on the decision of insurgents to negotiate an end to the insurgency.   
6.1.4 H4: Training/Tacit Knowledge Transfer 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
a restricted ability to train its members and transfer tacit knowledge is less capable of sustaining 
successful attacks on COIN forces and thus more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In 
the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” training/tacit knowledge transfer is 
represented by the letter o.  This sub-variable is not considered to have explanatory value in the 
theory of insurgent negotiation. 
 
In an insurgency, the counterinsurgents are very often the superior military force.  But 
with the right operational tools, insurgents can be trained to inflict great harm on their 
adversaries.  If training becomes institutionalized, the insurgency can grow in size and lethality, 
making the chances of negotiating less likely, at least in the near term.  Training was among the 
most important operational tools for the PIRA, Hizballah, and the ANC.   
 Specialization, lethality, professionalism and image, and networking are just a few of the 
byproducts from the PIRA’s intense focus on training and tacit knowledge transfer.  
Undoubtedly, training also played a role in the group’s longevity.  Per negotiations, though, 
training had relatively little effect on the group’s decision to negotiate other than the political 
training new recruits underwent before becoming a full-fledged member of the organization.  To 
this end, political training and indoctrination radicalized some members whose politics became 
less about objectives and more about ideology.   
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 Hizballah relied on training to increase its military prowess, enable recruiting, expand its 
international reach and establish its “train the trainers” program.  For Hizballah, the goal of 
training was to neutralize Israel’s military superiority, but one of the results was to entrench 
Hizballah further within Lebanese society.  Rigorous training increased military capacity which 
was demonstrated in the eighteen year battle against the Israelis in southern Lebanon and again 
in 2006 during the thirty-three day war.  With increased military success has come a more 
devoted following, which has grown increasingly more militant and has hardened its stance 
toward negotiations with Israel, even as it has simultaneously advocated for greater political 
power within Beirut, greater Lebanon, and the Arab/Islamic world more generally.  In the case of 
Hizballah, training has been on obstacle to negotiations.   
 For most of its tenure, training for the ANC was merely a matter of survival.  Still, MK 
fighters and ANC activists relied on training as an operational tool to provide ideological 
support, increase both lethality and optempo, and assist with recruitment.  In the end, training 
was a relatively unimportant factor in the ANC’s decision to negotiate with the South African 
government, although it was an important factor in the group’s ability to wage an insurgency 
against the better-trained, better-equipped South African Defense Forces.  Reaching the point of 
a military stalemate with the SADF would not have been possible without the training of MK 
special forces units.  
 In Sri Lanka, training failed to rank as one of the LTTE’s three most important 
operational tools but the importance of training was evident in its ability to conduct a range of 
operations as well as its elite suicide commando squad, which was responsible for eliminating 
heads of state, military leaders, and both Sri Lankan and Indian politicians.  As the case studies 
clearly demonstrate, an insurgency with the inability to transfer tacit knowledge and train its 
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members is less capable of sustaining successful attacks on COIN forces.  Nevertheless, as far as 
the relationship between training and negotiations, this research finds that as an operational tool, 
training had a minimal effect on the decision of insurgents to negotiate an end to the insurgency.   
6.1.5 H5: Funding/Financing 
Overall, research findings offer a high level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
limited funding/financing is less capable of sustaining successful attacks on COIN forces and 
thus more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of 
Insurgent Negotiation,” funding/financing is represented by the letter p.  This sub-variable is an 
essential component helping to explain the theory of insurgent negotiation. 
 
Choking off an insurgent group’s funding stream is critical to preventing the insurgents from 
resupplying and meeting their essential needs.  Funding can be provided externally, through state 
sponsors, diaspora communities, NGOS/charities, or several other avenues.  A group can also 
fund itself internally, through a combination of licit and illicit means.  It is important to note that 
a COIN force or government can be relatively successful in blunting threat finance and an 
insurgent group can still plan and execute spectacular attacks.  Operations are cheap.  Still, once 
a group grows in size and sophistication to the level of a Hizballah or LTTE, just sustaining the 
everyday functions of such a large organization requires a large and consistent operating budget. 
 In Northern Ireland, the group’s finances covered the salaries of full-time fighters, 
acquired weapons and munitions from international sources, financed the planning and 
preparation of operations, and sustained the families of imprisoned fighters.  Toward the end of 
the conflict, funding was instrumental in the group’s decision to negotiate, as money that was 
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previously used to grow its military wing was diverted to building up the PIRA’s political wing, 
Sinn Fein.   
 The LTTE, on the other hand, retained the majority of its funding almost exclusively for 
military means.  Funding provided the group with seed money for its licit businesses, which 
would then help launder the proceeds it obtained through organized crime.  In turn, these profits, 
as well as the millions of dollars donated to the LTTE from the diaspora community, went into 
building the insurgents’ military capabilities, including the development of a world-class 
maritime capability.  Only toward the end of the conflict was the Sri Lankan government 
successful in clamping down on LTTE financing.  By this time, however, negotiations were no 
longer an option and the insurgents were summarily defeated in 2009. 
 Without the funding provided to Hizballah by the Iranians, the insurgent group would not 
be able to sustain its broad social services network throughout southern Lebanon.  These services 
are a major reason for Hizballah’s popular support in the country.  Overall, funding has been a 
factor in the group’s refusal to disarm and negotiate a peaceful transition away from armed 
conflict. 
 With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
African National Congress lost its primary source of external support.  No longer able to rely on 
the Russians for training and other forms of support, the ANC consolidated its resources around 
devising a political solution to the conflict in South Africa.  Entering the third decade of its 
insurgency against the apartheid government in South Africa, the ANC was suffering 
economically.  In the townships, Black Africans were far poorer than their white counterparts, 
meaning the insurgents’ domestic base of support had little to contribute financially.  The 
prospects of reversing the economic fortune of its constituency proved too enticing for the ANC 
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to ignore.  Along with sanctuary/safe haven, the operational tool funding/financing is one of two 
critical variables to the contribution of operational tools in the theory of insurgent negotiation.   
In other words, this research finds that funding/financing has a significant influence on the 
decision of insurgents to negotiate an end to the insurgency.   
6.2 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS 
6.2.1 H6: Command & Control 
Overall, research findings offer a moderate level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency 
with a compromised command & control structure will be unable to sustain its existence as a 
cohesive entity and will therefore be more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the 
section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” command & control is represented by the 
letter q.  This sub-variable is not considered to have explanatory value in the theory of insurgent 
negotiation. 
 
Command & control, or C², is one of the most important insurgent organizational tools.  How a 
group is structured influences both the leadership of the insurgency as well as the way decisions 
and policies are reached and implemented.  The leadership provides strategic direction to the 
movement, issuing directives and shaping major decisions that affect every aspect of the 
organization.   
 In Lebanon, following long periods of protracted warfare, all sides to the conflict are 
understandably reluctant to disarm or demobilize.  This has been a continuous problem for the 
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government in Beirut, where Hizballah brazenly flaunts its refusal to abide by United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559, which calls for the group to disarm.  Hizballah 
commonly cites the Israeli threat as its primary reason for retaining its militia forces.  Since the 
government in Beirut does not maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, it remains 
illegitimate in the eyes of some Lebanese and many in the international community.  Hizballah’s 
decision to enter into the domestic political scene while maintaining a defensive posture with 
offensive capabilities is a decision influenced by it command and control structure.   
 Lessons from Northern Ireland prove instructive here, as the peace process was pursued 
in tandem with, or parallel to, disarmament.  In Lebanon, it has always been argued that 
disarmament should be a pre-requisite to legitimizing the group as a political party and dropping 
its designation as a terrorist/insurgent group. 
 In Sri Lanka, Prabhakaran’s refusal to neuter the LTTE was the product of thirty plus 
years of continuous conflict against an array of foes—Sinhalese, fellow Tamil groups, and Indian 
‘occupation forces.’  The top-down nature of the organization prevented dissent.  Consultation, 
cooperation, and commiseration between the LTTE’s top echelons were far less common than 
they were in the PIRA, the ANC, or Hizballah. 
 The Provisional IRA favored a vertical structure initially before switching to a more 
networked structure to counter British infiltration of the organization.  Still, especially within 
Sinn Fein, policies were enacted through a more hierarchical approach.  When the group’s 
political wing ascended its military wing in power, the fact that Sinn Fein was more vertically 
structured than the militants actually enabled the negotiation process.  Once the decision to make 
this shift was made, Sinn Fein activists led the charge in carrying out Adams’ orders.   
 Similar to the situation in Northern Ireland, the insurgency in South Africa integrated the 
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External Coordinating Council (ECC) with the Politico-Military Council, which emerged as one 
of two coordinating bodies with the executive power to make decisions.  On a more local level, 
the creation of a Politico-Military Council to replace the Revolutionary Council signaled the 
organization’s intent to move toward politics.   
 Command and control is undoubtedly a major factor in whether or not insurgents are able 
to sustain their existence as a cohesive entity, but this research finds that this was not a 
significant factor in pushing insurgents toward negotiating an end to the insurgency. 
6.2.2 H7: Group Composition 
Overall, research findings offer a high level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
a heterogeneous group composition, particularly one comprised of a significant number of 
politicos, will be unable to sustain its existence as a cohesive entity and will therefore be more 
likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent 
Negotiation,” group composition is represented by the letter r.  This sub-variable is considered 
an essential component of explaining the theory of insurgent negotiation. 
 
Cynthia Irvin’s theory of group composition suggests a model of revolutionary nationalist 
politics that integrates several variables, including: institutions, individual motivations, and 
ideology.  Group composition was one of the most important factors in the trend toward or away 
from negotiations.  This proved especially true when the group’s overall leader was an 
exemplary case of a distinct prototype.  In the case of Sri Lanka, Prabhakaran is an example of 
the most extreme form of ideologue.  As long as he maintained control of the group, the LTTE 
was never going to seriously entertain negotiating an end to the conflict that did not result with 
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LTTE-controlled areas seceding from Sri Lanka. 
 Provisional IRA leader Gerry Adams recognized that the offer of political legitimacy 
during negotiations with Protestant politicians and British government leaders was the best 
opportunity for the Catholic population in Northern Ireland to achieve an outcome of peace and 
prosperity.  His transformation from a young ideologue to a radical after his years in prison set 
the tone for the PIRA’s armed struggle and ultimate transformation into a political force in 
Northern Ireland.  The PIRA had to shelve its objective of establishing a united Ireland, but in 
return the insurgency’s leaders were granted a stake in a power-sharing government.   
 Similarly, in both South Africa and Lebanon, the insurgents agreed to stop fighting in 
exchange for the chance to take part in the legitimate government of their respective countries.  
These decisions were driven, in no small part, by the respective leaders of the groups, Nelson 
Mandela and Hassan Nasrallah. 
 For the Tamils of Sri Lanka, however, there would be no negotiations, due largely to the 
ego and relentlessness of the LTTE’s leader, Prabhakaran.  For Prabhakaran, negotiations 
equaled surrender and were only used to prolong the insurgency.  Unflinching in his goals, 
Prabhakaran missed several openings to use political negotiations to secure significant 
concessions for the Tamils, but his insistence that the group continue fighting led to the group’s 
defeat at the hands of the government.  In retrospect, the Sri Lankan COIN force should have 
placed a higher premium on following a decapitation strategy against the insurgents.  Had a more 
earnest effort to kill Prabhakaran succeeded, it is unlikely that his successor would have been 
equally as opposed to a negotiated settlement, meaning the insurgency could possibly have been 
ended with the government spending far less treasure and spilling far less blood. 
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While it is notoriously difficult to accurately decipher the group composition of an 
insurgency, group composition is an essential factor in helping insurgents sustain their existence 
as a cohesive entity.  As a whole, this research finds that group composition was one of two 
critical organizational tools helping to determine the theory of insurgent negotiation.  
6.2.3 H8: Ideology 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
a rigid ideology will be unable to sustain its existence as a cohesive entity and will therefore be 
more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent 
Negotiation,” ideology is represented by the letter s.  This sub-variable is not considered to have 
explanatory value in the theory of insurgent negotiation. 
 
Ideologies are crucial for insurgent groups because they translate the group’s message to its 
followers and articulate a platform to resolve grievances.  Ideologies can also affect a group’s 
willingness to negotiate.  The more ideologically rigid a group is, the less willing it is to 
compromise on the fundamental tenets or principles of its beliefs than a group that is more 
ideologically flexible, or pragmatic. 
 Of the four groups studied in this dissertation, the PIRA and Hizballah proved to be the 
most ideologically flexible.  The PIRA toned down its nationalist rhetoric during the negotiation 
process while Hizballah admitted publicly that its desire to establish an Islamic state within 
Lebanon was unrealistic and therefore not worth pursuing, at least in the short-term.   
 The LTTE proved to be the most ideologically rigid of the groups studied, insisting on an 
independent Tamil state, although in 2001 the group announced its willingness to explore 
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political devolution measures that safeguarded Tamil rights in a “united” Sri Lanka, although 
skeptics are highly dubious of Prabhakaran’s sincerity to abide by this agreement. 
 For the African National Congress, the most important strands of the group’s ideology 
included nationalism, black consciousness, and communism, probably in that order.  Once it was 
determined that communism was never an overarching goal of the insurgents, the political 
situation in South Africa during the end of apartheid reflected favorably on the ANC’s other 
cohesive elements, nationalism and black consciousness. 
 Insurgent groups tend to be more ideologically rigid in the first stages of their existence.  
Over time, thinking evolves and battlefield experiences teach lessons that textbooks are unable 
impart.  Being able to positively identify the tenets of an insurgent group’s ideology is essential 
to negotiating with the group.  Unless COIN forces have a clear indication of what makes the 
insurgents tick, there will be little chance that any carrots involved will have the desired effect of 
drawing combatants away from the fight.   
 While ideology is a factor a major factor in whether or not insurgents are able to sustain 
their existence as a cohesive entity, this research finds that in the overall scheme of why 
insurgents negotiate, it does not play as significant a role as initially hypothesized.  
6.2.4 H9: Popular Support 
Overall, research findings offer a high level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
low levels and/or changing levels of popular support will be unable to sustain its existence as a 
cohesive entity and will therefore be more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the 
section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” popular support is represented by the letter 
 388 
t.  This sub-variable is considered an essential component of explaining the theory of insurgent 
negotiation. 
 
The case studies demonstrate the importance of maintaining the good will of the population, not 
from an altruistic perspective, but from a pragmatic standpoint.  Popular support is also critical  
when considering the translation of passive support into more active forms, including 
recruitment into an organization.   
 The issue of leverage is not always easy to delineate.  Throughout the course of an 
insurgency, different factions may have leverage at different points.  Since insurgency is not 
static, the power position is liable to change multiple times.  In Lebanon, Hizballah has 
negotiated from a position of leverage throughout most of its lifespan.  It maintains high levels of 
popular support, political legitimacy, and the backing of a regional power that provides the group 
with funding and arms.  When it has negotiated, it has largely done so on its own terms. 
 Throughout its three-decade long insurgency, the PIRA maintained relatively high levels 
of popular support among the working-class Irish Catholic communities of West Belfast and 
Derry, as well as extensive popular support in the Republic of Ireland and among Irish 
Americans in the United States.  It was this latter group, however, that played a key role in 
convincing the PIRA to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  By the 1990s, influential Irish 
Americans began to pressure Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams to accept the British offer of 
political legitimacy in exchange for a promise to cease the armed struggle.  While numerous 
factors contributed to this gradual ‘about-face,’ the important thing to realize is that an influential  
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constituency which had always been a source of PIRA popular support was able to affect the 
insurgent leadership’s decisionmaking calculus and open doors that would demonstrate tangible 
benefits. 
 The ANC’s popular support grew over the course of the conflict in South Africa and 
largely resulted from several variables: the ANC’s comprehensive political message and appeal 
for reform; heavy-handed and clumsy policies implemented by the Afrikaner government in 
Pretoria; and a growing momentum that brought about real geopolitical change both within 
South Africa and within the international community.  Following the legalization of the ANC in 
1990, the groundswell of popular support for the group was evident in its election of Nelson 
Mandela as the first president of the post-apartheid government. 
 For the most part, the LTTE maintained high levels of popular support, with the 
exception of the final phase of the conflict.  Following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and 
tsunami, the LTTE came to be viewed more as a predator and less as a protector.  By this stage in 
the conflict, LTTE funding was restricted, and the insurgents turned on their own people for 
materiel support.  Internal support had always been forthcoming throughout the conflict, but 
when the Tigers relied on extortion to extract scant resources from a vulnerable population, 
many Tamils were turned off.  Following Karuna’s defection that same year, the LTTE lost a 
significant portion of its popular support base, which sapped its legitimacy and convinced the Sri 
Lankan government that one final push could defeat the insurgency once and for all. 
 When an insurgency loses popular support, the trend indicates that negotiation is more 
likely (or military defeat, as in the case of the LTTE).  Therefore, maintaining the good will of 
the population is critical.  To be sure, the population in an insurgency should be considered the 
center of gravity.  The push and pull over the loyalty of a certain constituency can mean the 
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difference between survival and demise.  Moreover, predatory actions and collateral damage risk 
provoking backlash from the population.  Overall, popular support had a central impact on the 
existence of an insurgent organization as a cohesive entity.  Accordingly, this organizational tool 
formed part of the theory of insurgent negotiation, demonstrating that the willingness of 
insurgents to negotiate or continue fighting was directly affected by the level and nature of 
popular support. 
6.2.5 H10: Public Relations/Propaganda 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for the hypothesis that an insurgency with 
a weak public relations/propaganda capability will be unable to sustain its existence as a 
cohesive entity and will therefore be more likely to negotiate an end to the insurgency.  In the 
section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” public relations/propaganda is represented 
by the letter u.  This sub-variable is not considered to have explanatory value in the theory of 
insurgent negotiation. 
 
Media and public relations efforts are important tools in winning the battle of perception.  This 
type of organizational tool can help insurgent organizations recruit, fundraise, and develop a 
coherent political platform, thus prolonging the conflict.  But also, as in Northern Ireland and 
South Africa, the media wing of a group can serve to win over supporters to a decision to enter 
negotiations.  Propaganda, even with its pejorative connotation, can play a positive role in ending 
conflict by positioning a group prior to making a decision as well as justifying and rallying 
supporters to that decision once it has been made. 
 In Lebanon, public relations/propaganda has played a more divisive and provocative role.  
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Rather than using its media capabilities to engage the Israelis and find common ground, Al-
Manar is at the forefront of villainizing both the IDF and the Israeli public, thus ensuring that 
prospects for negotiations are unlikely any time soon.  Following the July 2006 war, Hizballah 
used its media wing to justify its decision to begin a conflagration with Israel by kidnapping its 
soldiers.  Still, as history has demonstrated in Northern Ireland and South Africa, if the Party of 
God’s leadership decides that a more permanent détente with Israel is a wise policy, the group’s 
political support/propaganda arm will likely play a central role in expressing this dynamic both 
to the Israelis as well as to its support base within Lebanon. 
 The LTTE’s use of propaganda consisted of television, radio, and print communications 
that directed its message to various segments of the Tamil diaspora (those that would contribute 
money to the group) and politicians and human-rights activists who might be able to influence 
the situation from a diplomatic or political perspective.  Similar to Hizballah, the LTTE was 
extremely effective in highlighting its role as the victim.  This allowed the group to receive 
significant support in various political arenas.  However, because of continued human rights 
violations by members, and Prabhakaran’s failure to offer a more coherent narrative, the group’s 
public relations assets had little positive effect on securing concessions which could be translated 
into tangible gains for the LTTE.  Overall, while public relations/propaganda assisted insurgents 
in sustaining their existence as a cohesive entity, this research finds that its role as a variable with 
explanatory power is lacking, and it therefore did not form a part of the theory of insurgent 
negotiation. 
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6.3 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
6.3.1 Goals/Objectives 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for goals/objectives as a condition 
variable (contextual factor) with significant impact on the theory of insurgent negotiation.   In 
the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” goals/objectives is represented by the 
letter v.   
 
Sometimes insurgencies end because the groups achieve their goals.  However, insurgent groups 
typically espouse a number of objectives and achieving all of these objectives is rare.  Moreover, 
throughout the course of an insurgency, goals change, strategies shift, and objectives are 
modified.  Sometimes new leaders ascend to the helm and change the direction of the 
organization.  Depending on what kind of ideology a group adheres to, how the group is 
structured, and what kind of decisionmaking process it follows, the achievement of or the failure 
to reach an organization’s goals do not always lead them to end their struggle. 
 Simply put, no group studied in this dissertation achieved all of its goals.  Yet, two 
groups negotiated outright (PIRA, ANC), while another group negotiated an internal end to its 
insurgency (Hizballah) and the last group negotiated at various times throughout its three 
decades fighting the government (LTTE).  For the PIRA and the ANC, negotiating an end to 
their respective insurgencies did not mean abandoning their goals.  Rather, both groups used the 
negotiation process to gain political legitimacy.  Hizballah did the same.  After existing on the 
far end of the political spectrum, three of the four groups analyzed considered political 
legitimacy so important that they were willing to abandon violence to acquire it—although 
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Hizballah should still be considered an active insurgent group. 
 Sri Lanka’s attempts to bring an end to the conflict with the Tamil Tigers were 
continuously undermined by the recalcitrance of the LTTE’s leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.  On 
the battlefield, and off—leadership matters.  Prabhakaran’s insistence on the possibility of 
securing victory through military force meant that Colombo’s attempts to negotiate an end to the 
insurgency were doomed to futility.  Prabhakaran sincerely believed that the only route to 
achieving the group’s goals was through violence.  Therefore, any legitimacy gained through the 
political process that did not result in independence for the Tamils was not worthy of pursuance.   
6.3.2 Seminal Events 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for seminal events as a condition variable 
(contextual factor) with significant impact on the theory of insurgent negotiation.   In the section 
6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” seminal events is represented by the letter w.   
 
Seminal events can define an insurgency, for better or worse.  Some can have the effect of 
tipping a conflict further toward violence, while others can have a mitigating effect, essentially 
providing a respite in conflict for cooler heads to prevail and for politics to trump force. 
 Each of the four insurgencies featured a seminal event that tipped an already simmering 
confrontation further toward all-out war.  In Northern Ireland, the “Bloody Sunday” killings of 
13 unarmed civilians mobilized the Catholic population and drove hundreds of recruits to join 
the PIRA.  In Lebanon, Israel’s 1982 invasion of the country to drive out PLO militants resulted 
in an eighteen-year occupation of the southern part of the country and was immortalized in 
Hizballah lore as the group’s primary reason for resistance.  For the LTTE, the “Black July” riots 
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of 1983 tipped low-intensity conflict toward a far more violent confrontation in Sri Lanka.  And 
finally, the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa accelerated racial violence between the 
majority black population and the minority white Afrikaner population, providing the spark to a 
racial and ethnic powder keg ready to explode. 
6.3.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for previous attempts at conflict resolution 
as a condition variable (contextual factor) with significant impact on the theory of insurgent 
negotiation.   In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” previous attempts at 
conflict resolution is represented by the letter x.   
 
Just as seminal events can tip a conflict toward or away from violence, so too can attempts at 
conflict resolution have a similar impact.  Negotiations usually play our over the course of years, 
even spanning decades in many cases.  Perceived slights or bad faith negotiations can have a 
deleterious effect on future negotiations. 
 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was a deal brokered between the British and Irish 
(ROI) governments that granted Dublin rights of consultation on all aspects of the British 
government’s Northern Ireland policy.  At this point, PIRA leader Gerry Adams realized that the 
treaty essentially institutionalized a formal role for the Irish government in the political future of 
Northern Ireland.  Toward this end, Adams began shifting resources from the Army to Sinn Fein 
so that when the time for negotiations arrived, which now seemed imminent, the insurgents 
would be well placed to take advantage of British concessions and the opportunity to secure 
political legitimacy within Northern Ireland. 
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 For Hizballah, the Taif Accords that ended the Lebanese Civil War were somewhat anti-
climactic.  On one hand, Hizballah had used the civil war to solidify its role as a potent military 
force within the country.  On the other hand, because of its policy of staying out of politics prior 
to 1992, the insurgents were unable to reap serious benefits from the divvying up of political 
spoils during Taif.  One of the main reasons that Hizballah entered the Lebanese government was 
in order to represent the grievances of the Shia community in southern Beirut and south 
Lebanon.  Once Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon, Hizballah’s primary grievance was 
removed.  Although it moved into politics beginning in 1992, this process was accelerated 
following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.   
 As I documented in the section on the Norwegian-mediated peace process, the prospects 
of an end to the violence were soon dashed with a change in Sri Lankan government 
administrations and a change in LTTE demands that led both sides back into a spiral of ethnic 
outbidding.  Because of so many previous false starts, successive Sri Lankan administrations no 
longer gave the insurgents the benefit of the doubt.  Unlike the PIRA and the ANC, groups that 
were able to capitalize on increased leverage at the right time for maximum effect, the LTTE 
“overplayed its hand,” and as a result, paid the ultimate price. 
 In 1989, the Harare Declaration laid out the terms of the ANC’s willingness to negotiate 
with Pretoria if certain conditions could be met.  Unlike the South African government, the ANC 
had always proved a reliable partner in negotiations, so the Harare Declaration was only further 
reinforcement of that fact.  While distrust and enmity had characterized earlier attempts to 
explore the topic of negotiations between the two adversaries, a burgeoning relationship of trust 
and mutual respect had blossomed between Mandela and F.W. De Klerk.  Harare set both sides 
on the path to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the end of apartheid in South Africa. 
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6.3.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
Overall, research findings offer a high level of support for the mutually hurting stalemate as a 
condition variable (contextual factor) with significant impact on the theory of insurgent 
negotiation.   In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” MHS is represented by 
the letter y.  As stated above, as a condition variable, the mutually hurting stalemate governs the 
magnitude of the impact the IVs (operational tools, organizational tools) have on the DV (the 
decision insurgents make of whether or not to negotiate) and thus contributes to our 
understanding of the conditions under which negotiations take place.   
 
Zartman’s concept of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) was a contributing factor in each of 
the four insurgencies examined throughout this dissertation.  The presence of a MHS was an 
important reason for negotiations in Northern Ireland and South Africa, while the absence of a 
MHS was critical to the insurgents’ refusal to negotiate in Lebanon and Sri Lanka. 
 In both Northern Ireland and South Africa, the COIN force and the insurgents reached a 
point in the conflict where both sides were hurting militarily and neither side had the potential to 
escalate their side to victory.  The Provisional Irish Republican Army fought for thirty years 
against Protestant paramilitary groups and the British Army.  Even though the insurgents were 
infiltrated at some of the highest levels of their organization, the PIRA maintained the capacity to 
wage war—training, sanctuary, and funding all played a significant role in the group’s longevity.  
With no clear winner and neither side able to escalate to victory, the conflict became ripe for 
resolution.   
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 Throughout the ANC/MK insurgency against the South African apartheid regime, the 
insurgency grew in strength and numbers as the conflict progressed.  Even though the COIN 
force was far superior from a military standpoint, the insurgents relied on guerilla warfare and 
subversion to lock Pretoria’s security forces into a stalemate.  Once the government realized that 
this deadlock could not be overcome, even some of the more ardent hawks within the security 
forces realized that negotiation was the only way for the minority government to maximize its 
power in a future government dominated by South Africa’s black majority. 
 The lack of a mutually hurting stalemate in Lebanon is one of the main reasons why 
Hizballah never officially ended it insurgency.  Indeed, it remains a well-armed terrorist group 
with a political wing active in the Lebanese parliament.  The Israelis withdrew in 2000 and the 
Syrians followed in 2005.  The Lebanese state, particularly the Lebanese Armed Forces, lack the 
force to compel Hizballah to disarm.  In fact, the LAF remains divided along sectarian lines and 
militarily and at present remain unable to project power throughout the whole of the country.  As 
a default, Hizballah has been allowed to keep its militia intact, since Beirut recognizes the role it 
plays with regard to Lebanese internal security.    
 Similarly, the lack of a mutually hurting stalemate in Sri Lanka was a major reason why 
the insurgents never agreed to peace.  Ironically, it was negotiations themselves and a feigned 
interest in ending political violence that allowed the LTTE to avoid reaching the state of a 
mutually hurting stalemate.  This was especially true of the 2001 cease-fire, when the LTTE 
declared a unilateral cessation to the violence.  Alas, like its apparent attempts to make peace in 
1985, 1989, and 1994, this temporary halt in the fighting was merely a ruse intended to allow the 
Tigers to regroup following the heavy casualties suffered by the LTTE in its 2000 and 2001 
campaigns. 
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6.3.5 Decisionmaking Structure & Process 
Overall, research findings offer a low level of support for decisionmaking structure & process as 
a condition variable (contextual factor) with significant impact on the theory of insurgent 
negotiation.   In the section 6.3.6., “A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation,” decisionmaking 
structure & process is represented by the letter z.  This sub-variable is not considered to have 
explanatory value in the theory of insurgent negotiation.  
 
A subsection of strategic decisionmaking is the structure and process that insurgents work 
within to make decisions of major import.  The organizational tools of insurgent groups, 
particularly issues of group composition and command and control, factor into this element of 
decisionmaking,. 
 The PIRA’s Army Council remained the ultimate arbiter of major decisions throughout 
the conflict and shaped the decision to commit to the 1994 cease-fire.  The cease-fire was an 
explicit acknowledgement of the MHS between the insurgents and COIN force and gave the 
politicos within the group the opening to work through the details of the Belfast Agreement. 
 
Hizballah’s decisionmaking structure and process has been heavily influenced by both 
Syria and Iran from its very inception.  The power dynamics between Hizballah and its two 
primary patrons have changed drastically over the years.  This change has accelerated even more 
rapidly with the advent of the 2011 Arab Spring movement and subsequent insurgency in Syria.  
At present, Hizballah’s Lebanese leadership, headed by Hassan Nasrallah, probably retains more 
autonomy than at any time in the group’s history.  This has led to more pragmatic decisions, on 
the whole, but as evidenced by the 2006 July war against Israel, the group is still prone to 
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miscalculating the repercussions of some of its actions. 
 The downfall of the LTTE was due in no small part to poor decision-making on the part 
of the insurgents in the final phase of the conflict.  Following the defection of Karuna and the 
clampdown of LTTE funding after 9/11, the Tigers began to recruit child soldiers and forcibly 
extort their fellow Tamils in order to maintain their troop level while simultaneously continuing 
to fill their coffers.  By and large, these decisions contributed to a loss of popular support for the 
LTTE. 
 In South Africa, the insurgents’ decision to engage the government in “talks about talks,” 
coupled with a unilateral declaration to negotiate in good faith, helped the ANC position itself as 
the party most capable of leading post-apartheid South Africa.  Indeed, while some rogue “Third 
Force” operators attempted to sabotage the peace process, the “talks about talks” were an 
effective strategy to capitalize on the “ripe moment” which resulted from a MHS and the end of 
the Cold War.  
6.3.6 A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation 
In figure 16 below, the theory of insurgent negotiation postulates that where operational tools 
(A), as represented by sanctuary/safe haven (m) and funding/financing (p), in combination with 
organizational tools (B), as represented by group composition (r) and popular support (t), and 
considered in conjunction with a mutually hurting stalemate (y), leads to the decision to 
negotiate (C).   
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A m p B r t C 
X 
y 
Figure 16: A Theory of Insurgent Negotiation 
 
Figure 16 displays the theory’s independent variables (A and B), intervening sub-variables (m, p, 
r, and t), and the dependent variable (C), which comprise the theory’s explanation.  The proposal 
“A B C” is the theory’s prime hypothesis, while the proposals that “Am,” “mp,” 
“Br,” and “rt,” are its explanatory hypotheses.  To this, I add the condition variable “y,” 
which represents the mutually hurting stalemate and is indicated by using the multiplication 
symbol “X” to show that the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable is 
magnified by the presence of “y” and reduced when “y” is not present. 
 
  
 
The study considered the relative importance of five separate operational tools on the decision of 
insurgents to negotiate, where A= operational tools, l= weapons, m= sanctuary, n= intelligence, 
o= training, p= funding, and C= decision to negotiate/continue fighting: 
 
A l m n o p C 
Figure 17: Research Hypothesis 1 
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After analyzing the four historical case studies in sections two through five, the following 
explanatory hypothesis, one of two intermediate hypotheses that constitutes the theory’s 
explanation, appears in Figure 18 below. 
 
A m p C 
Figure 18: Explanatory Hypothesis 1 
 
Explanatory hypothesis one shows that the tools most important for insurgents to maintain their 
ability to sustain attacks, sanctuary (m) and funding (p), are critical to helping explain why 
insurgents negotiate.  The study also considered the relative importance of five separate 
organizational tools on the decision of insurgents to negotiate, where B= organizational tools, q= 
command & control, r= group composition, s= ideology, t= popular support, u= public 
relations/PR, and C= decision to negotiate/continue fighting: 
 
B q r s t u C 
Figure 19: Research Hypothesis 2 
After analyzing the four historical case studies in sections two through five, the following 
explanatory hypothesis - one of two intermediate hypotheses - that constitutes the theory’s 
explanation, appears in Figure 20 below. 
 
B r t C 
Figure 20: Explanatory Hypothesis 2 
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Explanatory hypothesis two shows that the tools most important for insurgents to sustain their 
existence as a cohesive entity, group composition (r) and popular support (t), are critical to 
helping explain why insurgents negotiate.   
 
Finally, this study considered the relative importance of five condition variables/contextual 
factors on the decision to negotiate, represented by v= goals/objectives, w= seminal events, x= 
previous attempts at conflict resolution, y= MHS, and z= decision-making structure & process.  
Of the five condition variables considered, only the mutually hurting stalemate (y),was found to 
frame the antecedent condition.  This completes the theory of insurgent negotiation, which 
appears earlier in figure 16, but is displayed once again below for further edification. 
 
A m p B r t C 
X967 
y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
967 Note that this is a capital “X,” which represents a multiplication symbol and should not be confused with a lower 
case “x,” which represents the sub-variable previous attempts at conflict resolution. 
 403 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 404 
7.0  NEGOTIATIONS AND THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY 
With a drawdown of US forces in Iraq underway and the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan 
in May 2011, the Obama administration has concentrated its efforts on devising an endgame for 
Afghanistan.  The terminal phase of the conflict will entail a shift from the current 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy to a focus on stability operations, including practical end- 
state objectives within Afghanistan, to include reconciliation with and reintegration of elements 
of the insurgency.968  Of the major insurgent groups opposing the Afghan government, none is 
more important than the Afghan Taliban.969  Afghan President Hamid Karzai has correctly 
recognized that as ethnic Pashtuns, the Taliban is an inseparable part of Afghanistan’s national 
DNA.  To bring an end to the insurgency, Taliban fighters must be reintegrated into Afghan 
society and their representatives included in any future government.970  Exactly how, and under 
what circumstances insurgents make the transition to ex-combatants holds far-reaching 
implications for the stability of the Afghan state and the prospects for continued violence 
                                                 
968 For definitions and the major differences between reintegration and reconciliation, see Mark E. Johnson, 
“Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Time to End the Conflict,” Military Review, 
November/December, 2010, p.97. 
 
969 In addition to the Taliban, a panoply of insurgent groups operate in the AFPAK theatre: Haqqani Network, HIG, 
TTP, LeT, etc. 
 
970 Karen DeYoung, Peter Finn, and Craig Whitlock, “Taliban in Talks with Karzai Government,” Washington Post, 
October 6, 2010. 
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following the withdrawal of foreign troops.  It remains to be seen whether the Taliban is willing 
to integrate into an Afghan government with a dominant non-Pashtun element. 
Karzai’s public statements occasionally refer to the Taliban as “sons of the soil,” in an effort to 
convince the world that the Taliban are a fact of life when envisioning the future of Afghanistan.  
Despite the proliferation of recent studies calling for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan, history 
tells us that while success may require negotiation, negotiations in and of themselves do not 
equal success.971  In his analysis of negotiating with insurgent groups, Byman points out several 
of the dangers inherent in inviting a group like the Taliban into a power-sharing arrangement.”972  
Because of their organizational skills, propensity to intimidate locals and genuine popularity in 
parts of the country, the possibility exists that the Taliban could be victorious in future elections.   
  In January 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta outlined the most pressing threats 
facing the United States—terrorism, Iran, North Korea, nuclear proliferation, cyberwar, and the 
threat of a rising China.973  He also notes that before the United States can turn its full attention 
to these threats, it needs to resolve the smoldering insurgency in Afghanistan.  According to Sean 
Maloney, “It is possible that successful negotiations with Mullah Omar’s Taliban faction would 
have some effect, but we must confront the possibility that that window of opportunity is now 
closed and that we are up against something new.”974  We are not there just yet.  Negotiating 
                                                 
971 Among some of the most important studies on a negotiated peace in Afghanistan are Matt Waldman, “Dangerous 
Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban: The Feasibility and Risks of Negotiation,” United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
Report #256, October 2010; Thomas Ruttig, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Negotiations with the Taliban,” New 
America Foundation, Washington D.C.: May 2011; Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 
 
972 Daniel Byman, “Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.32, Iss.2, 
April 2009, p.136. 
 
973 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66977  
974 Sean M. Maloney, “Can We Negotiate with the Taliban?,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol.21, No.2, June 2012, 
p.408. 
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with the Taliban is still an option, but unlike a decade ago, it now seems the only plausible 
scenario for bringing the war in Afghanistan to an end and establishing a modicum of stability in 
a country perpetually in conflict.   
7.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND 
The Taliban first emerged in Kandahar province in 1994 as a vigilante group comprised of 
madrassa students, or Talibs.  Unlike the Northern Alliance or the various militias led by former 
mujahedin turned warlords, Taliban fighters were “students,” or “seekers,” to use the religious 
connotation.975  Led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, this group of religious students initially rose 
to prominence after providing security to local Afghans being preyed upon by warlords and 
militia commanders.  In the spring of 1994, the Taliban freed two young girls who had been 
kidnapped and abused by a militia commander in Singesar.  The commander was killed and hung 
from the barrel of a tank as an example to others.  Later that year, the Taliban rescued a young 
boy whom two local commanders were fighting over—in order to determine who would get to 
sodomize him.976  By 1996, the Taliban controlled the southern Pashtun heartland of 
Afghanistan, as well as Heart and Kabul.977   
 It is important to note however, that Taliban is far from a monolithic entity.  Indeed, there 
                                                 
975 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban, 
revised edition, Philadelphia, PA: De Capo Press, 2009, p.279. 
 
976 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, p.25. 
 
977 Daniel P. Sullivan, “Tinder, Spark, Oxygen, and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol.44, No.1, January 2007, p.96. 
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are many differences to be cognizant of—Afghan versus Pakistani Taliban, ‘old’ Taliban versus 
‘neo-Taliban,’ and stark divisions within the Taliban itself, between Durrani and Ghilzai 
Pashtuns.978  Throughout this chapter, I use the terms Taliban, Afghan Taliban, “neo-Taliban,” 
and Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) to refer to the same group, led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. 
7.1.1 Operating Logic 
Taliban insurgents who fight against US and ISAF troops in 2012 are motivated by a different set 
of factors than the group of young madrassa students that initially comprised the movement in 
the mid-1990s.  Then, the Taliban was primarily motivated by the desire to establish an ideal 
Islamic state governed by sharia law.  After all, the Taliban’s ranks were made up of young 
Afghans who grew up in the refugee camps of Pakistan, displaced from the fighting of the 
Soviet-Afghan War.  Today, the Taliban fight first and foremost to expel foreign troops from 
Afghan soil.  Following ten years of fighting against Coalition forces, the Taliban has been 
seriously degraded.  Estimates put the number of insurgents somewhere between 60,000 and 
70,000, of which approximately 15,000 insurgents are full-time fighters.979  American airpower, 
ISAF counterinsurgency warfare, and special operations night-raids have damaged the 
organization and caused it to disperse throughout Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.  
However, this is the same group that claims membership in the mujahedin that drove the Soviets 
out of Afghanistan in the late 1980s.  Despite suffering major losses, elements of the insurgency 
                                                 
978 For more on the differences between ‘old’ Taliban and ‘neo-Taliban,’ see Antonio Giustozzi ed., Decoding the 
New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.  On meaningful 
differences between Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns, see Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political 
History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp.285-336. 
 
979 Giustozzi, “Negotiating with the Taliban,” p.4. 
 
 408 
remain confident that if its fighters are able to muddle along, the Taliban can survive until US 
troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan.  This could potentially set the stage for a return to 
violence and yet another Afghan civil war. 
7.1.2 Type of Insurgency 
Exactly what type of insurgency the Taliban is waging in Afghanistan in 2012 is still a matter of 
debate.  While some would term the conflict an example of a “local-global” insurgency, because 
of the Taliban’s links to Al-Qaida (which is now acknowledged to be quite limited, at least 
within Afghanistan proper), others, like Peter Dahl Thruelsen, would argue that the Taliban is a 
localized insurgency with a local objective.  Perhaps the most accurate characterization would be 
a “local-regional” insurgency encompassing various parts of South Asia.  The majority of the 
Taliban’s military operations are conducted by insurgents operating within their home 
provinces.980  Still, the influence of Siraj Haqqani and his links to both Al-Qaida and the Tehrik-
i-Taliban (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, indicate that as the conflict continues, the Afghan Taliban 
could be influenced by actors with more regional and even global ambitions.981  Thomas Ruttig 
believes that the current U.S. strategy of degrading the Taliban to force it to the negotiating table 
is having unintended effects.  The most serious of these is contributing to the rise of younger, 
                                                 
980 Christia and Semple, “Flipping the Taliban,” p.41. 
 
981 Shezhad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol.22, Iss.4, pp.574-602. 
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more radical Taliban commanders who are filling the ranks of the ‘neo-Taliban,” an iteration of 
the insurgency with a more ‘jihadist internationalist’ worldview.982  
7.1.3 Approach 
The Taliban’s approach is a mixture of rural-urban insurgency, depending on which regional 
command of the country is being analyzed.  Overall, the insurgency is rural, protracted, and 
funded through rents acquired from illicit economies.983  Its approach, or fighting strategy, has 
alternatively been described as asymmetric, ‘Fourth Generation,’ Maoist, and that of the ‘war of 
the flea.’984  While there are certainly elements of each of these fighting styles apparent in the 
Taliban’s approach, the most accurate characterization is probably closest to Maoism.  In the 
opening stages of the conflict, insurgents infiltrated the population and gained control over key 
areas before moving on to consolidate base areas, organize guerilla war, and create rudimentary 
political structures. 
 Before the Taliban escalated its activities between late 2005 and 2007, its fighters relied 
mainly on AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, BM-1 field rockets, machine guns, 
suicide bombers, and improvised explosive devices.985  The fighting is asymmetric and the 
Taliban function primarily as a guerilla army, relying on sniping and ambushes.  At times, the 
                                                 
982 Thomas Ruttig, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Negotiations with the Taliban: History and Prospects for the 
Future,” New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, May 2011, p.5. 
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Taliban has relied on human wave attacks, specifically in the south and east of Afghanistan.  
This kind of ‘open warfare’ is rare and is mostly used to counter the effectiveness of Coalition 
air strikes.986   
7.1.4 Funding/Financing 
The Taliban’s two primary sources of funding are the narcotics trade and money donated by 
sympathizers in the Middle East.987  Though figures vary widely, the narcotics trade generates a 
profit between $70 million and $500 million per year for the Taliban.988  Even after the costs of 
sustaining an insurgency are debited, this is hardly a “rainy day fund.”  How an insurgent group 
finances itself has a major impact on the motivation of its members, overall group morale, 
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political legitimacy, and the trajectory of the conflict.989  The Taliban does not rely solely upon 
narcotics as a means of funding its insurgent activities in Afghanistan and indeed maintains 
diverse sources of financing, coupled with a robust support network that offers both active and 
passive support.990  Part of the Taliban’s war chest is derived from a multi-billion dollar trade in 
goods smuggled from Dubai to Pakistan.991   
 The Haqqani network is also a major player in the Afghan insurgency.  Although the 
network is part of the insurgency, it also functions like a mafia, motivated by profits but also by 
issues such as honor, revenge, and ideology.992  An in-depth analysis of HQN funding is beyond 
the scope of this appendix, but it is worth noting that recent assessments suggest that high levels 
of violence, rampant criminality, and indiscriminate brutality could mean that the group has 
descended into more of a criminal operation than an insurgent group. 
7.1.4.1 Why has funding/financing been so valuable? 
Funding has been valuable because it has allowed the Taliban to sustain the insurgency for over a 
decade.  Giustozzi estimates that the Taliban retains an annual surplus of between $110 and $130 
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million.993  Gretchen Peters does a comprehensive job mapping out the Taliban’s funding 
streams in southern, southeastern, northern, and northeastern Afghanistan.994  Money generated 
through crime, extortion, and fundraising is devoted to paying Taliban insurgents and obtaining 
weapons for the group’s fighters.  At various times, particularly when relations between the two 
groups were more cordial, the Afghan Taliban siphoned funds off for Baitullah Mehsud and the 
Pakistani Taliban over the border.995 
7.1.4.2 How has it changed over time? 
Prior to September 11th and in the nascent stages of the insurgency, the Taliban was able to rely 
on a steady stream of income from Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida’s financial network.996  
Furthermore, while the Taliban once relied heavily on extorting transportation companies and 
other private contractors, as the Western footprint in Afghanistan diminishes, the funding is 
drying up along with it.997  As this source of internal revenue declines, the Taliban will continue 
to solicit donations from Middle Eastern sheikhs with deep pockets and sympathizers from the 
Persian Gulf and elsewhere to keep its bankroll steady. 
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7.1.5 Sanctuary/Safe Haven 
The worst kept secret throughout the insurgency has been the Afghan Taliban’s Pakistani safe 
haven, both in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as well as in major cities like 
Karachi, Quetta, and Lahore.  In more recent years, the Taliban has also enjoyed sanctuary in 
parts of Iran.  Pakistan remains the preferred locale, however, as it is geographically proximate to 
southern and eastern Afghanistan and is home to approximately twenty-five million Pashtuns, 
twice as many as live in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the rugged terrain of the AFPAK border 
region make it ideally suited for avoiding detection.998  At the height of the Taliban’s comeback 
in 2007, the border provinces between Afghanistan and Pakistan were designated as either 
“extreme risk/hostile” or “high risk/hostile” environments.999 
7.1.5.1 Why has sanctuary/safe haven been so valuable? 
Throughout history, insurgents who have enjoyed relatively unfettered access to safe haven, 
either internal or external, have fared more successful than those insurgents without such 
access.1000  Besides the popular support enjoyed by Taliban insurgents in their Pakistani 
sanctuary, fighters have been able to plot, recruit, proselytize, fundraise, and communicate with 
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each other.1001  Obviously, the most valuable aspect of the Taliban’s Pakistani sanctuary is that it 
allows the insurgents to evade ISAF counterinsurgency operations.1002  The border stretches for 
2,450 km and is almost impossible for Coalition troops to patrol.  This challenge is compounded 
by a less capable and altogether unwilling Pakistani military, which deployed its paramilitary 
Frontier Corps and regular army elements from the 12th Corps to the FATA in 2004.1003  
Pakistan’s FATA has been a generous safe haven to Al-Qaida as well.  Between 2004 and 2011, 
of the 32 “serious” terrorist plots against the West, more than half (53 percent), had operational 
or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan.1004 
7.1.5.2 How has it changed over time? 
The Taliban has maintained a sanctuary in Pakistan since being chased over the border by U.S. 
Special Forces on horseback in November 2001.  In 2003 and 2004, the ISI operated training 
camps for Afghan Taliban insurgents in Pakistan, just north of Quetta.1005  U.S. drone strikes 
have limited the ability of insurgents in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
FATA to operate freely.  This is true not only of the Afghan Taliban, but also of the TTP.  The 
issue of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan has been perhaps the most vexing obstacle facing ISAF in 
Afghanistan.  In what should probably qualify as somewhat of an understatement, former US 
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Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair conceded that the safe haven in Pakistan ‘is an 
important Taliban strength.’1006  In addition to safe haven provided by Pakistan, the Taliban has 
also bolstered its support on the western front by strengthening its ties to the mullahs in Tehran 
in the past few years.1007    
7.1.6 Intelligence 
Even prior to the insurgency, the Afghan Taliban maintained a robust intelligence structure on 
both sides of the border, cooperating often with the ISI as well as the Pakistani political party 
Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI).  In the early stages of the conflict, Taliban intelligence operatives 
bribed Northern Alliance commanders to infiltrate the ranks of their comrades to conduct 
assassinations.1008  Taliban intelligence networks are strong at the village and neighborhood 
level, which allows the insurgents to control large segments of the Pashtun population in the 
south and east.1009  Over the past several years, both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network have 
placed spies inside the ranks of the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), and this has allowed the insurgents to strike at the heart of the Afghan security services. 
                                                 
1006 Dennis C. Blair, ‘Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,’ Testimony before the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 February 2010. 
 
1007 For more on the relationship between the Taliban and Iran, see Sajjan M. Gohel, “Iran’s Ambiguous Role in 
Afghanistan,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, March 2010, Vol.3, Iss.3, pp.13-16; Alireza Nader and Joya 
Laha, Iran’s Balancing Act in Afghanistan, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2011; and Seth G. Jones, “Al Qaeda 
in Iran: Why Tehran is Accommodating the Terrorist Group,” Foreign Affairs, January 29, 2012. 
 
1008 Ben Brandt, “The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” Combating Terrorism Center 
Sentinel, Vol.4, Iss.6, June 2011, p.20. 
 
1009 C.J. Chivers, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government,” New York Times, February 6, 2011. 
 
 416 
7.1.6.1 Why has intelligence been so valuable? 
The Taliban rely on intelligence and counterintelligence to mitigate the overwhelming US 
firepower and technological advantage.  Intelligence has been used in several capacities, from 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to military deception (MILDEC) to high value-
targeting (HVT).1010  The Taliban intelligence network is also largely responsible for the 
successful jail break in Kandahar city in the spring of 2011.  Although it is impossible to know 
how many fighters went directly back to the battlefield, the spate of attacks immediately 
following the incident indicated an increased capability for Taliban units operating in the 
area.1011  
7.1.6.2 How has it changed over time? 
The removal of key leaders in the Taliban’s intelligence apparatus—Khairullah Khairkhwa, Qari 
Ahmadullah, and Abdul Haq Wasiq have all been captured or killed since the conflict began—
has enervated the insurgents, but overall the network has proved resilient.1012  ISAF operations in 
Afghanistan and U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan have kept the insurgents off balance.  Evidence 
suggests that the Taliban’s attempt to share intelligence has been made more onerous as the 
network is forced to reorganize and replace its commanders.1013  From a COIN perspective, the 
most alarming trend has been the increase in incidents since early 2009, in which Taliban 
insurgents posing as Afghan security force personnel executed coalition troops. 
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7.1.6.3 What effect could operational tools have on negotiations? 
If the Taliban were to lose its two primary sources of revenue—donations from wealthy sponsors 
abroad and money obtained through the drug trade—it could have a significant impact on the 
insurgents’ ability to continue fighting.  Neither of these two outcomes is likely, however.  
Moreover, the Taliban maintains a diversified revenue stream, with other income garnered 
through various organized crime rackets, to include kidnapping for ransom and extortion.  In 
short, the only way funding will play a role is in possible financial incentives offered to 
insurgents as part of a reintegration package.  
 A Department of Defense Report to Congress on Afghanistan from April 2012 states that, 
“the insurgency’s safe haven in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan 
Government, remains the biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable and 
sustainable Afghanistan. The insurgency benefits from safe havens inside Pakistan with notable 
operational and regenerative capacity.”1014  The continuing ability of the Taliban to use Pakistan 
as sanctuary provides it with a clear advantage should the insurgency’s goal be to “wait out” the 
United States before returning to Afghanistan after an American withdrawal and retake the 
country by force.  At the end of the day, there is little the United States can do militarily to force 
the Pakistanis to eliminate this safe haven.  After all, Pakistan is an “ally” with six times the 
population of Iraq, in addition to a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons.1015 
 It is difficult to know how substantial a factor the Taliban’s intelligence apparatus will be 
in negotiations because it remains unclear what role, if any, is designated for the intelligence 
network in a negotiation phase.  In South Africa, both the insurgents and COIN force intelligence 
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operatives were active in negotiations between the two sides.  Since the Taliban’s intelligence 
network is a primary conduit for the Pakistani ISI, there is a high likelihood that the network will 
factor into whatever form negotiations take.  
7.2 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS 
7.2.1 Command & Control 
The Afghan Taliban is a decentralized network comprised of four regional shuras located in 
Quetta, Peshawar, Miramsha, and Gerdi Jangal.1016  Three overlapping networks, including the 
Haqqani network, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and the Mansur network are also associated 
with the group.1017  The Taliban maintain both formal and informal structures, with the former 
consisting of the Leadership Council, provincial leadership councils, and a host of different 
commissions.1018  In addition to regional shuras, the Taliban maintains four “regional 
commands,” covering southern Afghanistan, eastern Afghanistan, southeastern Afghanistan, and 
western Afghanistan.  Each “regional command” has a different relationship with the group’s 
leadership in Pakistan as well as with the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.1019 
 Since each of the four regional shuras is located across the border in Pakistan, the 
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Taliban created shadow governments in each of Afghanistan’s provinces, mainly as an 
alternative to the corrupt Afghan government.  Taliban shadow governance includes a 
mechanism for land dispute resolution and a provincial level commission where civilians can file 
formal complaints against local commanders.  This stands in stark contrast to an Afghan 
government that takes months to resolve disputes, is widely viewed as both corrupt and inept, 
and operates with little fear of consequence for accepting bribes and preying on the 
population.1020  The Taliban’s shadow government rules through sharia, or Islamic law.1021  
According to Dressler and Forsberg, the Taliban’s parallel institutions “are more effective than 
anything the Afghan government or international community has been able to muster.”1022 
 Each province has its own Taliban shadow governor responsible for civil and military 
matters, including financial oversight and judicial processes.1023  In some areas, the Taliban 
dispenses licenses, collects a form of taxation known as zakat, and is preferred over the Afghan 
government because it is perceived as more reliable and less corrupt.1024  These provincial level 
commissions were established to make the Taliban’s shadow governance competitive with 
Kabul’s administrative ability, which in many cases it either equals or surpasses in efficiency.  
The shift toward structural reorganization, rather than merely “tactical and financial in motive,” 
appears to be a strategic move aimed at gaining support over the medium to long-term.1025  
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7.2.2 Group Composition 
Even ten years after the start of the insurgency, it remains difficult to present an accurate 
depiction of the Taliban’s group composition.  Tier I is comprised of the strategic leadership, the 
Quetta Shura, province shadow governors and old fighters from the 1990s.  These are thought to 
be the most hardcore ideologues of the entire group and those most inimical to negotiating.  Of 
course, these are the individuals most removed from the actual fighting, so they are the least 
likely to be affected by ISAF kinetic operations designed to force the Taliban to the negotiating 
table.  Local leaders, fill-time fighters, and active supporters make up most of Tier II.  While it is 
difficult to gauge the political commitment of this tier, the full-time fighters are undoubtedly 
suffering the brunt of the COIN force military offensive.  Finally, Tier III is composed of part-
time fighters (to include those fighting for remuneration), less committed local supporters, and 
those that sympathize with the Taliban’s cause. 
7.2.3 Ideology 
Over time, the Taliban has increasingly recognized the utility of alienating the population from 
the government and acquiring its active support, an indispensable outcome for any insurgent 
group involved in an asymmetric conflict against far superior military forces.1026  In 2009, the 
Taliban released a sixty-nine page “Code of Conduct,” which was updated a year later.  The two 
main purposes of the booklet were to rein in unruly commanders and win back segments of the 
population that were disenfranchised by the Taliban’s harsh tactics.  The Taliban’s ideological 
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transformation has addressed the group’s continuing effort to garner legitimacy, as well as 
changes in its organizational structure.  Finally, it includes a concerted effort to portray the group 
as a national movement whose appeal extends beyond the traditional Pashtun strongholds of 
southern Afghanistan and into parts of the country dominated by Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks.   
An analysis of the Taliban’s ideology would not be complete without addressing the 
group’s changing tactics over the course of the insurgency.  During the early stages of the 
insurgency, those Taliban fighters who remained in Afghanistan organized into small pockets of 
resistance throughout the south and east of the country.  They fought US forces in the P2K 
region (Paktia, Paktika, Khost) and Kunar province.1027  At least initially, the Taliban relied on 
rocket attacks, small arms fire, and ambushes as its main tactics.  However, beginning in 2005 
and increasing exponentially over the next several years, the Taliban conducted a campaign of 
suicide attacks and roadside bombings through the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
unseen before in the Afghan conflict.   
 While it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when the Taliban began to reconsider the more 
austere elements of its ideology, some scholars argue that the genesis of the “neo-Taliban” 
harkens back to 2002.1028  Like the Coalition, the Taliban also realizes the importance of gaining 
the trust and support of the population, although the increased use of improvised explosive 
devices, suicide bombing and the targeting of civilians might suggest otherwise.1029  The driving 
force behind the switch to the use of suicide bombing was Mullah Dadullah, a leading Taliban 
                                                 
1027 Anne Stenersen, “The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan—Organization, Leadership, and Worldview,” 
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), 5 February 2010, p.24. 
 
1028 Brahimi, “Evolving Ideology,” 4. 
 
1029 In fact, a United Nations report attributed 75 percent of civilian casualties to the Taliban and other insurgents.  
See Alissa J. Rubin, “Taliban Causes Most Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” New York Times, March 9, 2011. 
 
 422 
military commander who adopted suicide bombing as a tactic after watching DVDs of similar 
attacks by Iraqi insurgents.1030  Suicide attacks in Afghanistan increased each year from 2003 
until 2007, the year that the Dadullah was killed by US forces in Helmand province.1031  After 
Dadullah’s death, suicide attacks began to decline steadily, and in 2009 the Taliban’s Code of 
Conduct provided guidance on the subject.  The document suggested that suicide attacks were 
only acceptable in the case of high-value targets and that civilian casualties should be avoided 
with great care.1032 
 Even with the guidance offered to avoid civilian casualties, a 2011 United Nations Report 
estimated that nearly three quarters of all civilian deaths in Afghanistan are caused by the 
Taliban and other insurgents.  Possibly in response to this report and an increasing perception in 
Afghanistan that Taliban fighters are undisciplined, often showing wanton disregard for the lives 
of their fellow Afghans, the group publicly announced the start to its spring offensive in late 
April 2011, the first time such an announcement has been made since the beginning of the 
insurgency.1033  In its statement, the Taliban mentioned the protection of civilians as a priority, 
claiming that every effort would be made to avoid harming or killing Afghan civilians.   
The most important component of the Taliban’s evolution is the group’s shift to an 
inclusive and less draconian political platform.  In sum, the Taliban still values power over 
profit, even if as many believe, the group’s ideological shift is disingenuous and a byproduct of 
political expedience.  Indeed, while comparisons of insurgent groups often oversimplify the 
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complexities inherent in these organizations, comparative historians know that sequence matters 
and will always look to the past for answers. 
7.2.4 Popular Support 
Minimizing the financial exploitation of the population and creating the mechanisms that allow 
for censure against those Taliban members convicted of wrongdoing places the group in 
juxtaposition to the corrupt and unaccountable Karzai government.1034  In the “Code of 
Conduct,” one passage notes that “the Taliban must treat civilians according to Islamic norms 
and morality to win over the hearts and minds of the people.”1035  From the standpoint of basic 
strategic approaches to insurgency, these directives should not be seen as revolutionary.  In fact, 
many of these same tenets were laid out by Mao in “Six Main Points for Attention,” which 
provided his troops with directions on how to treat the population as they marauded through the 
countryside.1036  These basic guidelines for maintaining the goodwill of the population have 
become more important to the Taliban’s campaign as the group’s ideology has evolved to 
include a more nuanced view of the importance of the population in fighting an insurgency.   
 If the population is truly the sea in which insurgents (the fish) swim, then the popular 
support of the population is critical to their success.1037  The Taliban has picked up on the 
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Americans’ insistence on a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy and has countered with 
its own campaign to win over the population, making critical changes to its approach over the 
past several years of the insurgency, including its views regarding narcotics. 
In 2006, at about the same time the Taliban placed a higher priority on earning legitimacy 
in the eyes of the Afghan people, the group also greatly expanded recruitment efforts throughout 
Afghanistan, including at the village level.1038   One of the main driving forces behind local 
recruitment of Afghans into the insurgency was the influence of the clergy.1039  While the 
Taliban undoubtedly draws recruits from madrassas along the Afghan-Pakistani border, after 
2006 the group expanded efforts to recruit in urban areas, especially in universities, and began to 
reconnect with former mujahedin commanders to grow its fighting force.1040  The Taliban 
recruitment process also relies on family and clan loyalties, tribal lineage, personal friendships, 
and social networks.1041 
 Taliban recruitment efforts are bolstered by continuing corruption in the Afghan 
government, which extends from the highest reaches of the Karzai government all the way down 
to provincial, district, and village officials and security forces.1042  Indeed, a desire to respond to 
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grievances is a commonly cited factor motivating the radicalization of individuals who make the 
decision to join an insurgent or terrorist group.1043  By exploiting the narratives of oppression, 
occupation, and corruption, the Taliban can appeal to both theological justifications and 
nationalist sentiments at the same time.1044 
7.2.5 Public Relations/propaganda 
For a group comprised largely of illiterate and rural fighters, the Taliban has displayed an 
effective propaganda effort by taking advantage of the full range of media outlets—radio, 
internet, DVDs, audio cassettes, magazines, and traditional songs and poems.1045  Through its 
propaganda, the Taliban attempts to portray itself as the only legitimate actor in the conflict, the 
vanguard of not just the Pashtun population, but of the Afghan people as a whole.  The 
Americans are cast as just the next wave of foreign occupiers, no different than the Russians 
before them and the British before them.   
 Taliban propaganda routinely points out ISAF and Afghan government shortcomings.  
Frequent themes include civilian casualties resulting from Coalition air strikes and the rampant 
corruption of the Karzai government.  In addition to these messages, Taliban propaganda assails 
the American-run prison at Guantanamo Bay and also provides justifications for the use of 
suicide bombings in Afghanistan.  A significant component of the organization’s propaganda 
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machine, which former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan David Richards 
characterized as the most sophisticated he has ever seen, is the group’s public relations activities.  
Taliban spokesmen eagerly address the press by arranging meetings with journalists and satellite 
phone calls to explain their side of the story.1046 
7.2.5.1 How might organizational tools affect negotiations? 
Because the Taliban is structured as a horizontal organization, it is not completely clear how 
much control the Quetta Shura commands over other branches of the organization.  If the order is 
given from Mullah Omar to negotiate, who will follow?  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
significant numbers of mid-level commanders and fighters in the field are ready to quit.  
Meanwhile, the Quetta Shura grows more alienated by the day, removed from the day-to-day 
realities of protracted guerilla warfare.    If the Taliban leadership were to negotiate an end to the 
conflict, it is likely that it would only face sporadic pockets of resistance from foot soldiers in 
Afghanistan. 
 In 2007 and 2008, an element of the insurgency that came to be called “pious Taliban,” 
came out against the group’s use of suicide bombing as a tactic.  This group of insurgents, a sub-
element of the ‘Kandahari mainstream’ Taliban, recognized that victory through military means 
was not possible.  Splintering and spoiling both remain acute possibilities with respect to a 
negotiated settlement.  Like most insurgent groups, the Taliban has its share of hardcore fighters 
who will refuse to give up the fight, especially those who see it as a religious obligation to retake 
the country and implement sharia in an Islamic Emirate governed by religious leaders. 
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How much the Taliban’s ideology will affect possible negotiations is a question of much 
speculation.  The Taliban has already moderated its position on several fronts.  This moderation 
is largely superficial and is mostly an attempt to avoid alienating potential supporters in its quest 
for legitimacy.  If negotiations do take place, ideological hardliners could seek to play the role of 
spoiler, as they did in the post-Bonn period.1047  To that end, radical splinter groups aligned with 
the Haqqani network or Al-Qaida is almost guaranteed to emerge following a negotiated 
settlement. 
 The majority of Afghans want peace.1048  Inevitably, the longer the conflict drags on, the 
more Afghan civilians are killed.  This affects the level of popular support for the Taliban, even 
when the casualties are caused by the COIN force.1049  Understandably, Afghans are war weary 
following over thirty years of constant conflict.  If the Taliban is seen as a force for stability in 
the country, its members may be able to concentrate significant support from the Pashtun 
population.  When translated into a political context, this bodes well for a negotiated settlement. 
 While public relations and propaganda will not play much of a role in influencing the 
Taliban’s decision to negotiate or keep fighting, they will certainly affect the course of 
negotiations should the insurgents pursue this option.  Taliban spokesmen control the group’s 
message and influence its followers through carefully crafted public relations.  This skill carries 
over to the realm of politics, where these same insurgents will attempt to position the Taliban as 
the most legitimate and representative entity of the Afghan people. 
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7.3 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
7.3.1 Goals & Objectives 
The Taliban, or the “neo-Taliban,” as it is sometimes referred to, has developed a more nuanced 
understanding of the political dynamics of the insurgency since 2001 and is currently engaged in 
a struggle with the Afghan government to gain the allegiance of the Afghan people.  The group’s 
focus on affecting public opinion, in accordance with Hoffman’s discussion, demonstrates that 
the Taliban has political goals and is using economic gain to further these goals.  With so much 
attention paid to how the insurgency is funded, the Taliban’s ideological evolution has been 
misinterpreted.  By temporarily shelving some of its more austere policies, the Taliban is angling 
to position itself as a legitimate political actor in Afghanistan. 
 Organizations change over time and adapt to new circumstances.  Insurgent groups are no 
different.  The changes implemented by the Taliban have been both deliberate and carefully 
calculated.  The willingness to put certain objectives on hold in the short-term is nothing more 
than misdirection.  Once in power, it is possible the Taliban will return to these goals.  Having an 
idea about what the group’s objectives are will go a long way toward fashioning a peace deal 
amenable to all sides.  As Shinn and Dobbins point out, in any negotiation there are “must 
haves” and “want to haves.”  Taliban “must haves” include the removal of foreign forces from 
Afghanistan (with no presence other than temporary peacekeepers), a guarantee of security for 
the insurgents, and the prospect of political legitimacy, both internal and external.1050 
 One of the most important questions is whether or not the Taliban remains committed to 
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building an Islamic state in Afghanistan.  To this point, all indications have suggested that this is 
the case, although just how much Afghanistan would move toward the institutionalization of 
Islamic law is likely an area of compromise. 
7.3.2 Seminal Events 
7.3.2.1 The Demise of Al-Qaida? 
Of all possible outcomes in Afghanistan, the most important to the United States is that 
Afghanistan never again becomes a country hospitable for transnational terrorists.  Some 
ancillary objectives, like women’s rights, are likely to suffer once Coalition troops depart.  
Despite the best intentions of those who work to obtain such noble, if not quixotic, goals, 
Afghanistan is unlikely to develop into a Jeffersonian democracy.  From a purely pragmatic 
standpoint, the US is mainly concerned that whatever follows its exit from Afghanistan, Al-
Qaida or groups of its ilk will not be able to use the country as a place to plot, plan, and set in 
motion attacks against the West.  Much of this depends on the state of the relationship between 
the Taliban and Al-Qaida.   
 By now, the story of how the Taliban provided sanctuary to bin Laden and Al-Qaida 
before September 11th, and refused to ‘hand him over,’ following the attacks is well-known.  
Throughout the late 1990s and leading up to 9/11, Al-Qaida ran a parallel state alongside the 
Taliban and even conducted its own foreign policy independent from Omar’s organization.1051  
While Al-Qaida has since developed relationships with groups in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, 
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Mali, and even Nigeria, “in none of these other places is there a partnership between the local 
governments and Al Qaeda such as existed between that organization and the Taliban regime 
prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001.”1052 
 What is less clear is the current state of the relationship and what form that relationship 
would take in a future Afghan government that includes Taliban members within its ranks.  As 
Strick van Linschoten and Kuen note in their recent study of these two groups, “The issue of the 
relationship between the Taliban and al- Qaeda is not as big a potential stumbling block among 
old-generation Taliban as common wisdom holds. For circumstantial reasons, in the last three 
years (2007- 10) the Taliban have taken considerable care in their public statements to implicitly 
distance themselves from al-Qaeda, while offering clear indications of their disaffection with the 
foreign militants in private.”1053  Within the Taliban, Al Qaida’s numbers are small, its leverage 
has decreased, and its influence on decision-making is likely minimal, especially after the death 
of bin Laden.  Shinn and Dobbins quote a former Taliban minister who told them, “Our ties with 
Al Qaeda will end with a negotiated peace accord.  Our alliance with Al Qaeda is a fighting 
alliance, a convenience of war.”1054 
7.3.2.2 After ISAF: Preparing for the Withdrawal of the US & NATO 
Of all the seminal events in Afghanistan over the past decade—Quran burnings, civilian 
casualties, the Kabul Bank scandal—none will be more important than the phases immediately 
following the withdrawal of US, NATO, and ISAF troops from Afghanistan.  Then, and only 
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then, will the international community have a hint at what the future might hold.  The Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF), to include the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) will be left with the difficult task of providing security throughout the 
country, likely with the assistance of a small footprint of U.S. Special Forces and other 
counterterrorist capabilities.1055 
7.3.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
Previous attempts by both all parties involved to resolve the conflict will likely influence the 
manner in which future negotiations unfold.  In the first few months following the U.S.-led 
invasion of Afghanistan, scores of Taliban fighters defected for money and promises of 
honorable positions in a new government.  In December 2001, Mullah Omar made a public 
offering to surrender Kandahar to Afghan tribal leaders.1056  The emir dispatched a group of 
senior Taliban leaders—Tayyeb Agha, Mullah Baradar, Mullah Obaidullah, and Mullah Abdul 
Razzaq—to negotiate the terms of a surrender.1057  But in December 2001, the United States and 
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the Northern Alliance were not interested in compromise, and summarily rejected the Taliban’s 
offer.  Ruttig describes the U.S. strategy during this period as “mopping up ‘Taliban remnants,’” 
which served as a complement to its’, “we do not talk to terrorists doctrine.”1058  Other attempts 
at resolving the conflict occurred with the establishment of Jamiat-e-Khuddam ul-Furqran in late 
2001, the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002, the Saudi Initiative in 2007-2008, HIG rapprochement 
in late 2008, and meetings in Dubai in the spring of 2009.1059   
 On a more micro-level, reintegration efforts in Afghanistan have proceeded on and off 
since 2001.  Unlike the macro-level reconciliation efforts, which include the high-level, strategic 
and political dialogue that is the focus of this final section, reintegration refers to tactical and 
operational efforts to assimilate low and mid-ranking fighters back into their local villages and 
provinces.1060  Since 2010, the locus of reintegration efforts has been the Afghan Peace and 
Reintegration Program (APRP), which is “based on a broad strategic vision led by Afghan men 
and women for a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan.”1061  Implementation of the APRP 
is proceeding on two tracks.  The first track centers on reintegrating low- and mid-level fighters 
back into their local communities (the “operational level”) while the second track is geared 
toward reconciling with members of the insurgent leadership to permit them back into Afghan 
society (the “strategic and political levels”).1062 
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7.3.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
A snapshot of summer 2012 reveals a different strategic scenario in each of Afghanistan’s 
regional commands (RCs).  Regional commands North and West, commanded by Germany and 
Italy respectively, are relatively pacified compared to the rest of the country.  In Regional 
commands South, Southwest, East, and Capital (Kabul), Taliban and insurgent activity is still an 
everyday reality.  For the countries operating in these RCs—the United States, France, Holland, 
Britain, and several others—the insurgent threat shows little sign of abating.  According to 
Ruttig, “despite the significant number of casualties the Taliban have suffered, including among 
commanders, there is no sign that their momentum has been stopped, in spite of U.S. military 
assertions to the contrary.  Instead, their geographic reach, ethnic inclusiveness, and potential for 
intimidation seem to be growing.”1063  The decision by the Obama administration to go ahead 
with the troop surge and increased drone strikes across the border in Pakistan were supposed to 
be the great equalizers, however, neither has been able to crush the Taliban in the manner that 
many expected. 
7.3.5 Decision Making Structure and Process 
The Taliban’s efforts to present itself as the most legitimate actor in the Afghan conflict require 
buttressing its own credentials while simultaneously discrediting the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan government.  In this sense, legitimacy is a zero-sum 
game.  Beginning in 2006, as the insurgency increased in strength, the Taliban portrayed itself as 
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a broad-based independence movement.1064  Public statements drew attention to the American 
occupation, egregious corruption within the Afghan government, and even attempted to offer 
commentary on political events.1065  Furthermore, the Taliban crafted its public statements in a 
way that avoided mentioning specific tribes or ethnic groups and even softened its anti-Shia 
rhetoric.1066   
 Another departure from past views includes a different approach to women’s rights and 
female education, which the Taliban no longer opposes as fervently as it once did.1067  In 
Taliban-controlled areas, there has been an easing of social restrictions, including a toleration of 
television, music, and movies.1068  Finally, the Taliban’s shadow governance has imbued the 
group with a sense of legitimacy because the judicial arm of the group’s parallel government is 
credited with offering swift justice in areas including disputes over land, family issues, loans, 
and crime.1069 
 The Taliban’s “hearts and minds” offensive has been girded by an attempt to distance 
itself from al Qa’ida, although any separation is likely more rhetoric than reality.  To be sure, 
several senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar and Mullah Zakir, continue to have 
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working relationships with senior al Qa’ida leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya 
al-Libi.1070 
On narcotics, the Taliban’s position has evolved considerably throughout the years.  As 
described above, the Taliban flip flopped back and forth on its stance toward narcotics between 
1994 and 2001.  Keeping in line with its renewed offensive to win “hearts and minds,” the 
Taliban now actively promotes the growing of poppy and provides protection to farmers growing 
the crop.1071  As Coalition forces continue to target the nexus between narcotics and the 
insurgency, the Taliban portrays itself as a defender of Afghans’ livelihoods, while attempting to 
paint Coalition forces as an occupying force intent on destroying the crop most important to the 
Afghan economy.  More recently, a report in May 2012 surfaced suggesting that Taliban fighters 
destroyed fields of opium poppies in eastern Afghanistan, the first time since 2001.1072  
7.3.5.1 How could strategic decision making influence negotiations? 
The factors that comprise a group’s strategic decision making will have a major impact on 
whether or not the insurgents will negotiate.  If the Taliban maintains the quixotic goal of 
reestablishing the country as an Islamic Emirate, negotiations will break down quickly.  
Determining just how ‘tribal’ Taliban decision-makers actually are will go a long way toward 
determining the utility of negotiations.1073  Moreover, seminal events, foremost among them the 
Taliban’s relationship with Al Qaida is likely a deal breaker should Mullah Omar’s organization 
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remain intent on continuing the relationship.  Previous attempts at conflict resolution, contrary to 
popular opinion, may actually work to enhance the prospects of negotiation.  Even though 
previous attempts have fallen short, these forays into reconciliation familiarized the parties 
involved.  Indeed, the United States is not going to withdraw support from the Karzai 
administration anytime soon, despite heated rhetoric. 
7.3.6 Snapshot in Time: Late 2012 and U.S. Prospects for Success in Afghanistan 
If, as I state in the beginning of this study, the best outcome in Afghanistan is a negotiated 
settlement with the Taliban, then the United States is going to be disappointed.  With a 
continuous funding stream from the Middle East and Persian Gulf donors, and a neighboring 
sanctuary provided through the protection of Pakistan’s ISI, the Taliban still possess the two 
most important operational tools to maintain its ability to conduct successful attacks against 
ISAF forces operating in Afghanistan.  On the organizational side, the Taliban still maintains a 
high level of popular support among the Pashtun population and its group composition is 
dominated by ideologues, particularly among the leadership.  Even if one argues that ISAF has 
locked the insurgents into a mutually hurting stalemate, the most important factors that lead 
insurgents to negotiate are missing.  The most likely scenario post-2014 is a return to civil war 
among Afghanistan’s fragmented ethnic groups, which will make a negotiated settlement seem 
like a grand bargain. 
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